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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 42
丁 福寧
Ting, Paschal Fu-Ning
亞理斯多德的靈魂不朽概念
Aristotle on the Immortality of the Soul
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亞理斯多德的《論靈魂》一書探討所有有機體;植物、動物和人之所以 有生命的事實,以及它們分別可以有的活動。他將靈魂定義為生命的原理,靈魂是潛能中可以有生命的自然身體之所以活著的現實原理。有關靈魂不朽的問題是亞理斯多德思想中最不清楚的問題。唯可以明確 的即靈魂不朽的概念是他早期已遺失的著作中的核心問題。在早期著作中,他基本上受柏拉圖的影響,肯定靈魂不朽。在他的成熟期著作中,亞理斯多 德以物理學中的形質論,類比的用到靈魂與身體之間的是形式與質料之間關 係。人是一完整的人,靈魂不能分開、自立地存在,靈魂當與身體組合成一 完整的人。在形質論的框架下如何解釋在身體死亡後,靈魂仍有繼續存在的 可能,就成為哲學家不斷地探討的問題。在本文的探討中,我們指出亞理斯多德雖從沒有一系列有關靈魂不朽的 論證,但從他肯定理性才是人的靈魂,它是形上的簡單,是非物質的,它的 固有活動是非物質的活動,他肯定靈魂的本性是不朽的。理性非身體的形 式,它是在自身分開的實體,形質論不能用到理性與身體的關係。不同於植 物和動物的靈魂當與身體組合在一起,理性是不同類的靈魂。從理性是分開 的實體,它的活動與身體無關,它是非物質的,它因而是永恆和不朽的。亞 理斯多德的這種有關理性的靈魂的獨特本性和活動的特性有著濃厚的柏拉 圖色彩。本文旨在論證靈魂不朽的概念是亞理斯多德早期思想中的主要概 念,也是他一生所未曾放棄的。
Aristotle’s De anima is the first book which deals with all sorts of organism: the living facts of all the plants, animals and human beings, and their proper activities or functions respectively. Soul is defined as the vital principle which enables the natural bodies from having life in potency to be a living body in act.The problem regarding the immortality of the soul is altogether unclear in Aristotle’s writings. However, what is definite is that the concept of immortality of the soul is one of the central ideas in his early lost writings. At his early age, Aristotle was influenced by Plato and accepted the idea of the immortality of the soul. In his mature writings, Aristotle develops his own philosophy. When he speaks about psychology, he speaks in terms of the hylomorphism in the Physics. According to which, all the material substances are composed of form and matter, so is a man composed of soul and body. For Aristotle, as a man is a whole man, the soul cannot subsist separately in itself. In such a case, the possibility of the survival of the soul, after the death of body, becomes the repeated question on which philosophers have been trying to investigate.Aristotle never makes any demonstration of the immortality of the soul, as Plato does before him. Nevertheless, he affirms that the intellect is the very soul of human beings, being metaphysically simple and immaterial, and its activity is immaterial in nature. Intellect is not the form of body; it is a separable substance in its own right. In fact, hylomorphism cannot be referred to the relationship between intellect and body. Intellect is different from the vegetative and animal souls which are bound to be united with bodily organs, whereas intellect can be a separable substance in its own right. It is a different genos of soul. Since intellect is immaterial, its activities are independent from body. It is therefore eternal and immortal. The Aristotelian idea of the intellect is platonic in essence. Aristotle has never given up his early idea of the immortality of the soul throughout his whole life.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 42
孫效 智
Johannes Hsiao-chih Sun
論儒家現實擁有判準理論 與等差之愛原則的人類胚胎觀點
Confucian Accounts of Personhood and the Moral Status of Human Embryos
