This paper presents the central part of the contemporary logic: the predicate logic. By determining the types of primitive elements that make up the parts of the judgement the author tries to describe the structure (logical form) of atomic judgement that we meet in predicate logic. The main task is to find out the logical and philosophical fundaments of the asymmetry of the subject and predicate in the logic of quantification. This main aim was motivated by the assumption that if the current logic (predicate logic) has the significance, which we are inclined to attach to it, then it must reflect fundamental features of our thought about the world. Therefore the author of the paper analyses the logical and philosophical reasons that can be put forward for preferring the modern predicate logic to the traditional theory of general inferences which occur in syllogistic. To show the difference between the logical form of the basic proposition established in traditional logic and the logical form of atomic proposition in post-fregean logic some specific points were taken into consideration: the problem of reference; negation; existential import and others. At the end it was explicated that the crucial move – which was revealed in predicate logic – lay in extending the idea of function−argument analysis from mathematics to logic.

Weil zwischen Gott und Geschöpf die Beziehung partieller Ähnlichkeit besteht, läßt sich aus den Eigenschaften der Geschöpfe das Sein Gottes in analoger Weise erkennen. Die traditionelle natürliche Theologie hat hierfür dreifache Weg ausfindig gemacht: der Verneinung, der Bejahung und der Vervollkommnung. Auf diese Weise bekommene Erkenntnis von Gott ist im hohen Grade abstrakt, wenn sie in der Sprache traditioneller Metaphysik ausgedrückt wird.Die Begriffe der Eigenschaften Gottes, die in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie gebraucht werden, sind zwar nicht so abstrakt gedacht; aber meistens sind sie unklar. In der solchartigen Situation wäre es angebracht nicht zu vergessen, das daß Schließen das wesentliche Mittel ist, um uns klar zu werden über das, was wir sagen. In der Sprache natürlichen Theologie: das Schließen der Konsequenzen aus der unseren Aussagen über Gott.Am Ende des Artikels wird auch eine moderne Reformulierung der analogen Reden über Gott vorgestellt (die Proposition H. G. Hubbeling’s in: Einführung in die Religionsphilosophie, Göttingen 1981, S. 173-175).

The article consists of two parts.In the first one the author, referring to Alfred Tarski’s and Antoni B. Stępień’s views and contesting them, presents his own definition of ’truth’, changing his former views in thisrespect. The definition is constituted by the formula:(e 0) /\x [x is true º \/yεR (x states y)],which may be read in the following way:a sentence is true iff it states a certain real (occurring) state of things.The above definition is consistent with the so called (J)[adacki’s] convention that, contrary to the so called (T)[arski’s] convention avoids certain difficulties, e.g. possible entailing, through occurrence of an extra-linguistic state of things, existence of a respective true sentence. This definition also does not get entangled either in accepting purely intentional or negative state of things. Using the opportunity to do so the author proclaims himself in favour of the evidential criterion of truth, contradictory criterion of falsehood, and pragmatic criterion of faith.In the second part of the article the author replies to the questions concerning his theses that were put during the discussion ’in the company of Professor Stępień’s pupils and his pupils’ pupils. Especially he answers the charges and questions brought by Dr. Paweł Garbacz. They mainly focused on the problems of falsehood. The author admits two conceptions of falsehood: a false sentence does not state anything, or, a false sentence states a presented (fictitious) state of things.

