This paper is aimed at a rethinking of the spiritual in relation to Marx. Drawing from Marx’s own formulations, it makes clear that Marx made an important distinction between religion and the spiritual, and that he did indeed speak of the spiritual in positive ways. Much of the discussion centers on Marx’s famous passage speaking about religion as “the opium of the people.” Therein Marx writes that: “Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers from the chain, not so that man will wear the chain that is without fantasy or consolation but so that he will throw it off and pluck the living flower.” This paper attempts to make clear whatMarx means by the “imaginary flowers” and also by the “living flower”; and in so doing helps to clarify what Marx means by “the spiritual”.

An atheist argument usually goes like this. If God exists and is omnipotent as believed, He could have created any possible world as he pleased. The existence of moral evil, though, makes problematic the existence of God, or His omnipotence at least. Plantinga's answer to an atheist is: it is not that God, as omnipotent, could have created any possible world as he pleased, but rather it is that God, even though omnipotent, could not have created the world as he pleased. In chapter 2, I formulate an atheist's view of moral evil which resulted from the free will of human beings, and examine Plantinga's view that distinguishes between an act of creation, and an act of actualization of state of affairs. He asserts that creation of earth, heaven, or Socrates can be attributed to God, but the actualization of necessary states of affairs, and among contingent states of affairs, false possible states of affairs cannot be attributed to God. In chapter 3, I explain Plantinga's view that God cannot be held responsible for actualizing state of affairs implemented by free choice, and that human action with free will can only be attributed to human being, not to God. In chaper 4, I will criticize Plantinga's view not to be a genuine compatibilism between the existence of God and moral evil, and sketch the compatibilism between providential determinism and moral evil.

Compared with the related western studies, Russian ecological philosophy has paid more attention to Eschatology and represented a unique path of thinking, that is, an intense rational conception and a religious consciousness. In the era of globalization, Russian ecological Eschatology, as an active response of Russian ideology to the world ecosystem crisis, contains a strong eschatological emotion and a spirit of salvation. It mainly deals with the sin and punishment between the nature and human being as well as the endeavor of atoning humanity. The first part of the essay traces back the origin and evolution of eschatology and ecology in the two systems of Russian philosophy—humanism and cosmism, with a trimming of the original relationship between the ecological eschatology and the traditional eschatology. The second part explores the way of salvation for the human being in crisis directed by Russian ecological philosophy, which is nourished by the profound spiritual tradition. For the human being, the way of civilization lies in a rebuild of rationality by faith. The goal of faith is to achieve a self-completeness in morality by a heart-open through God. In this way, the destiny of the world may be changed. This is the only hope of the human being and, therefore, a new chapter of salvation for our times.

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a French Philosopher and a Jew, became known first for his role in the introduction of Husserl’s phenomenology to France, and later for his criticisms of Husserl and Heidegger. As the Holocaust gave a significant impact on many theologians and philosophers to establish their theoretical systems, Levinas realized how ethic of responsibility was important through his personal tragic experience. What most peculiar character of his experience is that it leads him to cast a doubt a subject-oriented modern reason. I will explore the modern subjectivity through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. As Nietzsche mentioned earlier in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is subject dead? Is it no longer meaningful to discuss the modernity in the postmodern ear?Should the trend of anti-subjectivity in the postmodernity be the only alternative? Those questions are underlain this study. For him, the preeminence of the inviolability of the human being must be regarded as the initial point of departure and final destiny. According to Levinas, philosophy is open to its role of significance only insofar as it describes the ethical situation of the responsible self that precedes the metaphysical subject. A bold assertion against the modern perquisite of theory becomes a signature aphorism of Livinas’ work: “ethics is first philosophy.” For Levinas, ethics is not a question of adjusting one’s adherence to transcendent or historical laws or inner principles. Whereas philosophy traditionally gives priority to inner subjectivity and treats ethics as derivative, Levinas’ philosophy stresses that knowing occurs within and is a result of the intersubjective relation. The subject as hostage to the Other, he writes, “has been neither the experience nor the proof of the infinite, but the witnessing of the infinite.” This subjective condition of the ‘I’ is what Levinas calls the responsible self. This article explores whether Emmanuel Levinas's ethic of the Other can be regarded as a theological discourse. After publishing Totality and Infinity, there have been manyserious questions of the relationship between transcendence and immanence; infinity and the finite among many philosophers and theologians. Interestingly enough, Levinas tries to mediate these concepts by his ethic of the Other. I examine how Levinas deals with the tension and difficulty of these two areas in his ethic of the Other. As a French phenomenologist, Jean-Luc Marion already mentioned, this kind of attempt has confronted a double-bind dilemma. One is that it would be a question of phenomena that are objectively definable but lose their religious specialty; and the other is that it would be a question of phenomena that are especially religious but cannot be described objectively. In this sense, Levinas’s ethic of the Other gives us an insight that what philosophy of religion would be. A great deal of information about such great philosophers does not always guarantee sound philosophical reflection. As Levinas’ philosophy was developed in his struggle with Heidegger’s philosophy in the matrix of Husserl’s phenomenology, my philosophical reflection on Levinas’ ethics has to be examined by those who are experts in various philosophical areas. Many members of WCP from all around the world will provide me more mature philosophical thinking, and their advice and expertise will be invaluable. In addition, chances to meet great visiting scholars who will come from all over the world will be also one of the prestigious privileges to articulate my thinking. I look forward to interacting with the great scholars who will visit Seoul National University, and in these interactions, to clarify and better articulate my ideas.

