At the beginning of his article the author outlines the development of the Binet-Simon Intelligence Scale and briefly discusses the existing translations and adaptations of this Scale in U. S. A., England, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary, Denmark, Spain and Poland. He pays special attention to the development of the first scales for measuring the mental development of infants and young children (Kuhlmann-Binet Intelligence Scale, 1922, Linfert-Hierholzer Scale for Measuring the Mental Development of Infants During the First Year of Life, 1928) and the value of those scales.The author discusses in great detail those scales for the measurement of the mental development of Infants and Young Children which are today numbered among the most representative: 'Merrill-Palmer Scale of Mental Tests', 1931, 'Minnesota Pre-School Scale', 1932, 'California First Year Mental Scale', 1933 and 'Northwestern Infants Intelligence Scale', 1949. He describes their reliability and predictive value.He devotes much space and attention to „Psyche Cattell's Infant Intelligence Scale", 1940. He describes the Scale in detail, gives the principles of examinations and analyses the tasks from the psychological point of view, and gives information on standardization data, its reliability and validity.As a result of this critical analysis the author comes to the conclusion that:There are today several representative scales for measuring of the mental development of infants and young children, but their scientific value varies. 'The Psyche Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale' and the 'Minnesota Pre-School Scale' are amongst the best of these.The Psyche Cattell Scale has very considerable diagnostic and prognostic value in the examinations of young children with normal psychical development tested after the 12-th month. The ealier the child is tested, the more doubtful is prognosis of future mental development as based on these tests (this refers to infants between the 2-nd and 12-tli months). It is possible that the prognostic value of the Scale for Infants and Young Children from the 2-nd to the 12-th months rises after the removal from the Scale of those tasks exclusively examining motor abilities, and the replacement of them by tasks correlating highly with intelligence. A group of Polish psychologists has recently done so experimentally.The author believes that Professor Psyche Cattell's sample on which the standardization was made (274 individuals) is too small, and therefore the sample is not representative for the American population. It is sufficient for first appraisal of the Scale, for which a further standardization Scale should be made.Since in Poland there were no scales for testing mental development of infants and young children attempts are being made to adopt 'the Psyche Cattell Scale' to Polish conditions. A series of experimental tasks have been devised (by J. Kostrzewski) and added to the original tasks. At the present time tests are carried out and material collected (by H. Młotkowska and J. Kostrzewski) which indicate further changes which will have to be introduced. The data are undergoing detailed analysis especially of their reliability, diagnostic and prognostic value in relation to Polish children.The author thinks that tests carried out on this Scale, on the dynamics of the mental development of normally developing children, and on the dynamics of the development of feebleminded children in defined clinical types such as post-encephalitic and meningoencephalitic oligophrenia, mongolism, cretinism, phenylopiruvic oligophrenia etc., are essential.He indicates the necessity of more extensive research on the changebility of the Intelligence Quotient in the P. Cattell Scale. Since the mental age and I. Q. depend on the environment it is essential to examine children coming from various social environments. The question arises: will the I. Q.'s depend considerably on the educational attainments of the parents? If this is so, in which month or year of the child's life can differences be noticed between children coming from different environments?When we are testing mental abilities, we must pay attention not only to quantitative results, but also qualitative. We must note the dispersion of the mental function. Is it significant, or not? The question arises whether too great a dispersion is not connected with a defined type of retarded development?Exhaustive research carried out on feebleminded children allows us to make a cautious prognosis of further development, which will depend on the defined clinical type (as with prognosis in postencephalitic oligophrenia, mongolism, cretinism etc).Where there are disturbances, besides psychological examinations, psychiatric, neurological, neuroradiological, E. E. G., endocrinological and other examinations are necessary to facilitate a full diagnosis.It seems to be useful to add to the 'P. Cattell Scale', information obtained by other methods: interview, case history including former illnesses, data on the environment, living conditions, parents' education and material situation, as well as the results of the Personality Rating Scale and the Vineland Social Maturity Scale.

The analysis inherent in this text is basic for the construction of Proclus’s system, namely the problem of the relation: the One/Multiplicity. This question is central and constitutes the most meaningful systems of Greek philosophy. The relation: the One/Multiplicity is the starting point in constructing metaphysical systems, it makes that all that is its consequence must have and has a relational nature. This eliminates thinking about the world in terms of isolated, autonomic, and unrelated objects. The considerations in question have shown the most important stages in the problems: the One/Multiplicity, starting from Plato, through Plotinus Porphyry, Iamblichus, down to Proclus.

