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21. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
E. Feser Has Trinitarianism Been Shown to Be Coherent?
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Macnamara, La Palme Reyes, and Reyes have recently claimed to have shown decisively that the doctrine of the Trinity is internally consistent. They claim, furthermore, that their account does not commit them to any exotic emendations of standard logical theory. The paper demonstrates that they have established neither of these claims. In particular, it is argued that the set of statements they show to be consistent in fact expresses Sabellianism, not Trinitarianism; and that they can avoid this result only via commitment to the (questionable) doctrine of relative identity.
22. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Bernard D. Katz, Elmar J. Kremer The Cosmological Argument Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason
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We formulate a version of the Cosmological Argument that deploys an epistemic principle of explanation in place of the traditional Principle of Sufficient Reason. The epistemic principle asserts that if there is a possible explanation of a fact, and some proposition is entailed by that explanation and by every other possible explanation of that fact, it is reasonable to accept that proposition. We try to show that there is a possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings and that any possible explanation of this fact presupposes that there is a necessary being. We conclude that it is reasonable to believe that there is a necessary being.
23. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Daniel Howard-Snyder In Defense of Naïve Universalism
24. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Katherin A. Rogers Does God Cause Sin?: Anselm of Canterbury Versus Jonathan Edwards on Human Freedom and Divine Sovereignty
25. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Michael J. Murray Natural Providence (Or Design Trouble)
26. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Merold Westphal The God Who Will Be: Hermeneutics and the God of Promise
27. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Hugo A. Meynell The Philosophy of Dooyeweerd: A Transcendental Thomist Appraisal
28. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
J. William Forgie The Alleged Dependency of the Cosmological Argument on the Ontological
29. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 3
Wes Morriston Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?
30. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Lynne Rudder Baker WHY CHRISTIANS SHOULD NOT BE LIBERTARIANS: AN AUGUSTINIAN CHALLENGE
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The prevailing view of Christian philosophers today seems to be that Christianity requires a libertarian conception of free will. Focusing on Augustine’s mature anti-Pelagian works, I try to show that the prevailing view is in error. Specifically, I want to show that---on Augustine’s view of grace-a libertarian account of free will is irrelevant to salvation. On Augustine’s view, the grace of God through Christ is sufficient as weIl as necessary for salvation. Salvation is entirely in the hands of God, totally independent of anything that any human being might do. And faith, the human response to salvation, is best understood in terms of a compatibilist account of freedom.
31. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Scott MacDonald PETIT LARCENY, THE BEGINNING OF ALL SIN: AUGUSTINE’S THEFT OF THE PEARS
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In his reflections on his adolescent theft of a neighbor’s pears, Augustine first claims that he did it just because it was wicked. But he then worries that there is something unacceptable in that claim. Some readers have found in this account Augustine’s rejection of the principle that all voluntary action is done for the sake of some perceived good. I argue that Augustine intends his case to call the principle into question, but that he does not ultimately reject it. His careful and resourceful analysis of the motivations of his theft adds subtlety to his own understanding of voluntary action and allows hirn to introduce an important component of his general account of sin, namely, that it essentially involves prideful self-assertion in imitation of God.
32. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Gareth B. Matthews AUGUSTINE ON THE MIND’S SEARCH FOR ITSELF
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In De trinitate X Augustine seeks to discover the nature of mind (mens). As if recalling Plato’s Paradox of Inquiry, he wonders how such a search can be coherently understood. Rejecting the idea that the mind knows itself only indirectly, or partially, or by description, he insists that nothing is so present to the mind as itself. Yet it is open to the mind to perfect its knowledge of itself by coming to realize that its nature is to be only what it is certain that it is.
33. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
William E. Mann TO CATCH A HERETIC: AUGUSTINE ON LYING
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Augustine devoted two treatises to the topic of lying, De Mendacio and Contra Mendacium ad Consentium. The treatises raise interesting questions about whatlying is while defending the thesis that all lies are sinful. The first part of this essay offers an interpretation of Augustine’s attempts at definition. The second part exanlines his argunlents for the sinfulness of lying used to trap heretics and for the more general thesis that all lying is sinful.
34. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
T.H. Irwin AUGUSTINE’S CRITICISMS OF THE STOIC THEORY OF PASSIONS
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Augustine defends three claims about the passions: (1) The Stoic position differs only verbally from the Platonic-Aristotelian position. (2) The Stoic positionis wrong and the Platonic-Aristotelian position is right. (3) The will is engaged in the different passions; indeed the different passions are different expressionsof the will. The first two claims, properly understood, are defensible. But the most plausible versions of them give us good reason to doubt the third claim.
35. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 4
Paul Helm AUGUSTINE’S GRIEFS
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The paper begins by describing two episodes of personal grief recounted by Augustine in the Confessions, that at the death of an unnamed friend and thatat the death of his mother, Monica. It is argued that Augustine intended to show that the earlier fried, and an early phase of his grief for his mother, were sinful. However, contrary to arecent account of Augustine's grief, it is argued (by an examination of the later phase of his grief for his mother) that Augustine does not hold that it is wrong to grieve at the death of a loved one, provided that one grieves for the right reason.
36. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
William Lane Craig Wierenga No A-Theorist Either
37. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Mark Wynn Musical Affects and the Life of Faith: Some Reflections on the Religious Potency of Music
38. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Robert C. Roberts, W. Jay Wood Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the Intellect
39. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Edward Wierenga Omniscience and Time, One More Time: A Reply to Craig
40. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 1
Lambert Zuidervaart The Great Turning Point: Religion and Rationality In Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique