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141. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Donald Rutherford Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts
142. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Books Received
143. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Sandra B. Rosenthal Contemporary Metaphysics and the Issue of Time: Re-Thinking the “Great Divide”
144. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Philip R. Shields Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious
145. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Arthur Madigan Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito
146. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Louis N. Sandowsky Hume and Husserl: The Problem of the Continuity or Temporalization of Consciousness
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This paper examines Husserl’s fascination with the issues raised by Hume’s critique of the philosophy of the ego and the continuity of consciousness. The path taken here follows a continental and phenomenological approach. Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on the temporalization of immanent time-consciousness is a phenomenological-eidetic examination of how the continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of continuity are possible. It was by way of Husserl’s reading of Hume’s discussion of “flux” or “flow” that his discourse on temporal phenomena led to the classification of a point-like now as a “fiction” and opened up a horizonal approach to the present that Hume’s introspective analyses presuppose but that escaped the limitations of the language that was available to him. In order to demonstrate the radicality of Husserl’s temporal investigations and his inspiration in the work of Hume, I show how his phenomenological discourse on the living temporal flow of consciousness resolves the latter’s concern about the problem of continuity by re-thinking how, in the absence of an abiding impression of Self, experience is continuous throughout the flux of its impressions.
147. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Brendan Sweetman Can God Be Free?
148. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Gareth B. Matthews Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession
149. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Raymond Dennehy Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
150. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Sr. Mary D’Attore The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
151. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Derek J. Morrow Aquinas, Marion, Analogy, and Esse: A Phenomenology of the Divine Names?
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The recent translation into English of Jean-Luc Marion’s essay “Saint Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy” provides an opportunity to re-examine the significance of Marion’s earlier criticisms of Aquinas (set forth, as is well known, in God without Being) in the light of his most current position on Aquinas. Toward this end, I discuss the role that the doctrine of analogy plays in Marion’s reassessment, and partial retraction, of the controversial indictment of Aquinas that was presented in God without Being. Marion’s claim that the Thomistic conception of God as ipsum esse should be understood by “starting from the distance of God” is highlighted in order to elucidate how, for Aquinas (at least as Marion reads him), the doctrine of analogy functions phenomenologically, as do the divine names generally, to manifest the character of God as infinite goodness and excessive givenness.
152. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Books Received
153. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Richard Combes A Taxonomy of Technics
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Even as philosophers increasingly apply their analytical acumen to other subjects of intellectual study, technology is one area relegated to the sidelines. To help dispel such prejudice, this exercise in applied ontology explains why technology invites critical examination, enumerates the generic needs and perceived wants that it fulfills, and then supplies a taxonomy of technological devices individuated in terms of the functional roles that their designers or consumers intend for them. In light of the classificatory scheme developed, I conclude that everything in space and time may be used to realize technological goals, necessitating a more inclusive understanding of technology and thereby a heightened awareness of its pervasive character.
154. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Patrick Toner, Christopher Toner Pascal’s First Wager Reconsidered: A Virtue Theoretic View
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There are at least two versions of the famous Wager argument to be found in Pascal’s Pensées. In contemporary work on the Wager, attention is almost always focused on the second. In this paper, we take a look at the first, which is often quickly dismissed as a failure. Indeed, it seems to be generally believed that Pascal himself quickly dismissed it as a failure. We fi rst argue that Pascal himself accepted the argument. Then we argue (more importantly) that those who accept a virtue theoretic account of human flourishing ought to agree with Pascal in accepting the argument.
155. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Nick Trakakis Nietzsche’s Perspectivism and Problems of Self-Refutation
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Nietzsche’s perspectivism has aroused the perplexity of many a recent commentator, not least because of the doctrine’s apparent self-refuting character. If, as Nietzsche holds, there are no facts but only interpretations, then how are we to understand this claim itself? Nietzsche’s perspectivism must be construed either as a fact or as one further interpretation—but in the former case the doctrine is clearly self-refuting, while in the latter case any reasons or arguments one may have in support of one’s perspective are rendered bothimpotent and superfluous. The unpalatable consequences of Nietzsche’s perspectivism are further highlighted by considering its effects on Nietzsche’s treatment of the fundamental laws of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, Nietzsche’s perspectivism, if not self-refuting, at least seems to be refuted by his own writings, where he confidently puts forward various doctrines and critiques, thus indicating that he does not think of his own beliefs as being true merely in a perspectival sense. There is every reason, I conclude, to be perplexed about Nietzsche’s perspectivism.
156. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Robert Ehman John Locke’s Theory of Moral Consensus
157. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Blake E. Hestir Aristotle on Truth
158. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Martin Schonfeld Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality
159. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Christopher Arroyo Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Orientation to the Central Theme
160. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 1
Mary T. Clark Access to God in Augustine’s Confessions, Books X–XIII