The Olympic Games and the soccer World Cup are large international mega-events that demonstrate how highly valued sport is around the world. However, alongside the celebrations of sporting excellences is the opportunity to reflect upon and criticize the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and the host cities for ethical concerns that often accompany these events. One recent example is FIFA’s decision to ban women’s soccer players from wearing hijabs. Yet the IOC has encoded in its own charter ethical and axiological mandates that it terms Olympism. This Olympic philosophy can be fruitfully understood as an intersubjective moral approach to sport and sport governance. So conceived, it can be used to gain clarity on FIFA’s decision, both in terms of its ethical decision-making process and its conclusions. While FIFA recently lifted the ban, concerns about the process are still evident.

In this paper I examine the relation of social justice and professional sports. I discuss two interrelated key ideas of social justice: equality of opportunity, and the just distribution of income and social status according to the principle of desert. I sketch what they both could mean in the context of professional sports and conclude that social justice should be implemented accordingly. This includes measures to equal the chances of becoming a professional athlete, the regulation of their incomes—especially those which are exceptionally high—and that they—again especially those who are superstars—are viewed and treated as equals among equals. Professional athletes might show exceptional talent and effort, but they nonetheless fall under the jurisdiction of social justice.

Theories in both contemporary psychotherapy and ancient philosophy associate deprivation with wrongdoing and suffering, but operate with different understandings of deprivation. The article will focus on two concepts of deprivation, one psychological and the other one ontological, as advanced by Bowlby in attachment theory, and Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE). In attachment theory deprivation is something one suffers as a result of the others’ actions (receipt of insensitive caregiving in early childhood); it has neuropsychological effects, it relates to violent behaviour later in life, and it is therapeutically treated mainly by emotional sensory work directed at attaining self-regulation. Understanding deprivation as Augustine does (i.e., diminishment of a being’s inner unity and order caused by one’s exercise of will) introduces a distinctive philosophical view on formation and can inform a type of reflective-behavioural work centred on forming impaired volitional and emotional capacities, and on reclaiming agency and responsibility both for what can be called self-deprivation and for ways to counter deprivation in offenders and victims.

The article presents a review of Robert Woolfork’s book, The Cure of Souls, which argues that psychotherapy shares the “humanistic dimension” of philosophy. According to Woolfork, the philosophical roots of psychotherapy may be uncovered from its theories, concepts, and practices. Therefore, he explores the scientific, ethical, and philosophical issues at the heart of modern psychotherapy, showing their congruence with the ancient therapeutic concept of philosophy. Since modern forms of psychotherapy are founded on a descriptive and evaluative view of human experience, philosophers may embrace a calling as counselors who honor the heritage of the ancient philosophers within the context of modern scientific psychology.

Against the background of not-so-distant debate regarding “enhanced” interrogation techniques used by the United States during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which many understand to be torture, this essay explores the moral complexities of “ordinary” interrogation practices, those that are clearly not forms of torture. Based on analysis of the written reflections of two United States interrogators on the work they did during the Iraq war, I categorize the roles played by multiple modes of empathy within interrogation and argue that empathetic responsiveness within the context of military interrogation poses a significant threat to the moral integrity of interrogators.

Though there has been interest in philosophical counselling in South Africa since at least the 1990s little has been accomplished by way of formalizing and developing the practice into a profession. We ask what would be required for it to become a fully-fledged profession? We argue that in order to count as a profession, a practice must meet certain normative, cognitive, and organizational criteria, but that philosophical counselling in South Africa falls short both cognitively and organizationally. This has implications for individual philosophical practitioners, it would seem, who cannot any longer consider themselves professionals. We argue that being a professional is not contingent on belonging to an established profession, but rather that to claim to be a professional is to claim that one can be trusted because one has the client’s good at heart. Exploring the idea of trust highlights again, though this time from an ethical rather than from a sociological perspective, that there is an urgent need to fill the cognitive and organizational gap that exists in South Africa. We propose that in order to facilitate the professionalization of philosophical counselling in South Africa, we should adopt an approach that focuses on the training of philosophical counsellors in the hopes that an organizational component will grow out of this rather than following previous (failed) attempts to put organizations first.

