The paper concerns the principles presupposed in political protest against the totalitarian regime. In contrast to the utilitarian view of participating in political protest (K.D.Opp, M. Taylor) the author tries to suggest the moral model of political protest. According to this model, the main reason and motif for challenging the regime is the transgression of the limits of concession, which jeopardizes the spiritual identity and essential qualities of the individuals and all groups (i.e., Church, family, nation). The participants of the protest do not calculate in terms of egoistic or private interests and utilities but in terms of moral values. They consider what action is morally "good" and "bad" or morally "better" or "worse" in this situation, disregarding their personal profits and happiness. The overthrow of the communist system is an incalculating and contingent result of combating the extreme manifestations and worst excesses of the system.

Constitutional paideia designates a form of constitutionalism that construes a nation’s constitution essentially in terms of ongoing processes of collective self-formation. This paper explores the notion of constitutional paideia as formulated by Hegel, who explicitly defines constitutionalism with categories of Bildung. The paper’s strategy is to present Hegel’ position in light of questions that can be raised about it. The paper advances three central theses: (1) in spite (and perhaps because) of his historico-culturist approach to law, Hegel is a theoretician of constitutional paideia; (2) despite construing constitutionalism in terms of ongoing processes of popular self-interpretation, Hegel does not vitiate the distinction between law and politics deemed so central to constitutional theory; and (3) despite construing constitutionalism in terms of self-formative processes of a particular culture, Hegel does not jettison the normativity and trans-contextualism long associated with modern constitutional theory. The paper concludes with some observations on the contemporary significance of Hegelian constitutionalism.

Totalitarian political systems in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe destroyed and repressed the civil society that used to exist in them. The authoritarian and totalitarian ethos was formed under a powerful influence of ideologies of the communist parties and politocracy in these countries so that the political ethos of politicians dominated the political ethos of the citizen. The breakdown of the real socialism and its unsuccessful attempts to complete accelerated liberal modernization of these societies caused turbulence of social values in addition to the general moral chaos. The moral crisis has deepened; anomie increased as well as the society’s inclination to commit crime. This makes difficult the creation of the cultural matrix of the civil society and its moral values. The liberation and development of the political ethos of the civil society as an element of the democratic political culture require structural and mental changes in these societies. They imply abandoning the value matrices of the traditional and political societies based upon collectivism, tribalism, authoritarianism, egalitarianism, ethnocentrism, etatisme and mythologization of the past. They require the use of the citizens’ active potential as well as that of their associations, their readiness for political commitment, self-initiative, respect of the general interest and a courageous defense of freedom and social justice.

In this paper I discuss recent scholarly work on ideology, mostly by Europeans, that exposes a secularist bias in current political theory, invites a nonderogatory concept of religion, and (I argue) justifies more flexible church/state relations. This work involves (1) redefining ideology as any action-oriented ideas, whether destructive or ameliorative, including both secular theory and religion, then (2) drawing on hermeneutical and critical studies of the power/ideology relationship to rediscover a role for ‘utopia’ as a social catalyst for amelioration. I then call attention to the relevance of ‘mission’ to this work. For in both secular and sacred contexts, missions are defined and assigned to individuals or groups to enhance some aspect of the organizing entity’s sense of purpose and possibility. What stands out in each instance is that the sense of mission is not passively epistemic but actively project-oriented, goal-directed. It can be used with reference to any end or goal that is at least implicitly normative and which people seek to attain. A mission moves people, however, only if it is tied to some belief-based social identity which can be interpreted as oriented to that end. A case can be made, accordingly, for accommodating religious views in our political discourse, for they have a history of directing people’s thinking beyond what is to what ought to be, and without them we are ever more inclined to tolerate mediocrity in ourselves and despair in others.

This paper is a clarification and partial justification of a novel approach to the interpretation of Gramsci. My approach aims to avoid reductionism, intellectualism, and one-sidedness, as well as the traditional practice of conflating his political thought with his active political life. I focus on the political theory of the Prison Notebooks and compare it with that of Gaetano Mosca. I regard Mosca as a classic exponent of democratic elitism, according to which elitism and democracy are not opposed to each other but are rather mutually interdependent. Placing Gramsci in the same tradition, my documentation involves four key points. First, the Notebooks contain an explicit discussion of Mosca's ideas such that when Gramsci objects to a theoretical concept or principle, he often presupposes a common methodological orientation, and when he objects to a particular method or approach, he often presupposes a common theoretical view. Second, Gramsci accepts and gives as much importance to Mosca's fundamental principle that in all societies organized elites rule over the popular masses. Third, Gramsci accepts Mosca's distinctive theory of democracy defined as a relationship betwen elites and masses such that the elites are open to the influx of members from the masses. Finally, there is an emblematic practical political convergence btween the two: in 1925, both opposed a Fascist bill against Freemasonry. Although their rhetoric was different, their speeches exhibit astonishing substantive, conceptual and logical similarties.