The problem discussed in the study is part of the polemics connected with the so-called “Platonic question,” to be precise, it seeks to prove that the so-called two Platonic “critiques” of the writing/text (Plato’s Phaedrus, 275 c ff., Letter VII 341 c ff.) are not sufficient evidence that, according to Plato, dialectic procedures to discover and know the first forms of being may be realised only in a sensu stricto dialogue, in the act of living speech, and they cannot be fixed in a writing/text. On the basis of the Platonic descriptions of dialectic procedures three forms of dialectic skill (διαλεϗτιϗή τέχνη) have been distinguished: synoptic dialectics, which is alwaysa kind of propedeuctics of research in the form of ordering the results of sense perception in sets and trying to find in them a criterion of possibility for this ordering in the form of something one; hypothetical dialectics that calls for a thesis whose object is the ontic status of this one, where it is, and how to verify this thesis in a reliable manner; and diairetic dialectics that allows to elicit from the most general concept some definitions of concrete objects. By analysing the descriptions of dialectic procedures in Platonic texts, numerous statements of the Philosopher himself in the mouth of Socrates, or the Guest of Elea, we may conclude whether these procedures are carried out exclusively in the philosopher’s intellect, and Platonic dialogues are their written form “for voices,” or else they have, among other things, didactic purposes.

Antonius Andreae (ca 1280 – ca 1333) is an important figure in the early development of Scotist school but also an obscure one, known mostly for his professed fidelity to the doctrine of his Parisian teacher, John Duns Scotus. The analysis of his surviving texts that have survived up to date reveals (scant) information that allows for establishing a chronology of his most important works: De tribus principiis naturae, a commentary on the Metaphysics, a commentary on the Ars Vetus, and the Abbreviatio operis oxoniensis Scoti, as well as a (partial) reconstruction of his academic life after the return to his native Aragon from Paris. It also shows Antonius as a fierce opponent of Peter Auriol, whose views he finds to be especially repugnant to the teaching of Scotus.

Belief is a mental state, its content being the statement of a certain state of affairs. With respect to the manner they arise, we divide beliefs into spontaneous and reflexive. When we take into consideration their bases, we speak about basic beliefs and beliefs derived from others. The terms “spontaneous belief” and “basic belief” have various meanings, but they are equivalent with regard to their range.Contemporary religious spontaneous and basic beliefs have various forms. In the Christian religion we speak, among other things, about numinous beliefs, as described by R. Otto, and A. Plantinga’s properly basic beliefs. According to Otto, numinous experiences (of that which is tremendum et fascinans) are a source of firm beliefs for man, i.e. he has had contacts with some objective manifestations of divinity. Plantinga (whose thinking belongs to a more “naturalistic” strain) writes about properly basic beliefs, such that arise spontaneously in man (if he is not depraved by sinful life) who remains under respective circumstances. Such beliefs are the grounds for theistic derivative beliefs. The arguments for the truthfulness of the beliefs of the first and second type bring forth a series of questions, and they are constantly discussed by philosophers of religion.

The article presents Richard Kilvington’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views on the concept of justice. Richard Kilvington was a fourteenth century philosopher and theologian who commented on various Aristotle’s works including the Nicomachean Ethics. Kilvington’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics was composed in 1325-1326 at Oxford University. It contains, among others, a question Utrum iustitia sit virtus moralis perfecta, which is devoted to the concept of justice. In his investigations Kilvington always uses logic as a major analytical tool, and mathematics as a method to discuss the issues and settle between opposite points of view, which is common for Kilvington’s commentaries. These techniques allow him to indicate all the contradictions in Aristotle’s analyses. Kilvington’s concept of justice clearly points to a twofold order: horizontal and vertical. In the horizontal one Kilvington’s distinguishes the virtue of absolute justice that is a perfect model for all kinds of justice. In the vertical one he presents a model of a just man that is such a man who is ‘perfectly harmonious’. He also indicates the order of justice existing in the world, visible in human relationships, and regulated by three kinds of justice viz. compensatory, distributive and political. Kilvington’s investigations complete Aristotle’s opinions on justice, however they remain in the field of Aristotelian analyses and his concept of morality implemented in society. In this question Kilvington consistently separates the supernatural order and the order of natural reason, and, in his ethics, he never refers to theological issues concerning the relation between God and the created world, which was uncommon for medieval theoretical practice.

