The article describes an implementation of ran-domized computer-based tests in a philosophy course. Based on two control tests performed by 172 students, we demonstrate the effectiveness of statistical analysis methods for measuring stu-dent performance, as well as evaluating the valid-ity of developed multiple-choice questions. Four criteria are considered: the validity of the results obtained basing on the hypothesis of the normal distribution of correct answers; calculation of test reliability (Spearman-Brown Coefficient); the index of difficulty and the index of discrimination calculated for each specific task. In the course of post-examination analysis, using the example of four test items, the study shows which questions appear effective and which ones require further refinement. The text argued that multiple-choice questions are both significant for assessing know-ledge of philosophical concepts and should be considered an important element of feedback. The data obtained in the course of solving the test by students can be used for subsequent adjustment of the items.

We are witnessing a growing interest of post-positivist philosophy, history, and sociology of science in medicine. For historical epistemology, biomedical sciences, medical theory and practice are one of the most preferred subjects of research. What is the epistemological uniqueness of medicine? What can medicine tell the historical epistemologist? What is important for historical epistemology is the pronounced dependence of medical theoretical know-ledge on medical practice, which in turn reveals a strong dependence on the historically changing so-cio-cultural context in which it unfolds. The article considers naturalistic and objectivist interpretations of disease, which understand disease as an unchangeable “natural kind” that does not depend on a perceiving subject. It is shown that these interpretations face serious problems, for example, the problem of logical definition of causal mechanisms of the dis-ease. The author demonstrates that disease has on-tological, epistemological and value dimensions, which turns it from a “natural kind” into a “concept” that arises and exists in the space of a certain “style of thinking”. The coexistence of different styles of thinking explains the conflicting interpretations of “disease”, each of which has its own legitimacy in the context of a particular style. The question is also asked about the possible reverse influence of historical epistemology on medicine: what can a philosopher (historical epistemologist) tell a doctor? The article shows that the position that historical epistemology takes in relation to medicine assumes that medicine is receptive to philosophy. Is this receptivity to philosophy spontaneous? And what is its relation to professional philosophy (historical epistemology)?

The article discusses the institutional features of little and big science as two normative-oriented forms of the community of scientists and stages of the development of all the science. Is the author shows that despite the relatively stable understanding of the differences between little and big science the radically changed status of the latter, as well, ‒ as new interpretations of the internal content of the former, require clarifi-cation of their general and special features. These circumstances determined the relevance of the topic of continuity of little and big science institu-tions in the context of the formation of its new organizational forms. The formal-logical basis for achieving this goal is the lack of a clear indication of the presence of a common generic feature in the institutions of little and big science. The article uses the paradigm conception in the quality of its methodological orientation and the essen-tial understanding of science as more relevant variant of the institutional approach. It is noted that the key concept of the paradigm doctrine is the concept of «disciplinary matrix», the norma-tive element of which is exemplary ways of solv-ing scientific problems. This leads to the conclusion that the paradigm-matrix is a normative component of the institute of science designed to ensure its efficient and stable functioning. As the analysis of the components of the normative structure shows, there is a fundamental simi-larity between the stating part of technical norms and the results of scientific research. This coincidence allows us to identify the institute of science as a normative form of activity implemented as part of the scientific community. The final part of the article shows the differences in the constitutive features of the target unions of little and big science and makes the following conclusions. The main difference between the target associations of little science is their internally autocephalous and externally heteronomous character. In turn organizations of big science are associations of a heterocephalic type that maintain moral, political and ideological dependence on society and the state, but rely in their professional activities on the heteronomous prescriptions of the institute of science as a whole.

Archaic laws of Draco and Solon were authoritative for the Hellenes of classical Athens. In the ancient tradition of classical time, a word θεσμός was used to denote the old legal provisions (the laws of Draco and Solon), by which the ancient Greeks primarily understood the sacred ordinance and associated their first laws with religion. However, along with the use of this concept, classical authors described their modern laws by using the word νόμος, which together was widely used in the philosophical thought of the ancient Greeks. The article discusses the possible reasons why the concept of θεσμός, relevant for the archaic era, was rarely used in the writings of classical authors being replaced by a new term, which, in addition to political law, was actively used in philosophical systems. The author investigates the issue of how the political thought of Greece developed and how it first interacted with the Greek religion, and then with philosophy. She slso considers the process of rationalization of Greek society, which, according to the author, led to the distinction between archaic legal provisions and the political law of the classical period. The author concludes that the change in the use of concepts reflected changes in the consciousness of the ancient Greeks and the transi-tion from a mythological and religious perception of the world to a more rationalized philosophical perception.

