181.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
3 >
Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD
Znovu o abstraktních pojmech:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
|
|
|
182.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
3 >
Issue: 2
Patricia Díaz-Herrera
The Notion of Time in Francisco Suárez and its Contemporary Relevance:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In the fiftieth disputation of his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), Francisco Suárez distinguishes three notions of time. Suárez offers an account of the ways in which the predicate ‘when’ can be taken and presents a more general perspective based on the principle of duration, rather than the Aristotelian definition of time. His view differs from Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ account because Suárez emphasizes that time cannot be reduced to the number of the movement of the last sphere in the Aristotelian model of the cosmos. The intrinsic duration of a thing is its true time; this duration can be taken in an absolute or a relative sense. In an absolute sense, intrinsic time is an internal property of a thing that cannot be really distinguished from existence itself and cannot be compared with other durations. In a relative sense, we can imagine this intrinsic duration as filling up a certain interval within an infinitely extended imaginary succession. This imaginary succession is an ens rationis. The third concept of time is the Aristotelian notion: this is just an extrinsic time, a measurement of one movement by means of a comparison with another movement, especially the motion of the last sphere. Finally, in order to show the value of Suárez’s insights, I compare them with some contemporary issues in the analytic philosophy of time.
|
|
|
183.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
8 >
Issue: 2
Miroslav Hanke
„Debeo tibi equum“ Analýza slibů v terministické sémantice čtrnáctého století:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The construction of mediaeval semantic theories is based on defining semantic concepts introduced by means of paradigmatic examples. One of the commonly discussed expressions is the promise “Debeo tibi equum”. This study deals with analyses of this proposition in fourteenth century logic done by means of instruments of terminist semantics. We may distinguish between realist and nominalist analyses, the nominalist may further be classified according to how the propositional context is interpreted – whether as extensional, intensional or hyperintensional. If we take the function terminist logic has with respect to grounded elimination of false inferences as the criterion of its effectivity, all solutions must be considered comparably effective, and therefore acceptable.Medio aevo doctrinae semanticae super notionum semanticarum definitiones, quae exem plorum allatorum auxilio communiter introducebantur, construi solebant. Inter exempla saepius pertractata est etiam hoc promissum “Debeo tibi equum”. In dissertatione nostra explicationes, quae instrumentis semantices terministicae 14. saeculo in logica propositae sunt, investigamus, quorum aliae sunt realisticae, aliae nominalisticae. Inter hasce aliud porro discrimen notaripotest, scilicet quod aliae contextum dicti “extensionalem”, aliae “intensionalem”, aliae “hyperintensionalem” interpretantur. Quae omnes explicationes fere aeque efficaces esse inveniuntur, inquantum scilicet sufficientia praebent fundamenta ad argumenta fallacia eliminanda, quod et aeque acceptabiles.
|
|
|
184.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
8 >
Issue: 2
Helen Hattab
Suárez and Descartes:
A Priori Arguments Against Substantial Forms and the Decline of the Formal Cause
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In hac dissertatione primo ostendo Cartesii “argumentum a priori” contra formas substantiales proprie intelligendum esse ex definitione formae substantialis, quam F. Suarez proposuit, et ex ipsius argumentis a priori pro ea. Hoc quidem argumentum Cartesianum non nisi polemicam vim habere videtur, nam Cartesius potius ex superioritate explanationum mechanicarum a se percepta formas substantiales impugnavit. Tamen ipsum factum, Cartesium scil. in doctrinamSuarezianam de forma substantiali incurrisse, doctrinae Suarezianae auctoritatem et famam contestatur. Aliis verbis, Descartes sane demonstrationem, qua Suarezii argumenta ad absurdum reducentur, maiori momenti esse exspectavit quam argumentationem contra doctrinam Thomisticam de forma substantiali. Secundo ostendo definitionem Suarezianam formae substantialis novam conceptionem causalitatis formalis exegisse. Suarez causalitatem formalem ad modum unionis formae substantiali cum materia limitavit, quo pacto vim eius in philosophia naturali diminuit significantiamque causarum materialis ac efficientis in nova philosophia mechanistica anticipavit. Hoc modo serior metaphysica scholastica indirecte velut dispositionem fundamentalem praebuit ad rerum naturalium explanationes mechanisticas recipiendas ac sustinendas.In this paper I first show that Descartes’ a priori argument against substantial forms is properly understood against the background of Suárez’s definition of and a priori arguments for the substantial form. Even though Descartes’ a priori argument appears to have only a polemical value since his own path to the elimination of substantial forms was based on the perceived superiority of mechanical explanations, the fact that Descartes targeted Suárez’s account of the substantial form in his polemical argument bears witness to its widespread influence. In other words, Descartes expected that a proof that reduced Suárez’s argument to absurdity would have a greater impact than an argument directed against Aquinas’ account of substantial forms. Secondly, I show that Suárez’s definition of the substantial form prompted a reconceptualization of the role of formal causality. Suárez limits formal causality to the mode of union between the substantial form and matter, thus deemphasizing its importance to natural philosophical explanations and anticipating the emphasis on material and efficient causes typical of the new mechanical philosophy. In this indirect manner, late Scholastic metaphysics provided a general framework in which mechanical explanations of natural phenomena could find a place and take hold.
