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21. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Jean-Baptiste Guillon Orcid-ID Jean-Baptiste Guillon
“You Would Not Seek Me If You Had Not Found Me”—Another Pascalian Response to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness
„Nie Szukałbyś Mnie, Gdybyś Mnie Nie Znalazł” – Inna Pascalowska Odpowiedź Na Problem Bożego Ukrycia)

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One version of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness is about people who are looking for God and are distressed about not finding him. Having in mind such distressed God-seekers, Blaise Pascal imagined Jesus telling them the following: “Take comfort; you would not seek me if you had not found me.” This is what I call the Pascalian Conditional of Hiddenness (PCH). In the first part of this paper, I argue that the PCH leads to a new interpretation of Pascal’s own response to the problem, significantly different from Hick’s or Schellenberg’s interpretations of Pascal. In short: for any person who is distressed about not finding God, and who (for this reason) seriously considers the Argument from Hiddenness, the PCH would show that their own distress constitutes evidence that God is in fact not hidden to them (because this desire for God has been instigated in them by God himself). In the second part of the paper, I set aside the exegetical question and try to develop this original strategy as a contemporary response to one version of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness, which I call the “first-person problem.” I argue that the PCH strategy offers a plausibly actual story to respond to the first-person problem. As a result, even if we need to complement the PCH strategy with other more traditional strategies (in order to respond to other versions of the problem), the PCH strategy should plausibly be part of the complete true story about Divine Hiddenness.
22. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Pavel Butakov Orcid-ID Pavel Butakov
Divine Openness for Physical Relationship
Boża Otwartość na Fizyczną Relację

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The success of the atheistic hiddenness argument depends on the “consciousness constraint” it imposes on the divine-human loving relationship: namely, that this relationship requires human conscious awareness of being in the relationship with God. I challenge the truth of this proposition by introducing the concept of a physical relationship with God that is not subject to this constraint. I argue, first, that a physical relationship with God is metaphysically possible; second, that its plausibility is supported by natural theology; and third, that a perfectly loving God would prefer physical relationships with human beings over consciousness-constrained relationships, because a perfectly loving God would prefer to preserve the integrity of human freedom of participation and allow inclusion of all people regardless of their natural cognitive capabilities. I also offer an interpretation of apparent divine hiddenness in the light of the idea of God’s openness for physical relationships.
23. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Jacek Wojtysiak Orcid-ID Jacek Wojtysiak
How to Be a Christian Ultimist? On Three Lessons J. L. Schellenberg and the Christian Theist Can Learn from Each Other
Jak Być Chrześcijańskim Ultymistą? O Trzech Lekcjach, Których Mogą Sobie Wzajemnie Udzielić J. L. Schellenberg I Chrześcijański Teista

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In this text, in discussion with J. L. Schellenberg, I develop a position that I call Christian ultimism. This position lies between Schellenberg’s simple ultimism and traditional Christian theism. Christian ultimism is more apophatic than personalistic, though it more clearly emphasizes the presence of a supra-personal and communicative element in the Ultimate Reality. The proposed position is resistant to a philosophical version of the hiddenness argument, but it must answer to the challenge of the theological problem of the lack of universal access to Christian revelation. Schellenberg’s idea of deep time both magnifies this problem and provides the tools for solving it: the awareness of deep time does not allow us to judge the future, but it does allow us to hope for a revelation accessible to all at the eschatological end of time.
24. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Marek Pepliński Orcid-ID Marek Pepliński
The Hiddenness Argument and the Ground of Its Soundness
Argument z Ukrycia i Podstawa Jego Trafności

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The paper refers to the argument from hiddenness as presented in John Schellenberg’s book The Hiddenness Argument and the philosophical views expressed there, making this argument understandable. It is argued that conditionals (1) and (2) are not adequately grounded. Schellenberg has not shown that we have the knowledge necessary to accept the premises as true. His justifications referring to relations between people raise doubts. The paper includes an argument that Schellenberg should substantiate its key claim that God has the resources to accommodate the possible consequences of openness to a relationship with finite persons, making them compatible with the flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship that may come to exist between them. At the end of the text, I propose to treat the argument as a rejection of an anthropomorphic God.
25. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
J. L. Schellenberg J. L. Schellenberg
Comments for My Colleagues
Komentarze dla Moich Kolegów

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In the paper, the originator of the hiddenness argument, J. L. Schellenberg, responds to papers that challenge his reasoning. In his remarks he puts an emphasis on the concept of divine love and he explains why it is not only connected to the idea of the Christian God. He also clarifies his position on ultimism.
26. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 69 > Issue: 3
Piotr Biłgorajski Orcid-ID Piotr Biłgorajski
Ultimism: A Philosophy That Wants to Be a Religion
Ultymizm – Filozofia, Która Chce Być Religią

