By the late twentieth century, the liberal definition of a citizen as an individual with equal rights under the protection of the law has failed to respond to the demands of the members of contemporary plural societies. The recent discussions in political philosophy between Kantian liberal approaches and their communitarian and republican critics are relevant to this challenge. These criticisms are, in one way or another, related to the main principles of Western liberal thought. The communitarians take a stand against the priority of rights over conceptions of the good in liberal politics. They also criticize the ontological assumption of the individual as an "unencumbered" self. The absence of a substantive common good and the separation of politics and morality are the shortcomings of liberalism that are stressed by both communitarians and republicans. In contrast to liberals' emphasis on rights, republicans underline the role of duties and active participation as the constitutive elements of citizenship. In fact, they reverse the relation between rights and politics as it is understood in liberalism: they regard rights as the products of the political process, rather than its presuppositions.

In transitional societies, a search for ethnic identity becomes the most common form of personal response to the destruction of customary forms of social life. The sense of ethnic unity can arise spontaneously or be formed by ideologists. Ethnic stereotypes play a crucial role in embedding national myths into people's consciousness, and the effectiveness of their influence is practically independent of their accuracy. The system of perception stereotypes of a nation almost always adds up to a holistic myth of that nation that includes mythologems of different levels (from routine perceptions to historical-philosophical theories). Thus, one can say that turning mass consciousness towards a national myth is the main method of the formation of national identity.

In this short paper I would like to open discussion on the prevalence of political and ideological considerations in most of contemporary social theory in and pertaining to the Southeastern European context. With the significant political changes in this region the relevance of ideology has grown significantly.

This paper examines two conflicts that emerge in the engagement between monotheism, especially as it is expressed in its fundamentalist form in both Christianity and Islam, and the separation of church and state. The first conflict involves intellectual compartmentalizing. The second conflict concerns the possibility that the contract may require that all "absolute truths" be assigned metaphorical status.

This paper provides a structural and comparative analysis of two sets of concepts in social and political philosophy: the Russian Eurasian school of the 18th,19th, and early 20th centuries, on the one hand, and the concepts of American Exceptionalism and American Destiny, on the other. Both sets of concepts guided the social and especially foreign policies of Russia and the United States as semi-official political doctrines at certain stages of their history.

This paper discusses various social simulacra or real illusions as a substitution for traditional ideologies. Unlike ideologies, simulacra do not pretend to give a true explanation of reality but take its place. They rely on sign codes that create a totality erasing any distinction between the original reality and its copies or interpretations. The new reality principle itself is a product of the simulacrum. Nevertheless, there is a way to go beyond this enchantment; it consists of three steps: irony, parody, and grotesque. The grotesque is the final level of the dissolution of the simulacrum, disclosing the ugly realm hidden by the real illusion.

The purpose of this paper is to argue against a certain view of what terrorism is. In particular, I wish to dispute the definition of terrorism used by philosophers Andrew Vails and Angelo Corlett who separately put forward arguments defending the possibility of morally legitimate acts of terrorism. In support of this conclusion, they each employ a broad definition of terrorism that makes room for highly discriminate, i.e., precisely targeted, acts of political violence to count as terrorism. Defending a broad definition of terrorism requires the inclusion of such cases. I argue in defense of a more narrow definition of terrorism, one that associates terrorism with more indiscriminate acts of violence. I believe that this definition better accords with common usage and commonsense.

This article aims to elaborate two meanings of the category of the political in relation to the question of legitimacy in constitutional regimes: John Rawls's conception constructed on the regulative ideal of political neutrality and Carl Schmitt's notion of the political as friend-enemy distinction relying on a logic of exclusion. A comparative textual examination explicates that these two approaches imply opposed meanings to be attributed to the nature, essence, and boundary of the political, although both thinkers have the common aim of developing a theory of the political realm free of religious, metaphysical, and ideological connotations.