Unlike majority of classical and contemporary Indian philosophers, Gandhi was a practical philosopher, an experimentalist and a laboratiorian who developed practical instruments and carried out experiments for the existing life problems without bothering to build a consistent structure of philosophy. For this very reason there seems an ambiguity to call Gandhi as a philosopher. However, it seems to me that Gandhi was a practical philosopher who laid a pragmatic approach and method to his new insights for social and political action of national movement and the reconstruction of modern India without disturbing the social equilibrium.Gandhi exercised such tremendous skill in cooperative participation of our national movement and is rudely regarded as the “Father of pridely Nation”. As he is too skillfully organized his ideals in building a nation he rightfully ascertained as philosopher in the light of Homer’s (the Greek poet) definition to a philosopher. The same practical method is extended to the aspect of religion by Gandhi.

In Part 9 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a series of five criticisms is presented against the Cosmological-Ontological Proof of God’s necessary existence. In essence, the Cosmological-Ontological Proof seeks to establish that that the chain of causes and effects that constitutes the world, despite being eternal, requires a cause, in virtue of the contingency of the chain and its members. The argument attempts to defend the position that, of the four possible causal explanations for the chain of causes and effects -a contingent being that exists outside the chain; chance; nothing (in the Aristotelian sense of thisterm); or a necessarily existent being-only the latter can be successfully defended, leading to the conclusion that the cause of the world is a necessarily existent being. Of the five criticisms directed against this argument in Part 9 of the Dialogues, the fourth of these is the one that is most neglected in the literature: it is this criticism that I have selected for discussion in my paper. This criticism holds that since the causal chain is held to be eternal, it cannot have a cause, given that causal relations require temporal priority in the cause in relation to the effect, and that the effect be a new existent. However, since the Cosmological-OntologicalProof insists on the contingency of the causal chain as a whole and of each of its members, the fourth criticism is not regarded as a relevant criticism, inasmuch as all contingent beings require a cause in order for them to exist, and this includes the eternal causal chain that constitutes the world. In my paper, I attempt to support the fourth criticism of the Cosmological-Ontological Proof, by establishing that, in the context of this argument, the contingency of the causal chain and its members is not sufficient to establish that the chain must have a cause.

In an essay published in the May 2003 issue of Atlantic Monthly, Jonathan Rauch describes a phenomenon he refers to as ‘apatheism’ which he defines as “… a disinclination to care all that much about one’s own religion, and an even stronger disinclination to care about other people’s [religion]…” The phenomenon thatRauch describes seems to refer not to an epistemological state but rather to a normative way of being in the world. It also appears to be linked in some important ways to the rise of secularization. In fact, many cultural observers and philosophers have noted the increasing secularization of society, particularly Western society, and the corresponding decline in religious belief. In this paper I will attempt to place apatheism in the larger context of philosophy of religion. Inaddition, I will outline the connections between apatheism as described by Rauch and the work of Slavoj Zizek as well as the analysis of truth and bullshit offered by the Princeton philosopher Harry Frankfurt.

In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant outlines a system of church government that strikes many as an unworkable ideal. The “invisible church” is to be structured according to four basic principles that correspond directly to the categories from the first Critique. Whereas ordinary political systems must involvecoercion, a church is to be a free association of persons governed by non-coercive, internally legislated moral laws. Is this a realistic blueprint for church government? Kant’s metaphor of a “household” as the best way to regard the relationship between the “People of God” provides a much-neglected key to understanding how Kant’s ideal can be implemented. A new and technically more accurate definition of “theocracy”, as a system not of humanly-headed religious despotism but of divinely protected autonomous friendship, clarifies how Kant’s plan is not only realistic but currently implemented in some religious communities today.

