According to the social contract theory, in order to achieve justice, people grouped themselves in societies. Historically speaking, judges appeared long before the legislator which means that justice was the first element of the social life. Therefore, it expresses the social ethics of a particular time and requires a minimum of credibility. Excessive pragmatism and utilitarianism have kidnapped more and more of what is humane, superior and sacred in the act of justice, and “secularized” it. As Eliade said in The Sacred and the Profane, the sacred is something which is totally different, a space of radical otherness which overshadows the physical territory. This shading manifests itself through limitation, sequencing, reiteration and keeping what is sacred there, even in a courtroom, through ritualization.

The Sophists were the first supporters of the values of knowledge, education and political self-determination. Their attitude and tactics demonstrated that human nature and especially every individual’s personality is of prior importance. The Sophists rejected the idea of the ontological stability of the laws and declared their confidence in the eternal values of the natural law and cosmopolitanism, in the individual ability of every human being and in the concurrent refusal of traditions and of any form of authenticity. In addition, the Sophists were the first innovative enlightenment philosophers, who tried to exert their influence on society by using their teachings.

First I discuss the rights as unavoidable part of the human dignity. There are four possible relations: dignity has a wider extension, the volume of both is equivalent, dignity includes in itself a bundle of rights, or it is just a simple right. There are good reasons to support the last two, even the last position. Then I evaluate some of the challenging innovations in the medical technology, if they are acceptable in front of this close connection. The focus falls on three topics: PGD, cloning, and fusion of human-animal cells. Using moral principles such as non discrimination and non instrumentalization I look for some normative framing.

The first section of this paper examines the discursive procedure employed by Socrates to subvert common preconceptions of important socio-behavioral notions. The point of reference will be the concept of courage which is the main concern in Plato’s Laches. The key characteristics of paideia can be exhibited by reconstructing the procedure common sense is subjected to in this example. The second section discusses the tremendous influence this pattern of inquiry has had on traditional philosophy. Particular attention is drawn to the way it confers superiority to philosophers in “pedagogical” discourse and to the fact that this privileged stance can by no means be taken for granted under present circumstances.

Ren xing shan (human nature is good) is a famous thesis of Mencius. But it is questionable whether the Mencian concept of ren xing is an exact equivalent of the Western concept of human nature, and whether Mencius really thinks that all human beings are naturally moral. This paper suggests that when talking about ren xing, Mencius actually refers to both human being and human becoming. Ren xing may have a root in the nature of human being, which is a “mandate” endowed by the “Heaven.” But the complete notion of ren xing should be construed in terms of the process towards full human becoming. “Human nature is good” does not guarantee complete virtue for individual human beings. However, the human being has the capability of pursuing the moral direction along life’s path, and should take the responsibility of maintaining the right moral direction of human becoming, and thus should avoid veering from this moral path. This interpretation may provide a more consistent understanding of the metaphysical foundation, theoretic system, and self-cultivation practice of the Mencian ethics.

This essay considers the concrete consequences for human lives of social and economic values. Through case studies indicative of the Victorian age, early 20th century and contemporary 21st century, the evolutionary change in specific values is exhibited. Values are recognized as essentially shaping human conduct, while the exercise of individual choices in this milieu has resulted in progressive shifts breaking up the rigid adherence to values, establishing the possibility in some areas for greater tolerance, such as in the area of mores determining the institution of marriage. The destructive nature of corruption through material values is also presented.

The paper presents the role of the experience of historical transformation in the modifications of the historical conscience: the fragmentation, the marginality and the removal from the rational foundation of values. It associates the postmodern world with different forms of losing the sense of values, the lack of measure and nuance in appreciation, the weak preoccupation for identity, authenticity, conscience of values in human behavior. In order to discuss the theory of values the paper introduces Rickertʼs theory of the autonomy of value, Andreiʼs and Vianuʼs conceptions on the system of values, Schelerʼs hierarchy of values, and Hartmannʼs concept of knowledge of value.

This paper focuses on the relationship of myth with the ancient regime and on the transformation of poetic wisdom into poetic politics. The basic idea of this study claims that the political life in ancient communities was been projected into a mythology, and, in turn, a mythology often legitimizes political life. By reading Plato’s Timaeus and Novalis’ Heinrich von Afterdingen, this study aims to bring out the connection between the ancient and modern political regimes.

Although the cultural values of the Igbo of South-East Nigeria are multiple and diverse, research seems to have identified a seminal link between most of them to the much touted sense of communality. In communality, the sheer strength and vivacity of the Igbo spirit is magnificently showcased, and in it there is a concrete assemblage of the Igbo mythology.In this paper the Igbo myths of the origin of mankind and death are explored to evaluate their rich meaning-contents, their significant influence on the religious-cultural, and, in consequence, the whole gamut of the traditional people’s worldview was duly x-rayed. In conclusion, observations were presented which indicate that even the contemporary Igbo pathways are not bereft of the daunting influences of ancient myths.

In this article, we examine, in the light of Arendt’s categories, the fundamental structure of traditional claims on moral life. In other words, we evaluate the spirit inwhich traditional morality relates to the human world, especially, to the human condition of plurality. In this way, we shall be led to a perceptive reading of Arendt’sgroundbreaking view on morality and its borderline possibility of assuming a paradoxically significant role in the worldly affairs.

