Ontology is still relevant for the reception of Christian revelation. Transcendental subjectivity, whose main role is to constitute, calls out for a deeper foundation. It is this deeper foundation that supplies an ontology of participation of all beings in Being and in God, as found in St Thomas and in some interpretations of his work (those of E. Gilson, A. Chapelle, A. Léonard). God’s immanence in humanity and in creation, and human participation in Being and ultimately in God, enable us to conceive of a causal action upon the whole of humanity and upon the whole of creation, a causal action issuing from the death-resurrection of Christ. In the context of contemporary philosophy, marked too unilaterally by finitude and historicity, this ontology needs to be supplemented by an anthropological reflection on liberty – liberty donated to itself (C. Bruaire) rather than liberty uniquely devoted to an indefinite search of itself. This is the main point behind A. Chapelle’s anthropology. Moreover, it is this sense of liberty that underlies at the same time a genuine pathway to ethics.

The word ‘ontology’ has no meaning outside the context in which it was created. When it was invented, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, theword ‘metaphysics’ already existed. So the creation of ‘ontology’ had to express a distance with respect to tradition. ‘Metaphysics’ had its roots in Aristotle and his search, his impossible search, for a first principle. This project is taken up again by ‘ontology’ but this time by limiting the Aristotelian intention to the area of univocal formality, while Aristotle had situated himself within the order of dialectical investigation. Current phenomenology tries to re-actualize the Aristotelian intention by emphasizing ontological difference and analogy, while analytic philosophy remains firmly within the tradition of modern ontology.

Contemporary naturalism, especially through ethology, neuroscience and cognitive science, challenges the traditional ontological points of referencefor determining the specificity of human beings. After illustrating the full measure of this upheaval, I will show the inadequacy of a return to traditional essentialismand will then defend the relevance of a different type of essentialism: an approach to human specificity in terms of a homeostatic property cluster.

The aim of this article is to show that the “attestation of evil and testimony of hope” are characterized by the genitive that accompanies them. This places them both, each no less than the other, in two different horizons: while the horizon of attestation is Heideggerian, the horizon of testimony is a legacy of Jean Nabert. Both of these horizons are present in the thought of Ricoeur, and characterize the entire spectrum of his work. However, we are not dealing here with a syncretism resulting from the co-presence of a hermeneutic source and of the philosophy of reflection. On the contrary, I attempt to show that the copresence of attestation and testimony results from the fact that Ricoeur never stopped “walking on two legs,” given what he writes in a conversation published in the Critique and Conviction, and that this presence is rooted in Ricoeur’s formation, which is at the same time philosophical, literary and biblical, as he never renounced either the former one, or the latter ones.

This essay offers a personal account of the author’s friendship and collaboration with Paul Ricoeur in the last years of his life. Catherine Goldenstein, who, after Ricoeur’s death, took care of his manuscripts and organized the archives of the Fonds Ricoeur, reflects on her conversations with the philosopher. Their contents, recorded as she remembers them, illuminate Ricoeur’s philosophical endeavors and his work as an academic instructor. Ricoeur is also viewed through the testimony of letters addressed by him to the author, through his personal notes, and through the events of his academic career. These perspectives combine to offer a concise and challenging vision of a life devoted to reflection, whose ultimate boundary is a reality we do not know directly: that of eternity.

Every reader of Ricoeur knows that hermeneutics endeavors to answer the aporiae of historical phenomenology. Hence arises the need to return to those aporiae and those answers. On the one hand, phenomenology, born with the maxim of going “directly to things themselves,” is confronted with the incessant evasion of the thing itself and with its dreams of presence being thereby shattered. This reversal should not be blamed on the failings of this or that thinker, but attributed to the very destiny of phenomenology itself. On the other hand, Ricoeurian hermeneutics takes note of a gap (the very remoteness of the thing itself), and of a necessary return (to the thing of the text). Thus, there is nothing for thought itself to grieve over with respect to this enterprise. However, while the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, faced with the same difficulties, orients itself towards political philosophy, the hermeneutics of Ricoeur rather seeks to lead us to a philosophy of religion. This article hypothesizes that, in spite of the formula (inherited from Thévenaz) of a “philosophy without an absolute,” the thought of Ricoeur heads in fair measure towards the Absolute, and that ontology is not the only name of the Promised Land.

L'article aborde la question de la fonction cognitive de la fiction. Le dernier terme englobe le langage métaphorique vif aussi bien que ce que l'on appelle «textes». La question considérée implique une théorie générale du discours, présentant celui-ci comme dialectique de I'événement et du sens. La métaphore,en tant qu'innovation sémantique, renvoie à la médiation d'un travail inventif de rimagination. Le problème qui s'ensuit conceme la référence des énoncés métaphoriques. Le récit, avec sa composition interne, introduit le thème du temps. C'est en lien avec l'expérience temporelle de l'action humaine que le récit de fiction s'entrecroise avec I'historiographie. La notion même de fiction en sort transformée par l'intermédiaire de l'activité heuristique de l'imagination.

The transmission of the craft and the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder have in common that they involve a relationship of act to act between the master and the apprentice on the one hand, and between the therapist and the patient on the other. Phenomenology has from the outset considered movement as inherent to the flesh: Hardy thus hypothesises that the origin of the flesh is a gesture. For all that, his description remains largely dependent on a flesh that is primarily perceptive: this gesture can thus be qualified as an aesthetic gesture. But if the flesh is as much mobile as it is perceptive, would there not be another gesture that generates the flesh in movement that is not linked to perception? Housset takes a step in this direction and allows us to hypothesize the kinesic gesture which, alone, allows us to account for the two experiences mentioned above.

The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame proves to be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity?

By defining consciousness as nothingness or simply as “nothing,” Sartre plays with several meanings of these terms: negativity and negation, distance, indetermination, irreducibility. The nothingness of consciousness takes on an ontological meaning: it is a “tearing away” from being-in-itself, a transcendence understood as the capacity to transcend what is, while retaining an epistemological meaning: it is what cannot be positively determined as “something” or as a property of being. Still, on the epistemological level as well as on the ontological level, it is indeed from “something,” from physical and social being, that the nothingness of consciousness draws its existence and its capacities. In my article, I examine different meanings that can be given to the “nothing” of consciousness in the light of the thought of Sartre himself, emphasizing the difference between two major meanings of negation: as opposition and as indetermination. Then I confront Sartre’s concept of consciousness with more recent considerations of different inspiration, notably from researchers like Chalmers, Damasio, Gallagher, and Zahavi. My thesis is that the Sartrean concept, semi-transcendental and semi-naturalist, does admit the search for a naturalist explanation of consciousness, but assigns its limit precisely through the concept of nothingness.