This overview introduces an area of semantics that is not often discussed in works on the philos-ophy of language. The overview talks about the mechanisms by which information about time is encoded in natural languages. The philosophy of language traditionally pays attention to the problems of reference to individual objects, as well as accounting for the so-called intensional contexts. However, reference to moments of time not only reproduces the key problems of reference to individual objects in extensional and intensional contexts, but also reveals new aspects of how this reference can be expressed in the structure of a natural language and, consequently, in the structure of human thought, if the latter is understood in the Fregean spirit as intelligible objective content. The review introduces the reader to the ways in which these topics are discussed in the latest research that was presented at the leading conferences in semantics in 2019 and 2020. In particular, the review examines the problems of the semantics of tense morphemes, verbal aspect, the lexical content of verbs and such issues that are more familiar to philosophers as the semantics of certain descriptions in the temporal dimension.

In his famous report «Science as a vocation and profession» (1918) M. Weber spoke about the difference between the professional activity of scientists and their cognitive activity, carried out by virtue of inner interest, by vocation. The article considers the question of whether the activity is philosopher’s profession or vocation. It is shown that until the second half of the 19th century, philosophy was only a vocation, philosophical reflections were stimulated exclusively by internal interest. Philosophers of the New Time in their profession could be anyone – statesmen, diplomats, military men, doctors, scientists – and did their philosophical works only because of an irresistible internal need. From the second half of the 19th century, philosophy began to turn into a profession that required some training and was paid for by the state or private organizations. The introduction in our country of various grants in recent decades has finally turned philosophy from a vocation into profession.

The article discusses and clarifies the concept of boundary objects on the example of science art. The author argues that the specificity of an authentic artwork lies in its negativity, which manifests itself in the ability to critically reflect and overcome its own boundaries. Science art represents negative aesthetics by going beyond art and appealing to the tools and problems of science. The negativity of science art lies at the heart of its interpretive flexibility, which is also characteristic of boundary objects that perform at the intersection of different cultural and social worlds. Representatives of these worlds can interpret the boundary object in different ways, based on their own aims and values. The article argues that projects in science art contribute to the transformation of laboratories, art galleries and other spaces associated with art and science into trading zones, the result of which is embodied in a boundary object – a work of art. By interacting with professional researchers, artists gain access to new means of expressing and representing their ideas. On the other hand, scientists, following the creative intuition of artists, unexpectedly encounter with new questions and research horizons. This specificity of interaction between scientists and artists may be illustrated by the projects of S. Lee and M. de Menezes, mentioned in the article as representative examples of science art. Basing on the results of the analysis, the author concludes that the functioning of trading zones is hardly possible without the actors preserving their own identity and the system of value coordinates, which, however, does not interfere with their fruitful cooperation.

The article examines the specifics of the functioning of boundary objects in trading zones. Here, they play two interrelated roles: they construct a space of interaction within scientific practices, on the one hand, and of external communications of science, on the other. In the first case, they allow reaching mutual understanding between different groups of scien-tists. In the second case, the boundary object be-comes an important element in constructing the space of new meanings. They are artifacts, and therefore, each social group can attempt endowing them with distinctive meanings, sometimes different from the meanings that the creators of these objects have invested in them. As a result, within the framework of their use, new practices of mastering the world can originate and new meanings can emerge. Science art is one such practice. It allows the use of boundary objects to combine scientific practices and aesthetic components. This makes it possible to find non-trivial solutions both in science and art.

The article discusses the opinion of Artem Feigelman about the mediating role of artworks in trading zones from the viewpoint of T. Adorno's negative dialectics using the example of science art. The author accentuates the difference between artworks and fantasy. She touches upon the “eternal question” about the nature of art and argues that both art and fantasy can perform an intermediary function. The negative dialectics of T. Adorno and K. Popper’s the falsificationism are compared. The study discusses the difference between the interpretations of science art as an area of art or as an area of free imagination. Since the concepts of science and art are too elusive and eternally problematic, the article suggests narrowing the subject of discussion and considering only such elements of science and art as fantasy and cognition. This line seems more accessible for research into what can play the role of a mediator between science and society in the “non-Galison” trading zones.

