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21. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Deva F. Kemmis Hicks Exotic Spaces in German Modernism. By Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei
22. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Margaret I. Hughes Dynamic Transcendentals: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty from a Thomistic Perspective. By Alice M. Ramos
23. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
John Zeis A Rawlsian Pro-Life Argument against Vegetarianism
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Animal rights and vegetarianism for ethical reasons are positions gaining in influence in contemporary American culture. Although I think that certain rights for animals are consistent with and even entailed by the Catholic understanding of morality, vegetarianism is not. There is a plausible argument for an omnivorous diet from a Rawlsian original position. It is in direct contradiction to the Rawlsian-influenced ethical vegetarianism espoused by Mark Rowlands. Vegetarianism is not the moral high ground: ethical vegetarianism is in fact contrary to a position on animals that is fundamentally pro-life.
24. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Gregory S. Moss Hegel’s Free Mechanism: The Resurrection of the Concept
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In this paper I systematically reconstruct Hegel’s concept of “free mechanism” as developed in the Science of Logic. The term “free mechanism” appears absurd since each of the terms constituting it appears mutually exclusive. I argue that we may grasp it only on (1) the assumption of self-reference and (2) via a triad of syllogisms, which altogether constitute a process of alternating middle terms. On the whole, I employ Hegel’s account of “free mechanism” to illuminate the activity of objectivity, whereby the self-determining concept resurrects itself from its dormancy in an indifferent totality.
25. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
About Our Contributors
26. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Michael Tkacz Albertus Magnus and the Error of Ptolemy: Metaphysics and the Origins of Empirical Research Programs
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Is our science of the physical world a matter of theoretical description with predictive value, or is it instead a search for the productive causes of observed phenomena? Ancient astronomers such as Ptolemy maintained the former; ancient cosmologists such as Aristotle the latter. This debate is a central theme in Albert Magnus’s thirteenth-century Aristotelian commentaries. This paper shows how Albert defended the possibility of empirical science aimed at demonstrating the causes of observed phenomena. In the course of his defense, Albert identifies a specific error committed by Ptolemy concerning the subject of physical theory. The identification and correction of this error provides the basis upon which a proper metaphysical foundation for the empirical sciences can be laid. This foundation is nothing other than the recovery of the Aristotelian notion of form as the immanent intelligibility of physical natures.
27. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Michael Hector Storck Arts and Artifacts: An Aristotelian Approach
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In this paper I consider the nature of artifacts by looking at them as essentially connected with art in the broad sense of τέχvη or ars. After discussing the natural and the artificial in the light of Aristotle’s definition of nature in Physics II.1, I discuss artifacts using Aristotle’s definition of art in Nicomachean Ethics VI.4. This approach to artifacts is able to include not only paintings, poems, and plays but also found works of art, for there are some arts, such as navigation, whose making consists in finding rather than physical alteration. In addition to accommodating all the different sorts of artifacts that are produced by human making, approaching artifacts in this way implies that being an artifact does not distinguish any one kind of being. Rather, all artifacts essentially result from and thus relate to human making understood as action directed at something apart from the maker.
28. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis. By Richard A. Richards
29. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
James G. Murphy, S.J. The Principle of Double Effect: Act-Types and Intentions
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Objections to the principle of double effect usually concern its first and second conditions (that the act not be evil in itself, and that the evil effect may not be intended). The difficulties often arise from a rejection of the idea that acts have a moral nature independent of context, and a tendency to interpret intention as purely psychological. This article argues that the “act itself” should be understood as the act-type and suggests that examples of evil act-types are not hard to find. It argues that the notion of intention is involved in both conditions, but in different ways. It proposes that these different ways can be interestingly illuminated by Anscombe’s distinction between acting intentionally and acting with an intention.
30. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
David W. Rodick Gabriel Marcel and American Philosophy
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Gabriel Marcel’s thought is deeply informed by the American philosophical tradition. Marcel’s earliest work focused upon the idealism of Josiah Royce. By the time Marcel completed his Royce writings, he had moved beyond idealism and adopted a form of metaphysical realism attributed to William Ernest Hocking. Marcel also developed a longstanding relationship with the American philosopher Henry Bugbee. These important philosophical relationships will be examined through the Marcellian themes of ontological exigence, intersubjective being, and secondary reflection. Marcel’s relationships with these philosophers are not serendipitous. They are expressions of Marcel’s deep Christian faith.
31. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
C. Jeffery Kinlaw Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity. By Sally Sedgwick
32. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Books Received
33. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Joan Vergés Gifra Methodological Eclecticism in Practical Philosophy: Why It Would Be Better to Avoid It
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Methodological eclecticism has gained wide acceptance among practical philosophers in recent years. This paper analyzes and evaluates the strongest justifications supporting such a methodology: the primacy of practice thesis and the doctrine of value pluralism. Our aim is to show that methodological eclecticism cannot be justified by either of these considerations.
34. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Kai Hauser Cantor’s Absolute in Metaphysics and Mathematics
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This paper explores the metaphysical roots of Cantor’s conception of absolute infinity in order to shed some light on two basic issues that also affect the mathematical theory of sets: the viability of Cantor’s distinction between sets and inconsistent multiplicities, and the intrinsic justification of strong axioms of infinity that are studied in contemporary set theory.
35. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Peter A. Redpath The Nature of Scientific Explanation. By Jude P. Dougherty
36. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Peter Seipel Reason, Tradition and the Good: MacIntyre’s Tradition-Constituted Reason and Frankfurt School Critical Theory. By Jeffery L. Nicholas
37. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Eric v. d. Luft From Self-Consciousness to Reason in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: Aporia Overcome, Aporia Sidestepped, or Organic Transition?
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The transition from self-consciousness as the unhappy consciousness to reason as the critique of idealism is among the most important in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet this transition is implicit and not readily discernible. This paper investigates (1) whether we can discover and describe any roadblock that the unhappy consciousness is able to knock down, or despite which it is able to maneuver, and so become reason; or (2) whether the unhappy consciousness arrives at an impassable dead end and either manages to create a detour around it or just begins again, unexplained and unexplainably, almost ex nihilo, as reason; or (3) whether, despite its implicitness, there exists a continuous, tenable, and unimpeded path from self-consciousness to reason.
38. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Michael Davis Locke (and Hobbes) on “Property” in the State of Nature
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Anyone reading the second of Two Treatises of Government after Leviathan must notice how much more civil Locke’s state of nature is in comparison to Hobbes’s. Many readers may also notice how much space the Second Treatise gives the subject of property. While Hobbes has only a few scattered sentences on property, Locke has the famous chapter five, which constitutes about a tenth of the whole Second Treatise (§§25–51). Private property in the state of nature seems to be what protects Locke’s Second Treatise from the absolutist conclusion of Hobbes’s Leviathan. The Second Treatise’s account of private property achieves that without even a minimal theory of property. What Locke offers instead in chapter five is a proof that property of a quite limited sort is possible in the state of nature. He does not—and need not—claim that this possibility was ever realized (as one must do in order to have even a minimal theory of property). Insofar as Locke offers a theory of property, it is the same as what Hobbes offers.
39. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Ethical Reflections on the Financial Crisis 2007 / 2008: Making Use of Smith, Musgrave, and Rajan. By Wilfried Ver Eecke
40. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Peter Tumulty Recovering a More Robust Understanding of Naturalism and Human Rights: Remarks Inspired by McDowell and Wittgenstein
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To those working for human rights because of belief in their substantive value, Richard Rorty’s non-cognitivist advocacy of the Western culture of human rights is an example of a confused vision that is tragically self-defeating. Rorty undermines the grounds for a commitment that can transcend feelings and endure threats. In addition, the natural consequence of developing the reflective intelligence of the young would lead in time to seeing their “teachers” of human rights as cultural colonizers attempting to rob them of their identity. The argument here is that there is a more compelling vision of nature and human nature available that is (1) not a version of materialism, (2) eliminates having to confront materialism’s inherent difficulty with norms, and (3) can make intelligible and support a more self-aware, inspiring human rights culture. The argument draws upon, qualifies, and extends reinforcing insights to be found in the works of McDowell and Wittgenstein.