The common belief regarding contraception is that it leads to reductions in abortion, and many in the pro-life movement hold this belief, some going so far as to support access to contraception as a means to reducing abortion. A review of the abortion industry’s own studies and statistics reveal, however, that the opposite is true—widespread access to contraceptives actually leads to increases in the abortion rate. To oppose abortion, the pro-life movement should speak with a unified voice in opposition to contraception as well. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 (Summer 2015): 231–239.

The director of Courage International talks about the work of the apostolate in addressing homosexuality according to the mind and heart of the Church, which he calls “one of the most demanding aspects of education, formation, and pastoral care today.” But it is also an opportunity to attend to the often acute and persistent wounds of those who need healing within what Pope Francis calls the “field hospital” of the Church. The author points out that the work of Courage is not first about homosexuality but about what it means to be human. It is an invitation to consider the question of the fulfillment of the human heart according to God’s gracious plan. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 (Summer 2015): 221–230.

In Evangelium vitae, Pope St. John Paul II recognized that scientific progress would bring about new attacks on the dignity of the human person. Since that time, remarkable expansion in our knowledge and understanding of the human genome has brought forth questions of ownership rights via patents on human genes and related technology. This article argues that patenting human genes is incompatible with human dignity as it commodifies that which is priceless. In contrast, granting patents to manipulations of human genes does not violate human dignity so long as it is utilized toward the common good. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 (Summer 2015): 265–285.

A recent consensus statement claimed that double effect can justify induction of labor before viability when life-threatening pathological complications arise from the interaction of a normally functioning placenta with the diseased heart of the mother. The authors of this essay agree. They analyze two pieces published in response, using the framework of the first and fourth criteria of double effect; identify and attempt to clarify inaccuracies and other sources of ambiguity in the discussion; and acknowledge practical implications for other scenarios previously considered illicit. They conclude that more thorough medical and moral discussion is needed regarding the fourth criterion, even if the act itself is not intrinsically evil. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 (Summer 2015): 251–261.

In this essay, some of the signatories to “Medical Intervention in Cases of Maternal–Fetal Vital Conflicts: A Statement of Consensus” respond to “The Placenta as an Organ of the Fetus: A Response to the Statement of Consensus on Maternal–Fetal Conflict,” both recently published in this journal. The response examines Bringman and Shabanowitz’s claims and assumptions about the morally relevant pathologic condition in some cases of peripartum cardiomyopathy complicated by a subsequent pregnancy, the moral status of a normally functioning placenta, and the use of the principle of double effect in these cases. The signatories’ response sets out to demonstrate how Bringman and Shabanowitz do not engage the essential points of the statement of consensus and how their argument is premised on false assumptions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 (Summer 2015): 241–250.

Torbjörn Tännsjö has argued that the practice of palliative, or terminal, sedation can be distinguished from the practice of euthanasia in a morally relevant way. He seeks to develop a coherent conceptual model for those who accept the sanctity-of-life doctrine, affirm the ethical permissibility of palliative/terminal sedation, and reject various forms of euthanasia. The author argues that Tännsjö has not sufficiently distinguished the practices of palliative/terminal sedation and euthanasia in a morally relevant way for those who accept sanctity-of-life values in end-of-life health care. His argument is a philosophical critique of the soundness of Tännsjö’s conceptual model. With respect to moral theology, the author claims that, in Tännsjö’s attempt to make his case, he uses the wrong conceptual tools, and the tools he does use, he uses wrongly. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 (Summer 2015): 287–301.

This article offers an exposition and critical discussion of the account of the truth of practical reason in the natural-law theory of Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis. The exposition rests mainly on an article published by these authors in 1987. There they argue that “true” is said of theoretical and practical knowledge in radically diverse senses. They also distinguish, within practical knowledge, between two kinds of truth, practical and moral. This distinction is tied to their understanding of relations that obtain among the first principles of practical reason. The essay’s critical discussion raises problems for the account in all three areas and favors the view that “true” means the same for all knowledge. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 (Summer 2015): 303–329.