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本文旨在探討當代儒家在位格理論上所提出的「儒家現實擁有判準」 理論及「等差之愛」原則,以及它們對於人類胚胎的觀點。「儒家現實擁有 判準」(Confucian actual-possession criteria)是區別位格(person)與非位格 (non-person)的一種理論,該理論及由之衍伸出來的「儒家位格漸進論」 (Confucian gradualism)、「儒家社會性位格論」(Confucian social personhood) 是本文首先要加以探討的幾個儒家位格理論,這些理論對於人該如何看待人 類胚胎乃至如何看待人提出了非常具爭議性而值得探討的看法。其次,本文 進一步要探討訴諸儒家「等差之愛」原則以證立「為了醫學進步及人類福祉 的理由而許可傷害人類胚胎」的主張。本文主張,無論「儒家現實擁有判準」、「儒家位格漸進論」或「儒家 社會性位格論」等概念,都無法從儒家思想中推導出來,而且也與儒家思 想互不相容。至於以儒家「等差之愛」原則來證立犧牲胚胎的作法,不僅 證據薄弱,從「不傷害」(first, do no harm)原則的角度來看,更是站不住 腳的。
The aim of this article is to critically explore both the theories of “Confucian actual-possession criteria” and “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” and their views on the moral status of human embryos. “Confucian actual-possession criteria”, as accounts proposed for distinguishing person from non-person, and related ideas of Confucian gradualism and Confucian social personhood are discussed first. Their views on the moral status of human embryos are significant, though controversial, and therefore worthy of in-depth analysis. The article discusses then the claim appealing to “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” to justify the destructive use of human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind.I argue in this paper that none of the aforementioned Confucian theories of personhood is derivable from nor compatible with Confucianism. Moreover, the justification of sacrificing embryos based on “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” is not only ungrounded but also untenable from the viewpoint of the basic principle of non-maleficence.
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徐 學庸
Hsu, Hsei-Yung
四個角色的理論 ─西塞羅《論義務》I, 105-125
The Theory of Four Personae -Cicero’s De Officiis I, 105-125
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根據羅馬哲學家西塞羅《論義務》(De Officiis)的記載,西元前二世紀 的斯多葛學派的哲學家帕奈提烏斯(Panaetius),在論述合宜行為時提出四 個角色(personae)的理論(I, 105-125)。合宜行為的判定,根據帕奈提烏 斯的思想,必須依據一個人是否將其具有的四個角色扮演好,即理性,個人 特質,環境與運氣及選擇。這篇文章的論述主要有兩個目的:首先試探究帕 奈提烏斯的四個角色理論的內涵;其次是藉此理論的討論為當代一空洞的口 號「做自己」,提供一可能的內容充實。本文主要由三部分組成:第一部分 針對四個角色分別進行討論,並論及帕奈提烏斯的思想是受哪些哲學家或學 派的影響;第二部分主要處理的問題是:這四個角色如何能和諧運作?最後,能使四個角色和諧運作者會有什麼樣的生活,會是第三部分關注的焦點。
According to Cicero’s De Officiis, the Stoic philosopher Panaetius discusses the notion of proper conduct in terms of the theory of four personae, i.e. rationality,personal characteristics, circumstance and chance, and choice. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, the content and connotation of the theory will beexplored; secondly, by virtue of the discussion of the theory, the contemporary content-free slogan ‘Be Yourself’ could hopefully be provided with substance.This paper therefore consists mainly of three parts: The first part of this paper explores the four personae respectively, and discusses the problem: WhetherPanaetius’s theory is his own creation or influenced by some other philosophers? The second part deals with the issue: How can the four personae harmoniouslywork together? The third part focuses on the problem: What kind of life will one have, when he can make his four personae harmoniously work together?
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陳瑞 麟
Ruey-Lin Chen
牟宗三「科學開出論」的形上學困難 ─以儒家思想為本的中國文化 可以開出現代科學嗎?
Metaphysical Predicaments in Mao Zhongsan’s “Science Kei-Chu-Lun”: Could Modern Science Be Developed Out of Chinese Culture Based on Confucianism?
