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Owen Goldin
Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption I.
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162.
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Bernard Wills
Reason, Intuition, and Choice:
Pascal’s Augustinian Voluntarism
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Pascal is well known to be an early modern disciple of Augustine, but it has not always been sufficiently emphasized that Pascal’s Augustinianism differs profoundly from its source in many ways. The following essay examines his re-ordering of Augustine’s psychology and its implications for philosophy and religion in the modern period. For Augustine, intellect and will are equal moments in the activity of mens, but Pascal is radically voluntarist. For him, the will’s relation to the good radically transcends intellect’s relation to being. This moves Pascal to a position closer in some respects to neo-Platonism. It also prevents him from appropriating Augustine’s claim that the triadic human mens is a created analogue of the Trinity. Pascal drops Augustine’s teaching on this point, with profound consequences for his conception of humanity’s relation to God.
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Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei
Foucault and Classical Antiquity:
Power, Ethics, and Knowledge
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164.
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Presenting Our Authors
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165.
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Thornton C. Lockwood, Jr.
A Democracy of Distinction:
Aristotle and the Work of Politics
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166.
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Christopher Kaczor
Nature as Reason:
A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law
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167.
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Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
Defending Human Dignity:
John Paul II and Political Realism
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168.
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Peter Hanks
Donald Davidson:
Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality
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169.
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Maria Talero
Merleau-Ponty and the Bodily Subject of Learning
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In the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, learning is not a paradox, as suggested by Plato’s Meno, but the fundamental form of experience. To experience is precisely to be permeable and open to being reshaped by one’s experiences. I explore the reconceptualization of the human subject within Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy that allows us to understand how the body-subject can be a learning subject. Fundamentally this involves consideration of the nature of habit, and the way in which habit simultaneously locks us into a repressiveattachment to a specific past and opens us up to the possibilities of meaningful engagement with the world. Through an analysis of the temporality of habit, I conclude that understanding habit as the fundamental launching-place of learning also allows us to see how essential learning is to the experience of human freedom.
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170.
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Dana Miller
The Midwife of Platonism:
Text and Subtext in Plato’s Theaetetus
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171.
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C. C. W. Taylor
Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle
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172.
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Presenting Our Authors
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173.
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Severin Schroeder
The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy:
Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Proposition
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174.
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David J. Schenk
Heidegger’s B-theoretic Phenomenology
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In this paper I explain the basics of Heidegger’s early Daseinanalytik, an account that contains promising insights for the phenomenology of time. I then draw out some of the relevant lessons from his phenomenology for the debate between A-theorists andB-theorists in contemporary analytic philosophy of time, and I show how it is that he gives a more philosophically satisfying account of the phenomenological features of becoming than one generally finds in the analytic debate. In Heidegger’s theory, becoming is not some contingent and misleading artifact of consciousness or of Dasein. It is a necessary and sufficient condition for their occurrence, even though it is not identical with them.
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175.
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Books Received
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176.
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Richard Fumerton
Beyond Justification:
Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation
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177.
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Dominic Hyde
The Law of Non-Contradiction:
New Philosophical Essays
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178.
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Sarah Sorial
Heidegger and the Ontology of Freedom
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In this paper, I suggest that Heidegger’s conception of freedom, elaborated in piecemeal fashion in Being and Time, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and culminating in The Essence of Human Freedom, providesa way of rethinking our conception of freedom, not as a set of specific determinations and rights, but as the very condition for the possibility of both existence and community. In this elaboration, it is possible to trace Heidegger’s gradual removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence. This, I argue, offers us a way of thinking freedom, not in terms of a quality or attribute that Dasein possess, but in terms of community, fraternity, and hence ethics.
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179.
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Sterling Berry-Whitlock
Notices
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180.
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Sarah Borden
Edith Stein’s Understanding of Woman
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This essay looks at Edith Stein’s descriptions of the fundamental equality, yet distinct differences between women and men, and attempts to make clear the ontology underlying her claims. Stein’s position—although drawing from the general Aristotelian-Thomistic position—differs from Thomas Aquinas’s, and she understands gender as tied significantly to our form or soul. The particular way in which gender is “written into” our soul, however, differs from the way in which both our humanity and individuality are tied to our soul. Thus, Stein wants to account for gender in a way that does not attribute it primarily to biology, nor does she understand gender as merely socially-constructed. Rather, gender is a significant part of our soul, yet not in such a way that either our common humanity orour distinct individuality are compromised.
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