|
|
|
185.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
8 >
Issue: 2
David Černý,
Elisa Ferretti
Gödelův důkaz Boží existence:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Dissertatio proposita circa “argumentum ontologicum” pro existentia Dei, quem K. Goedel construxit, versatur. In prima parte structuram logicam dicti argumenti exponimus, singulos gradus argumenti explicamus, “collapsumque modalitatum”, quo argumentum invalidari invenitur, examinamus. Sequenti parte recentiores quasdam confectiones argumenti pertractamus; et scil. praecipue formam eius, quae super conceptum mathematicum multitudinis seu “complexus elementorum terminatorum” fundatur, et formam “algebraicam”, quarum affinitates quasdam notabiles prae oculos ponimus. Ultima parte disceptationes, quae circa huiusce argumenti validitatem ac momentum respectu modernae theisticae philosophiae agebantur, describimus. Loco conclusionis observamus, Goedelii argumentum exemplum esse notabile “fidei quaerentis intellectum”.The article deals with Gödel’s ontological proof of God’s existence. It consists of three parts. In the first part we present the logical structure of the argument, analyse its individual steps and discuss the implied collapse of modalities, which is fatal for the proof. In the second part we focus on some more recent versions of the argument, especially the set-theoretical version and the algebraic version, and we show several interesting connexions between the algebraic and the set-theoretical version. In the final part of the paper we briefly recount the discussions concerning the validity of the argument and its importance for modern theistic philosophy. We conclude by observing that Gödel’s argument is an interesting modern instance of “faith seeking understanding”.
|
|
|
186.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
8 >
Issue: 2
Peter Volek
Hylomorphism as a Solution for Freedom and for Personal Identity:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Secundum Petrum Bieri dualismus ontologicus hoc trilemma generat: 1) Status mentis non sunt status physici. 2) Status mentis causalitatem exerceunt in regionem statuum physicorum. 3) Regio statuum physicorum est causaliter clausa. Haec tertia propositio a Bieri “physicalismum methodologicum” exprimere dicitur. Ut hoc trilemma solvat, Bieri unum eius membrorum reicere suadet. Hylemorphismus causalitatem mentis ut causalitetem formalem explicat, relationem vero hominis ad mundum ut causalitatem efficientem. Unde clausura causalis mundi de causalitate efficiente intelligi potest, quae in physica investigatur. Liberum arbitrium ab intentione mentis originem trahit. Etiam possibilitas libertatis humanae ex intentionalitate mentis explicari potest. Libertas adhuc hominis ut electio unae duarum optionum intelligi potest. Homo eligens rationes ponderat, quae sunt abstractae et distinctae a causis efficientibus rerum materialium, quae sunt concretae. Doctrina hylemorfica insuper fundamenum sufficiens ad problema identitatis personae per tempus solvendum praebere potest. Quoniam omnia elementa materialia in homine per tempus mutantur – imo DNA mutari potest –, principium identitatis immateriale esse debet. Pro principio identitatis igitur forma substantialis personae accipi potest, quae est metaphysica explicatio naturae mentis, quae actionem liberam electione deliberata per intentionalitatem libertatemque arbitrii inchoare potest)Peter Bieri formulates the assumptions of the ontological dualism via a trilemma: 1) Mental states are not physical states. 2) Mental states have causal effects in the realm of physical states. 3) The realm of physical states is causally closed. Bieri labels the third sentence of this trilemma as methodological physicalism. In order to solve this trilemma Bieri proposes to abandon one of the three premises. Hylomorphism explains mental causality as formal causality, and the relation between human beings and the world as efficient causality. Thus, the causal closure of the world can be understood as closure of the efficient causes, which are studied by physics. Free decision begins with the intentionality of the mind. The possibility of human freedom can also be explained through the intentionality of the mind. Human freedom can be understood as a choice between two alternatives. When choosing, human beings weigh reasons which are abstract and distinct from the efficient causes of material objects that are concrete. Hylomorphism can, further, provide sufficient grounds for solving the issue of personal identity through time. Since all the material elements in a human being change through time – even the DNA can change – the principle of identity cannot be material in character. Thus, it is the substantial form of a person (i.e. the metaphysical explanation of the mind, which is capable of initiating free action through its intentionality and freedom of choice in deliberate decision making) that can be accepted as the principle of identity.