The science-art topic is certainly deservedly popular in modern culture. In this article, the author examines the possibility of the existence of a Science-Art work as an element of building a trading zone. The transdisciplinarity inherent in this form of art allows us to recognize it as a boundary object in the communication between representatives of different disciplinary fields. Nevertheless, to understand some science-art objects, a certain level of input knowledge is required in at least one of the areas – science or art, while others are a cultural product designed for the mass consumer. Accordingly, such objects will play a different communicative role in the formation of trading zones. The author argues that when working with science-art objects, it is appropriate to talk about different types of participants in communication and, as a result, different types of formed trading zones. To construct a “non-Humboldt” trading zone, it is proposed to turn to the phenomenon of computer games. The author pays attention to the fact that modern computer games in their aesthetic level can already be equated with a work of art. At the same time, within the framework of gaming virtual reality, it is possible to build an intuitive mechanism of integration into the value and epistemic world-picture. Modern means of data input and output used in advanced solutions in the VR and AR also do not require any preliminary preparation. The author concludes that only those works of science-art can be considered as a boundary object in the “non-Humboldt” trading zone, which embrace the corresponding techno-scientific solutions in the foundations and methodology of their implementation. In addition, the further evolution of technologies for building virtual and augmented realities can and should act as the main infrastructural solution in the formation of “non-Humboldt” trading zones, at least at the current level of technology development.

This article considers the process of formation and changes in social values of science in the Academia and cultural practices, proceeding from the trading zone concept. The author demonstrates that the habit of science is anyway mastered in the “Humboldtian” trading zones (the Academia), which can be the basis for further adaptation of cognitive and social values and meanings of science as a dynamic practice. She argues that, besides special scientific and educational trading zones, involvement in scientific endeavor occurs largely through values and meanings communicated via pop culture. The study of this process includes the description and interpretation of stereotypical images of scientists, created in science fiction, films and television series, in the context of social values. The modern TV series of “The Flash” and “Stargate” serve as empirical material. In addition to the existing stereotypical types of scientists, this article identifies new images which are associated with new social and cultural contexts and communicate new social values and meanings (an upgrade).

The article deals with the dynamics of the existential conditions of human existence in electronic culture. It considers discussions of the existential philosophy of 20th century technology, which focuse on a warning about the dehumanizing influence of technological development and mass culture on the life world and human existential experience. Cinematic images of the “discourse of disaster” of the 20th century are used to illustrate philosophical warnings. The study assumes that digital culture removes many of the identified fears, becoming a necessary platform for social development of the individual. This is being achieved because of modern forms of identity formation, communication and interaction, wide opportunities of personal and professional growth, and actualization of new sociocultural practices. The role of the “existential dimension of media” as a direction of social and humanitarian cognition, critical thinking, and philosophical reflection manifests in the compar-ison of the achievements of digital civilization and new forms of human vulnerability and personal disclosure.

The article is a reply to the discussion that followed my paper “The Work of Science Art as a Boundary Object in Trading Zones”. While commenting on Evgeniy V. Maslanov’s thought on a science artwork as an element of the external infrastructure of science, I suggest the possibility of interpreting an artwork as a “black box”, the semantic content of which remains completely opaque both for the author and the perceiver. In response to Vladimir V. Slyusarev, I assume that not every computer game based on scientific problems and having an aesthetic component is an artwork. Nevertheless, such a game may well serve as a boundary object between art and science. Proceeding from the reasoning of Svetlana V. Shibarshina on the mass culture products representing the image of a scientist, I assert the difference between them and the objects of science art. While films and TV series are able to popularize science among the public, the works of science art aim at a deeper reflection of the problems associated with science and its impact on individuals and society. In response to Natalya N. Voronina, I argue that the relevance of the artists’ agenda does not affect the authenticity of their works. Furthermore, a distinction is made between the negativity of science and art. The first, striving to refute itself, continues to move towards objective knowledge that has a final interpretation. As for the second, it aims at the continuous unfolding of negativity, suggesting an infinite number of interpretations.

The article focuses on the analysis of the phenomenon of citizen science and its role in the professionalization of scientific knowledge’s progress illustrating it by the case of the 1835 Great Tide Experiment. In the history of science, the nineteenth century appears as a century of scientific progress, embodied in the industrialization and professionalization of scientific knowledge, new discoveries and inventions. The number of scientific disciplines increases, new technologies actively develop, and the symbiosis of science and technology brings economic benefits and radically changes the entire structure of society. At the same time, it was during that period that, against the background of scientific professionalization, the phenomenon of citizen science emerged – the participation of non-professionals in scientific research. The case study of the Great Tide Experiment shows that explaining the phenomenon of citizen science solely by economic factors is incomplete. The organization of scientific research within the framework of citizen science repeats the internal conflicts of scientific institutions as-sociated with the hierarchical division of disciplines. In addition, citizen science perpetuates the privileged status of professional scientists over volunteers, just as in the past, representatives of the «pure» sciences had a higher status in comparison with the scientists conducting empirical research.