The claim to rationality is disputed by two rival enlightenments, which collided in the dispute between Plato, Socrates and the Sophists, and which Marx united critically. He criticizes the capitalist system immanently as restrictive of production, and its market as not a case of freedom or equality (justice). However, Marx is most concerned with ontological injustice, coerced alienation of the human into being a commodity. He retains Promethean Enlightenment values however: technology, creativity, democracy, which should be economic, participatory and international. Marx criticized Hegel’s rationalization, idealization, ‘transfiguration and glorification’ of private property and the market. But he retains key elements of the idealist notion of human nature: that human is a ‘universal, therefore free being.’ The proletariat, with no other class to exploit, is therefore the philosophical ‘universal class.’ Freedom is class emancipation, justice is common ownership. There is an unwarranted skepticism about the rationality of such values and ideals. Rawls for instance misrepresents them by putting them in the same category as wants or preferences. Ideals, values, and enlightenments can and should be rationally argued over, in dialogue.

A movement led by an organization called "One World" is advocating the idea of "Direct Democracy," whereby individuals everywhere would have the opportunity to elect delegates to a world constitutional convention. In theory, any document drafted by this convention would be returned to individuals throughout the world for their approval. The assumption of the Direct Democracy movement is that individuals throughout the world have the right to bypass existing governments in order to establish the rule of law on a global level. Leaders of this movement believe that the Direct Democracy movement is consistent with democratic ideas, including those articulated by Locke. Two questions are at issue. First, do individuals have the right to bypass existing governments in order to establish an international government? Second, is it desirable to establish world government? I conclude that, according to Locke, sovereign power rests with individuals—not governments. Individuals have the right to delegate a portion of their power from one government to another and, when they do so, revolution ensues. Revolution of this sort would be desirable because national governments cannot provide security in the nuclear age. So individuals should transfer some power from the national to the international level. The call for a world constitutional convention is a call for a peaceful revolution that could abolish war.

Both domestic and foreign policies of each state presuppose a certain ideology as a foundation. In a broad sense, an ideology may be regarded as a certain 'system of coordinates,' an interpretational model of the world (Weltanschauung) including both empirico-theoretical (realizing a nation's place in regional and global contexts, with a clear understanding of national interests, goals and resources) and metatheoretical (comprehending a nation in the context of human history and culture) levels. Some of the main issues on the agenda in Russia are the clear understanding and definition of national goals and interests, the formulation of a strategy of development in economic, social, political, etc., arenas, and the establishment of both domestic and foreign policy. I suggest that Russia currently does not have an ideology or a system of values able to unite the society. In short, I argue that Russia needs a new strategy of development, a new national idea which can replace (or fill the vacuum left by the collapse of) the old communist ideology.

David Hume offers a well conceived plan for the formation of government and its political workings. Furthermore, he grants that in special circumstances the citizens of a particular government may revolt. However, with respect to obedience and disloyalty, Hume gives no formal rules for revolution. We would like something more from Hume regarding revolution and, more specifically, what he considers justified revolution. Some authors, such as Richard H. Dees, find the basis for Hume’s account of justified revolution in his historical works. By connecting Hume’s historical writings with his political theory, we find a fuller account of revolution. Such an account, however, does not require him to give a rule or maxim prescribing revolution since such a rule or maxim would obviously go against his political theory as stated in the Treatise and his political essays. In sum, justified revolution for Hume centers around the established political practices and the principled causes held by factions. Unjustified revolutions, however, are denoted by lack of adherence to established practices and want of a genuine cause. They are, rather, motivated by speculative factions subject to fanaticism and enthusiasm which are the foundations of Hume’s political worries. These central tenets of Hume’s view of revolution are delineated within this paper.

