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21. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Kristjan Laasik Wilhelm Schapp on Seeing Distant Things
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In 1909, Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen, defended his doctoral thesis, Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. In this text, Schapp argues that color presents things to the sense of sight by contributing a certain order, or form, that manifests itself in the orderly, predictable variation of perspectives, in the course of experience. He also argues that we do not visually perceive certain distant things, like a house far down in the valley, due to a lack of such color order. While accepting, with qualifications, Schapp’s claim concerning the need for a color order, I will argue that we can visually perceive distant things. I will also argue that Schapp’s discussion of distant things is, nevertheless, of current interest, viz., by comparison of his views with Alva Noë’s recent arguments to the effect that we do not visually perceive distant objects.
22. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Mariano Crespo Moritz Geiger on the Consciousness of Feelings
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Moritz Geiger was one of the most significant members of the early phase of the phenomenological movement. His work on the consciousness of feelings constitutes an example of careful phenomenological analysis. The central question Geiger raised is this: how are feelings given to consciousness when they are “fully lived” (vollerlebt)? As I seek to prove, the principal result of his analysis is to point out a way of being oriented towards feelings without objectifying them. Geiger’s analysis of the consciousness of feelings is a masterpiece of phenomenological precision. It is reasonable to think that it influenced the way Husserl conceived of something so decisive as emotive intentionality.
23. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Bernardo Ainbinder From Neo-Kantianism to Phenomenology. Emil Lask’s Revision of Transcendental Philosophy: Objectivism, Reduction, Motivation
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Recently, Emil Lask’s work has been the object of renewed interest. As it has been noted, Lask’s work is much closer to phenomenology than that of his fellow Neo-Kantians. Many recent contributions to current discussions on this topic have compared his account of logic to Husserl’s. Less attention has been paid to Lask’s original metaphilosophical insights. In this paper, I explore Lask’s conception of transcendental philosophy to show how it led him to a phenomenological conversion. Lask found in Husserl’s Logical Investigations the possibility of grounding transcendental philosophy in purely objective terms, thus avoiding any risk of psychologism. But he also concluded that the tools found in Logical Investigations needed to be complemented by a method which would inquire back fr om the constituted to the constituting (anticipating Husserlian reduction) and a way of grounding such a methodological move in experience itself (anticipating Husserlian motivation). Lask then provided a model for reduction and motivation without bringing a transcendental ego into the picture.
24. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Timothy Martell Cassirer and Husserl on the Phenomenology of Perception
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This paper creates a dialogue between Ernst Cassirer, one of the last prominent representatives of Neo-Kantian thought, and Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. In Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer criticizes Husserl’s distinction between hylē and morphē. His criticism is based in part on the work of several figures belonging to the early phase of the phenomenological movement, including Wilhelm Schapp. By developing Cassirer’s criticism and considering the responses that Husserl could have offered, the dialogue helps to clarify the complex relationship between Cassirer’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology. It also reveals some of the ways in which early phenomenology influenced other philosophical movements. But dialogue between Cassirer and Husserl is of more than historical interest. I argue that Husserl would not have had an adequate response to Cassirer’s objections. Cassirer’s criticism of Husserl thus remains relevant for present day research in phenomenology.
25. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Philippe Merlier Interpellation et chiasme
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This article examines the points of similarity and the differences between the Patočkian concept of interpellation (oslovéni, questioning) and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasmus. These two modes of relating-to-being through language and body, perception and space share the same character of reversibility and openness to the other. However, the “co-respondance” between the subject and the world is not approached by the two phenomenological philosophers from the same perspective. Being-questioned is the inter-psychical event specific to one’s experience of others and of the world; the chiasmatic structure is the bedrock of the ontological relationship and the intercorporeity of beings. Close, but distinct one from the other, interpellation and chiasm(us) partially reveal the common preoccupations of two philosophers whose dialogue History never allowed to occur.
26. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Matthew Schunke Revealing Givenness: The Problem of Non-Intuited Phenomena in Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenology
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This article questions Jean-Luc Marion’s move away from intuition and shows how it risks the promise of his account of religion by returning to metaphysics and speculation. My aim is not to ask whether Marion’s phenomenology can adequately account for religious phenomena, but to ask whether Marion’s account of revelation meets his own phenomenological principle — that one must rely on the phenomenon to establish the limits of phenomenology — which he establishes to guard against metaphysics and speculation. To this end, I demonstrate how Marion drifts from his phenomenological principle when he claims that revelation is a phenomenon given without intuition. This drift leads to criticisms that he is leading phenomenology toward speculative philosophy and sneaking revelation in through the back door. I then show the detrimental consequences for both his phenomenological and theological projects and how he could better achieve the goals of both projects by maintaining the role of intuition.
27. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Christian Ferencz-Flatz Edmund Husserl, Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908-1937).
28. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Garrett Zantow Bredeson Sebastian Luft (ed.), The Neo-Kantian Reader
29. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Mădălina Diaconu Peter Fischer, Phänomenologische Soziologie
30. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Mădălina Diaconu Richard Shusterman, Körper-Bewusstsein. Für eine Philosophie der Somästhetik
31. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Mădălina Diaconu Tonino Griffero, Atmospheres: Aesthetics of Emotional Spaces, translation by Sarah de Sanctis
32. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Tibor Földes Alessandro Salice (ed.), Intentionality: Historical and Systematic Perspectives
33. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Philipp Berghofer Elijah Chudnoff , Intuition
34. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 16
Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Orcid-ID Julian Hanich Editor’s Introduction: What is Film Phenomenology?
35. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 16
Vivian Sobchack “The Active Eye” (Revisited): Toward a Phenomenology of Cinematic Movement
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The foundational basis of the cinematic moving image is camera movement, which occurs not only in the image but also, and from the first, as the image. This essay approaches off-screen camera movement through phenomenological description of the gestalt structure of its four interrelated onscreen forms: the moving image as an intentional and composite “viewing view/viewed view”; the moving image as “qualified” by optical camera movement through subjective modes of spatiotemporal transcendence; the movement of subjects and objects in the moving image as seen by a world-directed camera; and the spatial movement of the camera, whose perspectival vision affirms its status as an embodied, if anonymous, “quasi-subject,” whose visually perceptive motility responds to its world in visibly expressive mobility. Throughout, the essay develops Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the cinema is, perhaps, the phenomenological art par excellence, given that its “technical methods” correspond to an “existential” and phenomenological “mode of thought.”
36. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 16
Anna Caterina Dalmasso Le plan subjectif réversible: Sur le point de vue au cinéma à partir des écrits de Merleau-Ponty
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When I am watching a movie, I perceive on the screen a space, which is united and lived, even if it appears as fragmented and separated from the world in which I live. But is the space of the cinematic frame equivalent or commensurable with the one I see through my own eyes? Are they opposed to each other or do they merge together? The most amazing example of the possible convergence of gaze and frame the film realizes is the phenomenon of vision showing itself in the point-of-view shot. How can I perceive what I see on the screen as the vision of another, and the film itself as someone else’s vision? How does this relationship between the visual field of the film and my own, between my body and the screen, challenge the limits between objective and subjective? Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s reflections about cinema and visibility, I try to outline the traits of what I would call a reversible point-of-view shot.
37. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 16
Hans Rainer Sepp Kamera und Leib: Film in statu nascendi
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The central thesis of this article is that film is directing and directed kinaesthesis understood as an opening of world beyond the relation of “subjective” and “objective”. Thus the analysis does not focus on the recipients of a movie but on the origins filming finds in specific ways of experiencing, that is, in the living bodies of the persons who decide on the perspective of a take by using the camera’s body. Moved by its filmmakers, the body of the camera is directed as the product of its authors, and is directing insofar as it establishes a world by its own means. The article explains basic forms of opening world by kinaesthetic processes in general (1), and applies this investigation to the corpus of film (2). Finally, the results of these analyses will be put in concrete terms by relating them to basic film features and a few samples of movies (3).
38. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 16
Pierre Rodrigo Ontologie du mouvement, peinture et cinéma chez Merleau-Ponty
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The present paper investigates the late ontology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which considers being as expressive movement. The paper takes as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and especially cinema. Two reasons justify this choice. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on film as a work of art are now starting to be better known, after they have been overshadowed by his writings on painting, sculpture or literature for a long time. This entails a considerable enrichment of our interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics and his ontology. On the other hand, if Merleau-Ponty’s general theory of aesthetics leads to questions concerning the sense and the ontological status of movement, it is certain that, within this theory, the analysis of the particular mode of expression of cinematic images gains an extraordinary relevance.
39. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 16
Olivier Malherbe Roman Ingarden et le cinéma: entre visibilité et musicalité
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In the vast field of Roman Ingarden’s ontology, film seems to occupy very little space. Indeed, Ingarden dedicated only two short texts to it. This paper aims at reconstructing Ingarden’s theory of film by expanding on the intuitions and sketches presented in those texts, using Ingarden’s general inquiries on aesthetics and specific inquiries on various forms of art (literary works, music, painting, etc.) The paper first focuses on the mode of being of film, trying to elaborate the distinctions made by Ingarden between physical foundation, work of art, and aesthetic object and elucidating the relations between film and reality. The paper then moves on to the investigation of silent pictures as an art of pure visibility, then to talking pictures, taking into consideration all the modifications induced by sound and music. Ontological and aesthetical considerations jointly underpin this attempt to show the richness and significance of Ingarden’s theories.
40. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 16
Orna Raviv Orcid-ID The Cinematic Point of View: Thinking Film with Merleau-Ponty
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Previously unpublished fragments of Merleau-Ponty’s insights about cinema have added an important layer to our understanding of the medium. In this paper I examine these fragments along with some of Merleau-Ponty’s other observations about cinema, in the context of his work on perception and temporality. My aim is to show how his thought is relevant for understanding an important topic in film theory: cinematic point of view. With Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological articulation of what it is to see, the possibility opens up of conceptualizing the structure of cinematic point of view as a “whole” that is concomitantly dynamic and always plural.