The article considers smart home technology in the framework of philosophical problematization. The article explores the ontological and epistemological potential of the smart home concept, and evaluates the benefits this technology presents for humans. The authors refer to the book by A. Deschamps-Sonsino, which investigated smart home evolution (2018) as the most significant interdisciplinary study of historical stages in the development of smart home idea and its social determinants. This study touches upon the gradual elimination of architects from smart home’s idea implementation and its transition to the disciplinary (soft) engineering field, as well as the specifics of smart home virtualization with the advent of the Internet. Further, the authors present a picture of the smart home functioning in the IoT system and consequently estimate the posthumanistic theory (in particular, suggested by B. Latour) as the most relevant research tool for this case. Analyzing the modern posthumanist paradigm and the engineering rationality principles underlying the smart home concept and socio-technical problems of the IoT that embraces smart home, the authors came to a paradoxical conclusion. Instead of remaining in their own home life center, the house owners are being pushed to the periphery, which, to a certain extent, turns out to be a periphery of the new post-humanist world order. A human has come a long way in designing her home space, which, on the one hand, was focused on facilitating domestic work, and on the other, increasingly depended on external requirements and restrictions, and at contemporary stage, it seems, the two sides of this process merged into a single field of control over the private human needs and pleasures.

Our thinking is radically changing in the twenty-first century, and with it our society in its most di-verse manifestations. It brings to the fore the fact that any action of a person will be preceded by a thought, a design, a plan for his future activity. This means that the main thing is not the result, but the beginning, the basis of the work done. Thought develops from the empirical environ-ment, from the context where the problem arises unsolvable for the existing logic. Logic is being promoted into reality, into practice, which is un-acceptable for classical logic. For this reason, the birth of a thought in a person’s head has always remained outside of it. Natural science developed accordingly and its logic served as a model for humanitarian knowledge. After the revolution at the beginning of the past century, on the con-trary, humanitarian knowledge became a model for physics. Quantum physics made scientists (Heisenberg, Bohr, Born) to think that by studying the world we are studying ourselves. This is evi-denced by the devices made by man and facing nature. Scientists ask nature the questions that give it human features. In the area of the begin-ning of thought, there is still no clear division into the material and the ideal. When this beginning, the basis of logic, is formed, a mass of thoughts flickers in a person’s head, arbitrary and chaotic, without clear trajectories of their movements. Most of them disappear; yet, they participate in the creation of a “magic crystal” of the future work and in the general virtual space of things and events. We are already beginning to live in this world, creating this artificial world, new for us.

The author discusses some issues of the legitimacy of epistemic imperialism as a process that characterizes the specifics of interdisciplinary cooperation in the social sciences. This problem is analyzed on the example of discussions about the legitimacy of imperialism in economics. In this way, the suppression of political economy in the era of McCarthyism in the United States becomes a theoretical prerequisite for economic imperialism. In its turn, the socio-political context of economic expansion was determined by the rationale for the neoliberal version of political decisionism in the post-war world. The author believes that the phenomenon of epistemic imperialism can be viewed as a special case of the movement towards unificationism in science. Referring to Richard Posner’s ideas, the author shows that defenders of the economic analysis of law appeal to the values of unificationism. As for the critics, they argue the idea of the enrichment of the epistemic resources is misleading, since the ontologies “before” and “after” the reception are not comparable. The author believes that imperialism in the social sciences reflects the trend towards naturalization, which, in turn, is a reaction to the request for scientific support of politics. It follows that the further development of the epistemology of the social sciences will be characterized by the expansion of epistemic imperialism. Along with it, the author points out that the discussion about the legitimacy of epistemic imperialism goes beyond the problem field of epistemology and may be also relevant to the context of policy technocratization in the modern society.

This overview paper examines some current discussions in the field of interpretation of predicates of personal taste. These expressions are known to be judged on the basis of individual taste: what one considers tasty, the other does not. Their formal semantic interpretation faces a number of technical problems of logical semantics, as well as more general philosophical problems associated with understanding what the nature of disagreements about taste may be, what is the structure of propositional content, etc. The author offers an exposition of a number of influential approaches to the semantics of predicates of personal taste, and provides his own criticism of a difficult case that involves an occurrence of a predicate of personal taste in a de re propositional attitude report.