The liberal principle of tolerance limits the use of coercion by a commitment to the broadest possible toleration of rival religious and moral conceptions of the worthy way of life. While accepting the communitarian insight that moral thought is necessarily rooted in a social self with conceptions of the good, I argue that this does not undermine liberal tolerance. There is no thickly detailed way of life so embedded in our self-conceptions that liberal neutrality is blocked at the level of reflection. This holds true for us in virtue of the socially acquired reflective self found in the pluralist modern world. I reject Michael J. Sandel’s argument that to resolve issues of privacy rights we must reach a shared view of the moral worth of, for instance, homosexual conduct. The view of community most consistent with our situation is a simple causal conception: we are all members of the same community to the extent that we inhabit the same world of causes, physical and social. Any attempt to call us to some thicker, stronger conception of community fails to speak to us in our modernity.

If political dialogue is to identify and redress existing forms of injustice, participants in the dialogue must be able to appeal to the concept of objectivity in order to exchange claims, attitudes, and background beliefs which distort or conceal various forms of injustice. The conceptions of objectivity traditionally employed in liberal democratic political philosophy are not well-suited to play this role because they are insufficiently sensitive to the social and ideological pluralism of modern societies. Some liberal political philosophers have recently offered more context-sensitive and pluralistic conceptions of objectivity, requiring participants in political dialogue to frame their demands for justice in terms of a conception of justice acceptable to all participants in the dialogue. I argue that this conception of objectivity constitutes an improvement over traditional liberal conceptions. However, it is ultimately unacceptable because it does not take adequate account of the limited and distorted knowledge that members of dominant social groups tend to possess about the oppression experienced by members of subordinate and marginalized groups. As a result, this conception of objectivity wrongly deems the demands for justice voiced by members of subordinate and marginalized groups to be subjective simply because they seem unreasonable from the limited and distorting standpoint of dominant social groups.

In the wake of the postmodernist onslaught one thing is certain: morality is in crisis. Where are we to look for answers? Perhaps to the German idealists—that is, to their bold synthesis of right and freedom. This paper seeks to bring the timely issue of absolute freedom and the possibility of its total realization back into ethical-political discussion. Through a close comparison of the theories of Fichte and Hegel via a critique of the former by the latter, I show that the antidote to many of our political, moral and theological distresses may well be found in Hegel’s concept of the State and Sittlichkeiti. e., truly understood as the realization of absolute freedom, or the "We that is I."

This paper explores the relationship between justice and government, examining views on the subject expressed by traditional political philosophers such as Rousseau and Locke, as well as those expressed by contemporary political theorists such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. According to Rawls, justice is one of the fundamental concerns of a governing body; Locke and Rousseau agree that government and justice are essentially connected. Nozick and Max Weber, however, claim that the essential characteristic of government is not justice, but power. This paper argues that government, as an institution formed and controlled by human beings, is subject to the moral injunction to treat human beings as entities accorded certain rights, and included among these rights is the right to just treatment. Governments are therefore enjoined to be just because human beings, as rational agents, and therefore persons, are owed the minimal respect due a person, such as the right to freedom and the right to forbearance from harm by others to self and property.

This essay seeks to show that there are political implications in Jacques Derrida’s critique of J.L. Austin’s notion of performative speech. If, as Derrida claims and Austin denies, performative utterances are necessarily "contaminated" by that which Austin refuses to consider (the speech of the poet and the actor in which literal force is never intended), then what are the implications for the speech acts of the state? Austin considers the speech acts of the poet and the actor to be "parasites" or "ordinary language," "nonserious," and would relegate such speech to a region beyond his consideration, to a "ditch" outside the border of meaning for the performative. Derrida argues that the "contamination" Austin fears for language is necessary for its very performativity. If Derrida is correct, then the performative utterances of the state (e.g. the decree of the judge, "I sentence you...") from the biases of racial or sexual identity is also based upon an impossible desire, a desire that goes against the manner in which language functions. I argue that this desire for a just state cannot be satisfied unless racial and sexual identity is viewed not as "parasitic" and "poetic," but as necessary to the performativity of the state’s liberal power.

Rawls' theory of justice as fairness involves a central contention that principles of justice essential to the structure of a constitutional democracy must be viewed as political in contrast to more comprehensive moral, philosophical or religious doctrines. The concept of justice is not its being true to an antecedent moral order and given to us, but its being congruent with our self-understanding within the history of justice as political is not a mere modus vivendi, for it embodies an overlapping consensus that does have a moral basis. Critical reaction to Rawls has been that what is simply a consensus within a tradition of public discourse cannot afford an adequate criteria of moral justification, and that Rawls cannot define the moral basis for justice as fairness without some reference to a comprehensive theory of the good. But it will be argued that critics are missing what is central to Rawls' theory of moral justification as what he sees to be the outcome of a process of "wide reflective equilibrium" in which principles of justice initially given within a tradition are weighed against rival moral theories and in relation to scientific theories of human nature and society in order to establish what seems "most reasonable to us."