Until now, arguments for the distribution of resources by those who care about the plight of human-used animals have been either utilitarian or libertarian in nature. The utilitarian case has been made in writing by both activists and philosophers. The libertarian case is more a position that I have found comes naturally to many in the animal movement. In this article I make use of elements of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice to make a case for two principles of justice for the distribution of human resources by those in the animal rights community. My argument arises within the tradition of Tom Regan and Marc Rowlands where animals are held to possess negative rights. This is an argument largely by analogy to Rawls’ manner of making a case for his two principles.

In 2013 the World Health Organization published a Report in which it was argued that countries should become self-sufficient in safe blood and blood products, and that these should be secured through voluntary non-remunerated donation. These two claims were putatively supported by a wealth of citations to peer-reviewed academic papers, the results of Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries in both Canada and the United Kingdom, and data collected from Non-Government Organizations. Yet not only do many of the sources cited by the authors of this WHO Report fail to support their conclusions, many support conclusions that are the opposite of those that they draw. The aim of this paper is not, however, to argue against the conclusions of this Report. Instead, it is to argue that its authors were culpably negligent in its writing, in that they failed to take reasonable care to ensure that their conclusions were supported by the evidence, and in so doing exposed third parties to risks of harm to which they had not consented.

An argument is made for the preservation of certain regions simply on the basis of their uniqueness, without reference to other qualities. The Mono Lake region of Northern California is taken as exemplary, and the work of Tierney, Stimson, and Carle is cited.

While there are no serious arguments in favor of there being no state control whatsoever over the private ownership and employment of firearms, there are significant arguments on the other extreme of the ‘gun control debate’ which contend for bans on the private ownership of firearms or some subset thereof. In this paper I argue that gun ban proponents like Jeff McMahan and Nicholas Dixon confuse the risk or likelihood of being confronted by an attacker intent on serious or lethal harm with the right to defend oneself when faced by such an attacker. When this distinction is properly understood it becomes clear that arguments for the banning of all privately owned guns, or particular classes of guns, cannot stand so long as the firearms in question can be reasonably considered to be an effective means for individuals to defend themselves against attackers intent on serious or lethal harm.

German human rights campaigner Karl Heinrich Ulrichs advocated for same-sex marriage in the nineteenth century. Over a century later, we still have a long way to go. Arguing before his time, he took the Church, both Catholic and Protestant, head on. Ulrichs’s insights seem to have been all but forgotten. No one, to my knowledge, has invoked Ulrichs in contemporary debates about same-sex marriage, and yet he expertly diagnosed the problem and proposed a solution: start with the Church. In this paper, I resurrect his insights, and strengthen his case, for same-sex marriage.

Since the World Summit endorsed the Responsibility to Protect document (R2P) in 2005, a growing number of governments have begun to shape their foreign policies with R2P in mind. This paper seeks to clarify the basis, the nature, and the extent of our duty-to-others in the situations specified by R2P by bringing together current concerns and discussions surrounding the conceptualization of R2P as an imperfect duty. I begin by demonstrating that our imperfect duties to others are not optional, that Kantian imperfect duty is relevant to the discussion on R2P if read correctly, and that R2P must not be converted to perfect duties for meritorious deeds and what it mean to be a virtuous person to remain meaningful. Next, I discuss the scope of our duty-to-others, primarily regarding the limitations that we ought to observe when framing specific R2P operational duties. I argue that Kantian ethics must guide political and military responses to human catastrophes in order to ensure humanitarian ends are achieved.

