It has recently been argued that God’s causation of human free choices is best understood in light of Aquinas’s teaching on creation. Such a position is attractive because it provides a way of avoiding the compatibilism of classical interpretations of Aquinas. However, this position may be subject to other flaws. In fact, Francisco Suárez explicitly rejects the view that God’s creative causality can be understood either as the divine essence or as a predicamental relation of the created effect to God. The purpose of this essay is to investigate, first, whether Suárez’s view of efficient causality rules out conceptualizing God’s motion of the will in terms of creation, and second, whether it provides a more plausible alternative. I argue on both points that it does not, and that an error common to both Suárez and his sixteenth-century opponents is one reason to conceptualize divine motion as a kind of creation.

Classical Trinitarian dogma affirms that God is simple—a teaching also advanced by major proponents of classical monotheism. Nevertheless, as each one knows, this notion is controversial in modern analytic philosophy, where it is commonly contested. It is also largely ignored in contemporary continental dogmatic theology. Nevertheless, the teaching that God is simple is requisite for any authentic interpretation of the Trinitarian dogma of Nicaea. It is also eminently defensible from a rational, philosophical point of view. In what follows I will begin with (I) a theological consideration of the notion of Trinitarian simplicity before considering (II) the metaphysics of the simplicity of the divine essence. (III) I will then consider briefly two special problems that are associated with the metaphysics of divine simplicity: divine knowledge and divine freedom. (IV) Finally, I will consider briefly the significant Christological consequences of the acceptance (or non-acceptance) of the traditional affirmation of divine simplicity.

This article explores Bonaventure’s metaphysical account of creation, which holds that at the heart of every creature is a sort of metaphysical vanity. That vanity stems from the exigencies of a creation metaphysics in which the creator-God draws every creature out of nothingness into being. But, while God’s creative act sustains the creature in being, the nothingness from which God preserves creation, on Bonaventure’s view, always remains a feature of creation’s metaphysical constitution. In short, for the Seraphic Doctor, because nothingness always resides in creation, creation itself is fundamentally vain. Since vanity is a central theme in the book of Ecclesiastes, concerning which Bonaventure has left us a commentary, I argue that the metaphysical vision he employs to illuminate the nature of vanity as it pertains to creation—both within his biblical commentary and beyond—can be properly described as a “metaphysic of Ecclesiastes.”

This paper presents a broad-ranging critique of the traditional strong doctrine of divine simplicity which is attributed to Augustine and Aquinas. After showing two important arguments in favor of the doctrine to be unsuccessful, it argues that the doctrine itself, in this strong version, is problematic in three main ways. First, the doctrine involves extensive category mistakes. Second, it is difficult to reconcile with truths about God that are (nearly) universally acknowledged, such as that God knows contingent truths and performs actions which he is not necessitated by his nature to perform. Finally, it is difficult to reconcile with personal attributes of God which are important both for the Bible and for religious practice, such as the claims that God is responsive to human beings and that he loves them. This article contends that while there is a sense in which it is true that God is simple, the traditional strong doctrine of divine simplicity, attributed to Augustine and Aquinas, is a mistake from which theology needs to be liberated.

Aquinas holds that by its nature the human will has happiness as its ultimate end in every choice, and yet he holds that one can and ought to love God more than oneself or one’s own happiness. This generates the so-called “problem of love”: how can an eudaimonist like Aquinas account for non-selfish love? I argue that Aquinas’s doctrine of goodness as the will’s object and his distinction between the love of desire and the love of friendship solve this problem and indicate that Aquinas’s eudaimonism is only “subordinated eudaimonism.” By its nature the will has happiness—total inhering goodness—as its ultimate object secundum quid (love of desire), and God—total subsisting goodness—as ultimate object simpliciter (love of friendship). Nevertheless, Aquinas argues on philosophical grounds and with the support of Aristotle’s Liber de Bona Fortuna that God Himself would have to move the will if one were to love God above oneself even in the order of nature.

I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosophy of nature, I develop a Thomistic theory of intentionality that supports a certain kind of anti-physicalism. I then consider criticisms of the Thomistic theory of intentionality raised by Peter King and Robert Pasnau. In reply I argue that (a) King’s position would have the Scholastics adopt an approach to intentionality that fails to solve the very problem such a theory is supposed to address; and (b) contrary to Pasnau’s objection, there are ample resources available to show that the Thomist does not commit a content fallacy.

In this essay, I argue against an important position in contemporary perfectionist political philosophy, which holds both that the state is instrumental in nature and that there are principled, rather than merely prudential, limits on the scope of state authority such that pure paternalism is not morally acceptable. By so doing, I provide a conditional defense of the moral acceptability of pure paternalism.

Belonging presents a range of problems that have been treated thematically in the social sciences. However, belonging has rarely been explored as an explicit theme in philosophy. That said, many philosophers have implicitly considered the problem of belonging in their own way. In this paper, the work of Emmanuel Levinas is presented and considered, especially where it relates to the political. In outlining Levinas’s thought on fraternity, we are presented with a belonging that is not yet political. It is in some ways, but not necessarily, pre-political. On the contrary, we begin to see how all that is meant by the political—the State, citizenship, the remit of justice—is secondary or subsidiary to the primacy of the ethical which, in its only extension beyond the Other, finds expression in fraternity or in our belonging with others.

