In Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus contended that death is nothing to us since it is the deprivation of all sensations. I find that his argument implies at least three assumptions, which are hedonism, physicalism and existence requirement. At first glance, Epicurus’ argument seemed to be acceptable due to one is deprived all his sensations and unable to estimate whether death is good or bad for him when death comes. So, it is concluded that death is nothing to us. However, the question follows: is something really not bad for a person if one has no capacity to acquire the unpleasant experiences? I must say that the answer is ‘No’. In this essay, I will argue that something is bad for the people even they don’t have any unpleasant experience and most of us will agree that he is indeed harmed by the lack of pleasant experiences. Thus, Epicurus’ argument is implausible because the strong version of existence requirement is not justified.

Political power can be defined as “what the commanders purposefully do, by all means, to acquire public obedience to their allocation of resources.” Hanfeizi claims that a morality-based power relationship is theoretically possible, but not actually feasible. Instead, laws should be the core in a political power relationship. More specifically, by assuming that human beings are benefit-oriented and harm-aversive, commanders should make orders based on their advantages in education, economic status, and military power to punish and reward people. These orders will eventually replace resistance with obedience and construct a political power relationship.

Natural deduction is the logical system most commonly used in teaching elementary logic. However, different textbooks may adopt different versions of the natural deduction system, which can be quite annoying to many teachers and students of logic. More precisely, with regard to the inference rules for quantifiers, there are two completely different systems of natural deduction. One system (which I shall call the “Gentzen system”) has a rule of “existential instantiation” that looks pretty complicated, whilst the other system (which I shall call the “Copi-Kahane system”) has a much simpler rule for existential instantiation. Although most of the Chinese textbooks for elementary logic use the rules of the Copi-Kahane system, there are still some textbooks for elementary logic or intermediate logic which use the Gentzen system. This leads to some problems especially in teaching logic, as students may find it somehow difficult to learn intermediate logic (which usually use the Gentzen system) if what they learn in elementary logic is the Copi-Kahane system. In this paper, I shall critically compare the Gentzen system with the Copi-Kahane system to judge which one is better for teachingelementary logic.

This paper argues that the purpose of Mou Zong-san’s retranslation of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is to incorporate Leibniz and Russell’s thoughts of logical analysis into his A Critique of the Cognitive Mind. In order to succeed, Mou held the distinction between “discriminating speech” and “undiscriminating speech” to express his view of “philosophical language” which has at least two meanings: First, the “philosophy” that Mou argues is based on this view. Second, Mou’s unique view of “philosophical language” is likely to be a basis of his interpretation of the classics. Therefore, clarifying Mou’s view of “philosophical language” will significantly enable us to understand the two crucial tasks (philosophical thinking and philosophical interpretations) of Mou’s philosophy.

This essay first shows that the concept of recontextualization in Rorty and the fusion of horizons in Gadamer are ways of thinking through which knowledge is obtained. Then, I argue that recontexuationalization, as a way of thinking in Rorty, fails both in the achievement of knowledge about reality and in the establishment of Rorty’s philosophical ideal: edifying philosophy. The argument implies that the concept of recontextualization is not able to create a new paradigm by breaking the imprisonment of our present paradigm. Nevertheless, as Gadamer’s fusion of horizon avoids the theoretical difficulties existing in Rorty’s concept of recontextualization, it leads us to obtain the knowledge about reality by being able to create new knowledge. Therefore, in comparison with Rorty’s recontextualization, Gadamer’s fusion of horizons is a more satisfactory theory of thinking.

This paper tries to explain the idea of motivational efficacy included in Zhuxi’s concept of “true knowledge” by analyzing the content and structure of this concept, and to face the challenge of the Humean problem through T. Nagel’s theory. For Zhuxi, the knowledge of “knowing without being able to act” (zhi er bu neng xing) is merely knowledge of a shallow kind as the true knowledge will definitely lead to action. In a given situation, the better a man knows what good is, the more likely he acts according to his judgment. When a man’s knowledge reaches the highest degree, he will completely follow it. This kind of knowledge (“true knowledge”) is not only the one that man acts according to what he knows, but also the one that man should do. The latter originates from one’s own mind, and it can be known only through self-reflection by gaining the motivational efficacy determining why a man does this way rather than the other in moral actions.