Starting with an account of some of the main elements that are constitutive of the contemporary approach to the phenomena of religion, whereby special attention shall be given to the phenomenological approaches to the phenomenon of Religion as such, this paper shall, in the following moment, proceed with a reflexive analysis of some of the crucial analytic aspects of religion on the basis of a philosophical study of one of its most universal manifestations, i.e., the phenomenon of Prayer. We shall analyze different forms of prayer, which have a span that goes from its manifestation in the Prayer of Silence to its manifestation in the Cultic expression of Prayer. Following this analysis, attention will especially be given to the need for an identification of some of the dangers and menacesattached to an ideological or fundamentalist approach to Religion. Finally, what we intend to show is the creative power of the tension that is given between what Jean-Luc Marion calls the Idolatric and the Iconic, since in this very tension we can explore the true dimension of what Religion is both in its essence and in its manifestations.

The contemporary secularism is found to be a philosophy of life “as if there were no God” or a kind of ideology, which demands an absolute autonomy of human being to shape his destination. In the philosophy of Descartes at least three sources of secularism could be found: his theory of cognition which resulted in developing other than the classical concept of truth and rationality; his metaphysics; his arguments for the existence of God and in his concept of the nature of God. Karl Marx’s criticism of religion was a next powerful factor on the advance of secularism. Marx makes the charge against the religion that it acts to reinforce the break down the conscience of man living in the modern society, into a public and a private realm. The widest criticism of religion was made by Marx in: Acontribution to the Hegel’s criticism on the philosophy of law”. Especially its first seven paragraph, are particularly important in view of the advance of secularism. F. Nietzsche undermines metaphysics by showing that knowledge of a non-empirical world is cognitively superfluous. He makes clear that he has moved beyond the assumption that there might be a metaphysical world to a positing of the empirical world as the only one. Nietzsche considers that the notion of God is inimical to human nature and human life. Is this really so in reality? Is Nietzsche’s consideration about God and religion in any way applicable to our own age?

Philosophy and religion keep close connection by the intermediary belief of philosophers. The Greek philosophers criticized the object of masses’ and themselves religion depending on their rationality, finally gave up the masses’ belief and its object (religion). The Christian thinkers defended the masses’ religion and its object based upon philosophy and rationality. Modern philosophers appeared, going on with tradition of Greek philosophers, they reflected and criticized belief and its object, finally break away from masses ’ belief and its object and found themselves system of philosophy, and defended their belief and its object.In this way, philosophy broke away from traditional religion (Christianity). After the ancient philosophy of German, the philosophy is on the way of religion criticism; this phenomenon is related to the science directly. The philosophy which is not restricted by the religion could not help itself in the scientific world view. The philosophers who are swayed in the room between religion and science have not found their fairyland concerning the belief; as a result, their belief is thespian. The philosophy which could overcome the belief tragedy could be the other kind of philosophy. The western philosophy was searching for this new kind perpetually. This new kind of philosophy will emerge and boost in culture field.

En este escrito intento exponer la manera en que establezco una relación entre la filosofía de la ciencia social y la teoría social. Lo anterior se da “incidentalmente” a partir de mi propio trabajo en teoría social; el cual se origina en la Teoría de la Estructuración de Anthony Giddens y actualmente involucra al Naturalismo Crítico. Mi interés original en la teoría social, el cual giraba en torno al trato que Giddens le da a la dualidad agente-estructura a través de su Teoría de la Estructuración, me llevó a conocer la teorización social realista de Margaret Archer. De esa forma me comienzo a empapar del Realismo Crítico de Roy Bhaskar, que en su vertiente filosófica fundamenta la teoría social de Archer, y eventual y necesariamente, como parte de mi interés actual por analizar la teoríasocial realista, empiezo a involucrarme en la discusión contemporánea de la filosofía de la ciencia social. Una primera lección que me deja dicho ejercicio, la cual ejemplifico con ciertas puntualizaciones respecto al (que considero) deficiente trato que dicha filosofía recibe en y por parte de mi academia, es la necesidad de hacer explícito (de pensar un poco en) el trasfondo filosófico que subyace toda teorización social. Ya que creo que muchos de los problemas originalmente achacados a esta última pueden ser atajados, de forma satisfactoria, desde su contraparte filosófica.

The planetary civilization we are having affects positively world's religions. The former model, based on the isolation, suspicion and competency among religions, is being substituted for the search of common ties of those religions. The interreligious dialogue does not intend to eliminate the religious differences in order to create a common religion. On the contrary, starting from these differences, we are interested in those unity ties shared by all of them, beginning with the ethical-moral values. This contribution of religions to the creation of universal ethics is the first fruit of the interreligious dialogue. In the second part we analyse the relationship of the Christian religion with the others. Nowadays it is not understood to defend an absolutist conception of truth. Although Truth is unique, it is possessed in a multiple manner. That's why the interreligious dialogue is needed.