"Justice" has been, since Plato and Aristotle, a concept of central importance in European philosophy. It is also a concept in everyday speech and in political discourse. As an inter-discursive concept, its value is not culturally limited, so that it seems particularly apt for use in discussions about achieving "globalization with a human face" (as one might say). For such processes of communication it is, however, necessary to reflect on the different uses made of this concept, which is claimed by very different, even contrasting political-ethical projects.

One of the major political problems the world faces at the moment of its so-called globalization concerns the possibilities of maintaining, transforming, and expanding democracy. Globalization, as the extension of neo-liberal markets, the formation of multi-national, non-democratic economic powers, and the ubiquitous use of teletechnologies, threatens the modus vivendi of older democracies in ways that call for the reinvention of an old idea. Inasmuch as teletechnical globalization transforms space and time so as to put into question their very presence, and inasmuch as deconstruction has always sought to rethink the constitution as well as deconstitution of the metaphysics of presence, I will here examine the concept of democracy that Jacques Derrida developed over the last few years of his life.

Poststructuralist theories of identity have been accused of restricting the political efficacy of the subject. However, it could be argued that poststructuralist theory, as a philosophical method that insists upon a critical resignification of the traditional understanding of agency and critique, may actually enlarge the scope for activism.

Der Rassimus-Diskurs hat sich auf die fortschrittlichen kapitalistischen Länder konzentriert. Da der Rassimus kein westliches Phänomen ist, sondern eine aus der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise hervorgehende Idologie, sollte die Rassismus-Diskussion auch in Ländern, in denen sich die kapitalistische Produktionsweise erst spät etablierte, untersucht werden. Untersuchungen zu Rassismus in der Türkei zeigen, dass der Rassismus in der Türkei besonderheit aufzeigt, die nicht mit denen der westlichen Länder vergleichbar sind. Deswegen werde ich in meinem Referat den Rassismus in der Türkei vor dem Hintergrund einer Auseinandersetzung mit Albert Memmi, Robert Miles, Immanuel Wallerstein, Etienne Balibar, etc. erlaütern.

The subject of this paper is the new theory of political liberalism, developed by people like jJohn Rawls and Charles Larmore. This is a quite specific subject and it should not be confused with another and more usual meaning attached to the same expression. This more conventional meaning of political liberalism is primarily a form of liberalism which stresses the political sphere - the state - as opposed to the economic sphere - the marketplace. However, the new theory of political liberalism is not in opposition to economic liberalism in this way. Instead, the adjective political refers to the fact that this recent defence of liberalism avoids reliance on comprehensive and controversial religious, metaphysical, epistemological, and moral views. In this sense, political liberalism is a theory of argumentative restraint regarding the defence of liberal justice.

The paper develops a theory of human rights under three main headings: that ways of acting or of being treated require effective normative justification, that they must have authoritative political endorsement or acknowledgement, and that they must be maintained by conforming conduct and, where need be, by governmental enforcement. The paper, then, applies this notion of human rights to two main cases: as constitutional rights within individual states (the case primarily contemplated within the UN's Universal Declaration), and as international human rights maintained by confederations of states or by looser international coalitions.

The Paleolithic paintings and drawings found on cave walls at sites in France and Spain, such as Lascaux, Altamira and Vallon-Pont-D'Arc, have profound effects on those who see them. In addition to their historical interest, they are prized for their aesthetic and spiritual qualities, which have had an important influence on modern art. But the caves are small and the paintings are fragile. Access to them has been sharply limited: some caves have been closed to protect the paintings from the damage caused by human respiration; access to others is limited to those who negotiate a daunting reservation scheme. Despite being the heritage of humanity as a whole, the cave paintings are, and must be, restricted to a very few. Not everyone who wants to see the paintings can do so if they are to survive.

A Utopia in a conceptually complete form consists in four aspects, which are the aesthetic, psychological, sociological and moral aspects. In this sense the concept of Utopia has remained in the West as something not practically feasible. In Eastern thought, though, this concept did not develop in an institutional form, yet an instance in the East can be traced which fulfils, at least partially, the above mentioned aspects of this Buddhism may be considered as satisfying the psychological of a utopia. From this perspective a synthetic view of Eastern concept. For example, and the moral aspects and Western ideas of utopia is proposed in this paper.