The studies on the history of logic in the Polish schools of the Commission for National Education in the period of the Enlightenment that have been published up to date evaluate the educational practice with respect to its accordance to Condillac’s work. His textbook was indeed ordered by the Commission for its schools, and it was also evaluated highly, but it was not published in the Polish language. From the rules of the Commission and its didactic practice, which made use of a series of the most eminent eclectic textbooks on logic then functioning in the European school, we can deduce that the Commission must have evaluated Condillac’s book as too one-sided. Aside to his approach, there functioned in the then Polish school a number of other studies. The Commission exposed a textbook written by the French Jesuit, Claude Buffier, in the first place. Despite the fact that he was close to modern solutions, e.g. Descartes’ and Locke’s, nevertheless he showed respect for scholastic tradition. Accordingly, he presented a group of solutions well-known from the traditional approaches. He only emphasised, in the modern spirit, how important is the veracity of the premises of syllogism as the fundamental condition for the veracity of the conclusion. It follows that the role of the theory of reasoning was limited and at the same time the value of epistemological problems was stressed.

The paper opens with an outline of Roger Bacon’s linguistic interests. He claimed that the knowledge of languages is the propedeuctics of any knowledge because it is formulated in the Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic languages, and no translation can fully render the original text. There are also other reasons for which the knowledge of languages is necessary for the functioning of the Church, e.g. in the Liturgy or for missionary purposes. Bacon distinguished three stages of the command of a language, and the second is the skill of translation postulated for each person that studies philosophical and theological texts. This programme was too idealistic and, if only for the scarcity of original texts, it could not be carried out on a broader scale in medieval universities doomed to use Latin translations. And these translations were so negatively evaluated by Roger Bacon. He referred to his knowledge of some details that showed the translators’ incompetence.Then the paper discusses Bacon’s opinions on medieval translators. It indicates Bacon’s chronological mistakes and his lack of information with reference to many facts about the translator’s movements. It provides some possible reasons for Bacon’s ignorance and his harsh evaluation of that movement. There were the following reasons for that: he distanced himself from some learned information due to the fact that Aristotle had for many decades been condemned in Paris, there were excessive expectations in relation to the alleged astronomic and astrological knowledge of Aristotle, and its lack was painful for this scholar. He failed to be aware of the vagueness of Aristotle’s original text due to, among other things, only a rudimentary knowledge of Greek that Roger Bacon had, and Greek original texts were inaccessible. One may also mention a tendency typical of Bacon to trace causes of mistakes and his fear of being rush in creating authorities.Bacon’s testimony concerning William of Moerbeke is discussed in detail. This was done with a view to show that Bacon conveys some information that is not true and some that can be regarded as trustworthy or hypothetical in further research on the life and literary work of this medieval translator. The unique piece of information is that William of Moerbeke decided to revise the ancient translations of Aristotle’s writings. Bacon’s negative opinion about William’s translator’s skills must be treated as unjust, although contemporary research shows that, despite his indisputable accomplishments, William’s translations have some drawbacks. Accordingly, we cannot completely reject Roger Bacon’s testimony.

The first part of the paper shows two types of the systems of contemporary logic placed in one of J. Bocheński’s works. The second part of the paper contains Boche􀄔ski’s theses concerning contemporary logic. They have been shown against the backdrop of the views held by other authors who discussed some kin issues. In order to supplement Boche􀄔ski’s considerations a division of functors has been added. They are divided into extensional and non-extensional. Much attention has been devoted to the problems of logical constants that is rarely discussed in learned literature. It has been stressed that at least one of Bocheński’s typologies should basically be changed, having taken into account the remarks in the paper that supplement Bocheński’s analyses. The above issues have been discussed against the backdrop of the question of relations that obtain between contemporary logic, mathematics, and philosophy.

