This article presents a view of moral development based on the interdisciplinary study of moral psychology and virtue ethics. It suggests that a successfulaccount of moral development has to go beyond what the developmental psychology and virtue ethics advocate and find ways of incorporating ideas, suchas 'moral failure' and 'unpredictability of life'. It proposes to recognize the concept of moral development as an essential concept for ethics, moral philosophy andphilosophy of education, and as a useful tool for anyone who wants to engage constructively in dialogues of religions, cultures and personal interaction.

Irenaeus, Coleridge and Gadamer all wrote about religion in distinct historical periods, however the work that each produced reflects the anthropologicalcondition of the middle position. Furthermore, each thinker provides an opportunity for self-reflection about the motivations of faith without requiring the individualto abandon their religious belief in order to do so. In this manner they present a productive altemative to the required external views of the social sciences. Theindividual's position in mid-creation, his moral freedom and his historical contingence all require the acceptance, commitment and trust of faith. Gnosticism, Empiricist thought and the desire to overcome historical contingency all reveal intellectual impatience in riposte to this condition. This intellectual impatience seeks the absolute without the need for faith. For Irenaeus, Coleridge and Gadamer such absolute, logocentric, complete systems end up alienating man from the reality of the incomplete condition that permeates his existence and the faith-requiring my-thos that ultimate realities necessitate in order to be communicated.

Bolzano's theodicy is a very good example of Platonism in the philosophy of religion. Above all, Bolzano believes that there obtains an ideal realm of truths inthemselves and mathematical objects, which are independent of God. Therefore, we are allowed to conclude that God is only a contractor; true, more powerful than Plato's demiurge because He created substances (and matter) and sustains them in existence, but God must follow a project which is independent of Him. Since the world is determined, by the program and God follows the program, then in fact the program is a god, or better, there is no God (at least in the sense of the classical Christian tradition). Bolzano's project is not related to God's essence, since it is extemal to God, and is not made by God. Thus, Bolzano's theodicy is also the absolute opposite of the Cartesian theodicy. God in the Cartesian theodicy can change all rules, all scientific laws and, in consequence. He can create any world He wants. Bolzano's God cannot change anything and cannot create a different world than the world determined by the project, a world different than the one He has created. The responsibility of Bolzano's God for the evil in the world is limited by the project of the world.

The article presents the key problems relevant to the issue of 'transcendent action', as Peirce calls it. The author focuses on the relation between 'beliefand the 'transcendentals': unity, truth, goodness, and beauty, in their peculiar Peirceian context. He considers firstly 'belief in the sense of „an original impulse toact consistently, to have a definite intention" and, secondly, „Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty". Finally, he considers Peirce's defense again two popular accusations: one on the part of the logicians which „confounds psychical truths with psychological truths", and the second one regarding hedonism.

In this paper I would like to asses critically McDowell's argument to the effect that all experience is conceptualized and explain the role that this thesis playswithin his general philosophical project. It has been argued that McDowell's conception of experience leads to idealism. I will demonstrate why this charge couldbe made and whether it is a charge which McDowell can adequately respond to. The paper will clarify McDowell's conception of conceptualized experience, andevaluate its efficacy for his philosophical aim. In order to accomplish these goals, the paper will contain the following two components: (1) a reconstruction ofMcDowell's position, and (2) its critical analysis. To reconstruct the position of McDowell, I will try (i) to establish his motives (i.e. avoiding the collapse into theMyth of the Given or coherentism), and (ii) the sources of inspiration for his thought and its and context (the Kantian categories of receptivity and spontaneity; the thought of D. Davidson, W. Sellars, G. Evans and Ch. Peacocke); (iii) and to explain his arguments (i.e. the general idea of the unboundedness of the conceptual, and the arguments against existence of non-conceptual content) and his defence against the charge of idealism. In order to critically analyse his position, I will try to evaluate it in terms of whether his defence against the objections to his proposal, in particular the charge of idealism, is successful.

Ingarden conceives ontology as a philosophia prima, which deals with being as purely possible (it complies with the essentialistic tradition of Duns Scotusand Wolff). It is an intuitive (anschaulich) and a priori analysis of the content of the relevant ideas (rein apriorische Analyse der Ideengehalte). It consists of three parts: existential, formal and material ontology. Existential ontology deals with the possible modes of existence (Seinsweise). Problems of factual existence pertain to metaphysics, which is a separate branch of theoretical philosophy, based on ontology.