In Nietzsche (1961), Heidegger investigates the questions of being and time based on a common base, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), referring to the understanding of being. But his theses shifts from the being of beings and the individual of (in each case) mine (Jemeinigkeit) in Being and Time to the beings on the whole and being as such in Nietzsche.In Nietzsche, Heidegger has a new definition of eternity (the “Now” falling back into the Self), and seeks the eternity of the Augenblick (blink) by ways of interpreting Nietzsche’s concepts of Will to Power and Eternal Return. I argue that the new meaning of eternity which relates to time and the self (Selbst, Selbstheit) is similar to the concept of Augenblick (blink) and autonomic freedom (Freiheit der Selbstständigkeit) in Being and Time. So, mainly based on Nietzsche and with the aid of Being and Time, this paper aims to investigate Heidegger’s concepts of Augenblick and eternity as well as their relation with human beings.

Lonergan argues that intentionality analysis shows that ethical behavior is dynamic. It includes knowledge of reality, reflection on value, judgment of value, decision and action. Knowledge of reality is achieved through the application of cognitional theory. In addition, based upon the pure desire for value, human beings continue to ask a further question: “What should I do?”. With this question, human beings enter the realm of ethical reflection. In ethical reflection, human beings become conscious of value through feelings. Moreover, feelings in response to value occur in the horizon of feelings. The horizon of feelings constitutes an orientation toward the realm of value. It especially affects inquiry into value, reflection on value, deliberation, judgment of value, decision and action. Reflection on value and judgment of value are usually habitual. When human beings encounter a new situation with new feelings and new questions of judgement of value, human beings start a new process of reflection on value and judgement of value. Ethical reflection can be self-correcting as human beings make decisions and put them into action based upon their judgments of value.

Xiong Shili is one of the most influential and controversial philosophers in the modern neo-Confucianism. The paper, starting from the controversial topics haunted Xiong, tries to explore the practical base of morality behind them. Firstly, we compare the “mind-condition” structure and the cosmological structure and by this comparison a conflict hidden behind them is thus revealed as between “emptiness” and “qi”. The former is what Xiong borrows from Mahayana Buddhism, and the latter is derived from the Confucianism tradition that Xiong especially appreciates. As a matter of fact, Xiong’s absorption of the concept of “emptiness” leads to the resetting of the position of “qi” in Confucianism, and the substantial experience supported by “qi” in turn has influences on the formation of “emptiness” in Xiong’s thought. By holding the tension between “emptiness” and “qi”, we can further reveal Xiong’s ethical choice between the “ren” of Confucianism and the “karunā” of Buddhism, by which we are finally able to make tangible the profound moral concerns behind Xiong’s turning from Buddhism to Confucianism.

Hung Yao-Shun (1903-1986), one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in the Japanese ruled period, whose research deserves more attention today. My intention in this paper is twofold: First, to clarify some basic concepts of his “absolute dialectics of alethiological dialectics”, and secondly to indicate some possible developments of his logic. The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of my paper (section one), I focus on his main philosophical work “Being and Truth - A Study of Schalwa Nuzubidse’s Alethiology” published in April 1938 (totally 145 pages). Nuzubidse attempts to explicate the traditional metaphysics as an aletheological realism, aiming at the disclosure of the truth-in-itself. Some of the basic concepts of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and Hung’s interpretation are discussed here (sections two, three, four). Through these discussions, we can see that Hung goes deeply into the core of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and radicalizes his alethiological realism step by step to an “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”. Finally, Hung’s critique on Nuzubidse is discussed in the last section (section five). Hung’s project remains an unfinished ideal, which makes some of his creative thoughts still obscure. By explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments, some of the possible contributions and new perspectives that Hung provided to philosophy will be expounded in this section.

A commonly held view concerning moral responsibility is that someone has a moral responsibility for some action if and only if someone makes actions freely. In other words, if someone cannot avoid doing actions to be morally condemned, it is not attributable to moral responsibility. Can Zhu Xi’s theory of mind and ethical thoughts─xin-tong-xing-qing 心統性情─respond to the attribution of moral responsibility? Scholars have different opinions and to what extent their disagreement ranges is the focus of this paper.The conclusion of this paper is that the intertwining of these research approaches can be regarded as philosophical problems of the Chinese style concerning compatibilism and incompatibilism. This problem cannot be solved unless its metaphysical problem is dealt with in the first place. However, in addition to the above solution, perhaps we can see xin 心 as emergence of xing-qing 性情, and imagine a special vision of ontological gong-fu 工夫 and experience, taking care of thoughts like han-yang-xing-cha 涵養省察, ge-wu-zhi-zhi 格物致知, ke-ji-zhu-jing 克己主敬. We then adapt the famous statement of Peter van Inwagen as follows: “there is mysterious gong-fu between xin and xing-qing.”

The doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” is one of the core concerns of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. This paper is trying to elucidate Wang’s theory by investigating: 1. The philosophical origin of this doctrine. 2. The justification of its ethical theory. Regarding the investigation of its “origin”, I will show the philosophical inheritance between Wang’s doctrine and classical texts by the support of relevant textual evidence, instead of examining the linkage between different general ideas in the School of mind. The common ground is revealed in Book 4A of Mencius, of which has been stated clearly that to know is to act. The relationship between knowing and acting is analytic. Since knowing is the richest content of wisdom, and genuine knowing is the observance of action, the knowing of benevolence and righteousness is also the observance of such values. Such Mencius’ idea serves not only the lexical origin as suggested by Lao Sze-kwang, but also as the textual ground of Wang’s understanding of the knowing function of the mind of discerning right and wrong. The second purpose of this paper is to justify the doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” by ethical interpretation. Lao emphasizes the significance of activity in the concept of “acting”, and transforms the meaning of “acting” from common sense to the level of school of mind and philosophy of language. Nevertheless, if the ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” has to be justified, i.e. the reason why knowing necessarily entail acting, a further explanation is needed. In this paper, ideas in School of mind will be explained in terms of ethical concepts in order to achieve a transcendental analysis. The “unity of knowing and acting” is possible in subjective identity, which is the a priori condition to make the concept of an ethical norm and imputation possible. The ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” can thus be revealed. In the subjective identity, the ethical “ownness” of knowing and acting is justified, and an ethical norm and the possibility of imputation can also be possible. Since knowing and acting belong to one’s own self, the ethical norm and its imputation is then valid. This is a formal argument constituted by the self-relation of one’s subjectivity.

In the demonstration of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (B274-9), Kant brings up a persuasive strategy for seriously refuting skeptics’ position concerning the reality of outer world. He attacks directly the core presupposition of skeptics. First of all, Kant takes as a starting point the conception of self-knowledge that should be accepted by all skeptics. Kant then uncovers step by step the sceptics’ contradiction and he hence puts them in a dilemma. Under the sceptics’ assumption, either they must acknowledge the impossibility of self-knowledge or they must give up that assumption. In other words, not only must skeptics acknowledge the direct veridicality of self-knowledge, but also accept the direct veridicality of the existence of outer things as the condition of the possibility of self-knowledge.This paper argues that (1) the ‘refutation’ is persuasive, and (2) the ‘refutation’ and the core theses of ‘transcendental idealism’ are compatible.This essay contains three parts. The first part is to clarify the systematic status of the ‘refutation’ in transcendental philosophy and, by this clarification, to expound the empirically cognitive significance of the ‘postulate of actuality’; the second part is to critically analyze the structure of demonstration and justification of the ‘refutation’; the third part is to expound the compatibility of ‘refutation’ with ‘transcendental idealism’ by clarifying the ambiguity of key terms. The paper ends with a conclusion summarizing the strategy of the ‘refutation’.

In this paper I reconstruct how Aristotle sees the medium receiving color in De anima 2.7, 418a26-b20 and offer my own interpretation. I argue that Aristotle intends to establish a causal chain for a perception event, which begins with the color of the perceived object as the efficient explanation of the whole causal chain. And color moves the medium, i.e., something transparent such as air, in the manner of alteration. On the other hand, I argue that we should construe the actuality of the transparent thing to be the state of exhibiting the nature of transparency, which air shares with things such as fire. And receiving color in the transparent thing requires the transparent thing to be in actuality. If this line of interpretation is correct, it may reshape the current reading of how the faculty of perception “receives form without matter” (De anima 2.12, 414a18-19).

Bishop sentences such as “If a bishop meets a bishop, he blesses him” have long been considered problematic for the descriptivist (or E-type) approach of donkey anaphora (e.g. Evans, 1977; Heim, 1990; and Neale, 1990). Elbourne (2005) offers a situational descriptivist analysis that allegedly solves the problem, and furthermore extends its explanatory coverage to bishop sentence with coordinate subjects. However, I throw serious doubts on Elbourne’s analysis. Specifically, I argue that the purported solution is committed to the use of unbound anaphora, and it cannot sustain the claimed empirical adequacy.

In contrast with the late 19th century German Philosophy, most historians of philosophy emphasize the achievements of the first half of the century. In After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900, Frederick Beiser stands against this academic current and coins five different narratives, including “the rise of neo-Kantianism”, “the materialism controversy”, “the growth of historicism”, “the root of modern logic”, “the rise of pessimism” to allow readers to reengage with the second half of the 19th century. He takes the responsibility of enlivening the so-called “lost traditions”, and of course, for those readers who have similar taste and interest, this book is their cup of tea. However, if we, by the name of the book, anticipate this work to illustrate a general picture of the “mainstream” philosophical traditions from those times, we may be disappointed. From the academic point of view, this book is certainly well written, with rich references and a comprehensive understanding of the related topics. Through Beiser’s reconstruction of the philosophical controversies, the stiff narratives of the history of philosophy can be softened and refreshed. If the readers themselves are able to incorporate the details provided by the book into the wider historical context and the specific problems in the history of philosophy, the reward can be even bigger.

