In this essay, I consider the role of anger in the moral life, especially in the Christian moral life. For this purpose it makes sense to explore three questions. First, how should we describe the phenomenon of anger? Second, what virtues and/or vices properly account for the affection? Finally, what theological assessments of the phenomenon are most fitting? In Parts I, II, and III below, I pursue a response to the first two questions through a kind of Aristotelian strategy that describes the mean of the virtue rightly disposing us to be (both) good and angry. The final three sections more overtly consider theological assessments. My concern throughout is to give an account of anger that helps us make the everyday discriminations appropriate to the Christian life, a life in which the work of love may complete and transform the terms of justice. Most specifically, I explore how the sin of pride deforms the creaturely self-respect that anger fittingly protects, and describe one sort of correction to that peril that is proposed within Christian tradition. I believe that mine is a partial account. Surely it may be complemented by other approaches that pursue different emphases; nevertheless, I think that what follows captures something essential about Christian evaluations of the human emotion at issue.

A key aspect of the human rights debate in Africa has centered on the kinds of rights that are appropriate for the continent. This essay examines the controversy between the advocates of civil-political rights and those of socio-economic rights, and the tendency to separate these two sets of values on the grounds of their supposed incompatibility and of Africa's unique realities. The essay contends that this conclusion is dangerous as it could be used as an excuse to ignore any human rights in Africa, a fear that is justified by the recent history of the continent. Drawing upon religious and ethical perspectives, it proposes the concept of interdependence to forge a normative unity between the two contested sets of rights and argues that this integral vision of rights is needed to ensure maximal realization of human and communal flourishings in Africa.