Can science interpret morality? Ethics is pertinent to science. To explain morality scientifically is to understand moral concept and behaviour better. In view of Darwinism, the origin of morality is closely related to human hereditary evolution and biology can interpret morality. As it develops, science can interpret morality alone. Science can provide the only correct answer to the moral problems confronting us. But we should keep in mind that the interpretation has limitations and cannot decide or replace morality.

Davidson’s critique of conceptual relativism depends on the application of the principle of charity. I suggest that his argument is insufficient to reject a type of partial relativism. First, I propose a thought experiment, in order to show the shortcomings of the application of the principle of charity. Then, I examine the holism, as a possible answer to the experiment. Finally, I argue that Davidson either must leave the holism, or must accept a partial relativism.

Recently, David Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation has been attacked by context-relativists, who point to a number of intuitively absurd consequences of Lewis’ view – e.g. that my birth is a cause of my death – in order to argue that whether or not an event c is a cause of some distinct event e varies relative to certain contextual factors. Not all (e.g. Menzies (2004); Schaffer (2005); Maslen (2004); Northcott (2007)) agree on how contexts should be fixed; but all argue that context-relative analyses better account for our intuitions about causes. In defense of his invariantist account, Lewis argues that the intuitions by which the relativist-accounts purport to be informed are, in fact, intuitions about contrastive explanation rather than causes. That is to say, Lewis accepts that my birth is a cause of my death, and argues that it is odd to say so precisely because the pragmatics of explanation deem saying so inappropriate in most cases. I will examine a definitive objection from Peter Menzies (2004) to Lewis’ proposed defence and argue that the former reveals that the true locus of the relativist-invariantist debate lies in the question of how we ought to order possible worlds.

There are two main sources of risk in contemporary society, one is uncertainty, the other is modern fracture arising from the rapid development of science and technology. From the perspective of risk research, current thinking is focused on the ethical dimension, neglecting culture fracture in specific countries and regions caused by the development of modern science and technology. This article attempts to discuss Chinese cultural fracture by analyzing the Chinese traditional culture and the characteristics of modern western science.

Time, as we know, belongs to the subjects not only of science but also of metaphysics and it certainly is an entity of a special kind; one needs adequate methodological tools to research it. Currently, one of such widespread tools is interdisciplinary approach. However, it appears that its use runs into a difficulty associated with the fact that reality of a scientific theory is set by its ontology. This means that the ontology of time in various scientific theories, strictly speaking, should be different. The ontology of scientific and metaphysical theories of time will differ even more. Consequently, the study of time as an interdisciplinary subject from a methodological point of view requires the introduction of such epistemological presupposition to understand the reality, to which the constructions of time both in the natural sciences and metaphysics could be considered ontologically coherent. It appears that the role of such one can play the premise associated with the belief in the existence of an external world independent from the perceiving subject (so-called the ultimate reality). Coherent interdisciplinary ontology of time is, in this case, a part of the study of ontology of the ultimate reality which is the subject both of science and metaphysics.

W. V. Quine (1908-2000) and P. Feyerabend (1924-1994) shared many essential ideas in both historical as well as methodological contexts. Both claimed to be descended from the Vienna Circle. Both inherited the result of the protocol statements debates taking place in the Circle and considered it a crucial part of their philosophies. Both resorted to something like conceptual schemes by which they interpreted all experiences, even the most commonplace ones (the idea of “ontology” for Quine and the idea of “theory” for Feyerabend). These similarities enlisted here do not intend to be exhaustive, yet they offer a picture that Quine and Feyerabend are analogous in their ideas. This helps us to see the significance of comparing them, especially the part that while Quine’s philosophy of science is not entirely exempted from the tag of relativism, nor should Feyerabend be considered a prominent member of “epistemological nihilism”. The outcome of this comparison shows that while Quine offered in fact a ‘tolerant’ philosophy of science, Feyerabend instead demonstrated his constructive view of science by proposing a pluralistic methodology.

In this paper, I aim to explore a basis of interconnection of athletes in interpersonal athletics. The respect for their opponents needs a certain mutual understanding. The founder of Judo, Jigoro Kano (1860-1938), advocates the ideal of ‘mutual prosperity for self and others’. In order to assume that athletes confronting each other realize this ideal, we have to find out the possibility to connect athletes in some way. And we can name Kitaro Nishida(1870-1945) as one of the pioneers of Japanese philosophy, who developed an unique philosophical investigation based on Eastern philosophy. I will interpret the interconnection of athletes from the ‘pure experience’ and ‘I-Thou’ relationship which he referred. Empathy, which is an example of interconnection, means to assume an event occurred on the other (object) as that on the self (subject). This framework of this understanding, however, seems to have some methodological limits, e.g. solipsism or dualism. Nishida attempts to overcome this theoretical difficulty by introducing ‘pure experience’ into the issue of identifying subject with object. For example, Judoka is required to react as swiftly as possible to the opponent’s attack. In that moment he/she could perceive the opponent’s state and react to the attack at the corporeal level regardless of his/her consciousness.