The subject of the article is defining the specificity of broadly understood epistemology (theory of cognition, methodology of science) that could be seen in the teaching of physics at secondary schools (and partly also at universities) run by the Commission for National Education. It was the first European „ministry” of education, which worked in Poland in the years 1773-1795. Its specificity was defined by a new model of school directed to scientific rather than linguistic-humanist, and on a higher level − also than philosophical education. On the level of syllabuses it meant replacing lecturing Aristotelian philosophy of nature with phenomenalistic-mathematical natural science (mechanists), oriented to technical-economic practice (utilitarianism). The syllabuses declared so radical a break up − in the spirit of pre-positivism of The French Encyclopaedia − with traditional education that at secondary schools practically all the philosophical subjects were removed, apart from logic and ethics, and at universities logic was cancelled too. However, the teaching practice differed from the syllabus and organisational radicalism that was incomparable with any other education system functioning in Europe. In it numerous handbooks written in the circle of the so-called philosophia recentiorum were used. It joined the Aristotelian philosophy of nature with elements of modern natural history. Introduced into the secondary and university education in the whole of Europe in the first half of the 18th century, it broke the framework of the traditional philosophy syllabus. Also the handbooks of the Commission for National Education − like all of the eclectic school physics of the Enlightenment era − still contained philosophical elements, with the idea of justifying them inductively. However, at the same time numerous troubles appeared resulting from putting into effect the empirical-mathematical ideal of natural history. This was the result of shortage of instruments necessary for performing experiments, even on the didactic level that dominated over research work in the Polish science of that time. Also doubts were expressed as to the possibilities and range of applying the language of mathematics for defining the data obtained in experiments. This resulted from a low methodological level of natural science of that time that still had a describing-systematising character (natural history, partly also physics). Hence doubts appeared in defining the mathematical status of natural science, still treated as applied mathematics, or as an integral − sometimes even first-rate − element of physics. Especially development of mathematically defined mechanics and the possibilities of applying it in technology gave a higher prestige to reflection over technical-economic activity, which led to general acceptance of the ideal of applied science preferred at those times.

In its first half the article presents the main assumptions of the traditional (so-called Cartesian) theory of introspection. Among others (1) privileged access, (2) undoubtfulness of introspective data, (3) privacy of introspective data, (4) proposition that introspection is a separate act of consciousness, (5) proposition that introspection is a kind of inner perception, (6) proposition that introspection is concerned with what is going on in the consciousness at the moment, (7) proposition that introspective data may be the basis for knowledge about the outer world (fundationalism) belong to them. In the part concerned with behaviourism the main assumptions of scientific (methodological) behaviourism and of philosophical (logical) behaviourism are presented. The author accepts the main point of the criticism directed at the project of G. Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism. He maintains the charge that the behaviourist approach to mentality does not allow one to talk about various kinds of mental states. In the part concerning the structure of introspection stress is laid on the role of attention. With the help of the idea of modification of attention the author tries to dismiss the charge that performing a definite act and at the same time introspectively defining it is impossible. With the use of the idea of attention he also shows how it is possible to oppose the objection of continuing acts of introspection into infinity and the charge that introspection modifies its object. Also the issues of infallibility and of completeness of introspective data in the light of certain experimental data and theoretical hypotheses (e.g. blindsight, psychoanalysis, N. Chomsky’s theory of the language) are discussed. The last part concerns the problem of the relation between the ideas of introspection and unconsciousness. ’Unconsciousness’ in the strong sense means a certain kind of conditioning to which human mind may be subjected. This conditioning is not only actually unconscious, but by its nature is unrealisable in the normal introspective way. Various ideas of unconsciousness are analysed: unconsciousness as what can be called to mind, unconscious habitual knowledge, unconsciousness in the psychoanalytical interpretation, unconsciousness as conditioning by the so-called computative mind. The author shows that the autonomy of the ’I’ given in introspection is something peculiar and as such cannot be reduced to any kind of unconscious conditioning.

In the first part of the article remarks are made concerning the laws of natural sciences. First of all the field of analyses of modern natural sciences is presented.The second part of the article is devoted to a characteristic of the laws of formal logic, and especially of the laws of classical sentential calculus. The view that logical propositions state certain objective relations between states of things is explicated. After other authors, it is stressed that learning logic we not only train the art of correct thinking, but we also learn about certain relations between facts that constitute the logical structure of the world.In the third part of the article propositions of the general theory of being, i.e. the first principles of being and propositions concerning entity compositions are characterised; also numerous comparative analyses are made. The article tries to show similarities and differences between natural sciences laws, laws of logic and theses of the general theory of being. First of all attention is drawn to relations occurring between some laws of logic of sentences and the first principles of being.

In order to answer the question ’What is happening to aesthetics?’ in the title of the article one has to decide what the problem of aesthetics consists in. The discipline is in a crisis, and sometimes its ’death’ is announced and the rule of anti-aesthetics is proclaimed whereas the debate ’Aesthetics or anti-aesthetics?’ ends up in a cognitive stalemate: aesthetics is tainted with the error of normativism and reductionism; and anti-aesthetics finishes in relativism. Hence a return is necessary to the classical philosophy (metaphysics) of art (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas) that avoids errors of the aesthetic tradition and works out a universal and neutral criterion for evaluating purposefulness in art, and also does not interfere with the competence of humanities or of art criticism.