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「以儒家思想為本的中國文化可以接受西方現代科學嗎?」是二十世紀 新儒家企圖解決的一個核心問題。他們的解決方案是牟宗三著名的「科學開 出論」,亦即主張科學必須從中國文化內部、即儒家思想本身發展出來(開 出)。這套科學開出論預設了一個道德形上學的學說,包含一個「先驗道德 界」與「經驗現象界」的二分架構。本文爭論這套形上學不相容於現代科學 發展的形上學條件,因此無法支持科學開出論,進而我們可由此申論儒學與 中國傳統文化無能力發展出現代科學,雖然它已經產生中國傳統科學。最後 本文想指出,當代台灣哲學家要面對的問題不再是「中國文化與科學的關 係」,而是「在現代科技的衝擊下,什麼是中國文化」的新問題。
The key question which new Confucians in the twentieth century attempted to solve is “Can Confucianism-based Chinese culture adopt Western modernscience?” Their program is Mou Zhongsan’s distinguished “Kei-Chu-Lun,” which claims that modern science must be dialectically developed out of, but not be transplanted to, Confucianism-based Chinese culture. The theory presupposes a doctrine of moral metaphysics, which implies a dichotomy between “the kingdom of a priori morality” and “the kingdom of a posteriori phenomena”. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical doctrine is incompatible to ontologicalconditions by which modern science could be produced. Therefore, it fails in supporting “Kei-Chu-Lun.” I also argue that Confucianism-based Chinese culturehas no capability to develop Western modern science, although it has produced Chinese traditional science. Finally, I want to point out that the key problemwith which contemporary philosophers in Taiwan should deal is rather “what is Chinese culture when it has been transformed by modern science and technology” than “what is the relationship between modern science and Chinese culture.”
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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黃文 宏
Wen-Hong Huang
論早期西田哲學中「自覺」的基本構造 ─以〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉 為線索
On The Basic Structure of Self-awareness in Early Nishida -In View of His Discussion of "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding"
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「自覺」是西田對「純粹經驗」的發展的一個邏輯性說明。本論文的 目的在依據西田〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉(1912)來思考西田早期的 「自覺」構造。在這裏有著西田對齊格瓦特與李克特的邏輯思想以及對羅 伊斯與戴德金的無限觀念的改造,我們將重點置於李克特的部分,看看西 田如何從自身的立場轉化了李克特對邏輯與數理的想法,將「邏輯」與「數 理」視為連續性的關係,乃至有所謂「由邏輯往數理」的說法,這形成了 後來西田《自覺中的直觀與反省》中自覺的第一個階段。筆者的論點在於,自覺的體系除了無限自我表象的系統之外,還必須包含著一個對「有+非 有」的全體的直覺,這個全體的直覺或體驗才是自覺體系的中心。在行文 上,我們先沿著〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉的思路,重構西田對「邏輯 的理解」(第二節)與「數理的理解」(第三節)的思考,在最後一節(第 四節),筆者試著透過《自覺中的直觀與反省》西田對「絕對自由意志」 的討論來補充之。在這裏,筆者將西田這種「全體的直覺」連結到海德格 對康德的「先驗想像力」的闡釋,西田與海德格都將重點置於經驗中的「無 而生有」的領域。西田所謂的「理解之前的理解」或「純粹經驗」指的就 是這種全體直覺。筆者個人的觀點也表達在這裏。
In this article, I attempt to throw some light on the basic structure of self-awareness (jikaku), which is one of the central concepts in the philosophy of Nishida, according to his early essay "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding" published in 1912. Nishida puts forward a theory of logical development of experience which can be considered as the prototype of self-awareness. Here we can see Nishida's incorporation of ideas drawn from Rickert's and Sigwart’s logical thinking, Royce's self-representative system and Dedekind's definition of infinity into his own system of self-awareness. We focus on Nishida’s Rickert-interpretation. It is my view that only an infinite self-representative or a self-mirroring system cannot explain all of the aspects of Nishida's self-awareness for missing the intuition into the whole that inherent in this system. This ultimate whole which absolute free will intuits is the totality of being (on) and non-being (me on). I try to clarify its meaning according to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant’s productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft). The article is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction of the theme and method of the article (section one), I try to reconstruct Nishida's argumentations in logical understanding (section two) and mathematical understanding (section three). Finally in the last section (section four), I discuss some insights of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant's productive imagination, and attempt to expound possible horizons opened by Nishida in his discussion of the "Absolute Free Will".