The Polish football fans community has been recently in the scope of several academic studies, concerning – mostly – numerous deviations presented by its members. What has been left underestimated is the formal and practical capacity the football fans community to influence both the public opinion, as well as local and national governments. Albeit controversial, the “fanatic” football fans characteristics are inherently inscribed in the personal identities of the group’s members; they exceed simple “friend-foe” distinctions, rather consisting of a complex set of social and political views, rooted in communitarian and neo-conservative philosophies. In my lecture, I wish to discuss how the football fans community reacts to both theoretical projects of the post-modern society and its practical implementations. By stressing out the declared criticism of the changes taking place in modern society (especially those concerning morality, education and the so-called “weakening of social ties”), I wish to evoke the neglected dimension of the football fans society – that of a conservative educator and political actor.

Sport exerts such broad and deep influence on human beings that it is comparable with religion and science. Sport is not limited to physical acts in a physiological sense. It is rather related to the human spirit. Compared with this breadth and depth of sport, very little has been said on the thought connected with sport. It is as if popularization and intensification (escalation of breadth and depth) have been left to run rampant. In this paper, we would link sport with the human spirit and discuss it from the perspective of its role in the modern world. Aiming at sustainable societies in terms of energy and the environment through our own individual efforts is one of the major challenges we face today. At the same time, we would like to highlight the challenge we face of realizing societies that allow the sustainability and continued existence of achieved joy and cooperation with others. In relation to this challenge, we believe that the thought on sport will help in shaping our futures. Sport has functioned in a way that inspires independent actions in humans, and it will no doubt continue to do so. When doing so, we need suggestions for the types of thought that will give meaning to everyone’s sporting acts, from top-level athletes to ordinary people of all ages, and that will counter the type of external threats about which Karl Jaspers and Johan Huizinga were apprehensive. We believe that the possibility for a philosophy of sport lies in completely overcoming the etymological sense of ‘recreation.’

The reflections presented in the paper are not normative (in general, it can be said, that they do not create moral values and demands). The presented reflections particularly stress the sense, essence, meaning, and identity of sport in the context of moral demands. A disquisition pointing out that sports and sport-related doping can be situated beyond the moral good and evil must be considered precisely as metaethical, and leads in a consciously controversial way to fully defining the identity of sport in general, as well as the identity of particular sports disciplines. These reflections also refer to the issue concerning the identity of sports philosophy, i.e. general deliberations and specific issues concerning, for example, the factual and cognitive status of normative ethics in sport.

Ethics in sport demand not only that we respect ourselves and others, but also that we respect sport itself. But the question of respecting sport seems to create a kind of moral dilemma between the obligation to “play one’s best” by maximizing performance, and the obligation to follow rules and traditions that ban the use of ergogenic aids. It is often argued that bans on performance-enhancing substances, equipment, and training techniques are paternalistic and violate athletes’ liberty to rationally accept risks in their pursuit of excellence. Against advocates for the legalization of ergogenic aids, however, I argue in this paper that such bans must be respected because they are an essential part of the nature of sport. Whether one understands sports metaphysically to be Suits’ “voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” or a MacIntyrean social practice, inefficiency of means is an essential component sport that demands respect from all participants. The performance principle in sport is ontologically posterior to the prescription of inefficiencies upon which sport depends, so ethical respect for sport demands that we limit the efficiencies provided by ergogenic aids

An attempt is made to clarify the meaning of bodily exercises and the role of the passions on bodily movements from the viewpoint of René Descartes (1596-1650), as an educator. In the field of Cartesian philosophy, some attempts are being made to identify Descartes as an educator, however, there is little on bodily movements and exercises. However, his remarks on them seem to offer some beneficial suggestions to a philosophy of sport. So it is useful to examine his understandings of exercises, bodily movements and the passions in the context of education and health. It’s possible to identify Descartes as an educator. From his The Passions of the Soul, he indicates us the goal of education, to achieve Generosity. And we may reach to it through a good “upbringing”. Besides, Descartes points out that it is good for our health to do exercises, which makes us aware of our “perfection of the body” and could lead us to the pleasure of the soul which constitutes happiness. In addition, the passions are important incentives to our bodily movements. In conclusion, he was already conscious of the role of the passions on bodily movements and the meanings of exercises.

The power of technology is extended to the fundamental properties of existence, metaphysics becomes increasingly active in its ability to change these properties. This paper discusses a new relationship between philosophy and the advanced technologies that I call onto-technologies, because they change the foundations of being, the structure of existence and the way in which we experience it. In the past, technology was preoccupied with material particulars, while taking care of concrete human needs, such as food, shelter and transportation. Philosophy, in its turn, was preoccupied with big ideas, the first principles, essences and universals. Technology used to be utilitarian, while philosophy was speculative. Today technology and philos-ophy are moving ever closer towards each other: the power of technology is extended to the fundamental properties of the Universe, while philosophy becomes increasingly active in its ability to define and change these properties. Onto-technology has the power to create a new spatio-temporal continuum, a new sensory environment and modes of its perception. As a result, technology is now moving not away from, but towards, metaphysics; this way, the two of them are meeting at the very core of being, where the principles and universals traditionally considered the prerogative of philosophical study can be found.