|
|
|
187.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
8 >
Issue: 2
Yehuda Halper
The Convergence of Religious and Metaphysical Concepts:
Mofet and Devequt in the Hebrew Translation of Averroës’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Translators of Aristotle’s and Averroës’ metaphysical works into 14th C Hebrew often associated important philosophical concepts with Hebrew terms that were also used to signify central Jewish and Biblical religious concepts. Here I examine how two such terms, “mofet” and “devequt”, were used to refer to extraordinary, divine wonders and to clinging (in particular to God) respectively in the religious texts, but to Aristotelian demonstration and continuity (especially noetic continuity) respectively in the translations of Averroës’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This kind of convergence of metaphysical and religious terms makes possible, indeed encourages, a re-interpretation of the religious concepts along Aristotelian lines. Biblical expressions of God’s wonders are thus to be interpreted to refer to Aristotelian demonstration and the mystical desire to cling to God is to refer to unifi cation with the Active Intellect.Translatores, qui Aristotelis et Averrois opera metaphysica in linguam Hebraicam saeculi 14. transferebant, notabilibus conceptibus philosophicis saepe nomina Hebraica assignaverut, quibus et principales notiones religiosae Judaicae ac Biblicae solebant exprimi. In hac dissertatione investigatur, quomodo duo talium nominum, scil. “mofet” et “devequt”, quae in textibus religiosis “extra ordinaria miracula divina” et “adhaerentiam” (praecipue ad Deum) proprie significant, in translationibus Averrois Commentarii Magni in Aristotelis Metaphysicam ad demonstrationem Aristotelicam et continuationem (praecipue noeticam) significandas transumebantur. Huiusmodi nominum metaphysicorum cum religiosis coniunctio conceptus religiosos iuxta sensum Aristotelicum denuo explicari permittit, imo suadet. Hinc dicta Biblica quae miracula Dei olim significaverunt ad demonstrationes Aristotelicas relata sunt; item desiderium mysticum adhaerendi ad Deum de unione cum Intellectu Agenti intellectum est.
|
|
|
188.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 2
Miroslav Hanke
The Simple Paradoxes of Validity and Bradwardinian-Buridanian Semantics:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
This paper deals with the simple paradoxes of validity and with the possibility of solving them in terms of Bradwardinian-Buridanian semantics. The paradoxes of validity as conceived here are cases of semantic pathology, which result due to the use of terms signifying the validity of inference. Semantic paradoxes are a semantico-epistemological phenomenon which is a symptom of the need to revise several apparently acceptable semantic assumptions. The analysis of possible solutions to the paradoxes focuses on Bradwardinian-Buridanian semantics and as a result on the closed, token-based semantic theories that assume the existence of an implicit meaning of propositions. The key theses, as far as the solution to the paradoxes is concerned, are the principle of truth-implication which claims that every proposition expresses or implies its own truth and the closure principle which claims that every proposition asserts or expresses everything that follows from it logically. The present paper advances on recent research in claiming that (with certain reservations) the application of these principles can effectively solve inconsistency-paradoxes but not indeterminacy-paradoxes of validity.
|
|
|
189.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 2
Tomáš Akvinský,
Daniel Heider
O principech přirozenosti:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
|
|
|
190.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 2
David Svoboda
Participace v díle Tomáše Akvinského:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The paper deals with Aquinas’s concept of participation. Its goal is to introduce the reader to the problem, since no significant attention has been paid to it in Czech literature so far. The article is divided into three main parts: first a general description and division of participation is given, second the mutually opposite properties “to be through essence” and “to be through participation” are explained and finally the other general characteristics of participation are put forth.