In the article the question is considered if in the domain of philosophy it is possible to use methods that meet the postulates of repeatability and inter-subjective accessibility. The author analyses the very idea of method, as it functions outside philosophical disciplines and he states that in the very domain of philosophy it is difficult to separate subjective theses put forward by philosophers from the very methods of philosophising. He is rather in favour of the conclusion that in philosophy formulating repeatable and inter-subjectively accessible methods is very difficult, but at the same time he stresses that such a possibility should not be given up.

Dieser Artikel skizziert die Bedeutung der Fragestellung in der Erkenntnis, wie sie sich in den Anfänger der griechischen Philosophie darstellt: bei den drei Milesiern (Thales, Anaximander und Anaximenes), in den sokratischen und platonischen Dialogen sowie bei Aristoteles. Die griechische Philosophie war von Anfang an mit der Fragestellung an sich verbunden. Die erste philosophische Frage war die Frage nach dem άρχή. Sie diente der Entmythologisierung und hatte Erkenntnischarakter. Die Bedeutung der Frage nach dem άρχή wurde unterschieden je nach Bedeutung des Terminus άρχή. Jedoch unabhängig von diesen Unterschieden zielte die Frage auf die Klärung der ganzen Wirklichkeit ab, und diese Klärung mußte außerhalb der Fakten, dem Verstande nach, gesucht werden. Während wir es bei den Milesiern mit dem “Faktum“ der Fragestellung zu tun haben, wurde die Frage bei Sokrates und später bei Plato deutlich in die Methode, zur Fragestellung zu gelangen, eingebaut. Die Dialektik, jenes “Spiel“ von Frage und Antwort, war bei Sokrates und später bei Plato eine Konfrontation zwischen der einen und der anderen Seele und diente zunächst der gemeinsamen Wahrheitsfindung, der das Verhalten folgt. Im Bereich der Elenktik spielte die Frage eine therapeutische, dagegen im Bereich der Maieutik eine stimulierende Rolle. Die sokratische Dialektik betraf nicht die materielle Wirklichkeit, sondern des menschliche Vorstellungsvermögen von der Wirklichkeit und führte zu neuem Wissen, das rein intellektuell war. Gemäß der Lehre Platos war die Frage ein Mittel, um zu dem vorzudringen, was intelligibel ist, d.h. zur Idee. Erkenntnis wurde zur Erinnerung, zur Anamnese, und der Impuls für die Erinnerung an die Idee war unter anderem die Frage. Den Beginn der Theorie der Frage finden wir schon in den Logikschriften des Aristoteles. Er tat dies im Kontext des Syllogismus und der Theorie der Lehre. Die Frage betrachtete er als Baumaterial für jegliche Diskussion. Er unterschied vier Arten von Fragen, je nachdem, wonach wir fragen, sowie vier Arten von Fragen, je nachdem, welches Wissen wir erreichen, das sich auf das Wissen von ὄτι und διότι zurückführen läßt. Voraussetzung für jede dieser Fragestellungen ist das fehlende Wissen. Aristoteles bringt in das Phänomen der Bedeutung von Fragen im Erkenntnisablauf einige neue Elemente ein: er zeigt die logische Ordnung der Fragestellung auf; das Stellen von Fragen siedelt er im Bereich praktischer Fähigkeiten an, die der Wissensaneignung dienen, und er weist darauf hin, daß von der Art der Fragestellung der inhaltliche Gehalt der Antwort sowie die Art des erlangten Wissens abhängen.

The article is a discussion of the following issues: (a) moral significance of the so-called everyday life; (b) individuality of each man resulting from God’s creative act; (c) uniqueness of man’s fate due to God’s permanent presence in every moment of his existence; (d) man’s dignity, whose source is the fact that man is ontologically derived from God.

Emergentism is (a) an ontological doctrine about how the phenomena of this world are organized into autonomous emergent levels and (b) a metascientific thesis about the nature of relationship between basic physics and special sciences (such as biology, psychology and sociology). Claims involving emergent properties (laws and regularities) are now rife in discussions of non-linear dynamics, connectionist modelling, chaos theory, complexity studies and ontology of mind. According to R. Spencer-Smith there are three major concepts of emergence, which might be termed: (a) epistemic emergence, (b) interactional emergence, and (c) radical emergence. The author of the paper distinguishes and discusses two kinds of radical emergence − autocreational and actualizational emergence. The second notion leads directly to a form of dual-aspect theory in ontology of mind. In this case the notion of a causally closed (purely) physical world makes no sense because even micro-events have proto-mental properties. A metaphysical theory of this sort provides a conceptually coherent middle road between Cartesian dualism and materialist monism.

Wilfrid Sellars very often expounds his philosophical views in an historical context. In his paper „Being and Being Known” Sellars gives a succinct account of his epistemology while at the same time discussing the Thomistic conception of sensory and intellectual knowledge. His aim in that paper is to provide a plausible interpretation of the doctrine that both the senses and the intellect are informed by the nature of external objects, and thus our cognitive acts are isomorphic with their objects. Sellars claims that there are two dimensions to that isomorphism, and that those separate dimensions are conflated by the Thomists, as well as by other philosophers. That is to say, there is isomorphism in the real or the natural order, and there is isomorphism in the intentional or the logical order. Sellars insists that in sensory cognition isomorphism holds merely in the real order. By contrast, intellectual knowledge is based upon the isomorphism of the intentional order. However, that isomorphism obtains in virtue of specific relations holding in the real order. Thus those two orders are intimately connected. Unfortunately, Sellars does not fully elaborate the nature of the connections between those two orders. I argue that in light of his commitment to ontological naturalism, Sellars should claim that ultimately there is only one isomorphism, namely the isomorphism in the real order. I suggest that his insistence that there are no genuine semantical relations holding between the elements of the intentional and the real supports such an interpretation.

The article attempts at giving an adequate characteristics of Albert Einstein as a philosopher. Firstly, it presents a philosophical biography of the founder of the relativity theory. In order to fulfil this aim, first it was shown how, what manner and why Einstein became also a philosopher. Secondly, a reconstruction of Einstein’s views was undertaken to show his attitude to philosophy as a special kind of the human knowledge as well as to characterize it at the metalanguage level. Finally, the main topics of his philosophy are in short presented.

I suggest to distinguish the following three types of metaphysics:(1) the metaphysics of undifferentiated being (Parmenides, B. Russell, W. V. O. Quine, M. A. Kra˛piec, M. Przełęcki): to be (in the existential use) and to exist mean the same, all objects are/exist in the only one way (i.e. all objects are real), there are no nonexistent objects:(2) the metaphysics of differentiated being (Plato?, Ch. Wolff, A. Meinong, K. Twardowski, J. J. Jadacki): the meaning of to exist is the one of many meanings of to be, all objects are but not all objects exist, there are nonexistent objects;(3) the metaphysics of ways of existence (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas?, R. Ingarden, A. B. Stępień): to be (in the existential use) and to exist mean the same, there are some different ways of being/existence (i.e. some objects are real, other objects are ideal or intentional, etc.), there are no nonexistent objects – if something does not exist in some way, it does not exist at all.I consider in details the above-mentioned metaphysics. One can give some objections to each of them but there are some possibilities of their defence. How to choose one of given metaphysics? It seems that the choice of metaphysics is the choice of some uses of the words to be-to exist and its ontological commitments. I prefer the metaphysics of ways of existence because its universe is not too poor or too rich. This metaphysics is „the golden mean” between the metaphysics of undifferentiated being and the metaphysics of differentiated being.

The article is concerned with A. B. Stępień’s philosophical and metaphilosophical views. The author of the article analyses the main oppositions appearing − in his opinion − in Stępień’s views. They are: the opposition between metaphilosophical pluralism and metaphilosophical monism, between transcendental idealism and realism, between ontology and metaphysics, between existential pluralism and existential monism, between Platonism and nominalism, between intuition and construction and between essentialist and semiotic approach.