While utopia seems to have low esteem in current philosophical theory, technique, conversely, is increasingly followers. Utopia, as the original creation of the Renaissance, currently taking shape in different configurations to classical. Although the technique on permanent open spaces philosophical discussion, in some interpretations of the original elements remain τέχνη. From two operational definitions of utopia (Horkheimer) and technical (Bloch) I propose a division of utopias to display the proper place to instrumental uto-pias and, within them, to technical utopias. We describe Bloch’s proposal, we point his limitations and propose overcome it with the critical theory of technology approach

This paper is an effort to remark the importance of re-conceptu-alize what is democracy considering the importance that the new technologies, especially concerning to the information and communication. It is important to redefine the model of political action according to the technological advance of our era, and for that is necessary a discussion in which the philosophical aspect get in touch with technology to re-dimension the scope of democracy nowadays. To prepare the field for this new concept of e-Democrcy, first of all I present the case of an earlier attempt to revitalize democracy with new technologies, it is the case of cable TV, and after that I show the reason for its fail. After the exposition of the cable TV case, I show some of the conditions that are necessary to make the transition from analog democracy to digital democracy or e-Democracy.

In our everyday lives, we come into contact with a series of technological objects and use a lot of technologies. Usually, the “relation” we develop with these objects works, on a first level, for our benefit. On the other hand, we actually know little about the technologies we use in order to accomplish various activities. Technologies have neither been developed, nor do they exist independently, even though we tend to perceive them as natural objects in themselves. Perhaps they are as much defined by causal laws, which are relevant to their “behavior” as specific artifacts, as they obtain ad hoc characteristics through our significations, which already belong to a specific social system. This ignorance of common sense often leads to the exclusion of a number of topics that are intertwined with the technological phenomenon from the everyday agenda of political debate. Moreover, the errors that stem from our unsophisticated or even unconscious attitude towards these artifacts have important consequences on various areas, including “development” and “work”, education, the environment, and human communication itself. This short article will try to present elements of a critical theory of technology (highlighting topics and themes that emerge in the works of Andrew Feenberg) in order to illustrate the need to link the technological phenomenon with everyday political practice.

Three main features of engineering thought have formed over the centuries: artistic, practical (or technical), and scientific. Galileo chose an approach unusual for scholastic science: technology began to depend on mathematical knowledge and models. At the same time, he criticized the craftsmens’ approach to technical activity, which overlooked scientific knowledge and the laws of nature in building machinery. Galileo’s works paved the way for the formation of engineering thinking and activity in practice as well as theory. He personified a new figure, the engineer-scientist. His geometric-kinematic theoretical schematic model of the machines was a beginning and precondition of the application of the natural scientific theory to the first special engineering science – the theory of the mechanisms and machines or kinematics. Galileo elaborated not only a new scientific methodology oriented to technical needs, but also a new philosophy of technology based on scientific knowledge.

In this paper, I intend to support a currently controversial approach to the a priori -- the one that respects its fundamental role in science, and I furthermore suggest the relevance of the a priori may be expanded to technology. I shall address the following three issues: a priori in scientific and technological methodology, a priori and the essence of science and technology, and a priori in the assessment of science and technology.

The framework of engineering design for operation as a problem that seeks a satisfactory solution calls for a thorough consideration of issues such as the partial ignorance of lawfulness, of interdependence as well as of unmodeled dynamics of subsets of reality. Moreover the consideration should account for the inability of the complete and exhaustive mathematical representation of such subsets. A key element in the resolution of this problem is the possibility of causal unilateralization. This element is not innate in physical phenomena but is brought to the surface for exploitation by ingenious engineering contrivances. In conjunction with a guiding principle projecting the achievement of accuracy despite the unavoidable inaccuracy of the means, and along with conforming praxiological methods, the whole design procedure renders the goal of achieving any well-defined operation feasible. In addition, it follows that this line of approach leads to the distinct characteristic that for any desired outcome what is sought after is not the derivation of the necessary but rather the sufficient conditions which will guarantee an admissible manifestation of it. On the way it becomes apparent that engineering design of operation is a process that involves possible realities.

When the Technological Singularity (Bostrom, Kurzweil, Smart) is more and more near, the human-machine interaction covers various merging processes. Yet, in the Digital Era, we have to deal with and manage an amazing plethora of different identities (plural, multiple, alternative, concurrent, divergent, virtual, and so on). This engages us in a discussion on the criteria of the identity and it leads us from ‘no entity without identity’ (Quine) to ‘no identity without a process’ (Boyd). We also have to deal with the problem of what the “wisdom” is nowadays. In the last decades, we have continuously passed from the classical wisdom – word and face to face based, toward a multi-channelled, digital wisdom (Prensky) – a symbiotic, non-generic and non-unitary wisdom (Guliciuc). The analysis of those merging processes and multi-faceted, processual identities engages us in the search for a classification of our “merged identities” in the Digital Era, toward identities that are continuously negotiated.