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洪巳 軒
Szu-Hsuan Hung
論《管子》政治權威之形式與基礎 ─以〈權修〉為核心之探討
On The Forms and Bases of Political Authority in Guanzi ─A Research on “Quanxiu”
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本文將政治權威視為一種「命令─服從」的權力關係,並以呈現此種 關係之不同的性質為其「形式」,又以支撐起各種形式之原因為其「基礎」, 進而以此種角度探究《管子•權修》對於政治權威相關主張。結果本文發現, 〈權修〉篇中已然將道德與法律視為政治權威的形式,而且在法律形式中又 可以進一步區分出合法性、引誘性以及強制性等三種權威形式。再者,道德 形式的政治權威其基礎則是心理的,法律形式的政治權威則是以經濟與武力 為其基礎。
The present study treats political authority as a “command-obedience” relationship. This relationship appears in different “forms,” and each respective form is underpinned by a certain “base.” The author targets the forms and bases of political authority exposed in the chapter “Quanxiu” of Guanzi and finds that morality and law are typical forms of authority. From a more detailed analysis, the legal form is presented in the three distinctive dimensions: legitimate authority, induced authority, and coercive authority. The author further argues that the moral form has a mental base, whereas legal form is based on economy and force.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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陳 平坤
Chen Ping-Kun
幻有假名觀下的「物不遷」論辯
Dialectic of “Things Do Not Shift” under the View of “Naming of Illusory Existence”
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本文旨在論究僧肇依據幻有假名的佛教觀點,如何洞徹一切諸法的存 在底蘊,去開顯其中稱得上是究竟真實的內涵,以簡別於非真實的存在體 和認識構作物,從而為世人打通一條得以趣入「諸法實相」或「物性」的 思維道路。本文論述的主要典據是〈物不遷論〉和《注維摩詰經》的僧肇注解;而 所採取的進路,則為重視反省思維和闡釋義理的哲學研究進路。本文研究成果的主要重點如下:(1)涉及「物性」課題的「物不遷」論點只是一種假名言說。(2)「不遷」假說建立在取相分別之認知活動架構上。(3)「物不遷」雖不意謂就是諸法實相,但可當作趣入實相的一道 法門。(4)有關「物不遷」論據的探討,必須清楚辨明認識論問題思維脈絡 中的「[事]物」與存有論問題思維脈絡中的「[事]物」二者間的不同意 義分界,如此才能不管反對僧肇、還是贊同僧肇,在論據上都有比較圓滿的 說服力。
This paper aims to discuss how Sengzhao, basing on the Buddhist view of “naming of illusory existence”, acquires the insight into the existence of all dharmas and reveals the connotation of ultimate reality. Through this insight, he distinguishes true existence from insubstantial and epistemological existence and opens a thinking path to the “ultimate truth” or “nature of things”. The discussion is based mainly on Sengzhao's works: Treatise of Things Do Not Shift and Commentary to the Vimalakirti Nirdesa-Sutra. The approach focuses on self-reflection and the interpretation of his philosophy. The main conclusions drawn from this research include:(1) The viewpoint taken in Treatise of Things Do Not Shift involving “the nature of things” is a theory which establishes the concept of naming for the insubstantial existence.(2) The theory of “Not Shift” is established on the cognitive framework through which things are distinguished from the phenomena.(3) Although the concept, “Things Do Not Shift” does not imply that it is the ultimate truth, it can be seen as a path of exploring truth.(4) Regardless pro or con towards the views of Sengzhao, one must clearly distinguish the differences between the epistemological and ontological definitions of “Things” in order to discuss the divergent views of “Things Do Not Shift” and to be more convincing.