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Ultimism is the view that there is a metaphysically and axiologically ultimate reality in relation to which it is possible to achieve the ultimate good. John Schellenberg believes that ultimism is the backbone of every religion, while the differences between religions arise from different views of what the nature of the ultimate is. Schellenberg tries to show that if there is progress in religion, then it is most reasonable to assume that we are only at the beginning of the inquiry into the ultimate. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemological and methodological objections can be raised against ultimism. It will present an epistemological argument, pointing to the cognitive limitations of imagination, and a methodological argument, questioning the feasibility of Schellenberg’s project.
27. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
William Hasker Orcid-ID Introduction—Sketches from an Album
28. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Graham Oppy Orcid-ID Graham Oppy
Anti-Naturalistic Arguments From Reason
Antynaturalistyczne Argumenty z Rozumu

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This paper discusses a wide range of anti-naturalistic argument from reason due to Balfour, Haldane, Joad, Lewis, Taylor, Moreland, Plantinga, Reppert, and Hasker. I argue that none of these arguments poses a serious challenge to naturalists who are identity theorists. Further, I argue that some of these arguments do not even pose prima facie plausible challenges to naturalism. In the concluding part of my discussion, I draw attention to some distinctive differences between Hasker’s anti-naturalistic arguments and the other anti-naturalistic arguments mentioned above.
29. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Stewart Goetz Stewart Goetz
Some Musings about William Hasker’s Philosophy of Mind
Kilka Przemyśleń na Temat Filozofii Umysłu Williama Haskera

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While William Hasker and I for the most part broadly agree in our opposition to much of the contemporary philosophical community concerning issues in the philosophy of mind that he discusses in his book, there are nevertheless seemingly some domestic disputes between him and me about certain matters concerning the nature of events involving the self. In this paper, I will focus on two of these disagreements. The first disagreement concerns Hasker’s treatment of what is widely known today as the argument from reason and whether the events involved in our reasoning are essentially causal or teleological in nature. The second disagreement is about Hasker’s account of libertarian freedom, and whether agent causation is required to explain our free choices.
30. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
John Martin Fischer John Martin Fischer
An Actual-Sequence Theology
Teologia Aktualnej Sekwencji

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In this paper I develop a sketch of an overall theology that dispenses with “alternative-possibilities” freedom in favor of “actual-sequence” freedom. I hold that acting freely does not require freedom to do otherwise, and that acting freely is the freedom component of moral responsibility. Employing this analytical apparatus, I show how we can offer various important elements of a theology that employs only the notion of acting freely. I distinguish my approach from the important development of Open Theism by William Hasker. My view about God’s foreknowledge is in-between comprehensive foreknowledge and no foreknowledge (Open Theism).
31. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Katherin Rogers Orcid-ID Katherin Rogers
Saving Eternity (and Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will): A Reply to Hasker
Ocalić Wieczność (Oraz Bożą Przedwiedzę i Wolną Wolę)

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William Hasker and I disagree over whether or not appealing to a particular understanding of divine eternity can reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian human freedom. Hasker argues that if God had foreknowledge of a particular future choice, that choice cannot be free with libertarian freedom. I hold, to the contrary, that, given a certain theory of time—the view that all times exist equally—it is possible to reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom. In a recent article, “Can Eternity be Saved? A Comment on Stump and Rogers”, Hasker makes it clear that one of the fundamental disagreements between us lies in what each of us takes to be required for libertarian free will. In the present paper I outline the version of libertarianism that I find plausible, then explain how a libertarian free choice can be foreknown by God. (I call my approach “Anselmian”, in that it is based on my interpretation of the work of St. Anselm of Canterbury.) Then I will explain why Hasker finds this reconciliation unacceptable since it fails to do justice to what he takes to be required for libertarian freedom. Finally, I will argue that Hasker is wrong to insist upon his analysis of free will.
32. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Eleonore Stump Orcid-ID Eleonore Stump
The Openness of God: Hasker on Eternity and Free Will
Otwartość Boga