The Hellenic medical ideas have found appreciation among people over centuries. Though the initial concept remained the same, methods or ways to achievedesired aims have changed. Since Hippocrates, new generations of physicians have worked hard to find more powerful types of therapies to relieve their patients and make treatment less burdensome. The struggle of medicine is very specific and requires, apart from practical skills, a clear personal commitment to help people wisely. From the Early Antiquity, both medicine and medical ethics go together. Wherever Hippocratic medicine is practiced, an appropriate moral pattern accompanies it because the Hellenic doctor offered purely clinical data and his art should not be separated from anthropology, ethics and religion.

In this paper, I take three snapshots of Wittgenstein's philosophical work in order to jot a few notes on the issue of the continuity in his philosophy. I useWittgenstein's distinction between what can be 'said' and what can only be 'shown' in order to highlight Wittgenstein's continual insistence that our basic relation with reality is seamless. I propose that Wittgenstein holds, throughout his philosophical career, that our thinking does not stop short of the world. In brief, I suggest that Wittgenstein would note that our natural history is largely what the mediaevals would call second nature.

The problem of evil is a metaphysical problem bound up with the conditions of human existence. The radical evil of fascism and communism, according to Jozef Tischner, opens up the possibility that we live in the time of a modem Manicliaeism, understood as having two faces: nihilism and pessimism. The possibility of thinking of such a modem form of Manichaeism necessarily calls for a new inquiry into the question of evil. For Tischner, evil, like good, is not anobject, but something in which man participates, and for this reason it cannot be objectified and defined. One can only ask how it appears.

Proponents of the argument from regress maintain that the existence of Instrumental Value is sufficient to establish the existence of Intrinsic Value. It isargued that the chain of instrumentally valuable things has to end somewhere. Namely with intrinsic value. In this paper, I shall argue something a little more modest than this. I do not want to argue that the regress argument proves that there is intrinsic value but rather that it proves that the idea of intrinsic value is a necessary part of our thinking about moral value.

I reconsider the monism/pluralism debate about natural kinds. Monism claims that there is a privileged division of reality into natural kinds, while pluralismstates that there are many ways of classifying objects according to different purposes. I compare three different monistic accounts of natural kinds with the pluralism advocated by promiscuous realism. The analysis of some examples of the classification of celestial objects suggest that there are indeed different legitimate ways of classifying things according to different purposes; contrary to monism, the boundaries between kinds are not fixed. These results show that promiscuous realism is a better account of natural kind.

In the philosophy of the Jesuits of this period one can distinguish philosophy connected with teaching, i.e. taught at schools led by the Jesuits, and Civicphilosophy, not connected directly with teaching. This was mainly social, economic, and political philosophy, especially philosophy of the state, law and the like.

There are many arguments that so-called pluralistic theologies of religions face difficulties in being sufficiently pluralistic. In order to meet such an objection, a pluralist offers different solutions. I argue that the range of plausible possibilities for a pluralist is strongly constrained by philosophical arguments which one can develop out of the philosophy of Hilary Putnam. In the first part of this paper, I sketch out three important strands of the Putnamian thought I consider worth defending. Given such presuppositions, I formulate two constraints on pluralistic theology of religions. In the last section of my paper, I briefly point out which ofthe particular standpoints, often labelled as „pluralistic theology of religions", have problems with meeting formulated constraints, and which of the „pluralists" seem to be in accordance with them.

The paper begins by asking, in the context of McDowell's Mind and World, what guides empirical judgement. It then critically examines David Bell's accountof the role of aesthetic judgement, or experience, in Kant and Wittgenstein, in shedding light on empirical judgement. Bell's suggestion that a Wittgensteinian account of aesthetic experience can guide the application of empirical concepts is criticised: neither the discussion of aesthetic judgement nor aesthetic experience helps underpin empirical judgement. But attention to the parallel between Wittgenstein's discussion of understanding rules and the question of how empirical concepts can be applied to particulars suggests how to dissolve the felt need for an answer. This in turn helps shed light on McDowell's conceptualist account of experience.