In this article the author analyses two polemics against the stoic conception of fate – by Alexander of Aphrodisias and by Chalcidius. Alexander, who wants to show the Aristotelian doctrine of fate, presents the subject against a background of the Stoic conception, pointing out its disadvantages. He deals with the ideas concerning the existence and meaning of possibility in determinism. He also discusses issues referring to the free will of a man, free choices and their consequences. Chalcidius talks about the matters of evil and its beginnings, as he finds the stoics unable to give satisfactory answers to these questions. Not only similarities are there between Alexander and Chalcidius, but many differences as well. They are caused by the different backgrounds of the two critics of determinism. Alexander sees himself as an orthodox peripateticienne, whereas Chalcidius places his conceptions in the context of Platon’s teachings about fate.

The paper shows the elements of the cosmology of light in Bartholomew of Bologna, the Franciscan master of theology of the thirteenth century (d. after 1294). The paradigm of light is the key concept to understand the thought of this Bologna scholar. His views were principally inspired by Robert Grosseteste’s cosmology. According to Bartholomew of Bologna, the universe is not only the Platonic-Aristotelian machina mundi with its heavenly spheres and the spheres of the four elements of the sublunary world. It is also a vision of the cosmos in accordance with traditional theology with its Empyrean or crystalline heaven. In the construction of his picture of the universe he drew on the rich tradition of the Franciscan school.The paper discusses some particular issues contained in the Tractatus de luce by Bartholomew of Bologna, the issues that were widely considered in the Middle Ages. This concerns especially the conception of the multiplication of forms (multiplicatio specierum), the affection of light on the Earth and its effects, the composition of complex and animate bodies, the structure of heavenly bodies, and the conception of the natural place.The doctrine of Bartholomew of Bologna is a meaningful example how to adjust the problems concerning the metaphysics of light derived from Neo-Platonism to the theological Christian problems.

The article discusses the philosophical and theological currents that made their appearance at the university of Paris in the thirteenth century and prepared the rise of the philosophy and theology of John Duns Scotus. The principal rival orientations were newly the following: the new introduction of Aristotelianism, as represented by Roland of Cremona, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and his Dominican pupils, Siger of Brabant, and Boethius of Dacia, and the traditional and conservative Augustinianism, which found its defenders above all within the Franciscan order, where two schools of thought can be distinguished before Scotus: the older school culminating in St Bonaventure, and the second school, with Matthew of Aquasparta, William of La Mare, William of Ware, Peter Olivi and others. Due to the heterodox tendencies within the thirteenth-century Aristotelianism 219 of its tenets regarded as erroneous were condemned in 1277 by Church and university authorities, yet this fact did not stop further continuance and development of this current. After this condemnation there appeared syncretistic solutions by Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome; also mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysian inspiration (Eckhart) made its appearance. Against this background the origin and rise of the doctrine of John Duns Scotus can be explained as one more attempt to steer a middle course between the rival extremes of Aristotelianism and Augustinian Platonism and to include in a comprehensive synthesis the most valuable elements present in both currents.This attempt prepared the way for the new philosophy of the fourteenth century, although at the same time became the target of criticism by its representatives.

The affective knowledge of God is this kind of knowledge that follows human affection. This knowledge comes about on two levels: on the natural human inclination to God and on the religious level of man’s orientation towards God.What is the nature of the affective knowledge of God? What does the passage of ex affectu circa divina in intellectum consist in? It seems that there are three matters:– firstly, since there is a natural inclination towards God in man (desiderium naturale vivendi Deum), man will be “restless” as long as he does not recognise or find God,– secondly, who loves God gains a new and more profound knowledge of Divine matters through con-naturalness and inclination,– thirdly, as a result of meeting with God and unification with Him, man experiences certain subjective states that cannot be expressed in words.

The tsarist authorities dissolved the majority of monasteries in the Kingdom of Poland in 1864. This was one element of repression after the fall of the 1863 uprising. Those monasteries that remained could not enrol noviciates. The repression fell also on capuchins. In 1897 they were allowed, as an exception, to have one noviciate, namely Izydor Wysłouch who received his religious name Antoni. Accordingly, there was a need to educate the candidate in philosophy and theology, so that he could receive the priesthood. On the basis of correspondence between Bl. Honorat Ko􀄨mi􀄔ski and the general we may say what textbooks were used in the Polish Capuchin Province. Before 1864 they studied philosophy from the book Prolegomena universae philosophiae written by the Franciscan Herman Osterrieder (1719-1783), to be precise course books and compendia based on this book. This textbook was principally eclectic in character, it contained some Scotist trends, therefore one may presume that before 1864 Scotism was to a certain degree present in the teaching of philosophy among Polish capuchins.