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The understanding of God’s mode of existence as eternal makes a significant difference to a variety of issues in contemporary philosophy of religion, including, for instance, the apparent incompatibility of divine omniscience with human freedom. But the concept has come under attack in current philosophical discussion as inefficacious to solve the philosophical puzzles for which it seems so promising. Although Boethius in the early 6th century thought that the concept could resolve the apparent incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will, some contemporary philosophers, such as William Hasker, have argued that whatever help the concept of eternity may give with that puzzle is more than vitiated by the religiously pernicious implications of the concept for notions of God’s providence and action in time. In this paper, I will examine and respond to Hasker’s arguments against the doctrine of God’s eternity.
33. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Paul Helm Paul Helm
Divine Causation and Analogy
Boska Przyczynowość a Analogia

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Quentin Smith’s idea is that God being the originating cause of the universe is logically inconsistent with all extant definitions of causation, and thus logically impossible. Thus, for example the God of the Philosophers couldn’t have created the Universe, not even in both its senses, in both literal and analogical senses. The thesis is advanced by accounts of the usual views of “cause”. It is maintained these is successful. Such I shall then offer an account of divine causation of my own, and thus attempt to argue that Smith has not shown that the relation that God has to the universe is not a causal relation. Such as a Humean or that of David Lewis sense and of the “singularist” view of C. J. Ducasse would fail the analogical. And Malebranche’s “occasionalism” is surely an exception. If we turn to the other kind then it seems to be a case of “if the data are analogical-in, then the data will be that too”. Finally, it is argued that it is more productive to consider particular individual theistic powers and perfections, for these are mongrels which literality and of analogy are compounded.
34. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Robert C. Koons Orcid-ID Robert C. Koons
Some Puzzles about Molinist Conditionals
Wybrane Problemy Molinistycznych Okresów Warunkowych

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William Hasker has been one of the most trenchant and insightful critics of the revival of Molinism. He has focused on the “freedom problem”, a set of challenges designed to show that Molinism does not secure a place for genuinely free human action (HASKER 1986, 1995, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2011). These challenges focus on a key element in the Molinist story: the counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditionals of creaturely freedom. According to Molinism, these conditionals have contingent truth-values that are knowable to God prior to His decision of what world to actualize. This divine “middle knowledge” is supposed to enable God to execute a detailed plan for world history without any loss of creaturely freedom. Hasker has argued that this middle knowledge nonetheless deprives us of the power to do otherwise than we do, a crucial element in human freedom and responsibility.
35. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Jacek Wojtysiak Orcid-ID Jacek Wojtysiak
A Bigger God and the Pre-Creation Situation: Some Remarks Inspired by William Hasker
Większy Bóg i Sytuacja Przed Stworzeniem

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In the present essay, while entering into discussion with William Hasker, I addressed two divine dilemmas in “the pre-creation situation.” My considerations focused on the reasons for creating a world—the love (grace) reason and the manifestation reason—which in some way prevailed over the reasons against creating a world (the no need reason and the imperfection reason) and whose concurrence prompted the image of an (rather relatively) optimal creatable world. It turns out that the latter resembles both our world and the world suggested by Hasker’s theism. In that world, God has brought to existence both what is unworthy (thus showing his grace in a special way) and what displays high degrees of excellence (thus manifesting his glory). On this view, the eschatological conclusion of the world would be the full actualization of divine grace and of the manifestation of God. In the final part of the essay, I attempted to show that my view does not entail the rejection of the idea of divine impassibility.
36. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Dariusz Łukasiewicz Orcid-ID Dariusz Łukasiewicz
On William Hasker’s Theodicy, the Doctrine of Continuous Creation and the Nature of Morality
O Teodycei Williama Haskera, Doktrynie Ciągłego Stwarzania i Naturze Moralności

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In the article, I present the main assumptions of the natural-order theodicy and the free-will theodicy defended by William Hasker. Next, I pose the question of whether Hasker’s theodicies are compatible with the Christian doctrine of continuous creation accepted by Hasker himself. I consider several different ways of how the doctrine of continuous creation can be understood and the difficulties associated with them. Finally, I propose a modified conception of continuous creation and I claim that it is consistent with the main assumptions of William Hasker’s theodicies.
37. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
Joseph Jedwab Joseph Jedwab
A Neo-Lockean Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation
Neolocke’Owska Teoria Trójcy Świętej i Wcielenia

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I present two problems: the logical problem of the Trinity and the metaphysical problem of Incarnation. I propose a solution to both problems: a Neo-Lockean theory of the Trinity and Incarnation, which applies a Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.
38. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
William Hasker Orcid-ID Reply to My Friendly Critics
39. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 70 > Issue: 1
William Hasker’s Bibliography
40. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 50 > Issue: 3
Dalia Marija Stanciene Dalia Marija Stanciene
Metaphysical Principles of Genesis
Metafizyczne zasady genezy

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