Most religions share the belief that love is the supreme truth of the ultimate reality and also of all human beings. The ultimate reality is characterized by the absolute love for all beings. And authentic human life consists in embodying the divine love as far as possible. The religious-meaning of love can be interpreted in terms of the panentheistic conceptuality provided process philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne’s mind-body analogy is helpful in particular. The ultimate reality is the mind of the world. And the world is the body of the ultimate reality. Love as communion or mutualparticipation is experienced paradigmatically in the interaction between mind and body. Existential embodiment of the divine love is a necessary ingredient of authentic human life. And our love needs to be expanded more and more toward the limit of God’s cosmic love. If one expands one’s love to the greatest possible degree, one may be able to include the whole world as one’s body.

The majority of world religions have developed in the course of overcoming tribal and clan identity. The idea of "One God" carries the implication, overtly or not, of uniting mankind on basis of religious belief. The rise of world religions was associated with rise of huge empires and states where various ethnic groups coexisted, not only on the basis of force alone, but also on basis of common religious belief and value systems imposed by religious ideology. Governing polyethnic territories, developments in economy and trade and consistent humanization of human spirit resulted in the development of common human values.Mankind started perceiving itself as a single species sharing a common world history. The concept of 'mankind' came to unite people irrespective of their race, religion and nationality. Objective of our study was cross-confessional investigation of value systems in religions spread in Russia and establishing to what extent they are spiritually acceptable to Russians. We used the semantic space technique for the analysis of religious mentalities.

In this research the problem of liberty is considered in the context of religion as I am searching for an answer of the question if religion is not the main reason for limitation of freedom? My research is based on the philosophical essay of John S. Mill “On liberty”. An essential specification for this analysis is the fact that it is mainly interested in Christianity and to rather less extent, in the other religions. I am inclined to agree with the critical opinion of Mill regarding religion and I am asking myself if religion is not the social-historical phenomenon which suppresses free thought, obliterates individuality in people and aspires to reigning greater masses of people as possible. And one more thing. Is it possible that to the final results of the influence on society’s life between religions and ideologies isput sign of equality? Isn’t it the free critical thought that is limited in both the cases and therefore society’s progress that is also limited? However inspiring with hope is the fact that such powerful ideological movements lack these days and the influence of religions is not as big as it was in previous periods of history. And – “thanks God”…

This paper proposes a re-evaluation of the theism vs. atheism controversy from a Kantian transcendental perspective, connected with Jamesian pragmatism. Insofar as there is a morally vital human need to postulate the reality of God, and insofar as this theistic postulation can be regarded as rational or legitimate from the perspective of “practical reason”, metaphysical and ethical aspects of the theism issue turn out to be deeply entangled with each other. A Kantian-cum-pragmatist philosophy of religion will inevitably approach the question of God’s existence from a standpoint that thoroughly synthesizes ethics and metaphysics – just as Kant’s defense of theism as a postulate of practical reason did.

The paper deals with the problem how the relation between religions and philosophies can be thought in our contemporary world of technical and economocial globalization and intercultural connection of all world regions. In a first step, seven types of possible relations between spiritual and rational discourses are distinguished: From a philosophical point of view, two different models of separation and two different models of union between philosophy and religion are pointed out. From a religious perspective, the possible relations to philosophy can be described by the models of (1) exclusivm, (2) inklusivm and (3) a religiousform which negates a clear separation between spiritual and rational methods of finding the truth. Based on this systematic clearification, two arguments, in a second step, are developed from an intercultural perspective: 1) Each religion implies ontological and ethical presuppositions which can be brought into terms by philosophy. It is this philosophical explanation that allows a religion to be rationally discussed. 2) The transcultural character of a religion depends on its capacity to integrate philosophical thinking. Only by means of rational discussion, a spiritual system can become a transcultural power which contributes to adeeper understanding between different cultures.

The author investigates some Plotinus’ metaphors such as: war as the father of all things, universal life as a theatre performance, longings, works and horrors of bloody terrestrial life as a childish "external game", a battle as pyrrhic… All the mentioned metaphors are important for correct interpretation of ideas by the late Hellenistic philosopher. Plotinus’ doctrine of chaocosmic harmony is stated in its comparison with the data of modern science (of synergetics). The author of the paper confirms a conclusion that the oriental ideas range exerted influence on the great Antique thinker’s creative work. This influence was mediated and included Plato as an intermediary.

This essay explores the tension between those who find value in the example of the religious life and others who take the intellectual bankruptcy of religious doctrines as recommending the complete abandonment of religion. It briefly describes John Dewey’s attempt to overcome this tension through a rethinking of the religious life and the sources of its continuing value and purpose. Dewey responds to this conflict over religion by attempting to emancipate its fundamental valuefrom the constraints of any supernatural affiliation. He thereby suggests a more inclusive conception of the religious experience that permeates all aspects of social life. It is argued that Dewey’s attempt to find alternative outlets for religious values within our larger social community provides a better platform for dialogue across social divisions, since it does not begin from a secular standpoint that simply rejects the import of any sort of religious value.