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181. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 1
Anthony J. Langlois Framing the Right to Democracy
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The question of whether democracy is a human right or not has received increased attention in recent years from philosophers, and in the light of recent world events, from the general public. Tom Campbell provides a minimalist strategy to support the human rights status of democracy, one linked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21) and subsequent developments in International Law and global institutions. I suggest that we need to consider the question at a more philosophical level and argue that Campbell’s minimalist strategy for understanding the right to democracy is inadequate to both the normative and symbolic claims associated with the idea. I develop my argument by considering two themes also engaged by Campbell: the demandingness of democracy, and the relationship between rights and interventions.
182. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 1
Paul Voice Democracy and the Need for Normative Closure: A Commentary on Daylight’s “In the Name of Democracy”
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The paper is a response to Russell Daylight’s “In the Name of Democracy” (International Journal of Applied Philosophy 29.1 [Spring 2015]: 139–151). I argue that Daylight’s postmodernist approach to the question of democracy is flawed in several respects. First, he interprets the claim that the meaning of democracy is open to entail that there can be no closure when democratic norms are in dispute. I argue that normative closure is not only essential but also necessary to democratic practice, in particular for democratic legitimacy. I reject the claim that normative closure requires transcendental truths or dubious metaphysical commitments. Second, I critically examine Daylight’s positive proposal for “language-citizens.” I end by offering a sketch of a theory of democratic legitimacy that I believe evades the charges that Daylight and postmodernists offer against normative democratic theory.
183. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 1
Russell Daylight In the Name of Democracy
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What do people mean when they use the word “democracy”? From a survey of usage, we discover that democracy is a highly contestable notion. It is spoken of simultaneously as a moral principle, a state of being, and a system of government. But if democracy is a vigorously contested notion, it is not a hopelessly contested notion. Certain regular distinctions begin to emerge, with the most important being that between “liberal democracy” and “popular democracy.” Democracy today exists as a concept at war with itself. The resultant crisis for democrats is that they are forced to defend liberal values against popular reform. My own view is that democracy is best understood as pharmakon—as both poison and cure. My overall ambition in this paper, however, is not necessarily to defend one definition against another, but only to ask how we might proceed. In this sense, I want to address Jacques Derrida’s question of : “can one and/or must one speak democratically of democracy?”
184. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
About the Contributors
185. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Jane Duran The Problem of Polygamy: Moral Constraints and Attitudes
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The status of polygamy as a cultural artifact is investigated across a number of societies, and it is concluded that polygamy is extremely violative of the rights of a number of individuals in the societies in which it occurs, and not simply women. Extensive citation is made to the work of Elissa Wall on American polygamous groups in the Southwest.
186. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Ross W. Bellaby The Ethics of Torture-Lite: A Justifiable Middle-Ground?
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Torture-lite has been advanced as a new form of interrogation that raises the prospect of offering a more ethical way of colleting the intelligence needed to protect the state. However, this paper will argue that there can be no such thing as torture-lite as this misunderstands what interrogational torture is in the first place. Interrogational torture is a form of behavioural modification that relies on breaking the individual and conditioning their responses. Torture-lite would never be able to create the self-betraying effect necessary for cases such as the ticking time bomb scenario without crossing over into the higher harms caused by full torture, and is unable to force the individual to provide the required information to serve as the good in the consequentialist argument.
187. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
William Ferraiolo God or Atoms: Stoic Counsel With or Without Zeus
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In this paper, I make the case that metaphysical doctrines about the nature and existence of God, and a rationally governed cosmos, are rather cleanly separable from Stoic practical counsel, and its conductivity to a well-lived, eudaimonistic life. Stoicism may have developed within a worldview infused with presuppositions of a divinely-ordered universe, and, indeed, there may be a Creator or Designer of some type (I take no position, in this paper, regarding the existence of God), but the efficacy of Stoic counsel is not dependent upon creation, design, or any form of intelligent cosmological guidance. The Stoic practitioner does not require a divine stamp of approval to legitimize his pursuit of equanimity, excellence, and wise self-governance.
188. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Todd Burkhardt Justified Drone Strikes are Predicated on R2P Norms
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The US has conducted or routinely conducts personality and signature drone strikes into Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and most likely other states as well. The US does this in order to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist organizations (Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani, al-Shabaab, ISIL, and their affiliates). In some of these attacks, states have given their expressed (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen) or tacit (e.g., Pakistan) consent to the US to conduct these drone strikes. However, some states do not consent to the US conducting kinetic drone strikes within their territory. In these cases, it seems prima facie reasonable to suggest that these acts or use of force are unjustified because they violate the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of a non-consenting state. Furthermore, the US is not at war with these other states so there is no leeway in suggesting that a state has a right to conduct these operations against another state. As it currently stands, attempting to use jus ad bellum (justice of war) criteria to discern a state’s moral justification for implementing force short of war (drone strikes) is not only unhelpful but fails to provide a reasonable framework. The use of armed drones is a recent phenomena that will continue to evolve, and with this comes a need for establishing a set of moral guidelines on a state’s implementation of them. In an attempt to remedy this shortcoming, we need to look at drone strikes not as an act of war but as an act or force short of war. I want to make the case that drone strikes can be morally justified using the Responsibility to Protect norms. That is, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norms should be the guiding norms with regard to jus ad vim (the just use of force short of war). Incorporating the R2P norms into a jus ad vim account provides a framework of when states can morally resort to the use of force.
189. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Clifton Perry Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Clause
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The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” Although treasured as a statement of fundamental rights, the Amendment’s terms and relations are not uniformly read. This is amply illustrated by the various positions on the Amendment’s correct meaning expressed in the various majority, plurality, and dissenting opinions issued by the United States Supreme Court (U.S.S.C.). This is not to suggest that a more or less uniform interpretation fails to obtain with all of the phrases of the Amendment. The clauses covering excessive bail and excessive fines do enjoy some level of agreed meaning among the Court’s members. This, however, does not pertain to the Cruel and Unusual Clause. An apparent majority of the Court holds that the extent of application of an otherwise acceptable punitive sanction may nevertheless constitute cruel and unusual punishment. A minority of the Court denies this. This essay will critically examine the two major positions concerning the questioned Clause. Additionally, it will offer an argument which especially favors one of the noted positions.
190. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Jessica Payson A Third Aspect of Individual Responsibility for Justice: The Responsibility to Organize
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Iris Marion Young has written a compelling account of individuals’ normative responsibilities for structural justice. While I agree with much of Young’s account, in this article I argue that there is an underexplored aspect of Young’s account regarding the link between individuals’ shared responsibility for justice and the normative demand that individuals engage in collective action towards just structural reform. I argue that Young has neglected an important aspect of individual responsibility for justice that links the aforementioned responsibilities together—namely, the responsibility to organize. Recognizing this responsibility is crucial for understanding the real work of structural justice efforts in the nonideal world.
191. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Ari Santas Diagonalized Asymmetry: Myofascial Pain and Social Dysfunction
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Myofascial Pain Syndrome (MFPS) is somatic pain due to muscular tension associated with muscular-skeletal imbalance. The pain and discomfort of the patient is not simply due to some isolated tension, but in the dynamic relationships between related structures. As the body adjusts to reestablish balance and symmetry, the tension and pain in one area “diagonalizes,” creating a tense correlate along a diagonal axis. This diagonalization of tension exacerbates and perpetuates the initial condition of pain and dysfunction. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there are moral and social analogues to MFPS with their own forms of diagonalized asymmetry. Following the Aristotelian model of virtue and vice, whereby moral traits and dispositions become vice as a result of a loss of balance in conduct, and George Herbert Mead’s social psychology, which describes the self in terms of dynamic interrelation and co-operation of multiple sub-selves, I maintain that otherwise positive strengths in personal character, when overemphasized or exaggerated, can be juxtaposed to analogous weaknesses in related areas of personal health and conduct. I will argue that the descriptive analogy of MFPS has a corollary set of prescriptions for restoring balance in a moral subject.
192. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
James A. Rice Orcid-ID Hong Kong’s Migrant Workers and Their Impact on the Rule of Law Narrative
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Hong Kong’s adherence to the rule of law has been widely understood as one of its “core values.” As such, it has been understood as an institution necessary for good governance and a check against the abuse of governmental power as well as a feature that differentiates Hong Kong’s system of governance from other parts of China. At the same time, intervening issues of immigration and of constitutional interpretation have begun to challenge this perception. This paper argues that a recent landmark decision involving the right to permanent residence has served to weaken the rule of law in Hong Kong. It has further highlighted a lack of commitment by the judiciary to either human rights claims or equal treatment under the law.
193. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Jesper Ryberg Youth Discounts, Diminished Culpability, and Retributivism
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An often-suggested way of giving content to the view that adolescent offenders should be punished more leniently than adult offenders has been to advocate the idea of a general youth discount for adolescents. Several theorists hold that a youth discount can be justified on a retributivist ground. But is the idea of a general youth discount consistent with the basic idea of giving individual offenders their just deserts? This article examines three arguments that have been presented to this effect. It is argued that the arguments are implausible and that the idea of a retributively justified general youth discount for adolescent offenders is unpersuasive.
194. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 2
Fausto Corvino Orcid-ID Punishing Atypical Dirty Hands: Assessing the Moral Value of Coordination Failure
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Should those who get dirty hands (DH) always be punished in the same way? Must their punishment be regardless of the background elements that determined the DH dilemma, which has polluted their morality? This paper holds that common arguments in favour of punishing DH overlook the important difference between classic DH dilemmas that are structurally inescapable and those that are caused by a collective action problem. My thesis emphasizes that in talking about DH, our analysis should go beyond the structure of the dilemma. We should also take into serious consideration the background dynamics that made the choice between two evils inevitable.
195. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
John Kleinig Rights and Discretionary Power: The Ethical Dilemmas of Police Work
196. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
David B. Annis, Linda F. Annis Merit Pay, Utilitarianism, and Desert
197. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
William L. Hathaway Applying Philosophy in Psychology: Some Comments
198. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Joan C. Callahan Academic Paternalism
199. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Alan R. Drengson Applied Philosophy of Technology: Reflections on Forms of Life and the Practice of Technology
200. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
A. David Kline Health, Disease and Medicalization