Three phenomena strike one when he investigates the history of the issue of God in the 20th century thought: (1) existence of philosophies and ideologies denying God, i.e. various forms of atheism covering an earlier unparalleled range; (2) appearance of philosophies in which the issue of God is not their inner problem (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger); (3) striving after replacing philosophy of God (metaphysical approach) with philosophy of religion, and especially with phenomenology of religion.The article contains a presentation of the issue of God in the main philosophical trends of the 20th century. Philosophy of God in its metaphysical dimension is still continued in classical philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy of religion, whose main author is M. Scheler, originates in phenomenology. The broadly understood phenomenological trend brought new approaches in which not so much the problem of God’s existence and his nature, as the relation between God and man was considered. The approaches are: philosophy of dialogue (M. Buber, G. Marcel), philosophy of encounter (E. Lévinas, F. Rosenzweig), philosophy of gift (J. L. Marion). Also existentialism with its three standpoints is presented in the article: (1) natural (M. Heidegger), (2) negative (J. P. Sartre, A. Camus, M. Merleau-Ponty) and (3) positive (S. Kierkegaard, G. Marcel, K. Jaspers).In the article also the problem of relations between science and the issue of God is considered, pointing to various solutions (P. Teilhard de Chardin, H. L. Bergson; philosophy of process − A. N. Whitehead, Ch. Hartshorne). A special place is taken by a discussion of the issue of God in philosophy of process.

In this article the problem of justification of mathematical axioms (in the context of traditional standpoints in the philosophy of mathematics) is discussed. Stress is laid on themethodological analysis, which concerns the notion of “justification” itself. Concrete choices, known from mathematical practice are not discussed here.In the process of formulating an axiomatic theory, the problem of the choice of the appropriate axiom system and of the justification of this choice emerges. In particular, thefollowing problems are connected with it:(1) The problem of the relation between the concept of “justification” and “truth” of mathematical sentences (when the classical definition of truth is assumed).(2) The problem which criteria of justification can be considered appropriate, and whether the problem of justification is well-posed.(3) The problem, whether these criteria can be applied only to axioms, in the process of constructing an axiomatic theory, or also to independent sentences (after their metamathematical status has been settled. In that case, extending a theory T by an independent sentence φ or ¬φ cannot be justified by a formal proof.)(4) The problem, whether the choice of a particular justificatory procedure is motivated philosophically; in particular, whether the problem of justification is considered well-posed.These questions are analysed in the context of classical philosophical standpoints in the philosophy of mathematics, such as: (1) strict formalism; (2) Hilbert’s formalism; (3)mathematical instrumentalism; (4) intuitionism; (5) Quine’s realism; (6) Gödel’s realism. The standpoint of the “working mathematician” is also discussed.

In debate with scepticism three general strategies may be differentiated: (1) pointing to self-refutation of scepticism; (2) looking for certainty; and (3) modification of the concept of knowledge. The latter strategy has at least three versions: (a) knowledge does not require certainty, (b) knowledge is not broadened by way of deduction, and (c) knowledge does not require the knowledge of knowledge. The first strategy refutes global scepticism, but does not give an example of knowledge and is not efficient in the case of scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist. Also the second strategy is only able to refute the typical thesis of global scepticism (knowledge does not exist). Scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist is more efficiently refuted in the third strategy. However, separation of knowledge and certainty is only avoiding the problem of scepticism. It is also doubtful if the principle of broadening knowledge by way of deduction may be refuted. Negation of the principle of transparency of knowledge is the most convincing one. After it is refuted, knowledge is possible in the situation when we do not know if we know and we cannot exclude sceptical hypotheses.

The author discusses the question of reduction of consciousness. At the beginning she declares her externalistic and realistic position. Her externalism is seen through the nature of human action which demands both, intentionality and consciousness. But her argumentation against reduction of consciousness is made from an internalistic (not externalistic) point of view, and is supported by some results given by certain cognitive neuroscientists, like Susan Greenfield, for instance. In line with those neuroscientists she argues that consciousness (consisted in conscious states) is characterized by such features (like: spatial multiplicity, modality, single temporality) which in spite of their neuronal realizability, are not reducible. Another specific feature of consciousness (especially emphasized in philosophy by Kant and Husserl) is its ability to synthesize. In her consideration, the question of synthesis (contrary to Stanisław Judycki who used it in his argument against naturalistic conceptions of the mind) remains open.To conclude, she defends a many-dimensional strategy of research and thinks that despite the continuity between the account of the mind and the natural world, there is a place for nonnaturalized epistemology in which our rich mental life can be also viewed in certain autonomy.