|
|
|
191.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
19 >
Issue: 7
Prokop Sousedík,
David Svoboda
Pojetí muže a ženy (nejenom) u Platóna a Aristotela:
Problematika rovnosti a rozdílů obou pohlaví
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
We deal with the concept of man and woman, as well as with the problem of their equality, in the two great ancient thinkers Plato and Aristotle. The discussion of Plato leads to the conclusion that there is no substantial difference between man and woman. We find Plato’s view close or similar to today’s widely held doctrine of “unisexism”. Aristotle on the other hand believes that there are important differences between man and woman and we find in his texts two approaches to the problem. In his first view the sex difference is due to the lesser perfection of woman, according to the second view both sexes are equally perfect, nevertheless each in its own way. Both conceptions have their supporters in contemporary thought (so-called theories of „polarism“ and „compatibilism“). From a systematic point of view we suggest that Aristotle´s second approach should be further developed as it is most in accord with our Christian worldview.
|
|
|
192.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD
Imagination, Intellect and Premotion A Psychological Theory of Domingo Báñez:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The notion of physical premotion (praemotio physica) is usually associated with the theological topic of divine concurrence (concursus divinus). In the present paper I argue that the Thomist Domingo Báñez (1528–1604) applied the concept of premotion (though not the expression “praemotio”) also in his psychology. According to Báñez, the active intellect (intellectus agens) communicates a kind of “actual motion” to the phantasma (i.e. the mental sensory image perceived by the imagination) in order to render it a collaborator of intellectual cognition. Such an actual motion is, in other words, a premotion to the effect, as the phantasma is, in Báñez’s view, “elevated” to the production of an effect that transcends its proper powers. This Báñez’s theory was largely accepted in the subsequent development of Thomism.
|
|
|
193.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
7 >
Issue: 2
P. Banks
O filosofické interpretaci logiky aristotelský dialog:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
|
|
|
194.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
14 >
Issue: 4
Prokop Sousedík,
David Svoboda
Je Tomášovo pojetí matematiky instrumentalistické?:
Reakce na kritiku L. Nováka
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In our contribution we continue our discussion with L. Novák, who criticised our paper “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk.” Novák’s critique titled “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” served as an incentive for us not only to clarify certain points, but also to deepen our original exposition. We focused on Aquinas’s understanding of mathematics, the middle sciences and philosophy. We still insist that two substantially different interpretations of these disciplines are possible. On the one hand, there is much evidence for Aquinas’s realistic approach to mathematics and the middle sciences. On the other hand, ideas can also be found in Aquinas’s texts supporting an instrumentalist reading. In our opinion, it is important to point out these two approaches to the mathematical sciences in order to adequately understand the subsequent evolution of the history of ideas, especially in the modern period.
|
|
|
195.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
2 >
Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD
Ad „K modálnímu ontologickému důkazu“:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
|
|
|
196.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
2 >
Issue: 2
Augustin Riška
An aristotelian theory of power (metaphysical reflections):
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In this essay I investigate the interplay between actual and potential properties of a thing within an Aristotelian conceptual framework. A minimal formal treatment of such interplay is proposed, outlining the actual or possible causal impact of these properties with respect to the changes of a thing in question. I also mention the historically interesting controversy between Aristotle and the Megarians concerning the relationship between power and act, as well as Hintikka’s application of the Principle of Plenitude. The essay ends with certain suggestions for treating the problems of actual and potential properties by means of dispositions and contrary-to-fact conditionals.
|
|
|
197.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
2 >
Issue: 2
Prokop Sousedík
Moorova filosofická metoda:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In this article I consider two aspects of Moore’s philosophical method which lead to the turn to natural language. These are his interest in the meaning (not the truth) of problematic philosophical theses and his interest in common sense philosophy. However, Moore himself did not completely achieve the linguistic turn: he merely prepared the way for it. In the conclusions I show that Moore’s themes were developed by N. Malcom. The deeper sense of my paper is to show that the linguistic turn as begun by Moore does not conflict with the spirit of the Aristotelian tradition.
|
|
|
198.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
2 >
Issue: 2
Alfred J. Freddoso
Fides et ratio:
radikální vize intelektuálního bádání
|
|
|
199.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
2 >
Issue: 2
Thomas Williams
Nad metodou historie filosofie:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
|
|
|
200.
|
Studia Neoaristotelica:
Volume >
2 >
Issue: 2
Stanislav Sousedík
M. Rhonheimer o Kantovi a katolické teologii:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
|
|
|