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21. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 7
David A. Conway Hick, Faith, Science, and the Twentieth Century
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Over the past several years John Hick has developed a view of theistic faith which is philosophically sophisticated and religiously sensitive. In this paper I first attempt to develop an overall interpretation of Hick's position and offer several piecemeal criticisms of it. I then offer "diagnosis" of why Hick cannot, in his own terms, develop a coherent defense of theism and suggest a basic strategy for avoiding the problems he encounters. This strategy results in a defense of theistic faith that is philosophically coherent, but its result is to lay bare the genuine difficulty with being a theist in the late twentieth century.
22. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 7
E-H. W. Kluge St. Thomas, Abortion and Euthanasia: Another Look
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St. Thomas is usually thought to have rejected abortion and euthanasia as murder (viz, the statement of The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "On Procured Abortion"). By going back to Aquinas' own words I show that this is mistaken: that he explicitly states abortion prior to a certain point of fetal development to be non-murderous and that his position, when consistently developed, allows for euthanasia under analogous circumstances. These claims are argued by presenting an analytical expose of Aquinas’ metaphysics of man and of human ontogenesis. The implications of this for current bioethical concerns are sketched briefly.
23. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 7
Mark R. Wicclar Is Postitution Morally Wrong?
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It is commonly believed that prostitution—i.e., the practice of indiscriminately selling sex—is morally wrong. In this paper it is argued that it is at least not obvious that prostitution is morally wrong, and that several arguments which seem to underlie the view that it is are unsound. The following claims are examined: (1) Prostitution is morally wrong because it is degrading. Several interpretations of this claim are considered, and each is criticized. (2) Prostitution is morally wrong because it promotes socially harmful consequences. The following purported social harms are discussed: the destruction of the institution of marriage, the spread of venereal disease, and an increase in crime. Special attention is given to the assertion that prostitution contributes to the destruction of the institution of marriage. This claim is challenged on a number of scores. More generally, it is argued that consequentialist claims which cite the foregoing social harms do not provide a firm basis for the belief that prostitution is morally wrong. (3) Prostitution is morally wrong because of what it is: the indiscriminate sale of sex. A number of attempts to justify this claim are discussed, and it is argued that none succeeds in establishing that prostitution is morally wrong.
24. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 7
Fernando R. Molina A Reconstruction of C. I. Lewis’ Lectures on Epistemology
25. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 7
Richard Double On A Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke’s Dualism Argument
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In 'Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory' Michael Levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine Saul Kripke's Cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. In this paper it is argued that Levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which Kripke has provided a plausible alternative, viz., the causal theory of reference. Thus, using the private language argument in the way Levin suggests begs the question against the Cartesian line of argument.
26. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 7
Craig K. Lehman Conscious and Unconscious Mental States
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The purpose of the paper is to analyze the (ordinary-language) distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states, as when people say "Admittedly I did (saw, desired, believed, etc.) X, but I wasn't conscious of it." It is argued that "unconscious" varieties of mental states, processes, or events---even perception---can be analyzed entirely in terms of the possession, exercise, acquiring, or loss, of dispositions, whereas conscious mental states involve the same dispositional items, temporally conjoined with at least one of a variety of appropriate experiences. The "temporal conjunction" relationship between behavior and "appropriate" experiences turns out to be much looser than recent causal or functional theories of mental concepts have allowed; the views of e.g., David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett are critically discussed.
27. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
David Basinger Anderson on Plantinga: A Response
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In a recent discussion, Susan Anderson argues that Alvin Plantinga’s version of the Free Will Defense has not shown that the existence of God is neither precluded nor rendered improbable by the existence of evil. She grants Plantinga that God cannot control free actions and that only free actions have moral worth but denies that this entails that God cannot insure a world containing only moral good. God could do so, she argues, simply by taking away the freedom of persons when he foresees they would sin if allowed to act freely. Anderson also believes that Plantinga must assume that God is a benevolent being who attempts to bring about the greatest net good if he is to justify the evil we experience, both she argues that such an assumption is dubious. I argue that both of these arguments contain fundamental misinterpretations of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and, accordingly, that neither presents a serious objection to it.
28. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
John Forge Towards a Theory of Models In Physical Science
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The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the concept of model as it is applied in the physical sciences, and to show that this analysis is fruitful insofar as it can be used as an acceptable account of the role of models in physical explanation.A realist interpretation of theories is adopted as a point of departure. A distinction between theories and models is drawn on the basis of this interpretation. The relation between model and prototype is expressed in terms of the concepts of access and accessibility, and four conditions are proposed as an analysis of the concept of model. It is concluded that models are introduced when approximate methods are used.
29. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Joseph Smith, Antoon Boey Habermas “Hegelized”
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Since the early seventies, when English translations of Jürgen Habermas’ principal works became available to English-speaking scholars, there has been a virtual “Habermas explosion” of research papers, dissertations and books. Informative and penetrating discussions already exist discussing Habermas’ encounter with positivism and his relationship to the “Frankfurt school.” There are however few detailed discussions of the theoretical relationships between Habermas’ project of a critical theory of society and Hegel’s system. We attempt to correct this previous omission in the following paper.The central thesis of Jürgen Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is that theoretical discourse is fundamentally tied to human experience. Habermas wishes to show that all theoretical statements about the world have their genesis in the experience of everyday life and practices. His particular understanding of this approach to the question of the possibility of knowledge has its origins in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology defines the development of knowledge in terms of a science of experience and must therefore constitute the main text in locating the philosophical parameters of Habermas’ thought. Our paper is an exercise in hermeneutics addressed to this task.In rejecting both Hegel’s philosophy of identity and Marx’s ontology of nature, Habermas has forced himself into a position where he must elaborate exactly how knowledge is possible at all. That is, the question which he confronts concerns the underlying basis of human experience. Hegel and Marx in Habermas’ opinion, were both unsuccessful in developing an adequate account of human life precisely because they tended to give an absolute basis to the the structure of the world. Knowledge itself, was considered as knowledge of something which existed beyond the scope of human control. Habermas attempts to overcome these difficulties by developing an explicitly ontological account of man through his theory of cognitive interests. Thus the process of reflection is ‘guided’ by certain cognitive interests. These interests perform the same function in Habermas’ system as does the notion of Geist in Hegel’s or Nature in Marx’s. They determine the conditions by which ‘knowledge’ can be generated and thus constitute the grounds upon which our world-view is constituted.
30. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
William M. O’Meara Gewirth and Adams on the Foundation of Morality
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In his book, Reason and Morality, Gewirth has defended the principle of generic consistency as logically and materially necessary: “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.” This paper argues that Gewirth can make a good response to the evaluation of Adams that Gewirth gives “no conceptual analysis of ‘X is a necessary good’ and ‘X is a right’ that reveals . . . an entailment.” The paper also argues that Gewirth has not shown that one who would claim superior rights because of superior intelligence necessarily involves himself in a logical self-contradiction. Finally, the paper considers how the positions of Gewirth and Adams could be used to provide an existentialist, assertoric foundation of morality and suggests how Gewirth would evaluate such a foundation.
31. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Nancy Holland Two as an Odd Number: On Cumming on Derrida on Shapiro on Heidegger on Van Gogh
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This paper attempts to show that Robert Cumming’s effort in a recent article to explain the work of Jacques Derrida to American philosophers fails to present an adequate account of Derrida’s position because Cumming does not take Derrida’s philosophical views (in this case, his critique of Heidegger) seriously enough. By returning to the Heideggerian and Derridian texts, three main points become clear: first, that Cumming fails to present an alternative interpretation of Heidegger on which to base his criticisms of Derrida’s reading; second, that Cumming’s specific criticisms of Derrida often fail because he engages the issues on a relatively superficial level; and, finally, that Cumming has not proven that Derrida’s work does not present a substantial challenge to Heidegger’s position. I conclude that the task of explaining Derrida’s work to American philosophers has yet to be accomplished.
32. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Daniel Lyons The Last Word on Coercive Offers …(?)
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A dozen philosophers have recently groped for a formula to pick out coercive offers: when P proposes to give a benefit or withhold a harm for Q’s compliance, when does p’s proposal count as coercive? Five formulae are analyzed here. One account is completely “moralized,” claiming that we can’t pick out coercive offers without first settling questions of rights. Two accounts are completely “non-moral,” using as criterion a baseline of “What would in fact have happened” if P had not wanted Q’s compliance. Finally, two accounts offer “two-baseline” accounts, asking “What should have happened?” and/or “What would have happened otherwise?” four accounts are found quite inadequate; the fifth account (my own earlier formula) is threatened by two odd counter cases. Finally, an alternative to “defining coercion” is sketched.
33. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
George Carlson Internalism and Self-Determination
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As part of an attempt to give a “libertarian” account of some aspects of human agency, the author articulates and defends a modified interpretation of “internalism” which makes coherent the notion of a genuinely, self-determined choice amongst fundamental conceptions of practical reason. That such choices are “nomologically irreducible” is evidenced by the fact that although (contextually) unavoidable, they are nonetheless under-determined with respect to any combination of the agent’s (specific) desires and circumstances. Alternatively, to the extent that orthodox “externalism” subordinates reason to the field of externally determined “passions,” it is rejected, in conclusion, as yielding a naive and excessively reductive analysis of human agency.
34. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Edward Henderson A Critique of Religious Reductionism
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Accounts of theistic faith according to which it does not involve referring to or believing in God as existing independently of the life of faith are instances of theistic reductionism. Theistic reductionism, in holding that ‘God’ does not refer to reality outside the life of believers, holds thereby that theism is not rightly to be regarded as true or false. Such accounts may be proposed or used as defenses of theistic faith. They ‘defend’ faith insofar as they describe the form of life faith involves and show that the human and cultural functions it performs are valuable. Examining several reductionist accounts, ordered from weaker to stronger, I argue that they fail as defenses of theistic life and language. Whereas the reductionist views claim to leave the practice of theism as it is, I argue that in fact they imply a different form of life from the one theism actually is. Thus reductionist defenses of religious practice fail and fail precisely where they insist on treating God in some way other than as existing outside of religious life. From this I infer that theism as it exists can only be defended in ways that include taking ‘God’ as referring to a God who is real outside the life which recognizes him. The religious reductionists discussed include R.B. Braithwaite, P.F. Schmidt, Paul Holmer, Paul van Buren, Gordon Kaufman, and D.Z. Phillips.
35. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Charles Jarrett Materialism
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The following paper will attempt (i) to set forth a form of materialism that is ‘Spinozistic’ in maintaining that there is a conceptual, but not an ontological distinction between mental and physical phenomena; (ii) to undermine objections to this based on (a) ‘functionalism’ and (b) the conception of (and identity conditions for) an event that has been advocated by Goldman, Brandt, and Kim; and (iii) to explain why, according to the identity ‘theory’, the apparent failure of the indiscernibility of identicals is merely apparent.
36. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Phillip Gosselin Moral Responsibility and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise
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This paper evaluates three recent attacks on what Harry Frankfurt has called the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), i.e., the principle that if a person could not have done otherwise he is not morally responsible for what he has done. One critic of PAP argues that, if a person was drawn irresistibly to a drug yet was “altogether delighted with his condition”, he might well be morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise. A second critic describes circumstances in which, if the agent had failed to perform a certain action, physical forces would have taken effect and caused him to perform that action. Such a person, he argues, may be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. I argue that both of the preceding counterexamples fail. The third argument against PAP shows, I maintain, that PAP is not acceptable as it stands; appropriately supplemented, however, it will continue to serve its traditional role in the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate.
37. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
R. J. Connelly Necessary Order In the Primordial Nature of God in Whitehead
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This paper first identifies briefly several interpretations of the nature of the general order of eternal objects in the Primordial Nature of God (PNG). W.A. Christian describes the timeless ordering in terms of a “general scheme of relatedness,” or “matrix,” or “reservoir of potentiality.” Others, like Hartshorne, introduce the“continuum” concept. Unfortunately, none of the above terms has strict technical or categoreal meaning in Whitehead’s metaphysics. I try to remedy this defect by utilizing the Whitehead ian notions of abstractive hierarchies and contrast. My interpretation supports the idea that there is one fixed and necessary order of eternal objects in PNG.
38. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Wesley Morriston Pike and Hoffman on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
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In an article published several years ago, Nelson Pike recast his well known argument for the incompatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom in terms of a “possible worlds” analysis of human power. In this version, the argument is based on the assumption that past circumstances in the actual world “help to determine present powers.” If I am able to do something at the present time, Pike claims, there must be a possible world with a past just like the past of the actual world in which I do it.In a recent discussion, Joshua Hoffman attacks Pike’s argument and the analysis of power on which it is based. Specifically, he presents two objections to Pike’s thesis about past circumstances helping to determine present powers. Both objections are attempts to produce counterexamples to Pike’s claim.In the present paper, I hope to accomplish two things. I shall try to work out a reasonably precise formulation of the thesis about power on which Pike bases his argument. I shall also try to show that both of Hoffman’s objections to Pike’s thesis are mistaken. I shall argue that one of them is based on a serious misinterpretation of Pike’s claim, and is successful only against a thesis that is not required for Pike’s argument. The remaining objection, I shall argue, is based on a claim that is demonstrably false.Whether or not Pike’s thesis about power is correct is a larger question that I will not try to decide here. My only concern is to meet Hoffman’s objections.
39. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
Richard W. Momeyer Socrates on Obedience and Disobedience to the Law
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Considerable scholarship over the last dozen years has greatly increased our understanding of Apology and Crito. However, the knottiest problem between these dialogues--the frequently noted apparent contradiction between Apology 29c-30c and Crito 51b-c, between Socrates’ pledge to disobey a court order to give up philosophy and his argument that legal authority absolutely obligates a citizen to obedience--is far from being resolved. In the end I argue that this contradiction is unresolved, despite numerous ingenious attempts to eliminate it, because it is rooted in deep inconsistencies in Socrates’ principles and character. In the course of reaching a conclusion that most scholars have striven to avoid I review and dispute the major strategies on resolving the contradiction: that it is only apparent, because one of the views is not (unqualifiedly) Socrates’ or a sophisticated analysis of the rhetorical purposes of the dialogues eliminates any contradiction.
40. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 8
David Basinger, Randall Basinger Divine Determinateness and the Free Will Defense: Some Clarifications
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Proponents of The Free Will Defense frequently argue that it is necessary for God to create self-directing beings who possess the capacity for producing evil because, in the words of F.R. Tennant, “moral goodness must be the result of a self-directing developmental process.” But if this is true, David Paulsen has recently argued, then the proponent of the Free Will Defense cannot claim that God has an eternally determinate nature. For if God has an eternally determinatenature and moral goodness must be the result of a developmental process, then God cannot be considered morally good. In response, I argue that (1) many contemporary Free Will theists do not affirm a developmental concept of morality and thus avoid Paulsen’s criticism and that (2) even those who affirm a developmental concept of morality on the human level need not grant that divine morality is also developmental in nature.