Polanyi broke through the notion that science has a distinct methodology and epistemology which sets it apart from the other cultural disciplines (law, medicine, music). When it came time to address the issues of how Christianity functions, however, Polanyi unfortunately lapsed into romantic notions based upon his own ill-informed and marginal participation in the religious enterprise. By way of addressing this deficiency, my study puts forward seven theses designed to demonstrate that everything which Polanyi put forward regarding the transmission of a scientific heritage through a successive series of apprenticeships can be seen as functioning within the religious enterprise as well. Then, when it comes to the role of masters in pursuing lines of inquiry which sometimes lead to self-transforming acts of discovery, such feats can be understood as defining the function of creative theologians and pastors who both exhibit and transform the tradition in which they dwell. In conclusion, my inquiry will attempt to show that, when Polanyi’s own inadequate assessment of religion is set aside, one comes to a proper understanding as to how religious pedagogy actually functions within the Christian enterprise.

This paper suggests that moral neutrality erodes the liberal practices which sustain a free society. It supports the Polanyian claim that a free society is the political arrangement which is best able to realise universal ideals.

The focus of this essay is to read the nineteenth-century theories of poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge against the twentieth century theories of chemist and philosopher of science Michael Polanyi, and Russian philologist and critic Mikhail Bakhtin, showing their intellectual similarities and contrasts. My purpose in this essay is to redeem Coleridge’s thought for rhetorical theory by linking him to modern thinkers who are respected within the field.

Partly in reply to D. Cannon’s critique of my analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s post-critical theory of knowledge, I argue that there are good reasons for not appropriating Polanyi’s programme of self-identication and the confessional rhetoric which may be derived from it. Arguing that “post-critical”should not be identified with an uncritical dogmatism, I then go on to suggest that the theory of tacit knowing had best be elaborated further by drawingon the work of J. Searle and M. Johnson. Finally, I make use of E. Meek’s account of the notion of “contact with reality”to highlight the Polanyian criteria of truth.