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黃麗 綺
Li-Chi Huang
從「虛無」到「笑」 ─論尼采「永恆回歸」之概念
From “Nihilism” to “Laughing” -on Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
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在尼采「上帝已死」的思想中,人失去其價值根源的有效性,在強力意 志所建構的生成世界中,人不再具有不變與永恆的意義與真理,而是由其 相對、暫時的效用與價值來理解存有的意義。本文即嘗試研究在尼采永恆回 歸學說中,是否提供了一種在「上帝已死」、傳統形上學之外對生命的理解 與評價的可能,並且由這個新的理解方式創造出在生成世界之內的新價值。 對此,本文所提出的假說為:永恆回歸的學說是人自我評價的方式,它的特 殊性在於透過此評價方式,一方面保住了生成世界的意義,另一方面在虛無 與生成中創造了存在的價值;而此方式在尼采哲學中呈顯為由從「虛無」到 「笑」的動態發展;在一切言說與理性之外,「笑」創造了一個由身體出發的新視角,它是人作為超人的意義。
In Nietzsche’s idea of “God is dead”, man has lost his validity in the origin of value, no longer holds the meaning and truth of constancy and eternity in the world of becoming built on “will to power”, but comprehends the meaning of existence through their relative and temporary validity and value. The present work attempts to seek in Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence a possible comprehension and evaluation toward life other than “God is dead” or traditionalmetaphysics, and to create new values from the new way of understanding in the world of becoming. For this, the hypothesis addressed in the present workis: The doctrine of eternal recurrence is the manner of man’s self-evaluation. Its particularity lies in that, through this manner of evaluation, the meaning ofthe world of becoming is reserved on one hand, and the value of existence is created within nihilism and becoming on the other. This manner is presented inNietzsche’s philosophy as a dynamic development from “nihilism” to “laughing”. Beyond all language and rationality, “laughing” has created a new point ofview setting out from the body, and is the meaning of human as super-human.
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杜保 瑞
Bau-Ruei Duh
對王陽明批評朱熹的理論反省
Reflections on Wang, Yang-Ming’s Criticism of Chu, Xi
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This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentrated the limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on thisview that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.本文針對哲學史上王陽明對朱熹批評的意見做反思,指出這些批評意 見,從直接的材料上講,主要都是依據《大學》文本詮釋而來的,從陽明的 哲學創作來講,又多是針對朱熹理論做反對而來,就此而言,王陽明實在是 受到朱熹影響很深,兩人真正的差距,不像是哲學史上將程朱、陸王分為理 學、心學兩派之差異那麼樣的極端。又從實際上王陽明所爭辯的問題來看,則多為朱熹工夫不得力的批評,這就又有屬於朱熹談工夫理論還是朱熹自己 的工夫修養程度兩種問題,陽明亦是混淆此兩者。又從工夫理論的批評來 講,陽明又有哲學基本問題的錯置,將朱熹談於工夫次第及形上學存有論問 題的發言都從本體工夫的形式去批評,以致失去其批評的準確度。此外,還有從不同的先秦典籍之義理依據而做的文本詮釋之批評,以及對《大學》版 本本身的意見不同之批評,但上述批評,還是可以化約到哲學基本問題的不 同所致之批評。本文即以此為進路,說明陽明批評朱熹的意見是有可以被解 消之處,關鍵即在問題意識不同。
This paper, taking ideas from history of philosophy, reflects on Wang, Yang-Ming’s criticisms of Chu, Xi. The reflection indicates that these critical ideas are all derived directly from Wang’s interpretation of Dah Xue (The Great Learning). Taking the perspective that nearly all Wang’s works are based on criticizing Chu’s theory, we can say however that Wang is deeply influenced by Chu. Actually, their difference is not that explicit as seen from the generally held distinction in history of philosophy between Cheng and Chu about Li (principle) school on the one hand and Lu and Wang about Xing (principle) school on the other. In fact, according to Wang’s criticisms which concentratedthe limits of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu, we see clearly that the problem originated from Wang’s confusion of Chu’s theory of Kung Fu with Chu’s personal ability of Kung Fu. Moreover, on the Kung Fu theoretical level, Wang’s criticisms confused Chu’s theory of Kung Fu procedure and ontology with pure Kung Fu theory. Consequently this confusion caused the lost of accuracy. Besides, there were other problems relating to criticism based on different interpretations of Pre-Qing Dynasty texts and various views on deviating editions of Dah Xue. This paper however holds the view that these differences caused by referring to ancient texts can be attributed to their differences concerning their attitudes towards the fundamental philosophical problems. It is on this view that this paper argues that the difference between Wang and Chu can be resolved by elaborating their differing problematics.
