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21. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Katherine Hawley Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts
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Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it is hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence.
22. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Roy Sorensen A Reply to Critics
23. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
John M. Doris Replies: Evidence and Sensibility
24. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Ken Gemes, Christopher Janaway Nietzsche on Morality by Brian Leiter
25. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Matti Eklund Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology
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In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth in the relevant fiction. According to the indifferentist, by contrast, we are simply non-committal—or indifferent—with respect to some aspects of what is literally said in our assertive utterances (specifically, with respect to the ontologically committing aspects).
26. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Julia Annas Comments on John Doris’s Lack of Character
27. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Jordi Fernández Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore’s Paradox
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I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis.
28. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
James A. Woodbridge Semantic Pathology and the Open Pair
29. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Nomy Arpaly Comments on Lack of Character by John Doris
30. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Graham Priest Words Without Knowledge
31. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Dorothy Edgington The Mystery of the Missing Boundary
32. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Alan H. Goldman Reason Internalism
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This paper defends strong internalism about reasons, the view that reasons must relate to pre-existing motivational states, from several kinds of counterexamples, supposed desire independent reasons, that have been proposed. A central distinction drawn is that between there being a reason and an agent’s having a reason. For an agent to have an F reason, she must be F-minded. Reasons, as what motivate us, are states of affairs and not themselves desires or motivational states, but they must connect to existing motivational states. It has been claimed that rationality itself requires us to recognize certainreasons independent of our desires, that we acquire new desires by learning what is valuable, by acquiring desire-independent reasons to pursue certain values. It is claimed also that prudential and moral reasons are desire independent. By offering an account of rationality as coherence, by appealing to broader concerns as opposed to specific desires, and by appealing to the distinction noted above, the paper exposes weaknesses in recent arguments for desire independent reasons by Millgram, Smith, Korsgaard, and Searle. The reasons they propose can be interpreted as internal (not desire independent) or dismissed as nonexistent.
33. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Lucy O’Brien Self-knowledge, Agency and Force
34. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Acknowledgments
35. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
36. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
John M. Doris Précis of Lack of Character
37. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Roy Sorensen Précis of Vagueness and Contradiction
38. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Peter Forrest Universals as Sense-data
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This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being treeshaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material object and a perceiver, which is thus instantiated in the veridical case but not in the non-veridical.
39. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Jerome Neu Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice
40. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 3
Robert C. Solomon “What’s Character Got to Do with It?”