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141. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Tony Doyle Posner on Privacy
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Richard Posner is a leading contemporary critic of privacy. He is highly skeptical of most appeals to privacy, characterizing them as self-serving attempts to keep discrediting, embarrassing, or inconvenient facts from others. Accordingly, he is opposed to the legal protection of most personal information. Posner calls his own theory of privacy “economic.” He argues that the social “markets” in which people sell themselves as employees, business associates, friends, or mates would be far more efficient if nearly all personal information were available to potential “buyers.” I offer two direct criticisms of this view. I then attempt to show that Posner’s conception of privacy is too narrow in the light of the challenge presented by the so-called new panopticon that digital technology has created. I close with a criticism of Posner’s endorsement of sweeping surveillance of U.S. citizens’ e-communications in the name of fighting terrorism.
142. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
About the Contributors
143. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Scott F. Aikin Responsible Sports Spectatorship and the Problem of Fantasy Leagues
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Given a variety of cases of failed spectatorship, a set of criteria for properly attending to a sporting event are defined. In light of these criteria, it is shown that Fantasy League participation occasions a peculiar kind of failure of sports spectatorship.
144. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Joseph Mazor International Rights Violations and Media Coverage: The Case for Adversarial Impartiality
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I argue that the best way for journalists to enable their audience to determine the truth about international rights questions and to grant the parties’ claims a fair hearing is by adhering to strict impartiality—i.e., by producing coverage that does not reflect the journalist’s personal views on the rights question. I then argue that that the best way for journalists to provide strictly impartial coverage is by utilizing a legal trial, and more specifically an adversarial trial as a model for impartial presentation. Unlike the traditional Just-the-Facts model, the adversarial model explicitly requires the journalist to challenge the narratives of the parties and to cover the relevant normative controversies. It solves the problem of partiality in content choice by asking the journalist to take up the perspective of a principled zealous advocate for both sides of the international rights question.
145. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
About the Contributors
146. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Jean Harvey Beyond Policy and Law: Human Security and the Realm of the Informal
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In recent decades governments around the world have been increasingly concerned about terrorism and have introduced new laws and policies in an attempt to combat it. I examine here the weakest link in chains of security management: what I call the realm of “the informal,” where neither law nor formal policy is at work, but where stereotypes, traditional sayings and jokes, social ideals often promoted by mass media, etiquette requirements certainly are. This realm is so dangerous precisely because of its deceptively innocuous appearance. First, I explain the kinds of things that function in the informal realm, revealing that it is more extensive than might first appear. Secondly, I describe three real-life examples where some informal factor plays a vital role in a catastrophic outcome, to show that such seemingly trivial matters can acquire tremendous practical significance in critical situations. My focus is on the influence of some informal factor on individuals who are in no way trying to threaten security, but rather intend to maintain or enhance it. Their roles call for that commitment. Finally I consider one of the three examples more carefully and illustratively, to demonstrate some of the key points raised. Currently, thinking about the dangers informal factors pose is routinely reactive (rather than proactive), often prompted by a catastrophe that has already occurred, but this means we miss some of what could be learned from the catastrophe. We need a far more proactive approach to those factors in the informal sphere and we need a much stronger focus on individuals who are responsible for and committed to maintaining security. Otherwise threats to security will remain are more serious than is typically acknowledged.
147. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Carol Hay Integrity: The Peculiar, the Arbitrary, and the Different
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This paper attempts to address certain shortcomings in the various accounts of the virtue of integrity that appear in the philosophical literature. Specifically, most analyses of integrity fail to give an adequate account of cases where we might want to attribute integrity to certain aspects of a person’s life but refrain from attributing integrity to his or her life as a whole. They also fail to give an adequate account of what we are to say about the integrity of people with peculiar or arbitrary commitments. Attending to these shortcomings will shed new light on an issue that has received considerably more philosophical attention: the question of how we are to judge the reasonableness of others’ conceptions of the good, particularly when these conceptions are radically different from our own.
148. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Anja Matwijkiw, Bronik Matwijkiw The Missing Link in Stakeholder Theory: A Philosophical Framework
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The authors take a fresh look at the distinction between narrow and broad stakeholder theory, as represented by the business management models of Milton Friedman and R. Edward Freeman respectively. The main goal is a critical examination of the criteria and consequences of a practical application in the area of international law, a project that involves scrutinizing each version’s doctrinal assumptions as well as a comparative assessment. Emphasizing fundamental rights and corresponding duties, the starting point is that neither Friedman nor Freeman has a philosophically developed framework for the otherwise central value concepts. As regards economic/social rights, this results in a broad (stakeholder theory) defense that is as unsubstantiated as the attack which the narrow counterpart launches. However, once the Classical Choice Theory of Rights and the Modern Interest Theory of Rights are added to the case of Friedman versus Freeman, this can be adjudicated—using a number of different test procedures—in favor of a comprehensive typology of (civil/political and economic/social) rights and the Modern Interest Theory of Rights. In the course of adjudication, the authors also supplement the broad approach with a framework for needs that accords with Freeman’s proposed logic of value concepts.
149. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba Precis
150. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Norman K. Swazo A Grave Problem of Conscience: Kantian Morality in the Face of Psychopathy
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Clinical psychologists remain puzzled about the diagnostic basis and therapeutic disposition of individuals who present with a clinical profile of psychopathy. Psychopaths have been characterized as lacking in conscience and presenting a mask of sanity, thus differentiating them from psychotics and neurotics. The clinical profile of the psychopathic personality seems at odds with Kant’s moral philosophy, in which Kant characterizes not only the central role of conscience in moral judgment, but in which Kant also insists that every person has a conscience. In this paper the clinical assessments presented by Cleckley and Hare in particular are juxtaposed to Kant’s philosophical position, thereby to gain an understanding what is at the base of the psychopathic personality disorder. The clinical and the moral-philosophical assessments are reconciled, nonetheless leaving the clinical psychologist with the difficult task of therapeutic disposition.
151. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Marisa Diaz-Waian How Philosophy Can Help Us Grieve: Navigating the Wake(s) of Loss
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How might approaching loss philosophically help us grieve? What does it mean to approach something philosophically? Why might such an approach be advantageous to studies of grief? In my paper, I discuss the abovementioned queries (focusing primarily on methods most commonly, though not exclusively, associated with the analytic tradition) and offer an example of how philosophy has helped me navigate the wakes of loss faced with respect to the passing of my father. In the process, I discuss the field of philosophical counseling (in general), a specific brand of practice advanced by Dr. Elliot D. Cohen, and offer a brief account of the basic tenets and steps of its leading modality, Logic-Based Therapy (LBT).
152. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Anna-Karin Andersson Parental Responsibility and Entitlement
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This paper discusses parents’ rights and duties regarding their offspring from a certain classical liberal perspective. Approaching this issue from this perspective is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, classical liberalism’s alleged inability to explain the rights of very young human beings is a serious objection against such theories. Second, if we are able to show that a version of classical liberalism not only avoids this objection but actually implies very strong parental obligations to support offspring, the case for extensive parental obligations in general is indeed very strong. If we accept that parents produce offspring in the same sense that they can produce inanimate objects, but are able to show that such production does not create parental ownership in offspring, we should accept that parents have extensive duties to support their offspring in virtue of being their offspring’s producers. Moreover, these duties are negative duties, which parents must perform in order to avoid actively harming their offspring.
153. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Carla Bagnoli Morality as Compromise vs. Morality as a Constraint
154. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Claus Strue Frederiksen, Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen Do Anti-Discrimination Policies Sometimes Imply (Wrongful) Discrimination?: The (Alleged) Asymmetry between Religious and Secular Clothing
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To claim that companies should not discriminate on the basis of race, gender or religion seems almost as trivial as stating that they should not use forced labor or dump radioactive waste into the local river. Among other things, non-discrimination seems to imply that companies recognize and respect a range of religious preferences, including allowing religious clothing, e.g., by allowing Muslim women to wear headscarves. However, many companies do not believe that employees generally should be allowed to wear the kind of clothes they please. In this paper, we discuss the (alleged) asymmetry between the status of religious and secular clothing. We conclude that religious exemptions to dress codes can discriminate wrongfully. To solve this problem, companies should not ban religious clothing. Instead, companies should liberalize their dress codes, so that employees would be allowed to wear secular and religious types of clothing on an equal footing.
155. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
Duncan MacIntosh Sterba’s Argument From Non-Question-Beggingness for the Rationality of Morality
156. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
William J. Talbott The Elusiveness of a Non-Question-Begging Justification for Morality
157. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba Replies to Bagnoli, MacIntosh, and Talbott
158. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 2
About the Contributors
159. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 2
Joseph Farrell Los Desaparecidos: Ethical Implications of United States Immigration Policy (or Lack Thereof)
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How can a nation like the United States of America both have and lack immigration laws? The title here implies a contradiction! Considering the history of immigration law from the 1798 Naturalization Act through the recent controversial executive orders by President Obama, our government has sought to carve out a path to residency and/or citizenship for individuals so inclined. Some of the measures along the way have been exclusionary and even racist. However, recent immigration policies seem to have been attempts to control populations of people flowing into the United States for the sake of equity. Starting with the “Immigration Reform and Control Act” of 1986, laws have been made so that immigrants have inroads to permanent residency and citizenship but the problem is enforcement in both will and deed. Our nation has immigration in theory but in practice? One can not really be clear about what constitutes such a practice given millions of illegal immigrants live and work in the United States. Beyond the legal problem of enforcement, the moral problem exists in the loss of our humanity and the humanity of immigrants living in the United States. Unfortunately, the path to moral rectitude is blocked by a problem of incompatibility. Moral rectitude cannot be accomplished by the status quo. It also cannot be accomplished by amnesty or deportation. A morally tolerable solution exists somewhere in between with some degree of punishment and yet seems, concurrently, too much and not enough.
160. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 28 > Issue: 2
S. P. Morris The Sport Status of Hunting
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Applying Bernard Suits’s conceptual definition of game-playing, and his outline of a conceptual definition of sport, I ask and answer the following question: can hunting be a sport? An affirmative answer is substantiated via the following logic. Premise one, all sports are games. Premise two, a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. Premise three, fair-chase hunters voluntarily accept unnecessary obstacles. Conclusion one: fair-chase hunting is a game. Premise four, a sport can be defined as a game that requires the exercise of physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability. Premise five, some fair-chase hunts require physical skill, have a wide following, and have institutional stability. Conclusion two: fair-chase hunting that requires physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability is a sport. After substantiating each premise and conclusion I consider and refute several important objections. Primarily, (1) that hunting lacks constitutive rules and (2) that hunting lacks volitional engagement and thus cannot be a game or sport.