The tragic experience of the 20 century, the worst expression of which is the Holocaust, is a challenge to the fundamental values of civilized society. Many generations of thinkers will try to find a response to that challenge. The terrifying symbol of that challenge is Auschwitz, Universum Terroris, "the kingdom not of this world". Its understanding is beyond classical concepts of good and evil and cannot be described in the usual categories of crime and punishment. The entrance to this "kingdom" can be illustrated by Dante's words written at the entrance to Hell (Inferno): "Abandon hope all ye who enter". Finding no help either in God (the Almighty "has covered his face", as theologians put it) or in Reason (Reason has become madness), the shattered mind has to seek a new "measure of all things", to perceive wisdom born of despair, which we call holosophy.

In today's world the need for cultivating non-violence is becoming more pronounced. Gandhi extrapolated an ideal society based on truth and nonviolence. The Bombay Chronicle in its issue of 5th April, 1930, reported "...For the first time a nation is asked by its leader to win freedom by itself accepting all the suffering and sacrifice involved. Mahatma Gandhi's success does not, therefore, merely mean the freedom of India. It will also constitute the most important contribution that any country yet made towards the elimination of force as an arbiter between one nation and another..." For him, two cardinal principles of life, non-violence and truth, were the essence of sociopolitical good. "Satyagraha" was Gandhi's gift to the world. The word was coined by him in South Africa. In the West it was known as passive resistance. Satyagraha signified pure soul-force. Truth or Love is the very substance of the soul. To quote Gandhi in this context: "Non-violence as supreme dharma is the proof of this power of Love. Nonviolence is a dormant state. In the working state, it is Love, ruled by Love, the world goes on.... we are alive solely because of Love....we are all ourselves the proof of this..." In a centrifugal world, Gandhi's views expressed on non-violence and love are guidance to the world today more than at any other time.

Philosophy can enhance communication among new forms of knowledge, existing ones, and those that will arise in light of the heuristic possibilities of the revolutions in science, technology, and thought; it can turn to a reevaluation of all of the culture that humanity has produced for its own welfare and can prevent the loss of the differentiating essences of diverse social groups. In the conjugation of the forms of knowledge, I am interested in the relationship that has emerged between specialized scientific knowledge and ordinary knowledge, between the tradition, religion, art, and the evaluation of all that has previously been treated by philosophy. But if there is one discipline that I regard as privileged because of its effect on human actions, it is political science: public policy can provide a basis for planetary consciousness, a concern for mankind and for its potential destruction. The role of political philosophy is to serve as an ideological guide for a political science that would comprehend political behavior in relation to its consequences for individual human beings and would thus support actions favorable to humanity.

The modern conception of an atomistic subject constituting itself by excluding and dominating its other(s) remains insufficient for rethinking a "postcolonial subject" despite its merits in explaining the historical relationship between the Western subject and the Oriental other. Hegel seems to offer a promising alternative to this model. For Hegel, the construction of the subject does not take place in terms of the exclusion and oppression of, but in terms of a dialectical relationship to, its other, hence Hegel's model of subjectivity appears to be useful in rethinking the relation between the colonizer and the colonized in terms of mutual recognition and interdependent constitution. However, this appearance is misleading. In fact, the Hegelian model of the subject is the source of problems concerning the relation between self and other in general, and between the colonizer and the colonized in particular. Not only does Hegel attribute the possibility of the dialectical movement to a particular kind of subject (European), but his model of subjectivity reduces difference to opposition, and thereby obviates the possibility of rethinking a difference between the colonizer and the colonized. This paper tries to justify this observation through a discussion of Hegel's understanding of race as articulated in the third section of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. I argue that Hegel's understanding of race in the context of the natural soul allows one to draw inferences concerning his general conception of subjectivity and dialectics. Accordingly, this paper claims that rather than providing an alternative model for postcolonial subjectivity, Hegel's notion of the subject grounds the colonial model itself.