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30.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 44
胡 勇
Yong Hu
有無、本末與體用:王弼經典詮釋中的哲學創造
Being and Non-Being, Root and Branch, Substance and Function: The Philosophical Innovation in Wang Pi’s Interpretation of the Classics
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魏晉玄學在中國哲學發展史上的重要性,很大程度上要歸功於其在大量 的經典詮釋活動中所展現出來的強大的哲學創造性,正是這種創造性為後來 印度佛教中國化以及宋明理學的產生提供了十分重要的思想資源和理論範 型。有無、本末和體用是王弼在經典詮釋中最重要的三組概念,也正是這三 個範疇充分體現了王弼哲學詮釋的創造性。這種創造性主要表現為三種形 式:一種為保持原概念的語言形式,卻改變其概念的內在涵義或邏輯,「有 無」是其代表;一種為原概念的形式和內涵保持不變,獲得改變的是其在文 本脈絡或意義結構中的地位,例如從邊緣到中心、從平等到支配,「本末」 是其代表;一種為創造或採用新的概念範疇作為理解框架或詮釋邏輯,從而獲得和先前完全不同的文本意義,甚至創造出新的文本結構,「體用」是最 好的說明。筆者本文擬從有無、本末和體用及其相互關係等四個方面來呈現 王弼哲學中的創造性所在。
The remarkable philosophical innovations revealed in the interpretations of the classics, which has on the one hand contributed to the Sinicization of Buddhism and to the development of Neo-Confucianism, and has provided valuable intellectual sources and theoretical models on the other, are probably the reason why metaphysics in Wei and Jin Dynasties played an important role in Chinese philosophy. The essence of Wang Pi’s philosophy consists in three pairs of concepts, being and non-being, root and branch, and substance and function, by which his philosophical innovation can be illustrated. I try to show Wang Pi’s philosophical innovation in three ways: i. from the concept of Being and Non-Being, a new connotation or logic can be found in the ancient concepts. ii, from the concept of root and branch, the logical sequence of the text can be clarified. iii, from the concept of substance and function, the process of rendering brand-new meaning by employing new conceptual categories as framework (or logic) is demonstrated. This essay attempts to show the philosophical innovation in Wang Pi’s philosophy through these three pairs of concepts.
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31.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
都昆如
先蘇格拉底期的「太初」問題探討
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32.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1971 >
Issue: 1
劉福增
論證與推演
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33.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
.郎昆如
Kun-Yu Woo
魏晉社會哲學之研究
A Study on the Social Philosophy in the Wei-chin Period
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This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and bibliography.The first part deals with the historical development of the social philosophy created by the philosophers in the Wei-Chin Period: (220-420A. D.) from the Taoists Ho-Yen (191-249 A. D.), and Wang-bi (226-249 A. D.) through the Confucianists Fu-Hsuen (217-278 A. D.) and Pei-Twei (267-:300 A. D.) to the Confucio-Taoists Gho-Hung (253-333 A. D.) and Tao-Siam (365-427 A.D.). This historcial process reveals the ascension of Taoism and the descension of Confucianism though some philosophers tried to make amalgamation of those two main Streams in that period.The second part is concerned in the essential contents of the social philosophy in the Wei-Chin period. It shows a strong value-changing from the Confucian moral approach to the Taoist mystical one. The search for the Corporeal longevity was the main stream for the Scholars by negligence of the spiritual lifestyIe. The social principle was declined because of lacking interpersonal relation. The confucianists felt in that time without power.Finally, in the third part, we attempt a critique on the values and the limitations of the sosial philosophy in the Wei-Chin period, from the historical of view or the essential significance we maintain that , the Taoism may strenghten the personal individuum, but it neglects the interpersonal relation in the social affair, which may be more important for social philosophy.The philosophical contribution in Wei-Chin period was rare.