There have been many discussions about ‘Liberalism’ in modern political philosophy. In this paper, I want to discuss the liberal principles of political philosophy on the metaphysical level. This includes the liberal mind, the liberal consciousness, and the liberal ethos, all of which are presupposed in our liberal behaviors, and in turn serve as fundamental principles in any multicultural society. I want to emphasize the liberal tendencies of self-criticism and of the critical way of thinking in European traditional metaphysics, such as Plato’s dialectics or Kant’s philosophy of criticism. The latter is also the logic of dialogue which produces an endless questioning of possible universal truths. I group these characteristics under the label ‘Metaphysical Liberalism’ and assess them from three standpoints: (1) critical agnosticism; (2) methodological falsificationism; and (3) pluralistic universalism. These three points enable us to remain self-conscious of the limitation of any kind of special theory or thought in order to prevent the emergence of any dogmatic belief-system. Such liberal attitudes that allow the realization of individual ideas and thoughts without any political coercion in turn sustain a democratic federalism that creates space for the expression of public opinion even while protecting such space. Such a situation, however, is possible only by educating ourselves in this metaphysical method.

This paper deals with the characteristic features of Rawls’ property-owning democracy, and whether a liberal democratic socialism can be compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism. I argue that a property-owning democracy can be compatible with Rawlsian justice while liberal socialism cannot. I understand the choice between property-owning democracy and liberal socialism as the problem of which kind of regime is more compatible with the pluralism of modern democracies. Property-owning democracy is more compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism since it permits a wider variety of the conceptions of the good than liberal socialism while at the same time permitting worker-managed firms; thus I argue that it can be understood as a "mixed" regime.

The questions suggested by the term "multiculturalism" range far and wide, embracing: questions of inclusion; questions of criteria; questions of self-identity; and questions of the meaning of multiculturalism. In this essay I provide a framework: (i) that allows us to begin a discussion that might answer such questions; (ii) that illuminates why it is that such a modest aim is the most we can hope for at this time; and (iii) that provides an understanding of what we can do in a multicultural world in order to illuminate what we should do. This framework will reject both the idea of toleration as found in Berlin’s conception of human choice and will speak of as maximal multiculturalism, an orientation that is found in John Milton’s idea of truth as variegated and that sees multiculturalism as a great good. These views are plagued by at least three paradoxes that are really inconsistencies. In their place I develop the idea of a mitigated multiculturalism based on fear rather than on any ideal or vision, and with this a distinction between positive and negative toleration. Negative toleration proves to parallel a classic Hobbesianism, which while an unwelcome result, paradoxically, provides further direction and reason for hope that mitigated multiculturalism can and must be surpassed.

Within the liberal framework, policies designed to rectify inequality generally take two forms: the formal equality option of equal treatment for everyone or the substantive equality option of "special" treatment for those whose difference continues to matter. Martha Minow argues that the framework creates a "dilemma of difference" because each option risks creating or perpetuating further disadvantages for members of oppressed groups. This paper examines the framework and the dilemma by highlighting the relational features of the language of equality and of people who make determinations of equality. Relational insights are used to reexamine feminist work on care ethics, work considered to be hostile to equality analysis and justice theory. By providing a relational critique both of care ethics and of justice theory, I attempt to bring the two closer together by highlighting various connections. Care and justice are not entirely or always in opposition, but they inevitably interact and intertwine in ways that allow new possibilities and ways of being in social relations to emerge.

National sovereignty presents a puzzle. On the one hand, this notion continues to figure importantly in our descriptions of global political change. On the other hand, factors such as the accelerating pace of international economic integration seem to have made the notion anachronistic. This paper is an attempt to resolve this puzzle. Distinguishing between internal sovereignty or supremacy and external sovereignty or independence, I investigate whether some insights from the discussion of the former can be applied to our puzzle concerning the latter. One response to the objection that the notion of internal sovereignty is inapplicable because no group in society holds unlimited political power is to distinguish between different types of internal sovereignty, such as legal and electoral sovereignty. The resolution of the puzzle lies in applying this response strategy to the objection that the notion of external sovereignty is inapplicable because no state is completely independent.