Οὐσία in Numenius: a notion which is progressively elaborated: Analysis of the difficulties linked to οὐσία and ἰδέα in fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F (fr. 14, 16 et 20 dP). In the Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, Numenius refines his definition of οὐσία step by step. He uses the word at first as a synonym of τὸ ὄν (15 F) and as another designation of being. Then, he associates it to the ἕξις when he refers to the specific οὐσία which possesses science (22 F): in all likelihood, this οὐσία is the intellect as the essence common to God and Man in the possession of science. Finally, Numenius gives οὐσία two aspects or sides which, in our opinion, represent two manners of conceiving the intelligible it constitutes: on the one hand, οὐσία comes from Being itself (the Good) and seems to represent the eidetic predicates or what we could name the “fundamental intelligibility”, a state in which the form is not determined yet, but which gives it the status of a real being ; on the other hand, οὐσία is the product of the second god and intellect and the determined aspect of the previous one, which makes it possible to distinguish the forms one from the other. In this last case, Numenius seems to name οὐσία more specifically ἰδέα, even if both words are elsewhere synonymous and used to refer to the two aspects previously mentioned according to the context in which they are employed. The paper presents the analysis of fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F from which we arrive at this interpretation. The distinction between two manners of conceiving οὐσία makes it possible then to discover two levels in the Being at the origin of each of them: Being itself (αὐτοόν which is the Good itself, αὐτοάγαθον) and the ≪second≫ or ≪just≫ Being, constituted by the good demiurge which is probably the “One who is good par excellence”. From there, two ways of conceiving ἰδέα also appear: on the one hand, ἰδέα is synonymous with οὐσία, then it refers to the second aspect of οὐσία, the determined one; on the other hand, it can also refer to the level of Being which is the Good when, in fragment 28 F, it is conceived as a form and probably as the Form par excellence identified with the intellect which this Good is itself.

At the end of Treatise 38 (VI 7), Plotinus presents an original analysis of the activity of the intellect. The intellectual activity of the soul cannot produce its object and thinks what is in the Intellect from which it comes. On the contrary, the Intellect produces its object (οὐσία) and its intellection is not the act of a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), as in the preceding case. In this context, Plotinus uses, to account for this particular form of intellect, a very rare notion in his work, that of συνυπόστασις. In our opinion, its use is at the origin of a true explanatory model that Plotinus uses in particular in Treatise 39 (VI 8) to think how the One can be what he wants to be. The use of this notion can therefore help us understand the meaning of freedom and will attributed to the first principle.

This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of life and being in treatises VI, 2 [43] On the genera of being and III, 7 [45] On eternity and time. Life and being play a key role in Plotinus’ ontology since they characterise incorporeal realities as such (life and being cannot be drawn from the analysis of bodies). Therefore, focusing on these items makes it possible to attain an account of intelligible reality according to the principles appropriate to it. Three issues are considered: (1) the cognitive process through which the soul grasps being and life when it turns its cognitive activity away from the bodies and reverts to itself (VI, 2, 4‑6); (2) the status of being and life as genera of the intelligible reality (life is equivalent to intelligible motion: VI, 2, 7); (3) Plotinus’ account of life as the way of being typical of intelligible realities (III, 7); (4) his gradualist account of the hierarchy of life (III, 8 [30], 8; VI, 3 [44], 7; I, 4 [46], 3).

In his critic of the doctrine of Bardaisan († 222), Ephrem the Syrian († 373) devotes a lot of space to reflection on the meaning of the terms ītutā and ītyā (plural ītyē) which, as he denounces, are used inaccurately by his opponent. These Syriac terms can be translated by “being” or “essence”, but also by “substance”. This observation leads us to propose the comparison with the Greek term οὐσία, taking into account many difficulties raised by its uses in theological discourse. The article is devoted to the analysis of the uses of the terms ītutā and ītyā ‑ by Ephrem and by Bardaisan ‑ in their different ways of describing the divine essence. This comparison reveals the peculiarities of the two systems of thought and also their connections with the Greek philosophical doctrines.

This essay analyses the use of the term/concept hilasterion (‘propitiatorium’, i.e. the cover of Ark of Covenant) in the hypomnematic corpus by Philo of Alexandria. This subject needs to be examined in relationship with the Greek translation of the Septuagint and the exegesis of the Hebrew kapporeth ; so it will be argued that here Philo deals with semitic thought more than with the categories of Greek philosophy, since the real and bodily presence of God on hilasterion differs ontologically from any allegoric interpretation : only a sound Hebrew contextualisation of the theme as šekhînâ might take away this concern. As a result it means that, speculatively, there does not exist Philo Gracus only but this coexists with a sort of often neglected Philo Hebraicus too, when Greek allegory and allegorism fail to make sense, just as in the case of the special point of view of hilasterion, due to its semitic nature not totally compressible into Greek forma mentis.

Cet article propose d’identifier le fragment anonyme du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ff. 1‑73v avec les questionnes sur les Sentences de Nicholas Aston, connu grâce aux travaux pionniers de Zenon Kaluza. Une analyse des détails techniques de ce texte permet également d’avancer l’hypothèse que les Articuli d’Aston peuvent être lus comme des traces des principia. En annexe, nous éditons la liste des questions du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ainsi qu’une concordance entre ce manuscrit et les autres témoins manuscrits d’Aston, afin de démontrer que ce nouveau témoin contient la tradition la plus complète du texte d’Aston.

The rediscovery of the Hellenic philosophy, but also of the Patristic thinking is a typical feature of Thomistic thought, which consists of a new synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that raises anew the issue of the relation between Christianity and philosophy as a focal point of medieval philosophy. Acknowledgement of Hellenic Patristic thought that focuses primarily on man as an inseparable union of body and soul, joined in a whole, has been a determining factor in the Thomistic approach of being, through the distinction between a person (or hypostasis) from essence (or nature). Through this distinction and because of the Aristotle’s hylomorphism, the notion of ‘person’ is placed in the field of individuality and the unity of the human composite. The metaphysical notion of a person as individual, complemented by the notion of “relation” is directly related to the ontological unity of human nature and is founded upon the metaphysical notion of “essence” (substance).