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34.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
金忠烈
Choong-Yiol Kim
秦代哲學思想研究 一一試補中國哲學史上之一漏洞
Thoughts of Philosophy in the Ch'in Period Research fo the Lüshih Ch'iu Ch'inu
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I. This paper which is summarizing thoughts of philosophy in the Ch'in Period from 256 B..C. to 206 B.C. was written for writers already dealing with the history of Chinese Philosophy so that they might suipplement the gap in this time. II. Even if the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu is one of the most representative materials of philosoply in this period, many thinkers including Hu Shih have neglected and regarded it as miscellaneous thought because of not bieng creative motivation on it. But according to the result of my study, this would rather more synthetical than miscellaneous and the ideology as well as the new political world for coming unification must have been projected. In other words, we should not ignore this product of period which is containing not only purpose but intention, especially in the field of history of philosophy.III. After unification having selected all these conceptions, which was suggested by the Lüshih Ch'un Chiu concerning moralism in Confucianism, the whole-ch'i-ism in the In Yang school and revivalism in Taoism instead of power politics in late stage of the Legalist school for ruling people, the Ch'in would have been the owner of land undoubtedly and made the most utopian era in the political history of China.IV. The important philosophical concepts dealt in this paperis epitomizing the Calendar of Twelve Months (Shih Er Chi) regaeded as the main gist in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu to the political schedule or agriculturallife schedule for common people. Furthermore, the emphasis in this paper is saying that politics and survival should go with the order of universal operation itself so to mean the returning to naturalism and individualism which have ever been enjoyed for primitive agricultural period out of supreme nationalism in the Legalist School. The thought in Unification of the world desired by the Lüshih Ch'uTI, Ch'iu is involving that in opening of the world at the same time to restore everything in its original position and function. So, the main ideal in the Lüshih Ch'un Ch'iu asks for the significance of life and self-importance as a point of view in life. All the beings or behaviors must be exist for the whole life and. virtue of individual life, that is , individual life be the center of all. So to speak, the conversion of value which means that the lifeis self-reliable body and purpose itself was evolved from the individual life being also used to means for whoever had been lord in that period.V. Finally, the political thoughts in the Lüshih Ch'uTl, Ch'iu were not discussed in details. These are going to be dealt with the next.
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35.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
將信苦海
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
論孟子道德抉擇
On Menicus's Choice
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Menicus has been taken as a great metaphysician. He developes a metaphysics of morality. His theory of mind as being originating from the Heaven, "Ti'en" is an essential part of the metaphysics and ethics. The problems of ethics can be solved from the metaphysics of mind. Hence, the students of Menicus mistakenly believe that the problem of moral choice wiIl be dissolved, if one has a cultivation of the mind. The main topics of this paper are:1. The main concern of the author of Menicus is praxis rather than an establishent of meaphysics of mind.2. The Menicusian theory of mind is a foundation for the universality of moral principles and moral worth of moral actions.3. Menicus‘s theory ef moral decision is founded upon the moral principles rather than that of mind or the conception of "Ti'en".4. Menicus does not derive the principles of moral decision from the metaphysics of mind rather from the practical rules that were estabIised from the "moral genuis" such as the ancient great kings, Yoa and Hsiung.5. Menicusian ethics is not a deontological ethics but a consequential one sinc.e he emphasizes the principle of the greatest utility.6. The way of re-vitalizing the philosophy of Menicus is consisted in a development of a theory of moral decision rather than the Neo-Confucian interpretations of the metaphysics of morals.
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36.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
球縈莘
Wing-wah Chan
海德格〈存有與時間〉的世界性概念
The Concept of Worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time
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This essay attempts to clarify the concept of worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time. The author suggests that this concept may be interpreted in two different approaches. Firstly, it is called ontological approach. Here, worldhood is the a priori ground for the "presence" of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is "letting-be" of entities which is not Dasein. Secondly, it is called epistemological approach. In this approach, worldhood is the a priori ground for the meaning of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is to give meaning. It is in this approach that Heidegger takes the constitutive of worldhood as significance. But, why does Heidegger adopt the second approach instead of the first one? The author suggests that it is because in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, which is usualIy treated as existential or ontological analysis, is actually an analysis of the disclosedness of Dasein. If it is correct, then in his interpretation of worldhood, would Heidegger certainly emphasize its role in Dasein's disclosedness. Therefore, I-Ieidegger adopts the second approach.