This paper concerns the prospects for an internal validation of the Aristotelian virtues of character. With respect to the more contentious trait of patriotism, this approach for validating some specific trait of character as a virtue of character provides a plausible and nuanced Aristotelian position that does not fall neatly into any of the categories provided by a recent mapping of the terrain surrounding the issue of patriotism. According to the approach advocated here, patriotism can plausibly, though qualifiedly, be defended as a virtue, by stressing its similarities to another loyalty-exhibiting trait about which Aristotle has quite a bit to say: the virtue of friendship.

The paper tackles the question of the relevance of emotions in ethics. It argues that emotions are discerning and thus inherent components of morality and they deserve a place in adequate ethical projects. The paper engages into a conversation with Martha C. Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas. Specifically, it presents accounts of compassion and anger to illustrate the discerning nature of these emotions and the moral value they might signal.

This article discusses the corporeal component of the human mind. Uncertainty is a fundamental attribute of the human body due to which a body transforms itself into the body that allows to connect the world with the human mind. The process of overcoming the transcendental register of the human mind results in the ontological and anthropological shifts from ego to soma. Tracing the trajectory of these shifts we discover the bodily dimension in the human mind as its constitutive transcendental ground. This dimension makes the mind not only open to the world but makes the world a part of the human mind. It prevents the mind from exerting power over the world, and gives rise to life vitality of the embodied mind.

The problem sketched here in a non-conformist phenomenological manner concerns the transition from the theory of the self-sufficient individual to the theories of the social character of human being, and to the theoretical possibility to control the social asymmetries opposing to its fulfilment.

Passionate human behavior should be regulated by moral instructions, teaching and practices. For explaining the issue, Rene Descartes in The Passions of the Soul and the Hindu traditions of Sāṁkhya are here considered. These two systems provide fourdimensional physical, mental/moral and spiritual descriptions of human nature and a mechanism of regulating passions. The first two parts of the paper are focused on the nature of human beings, its holistic and integrative character, and on understanding emotional behavior. The next two parts describe moral ways used to regulate passions on the basis of Samkhya’s eight steps, i.e., reasoning, hearing, studying, Pramod, Mudita̅and Modma̅n, respect and gratitude. Descartes’ concept of generosity as a basis of the inculcation of virtues like self-esteem, veneration, hope, courage and bravery, selfsatisfaction, is also analyzed. In conclusion, the relevance of the aforementioned mechanismis presented at the individual and social levels.

In the Renaissance period, being a “humanist” meant graduating from a philosophical faculty and teaching the collection of disciplines necessary to become a university student. In this view, the humanist is the man of the unaccomplished higher education, or, a school teacher. Neither his status, nor the status of the disciplines he taught was high. Over time the situation changed. Studying ancient languages opened a whole world of the disappeared civilization, obvious ancestors to the Renaissance; a conception of humanitarian-historical cognition was founded. The Renaissance was the first to formulate a problem of comprehension—of the historical epochs passed, of the texts based on other (alien) experience and different mentality. In the context of unique singularitythe concepts of fate and biography were overestimated. The thesis of micro and macrocosm unity was revived. The humanists have created a new translation of the Holy Writ; as a result, the sense of many rite ceremonies of liturgy became clearer. Historicism and criticism have brought a new type of thinking and a new system of values in the long run. Humanistic values constructed the first system that had no need in religious foundation, and its relation with Christianity was not logical, but historical.All this, though well known, gains quite other sense today. The world becomes more and more complicated and multicultural. A post-secular, polio-confessional socium comes to replace the secular society. The former needs a new experience, as unique as that of Renaissance humanitarians.

This paper examines the relation between the problem of human nature and political theory; it is claimed that every such theory is founded on some anthropological preconditions. The paper studies the political conceptions of four modern philosophers: Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Pyotr Kropotkin. It reveals that two opposing tendencies form the imaginary of the modern era: the authoritative one that identifies an egoistic/ unsociable human nature that needs control, and the libertarian one that recognizes a human being capable of more advanced types of social fabric. It is also investigated how anthropological dualism can be transcended to permit the conception of a new anthropological type as well as the type of society that will help the humanpotentiality of consciousness and coexistence to unfold.

The paper deals with the Sartrean concept of lived experience which constitutes a bridge between phenomenology and Marxism, psychology and ontology, individual and society, as well as between philosophy and literary criticism. The notion of lived experience is rooted in psychology, at the same time being embedded in literary criticism and phenomenology. It is interlinked with the notions of facticity, contingency, singularity, intersubjectivity, and body in the Being and Nothingness, and became the theoretical base of Sartre’s essays on Baudelaire, Genet, and especially of that on Flaubert. This lived experience is closely related to the Sartrean phenomenological concept of nature which consists in the non-reflexive conscience of our own presence-at-theworld, including corporeality.

We analyse some current trends of viewing transformational changes of humankind (transhumanism, theory of androgyny, etc.). We present the key role played by philosophy of education in shaping an image of the future human being. We also determine the main characteristics of the personality of the planetary-cosmic type and the system of his personal, local and global interactions.