Nietzsche ascribes to Herder’s views on aesthetics and further develops the connection between aesthetics and freedom. He advocates an aesthetic realization of a “human of nature” (Naturmensch) echoing Rousseau’s call for getting “back to nature.” The concept of nature in Nietzsche’s aesthetics leads us towards a non-moralism beyond good and evil, its purpose being to liberate the body from Christian asceticism. Nietzsche celebrates the virtuosity of the Renaissance and takes Goethe’s combination of “noble upbringing” and “bodily dexterity” as an example of aesthetically transforming the “binary opposition of good and evil” into the “non-moralism of good and bad.” Cultivated individuals, like artistic geniuses, are good at mobilizing the multiple forces intrinsic and extrinsic to the body, without excluding the bad; yet, they still recognize the contingency in their destinies. In modernity, which is essentially self-destructive, conflicting forces, capable of destroying life, in effect become the source of innovative lifestyles. Free play is the main form of artistic activity and a sign of life’s vitality. This paper takes the relationship between power, nature and freedom as a lens through which to explore the following questions: Does the power of artistic liberation manifest and reinforce subjectivity or is it actually a process of desubjectification? If artistic activities involve individual liberation, is there any dimension of political freedom involved therein as well? What is the relationship between Nietzsche’s aesthetic ideas and critiques of the Enlightenment?

John Rawls systematically explored and tried to solve the problem of stability; that is, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can citizens be motivated so that they will accept and comply with social institutions voluntarily to maintain a just and well-ordered society? In Political Liberalism, Rawls proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. He argued that citizens who affirm different reasonable comprehensive doctrines would agree to “justice as fairness” and use this political conception of justice to regulate major social institutions. Based on this consensus, citizens will voluntarily comply with relevant norms and ensure social stability.This essay shall explore whether the argument of overlapping consensus can successfully solve the problem of stability in a pluralistic society. First, I shall explain the problem of stability with which Rawls was concerned. Second, I shall explain why Rawls gave up the argument for stability in A Theory of Justice and why he proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. Third, I shall analyze how Rawls argued that such a consensus can solve the problem of stability. Fourth, I shall examine and criticize the argument of overlapping consensus. By exploring how this argument fails, I shall point out how any argument appealing to principles of social justice fails to solve the stability problem successfully. Finally, I shall propose a preliminary form of the argument for stability based on moral psychology. This argument is not only compatible with Rawls’s claims but is also theoretically defensible.

This essay aims to discuss the concept of body in the Mozi through the investigation on self-cultivation. First of all, this essay tries to indicate that the body in the Mozi is constructed by‘xing (形, “body”) ─xin (心, “heart”) ─ qi ( 氣, “energy”)’which is in accord with the Pre-Qin thinkers’ understanding to the body. While xing refers to the flesh-bloody part of human being, the concept of xin focuses on the aspect of cognition and is closely related to the concept of shan (善, “goodness”), ai (愛, “love”), zhi (志, “will”) and xing. Despite the concept of qi has not been fully developed in the Mozi, it remains significant in understanding On Dyeing (〈所染〉). Based on this framework on the body, we could assert that the cultivated body which implied in the Mozi is not merely a physical body constituted by flesh and blood, but an integration of mind and body. Through the cultivation (gong-fu 工夫), the physical-mental state of the practitioners will then begin to transform. This essay reveals that the domain of gong-fu should not be restricted in the immanent cultivation of xin-xing ( 心性, “mental disposition”). Regardless of using the approaches of inside-out or outside-in, any practice could change one’s thought and behavior could be regarded as “gong-fu”. Thus, this essay generalizes six kinds of gong-fu from the Mozi, namely qu (去, “removing”), fan-zhi-shen (反之身, “self-reflecting and self-justificating”), li-zhi (立志, “determining”), li-shi (力事, “performing one’s duty”), xue (學, “learning”) and bian (辯, “debating”). This essay concludes that the purpose of self-cultivation on the Mozi is to establish an ideal model of Mohism, so as to promote benefits and eliminate harms for the society. This interpretation of body complies with three dimensions, which are zhi-wu-yu-e-zhi-shen (知無欲惡之身, “the body with intelligence neither desiring nor disliking anything”), li-yong-zhi-shen (力勇之身, “the body with power and bravery”) and jiao-li-zhi-shen (交利之身, “the body with mutual aid”).