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37.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
關永中
Wing-Chung Kwan
美的形上學一一文心雕龍原道篇
The Metaphysics of Beauty-Wen-Hsin-Del-Lung's "Yuan Tao"
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The first chapter, "Yuan Tao" (原道), of We-Hsin-Del -Lung (文心雕龍) by Liu Hsieh (劉碩) is a classical composition which is highly metaphysical. It maintains that the concept of Tao may be derived through one's experience of beauty. From one's perception of beauty in nature, in fine art, in love, and even in human virtues, one may transcend the boundary of concrete particular beautiful things to the source of all beauty--Tao. Tao, as the ontological foundation of all finite ontic beauty, is understood as the Origin of all things, the Ultimate Oneness, the Infinite Being, the Absolute Spirit. Beauty, in turn, can be understood as the attribute of Tao itself. The Tao of Wen-HsinDel-Lung conforms to that of the Book of Changes.This article is di vided into three sections:I. The Discovery of Tao through One's Awareness of BeautyII. The Three Levels of Beauty: A.. Ontic Beauty: Finite ObJects are Beautiful B. Perceptive Beauty: the Human Subject has the Ability of Appreciating Beauty. C. Ontological Beauty: Tao .is the Source of All BeautyIII. The Meaning of the Concept of Tao: A. In the Book of Changes B. In Wen-Hsin-Del-Lung
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38.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1987 >
Issue: 10
林義正
Yih-jing Lin
孔子論人之研究
A Study on Man in Confucius' Thought
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What is man? This is a perennial question in philosophy. The author has been interested in Confucius' view concerning this question.. The present paper is an attempt to explicate Confucius theory of man. It is divided into six sections: (1) human. intellect (2) human nature (3) human mind (4) human person (5) historical personalities (6) human virtues. Confucius approach to the problem of man is philosophical, rather than scientific or religious. His basic view is that there is no fixed, unchanging essence of man, and that man's essence is formed by his activities and deeds. In one word, man is what he does.
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39.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
郎昆如
Kun-Yu Woo
現象學方法一一從知識論到本體論
Phenomenological Method-from Epistemology to Ontology
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Phenomenology is a philosophical movement of contemporary western thought. Its founder was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Its main purpose was oriented towards a methodological research. In his phenomenological method Husserl tried to find an absolute scientific standpoint for philosophy without any presupposition.This study refers to my two previous articles, namely "The Concept Epoche by Edmund Husserl" (Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taivvan University, No. 21,Taipei, June 1972, pp. 203-307) and "A Comparative Study of Laotzu and Husserl--A Methodological Approach" (Analecta Husserliana, Ed. by A-T. Tymieniecka, Vol. XVII, D.Reider Publ. Co. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1984, pp. 6573) to show the husserlian essential way of researching from the epistemological investigation to the ontological sphere.In the problem of on the methological repistemology, there would be raised the following questions. Namely: What is the thinking subject? What would be the object of thisthinking subject? Furthermore, in the phenomenological study, the instrument method, and process used by the subject become also centres of problems. The relation between subject and object is therefore to be discussed in this article.In the discussion the relation between subject and object Husserl then used his epoché (bracketing) to transcend all the sensible world in the first step, in the second step however he refers the cartesian meditations, in which the cogito seemed to be the genuine and absolute standpoint for the beginning of all sciences. The cartesian ego, cogito, is therefore the transcendental subjectivity for Husserl and his followers to guarantee his methodological beginning.But phenomenology would not satisfy with this subjectivity. Contrarily, it would like to extend its influence on the objective world. That is the method of the husserlianWesensschau through which all the external world would be constituted by the subjective intentional Bewuβtseinsstrom (consciousness-stream).The place in which Husserl overcomes Descartes lies on the refinding of the objective world. Descartes said "cogito, ergo sun", Husserl can even added "cogito, ergo die Welt ist".Phenomenology demonstrates indeed a way from epistemology to ontology.
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40.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1988 >
Issue: 11
劉福增
Fu-Tseng Liu
鄧南倫之前之後 一一語言哲學的J 個例示
Before and After Donnellan--An Example of A Philosophical Study of Language
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The topic might indicate what kind of theme will be considered in this paper. I would like to do three things. First, to brief a historical development of the problem of definite descriptions, beginning from 1905, Russell's paper, through 1950, Strawson's rejection of Russell's theory, and 1966, Donnellan's theory of referential use and attributive use,to 1977, Kripke's criticism of Donnellan's theory. Secondly, to do some critical study of Donnellan's theory. And finally, taking the above account as an example to show that aphilosophical study of language is an important method of philosophy as well as one main philosophy in the modern time.
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