After distinguishing between moral and ethical expertise, I divide ethical expertise into five categories: knowledge of fact (propositions); knowledge of procedure (rules, commands, or guidelines); easily derivable knowledge of fact or procedure; skill (tacit knowledge or know-how); and judgment (the ability to evaluate a situation, design a reasonable course of action, and act accordingly more often than would an algorithm, computer, or clerk with a book of rules). Having explained the five categories of expertise so that each turns out to be relatively unmysterious, I describe how I would counsel a fellow faculty member who sought my help with an “ethics case” because she regarded me as an “ethics expert.” I make clear the part each of the five categories of expertise would have in my counseling. In this way, I show that my ethical expertise is possible. I then consider stronger claims of ethical expertise, such as one finds in Gesang (2010), “Are Moral Philosophers Moral Experts?” Bioethics 24: 153–9. We may divide experts by the demands of the role they fill: The greater the demands, the less plausible (all else equal) the claim of expertise. There are experts who: 1) merely know something specific and testify about it (expert witnesses); 2) claim (like me) to counsel (help people think through what to do); 3) advise, that is, recommend courses of action (physicians or financial advisers, for example); 4) act as agents (such as surgeons or courtroom lawyers); and 5) rule over us or at least claim the right to (technocrats, Plato’s philosopher-kings).

After dealing with some methodological (Part 1) and definitional (Part 2) questions aimed at justifying its focus on bringing out the practical consequences of adopting democracy as a human right, in Part 3 the paper outlines and criticises arguments commonly made against having such a human right. It distinguishes between those arguments that deal with: (a) alleged conceptual inadequacies, such as that democracy does not satisfy defining criteria for human rights, such as universality, importance and intrinsic worth, (b) political doubts relating to the practicality of ‘self-determination’ and the acceptability of international intervention on the grounds of democratic deficits, and (c) weaknesses and inconsistencies relating to the legal implementation of democracy, such as the problem of having democracy as a human right when a function of human rights is to limit democracy and, in international law, the reluctance to adopt measures against non-democratic regimes. The paper questions these arguments individually, and points out that, if sound, they would exclude several generally accepted human rights. This exposes a pattern of unjustified discrimination against the idea that democracy is or ought to be a human right.

When we encounter people with disabilities in our everyday lives, we may sincerely wonder how (if at all) we ought to help them. Our concern in these ordinary contexts is typically not about securing basic justice. We want to know instead, as a matter of interpersonal morality, when and how it is appropriate for us to open a door for a wheelchair user, to pick up a dropped napkin for her, or to engage her in conversation about her condition. When we do try to give help, we can be surprised and hurt by the cold reception we receive for our efforts. It is worth considering, therefore, how the attitudes of someone who is sincerely trying to help can nonetheless be less than ideal and what kinds of attitudes a disabled person should have toward herself and those who are trying to provide assistance to her. In this paper, I characterize some common attitudes about people with disabilities, explain how conscientious people of good will could come to have them, and then argue that these attitudes are less than ideal because they are incompatible with the virtues of respect, acceptance, and appreciation.

The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the manner in which the Ticking Bomb Scenario (TBS), a thought experiment in philosophical enquiry, has been used in the discussion of the justifiability or otherwise of forward-looking interrogational torture (FLIT). The paper argues that criticisms commonly raised against the thought-experiment are often inappropriate or irrelevant. A great many critics misunderstand the way in which thought experiments in general, and the TBS in particular, are supposed to work in philosophical (and for that matter scientific) inquiry. The paper is not about the acceptability or otherwise of FLIT per se but rather an attempt to show that thought experiments such as the TBS are useful analytic tools and ought not to be rejected due to their inappropriate use by those engaged in the justifiability or otherwise of FLIT. By rescuing the TBS from its erroneous use the paper seeks to show its proper worth as part of an argumentative device in uncovering conflicting moral intuitions in our search for ethical truths.

Professionals have a role obligation to satisfy certain standards when performing their work. However, as professionals, can they perform morally praiseworthy acts that are not within the scope of duty? According to applied professional ethics, the answer is yes, whereas some theoretical accounts of supererogation deny this possibility. I examine and ultimately reject two very different theoretical accounts that deny professional supererogation. First, a recent interpretation of Aristotle uses examples from the professional context to illustrate that the moral category of supererogation is not needed to describe heroic acts. Second, David Heyd’s account of supererogation argues that the category applies to natural duties alone and not to professional as professionals. Contrary to these claims, I argue that it is not only conceptually coherent to allow for the possibility of going beyond the call of duty but also morally important for assessments of responsibility and blame in professional life.