In the epilogue to Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul Ricoeur introduces an overlooked “vertical” axis into the problem of forgiveness. This verticality runs from the “depth” of fault to the “height” of forgiveness. For Ricoeur, forgiveness only appears an impossible “exchange” if one excludes this verticality from the question. Instead, he calls forgiveness “difficult” because it traverses from height to depth. This article argues that Ricoeur’s notion of the horizontal and the vertical in Memory, History, Forgetting is best understood as an allusion to his account of time and eternity in Chapter 1 of Time and Narrative, volume 1, even though Ricoeur himself does not explicitly make this connection. In light of the ontological tenor of this connection, the author also suggests a slight modification of Ricoeur’s account, calling forgiveness “improbable” rather than difficult.

The immense distance between God and creatures is a core statement of Gregory of Nyssa’s thought, which makes it distinctive not only in theology, but also in cosmology, anthropology, and spiritual doctrine. For him, the main distinction between beings that articulates all reality is not that of intelligible and sensible, but the one between infinite God and creatures. This paper, dealing with some selected texts regarding the creation of man, points out the main roots of Gregory’s theism: a high comprehension of God’s transcendence and a proper philosophy of time and creation. From here, Gregory’s understanding of the hierarchy of beings as a non-dialectic unity of creation supported by a transcendent participation in God, and his articulation of Eternity and Time within the unique creative action of God, could be seen as a deep Christian comprehension of reality that is still intriguing for contemporary thinkers.

Many discussions of per se and per accidens series focus on efficient causality and how a consideration of the metaphysics of the matter can deliver us a primary efficient cause of all that is (God). Drawing on my own previous work on causal series, I offer in this article a model for the understanding of per se causal series wherein the causality involved is that of finality. I then consider whether or not such per se final causal series are infinite. Finally, I consider the implications this has for our conception of God as creator.

The present study clarifies the theological importance of feeling in the formation of a person, as Edith Stein understands it. Feeling constitutes the originating dimension of the finite spirit, disclosing the dynamic pair of thinking and willing while being capable of anticipating infinite Spirit. A finite spirit is a most real and authentic incarnate spirit when it comprehends itself as stemming from God. The foundations of this formation are to be found in the ontic, historical, dynamic relationship between finite spirit and the Infinite Spirit, who anticipates finite spirit answering to an “image” logos (Bild ) as one who is led toward a “full similitude” (Gleichnis) to God by the Holy Spirit. The longing of the finite for the infinite manifests itself in the dynanimic relations between feeling, intelligence, and willing. Guided by these fundamental insights, Edith Stein teaches that the relationship between Bildung and Ausbildung constitutes a process of divinization based in a loving dialogue.

This contribution examines two related points in relation to Aquinas’s understanding of contemplation, which is a sorely neglected topic in scholarship. First, after having outlined that the final act of contemplation culminates in an intellective, simple apprehension of the truth, I will examine how this act relates to the three operations of the intellect (grasping of quiddity, judgement, and reasoning) Aquinas identifies in a number of places. Second, I argue that his view of contemplation as simple insight is significantly indebted to Neoplatonic sources; therefore, we must pay attention to the way he introduces Neoplatonic elements into his Aristotelian framework. I conclude this contribution by suggesting some reasons—of a theological nature—why Aquinas would have been drawn towards a non-discursive or “intuitive” notion of contemplation.

In this paper I interpret Arthur Danto’s thesis on “the end of art” in eschatological terms. He allows for this by having chosen Joachim of Fiore’s theological theory of the three ages to illuminate his own understanding of art history. I offer some ideas on how this post-history might be understood by means of theological method. I also explore the relationship between the concept of “tradition” and Danto’s concept of “transfiguration.” By means of these analyses I bring out the tendency in contemporary analytical philosophy of art to interpret the work of art via theological categories. I consider this to be another argument in favor of the view that art has taken the place of religion in the philosophical consciousness.

Philippa Foot’s attempt in Natural Goodness to defend the claim that moral goodness is a form of species-specific natural goodness and that immorality is a natural defect has elicited a number of challenges. For instance, Scott Woodcock presents the following dilemma: Foot’s account of natural normativity either yields morally objectionable results, or there exists an appeal to a normative standard not grounded in natural norms. I contend that the Footian Neo-Aristotelian approach possesses the resources necessary for an adequate answer to this dilemma. I argue that Foot’s naturalism does wind up with a normative standard not grounded in empirically typical natural norms but that it is no Achilles’ heel. To support this thesis, I contend that such a standard appears inappropriate only if one assumes Foot is endeavoring to justify or establish a substantive conception of human goodness and defect, something she is not attempting.

Many scholars find Socratic irony so obvious in the Euthydemus that they don’t bother to cite any textual support when they claim that Socrates does not sincerely mean something he says, e.g., when he praises Euthydemus and his brother. What these scholars overlook is the role of agapē in shaping Socrates’s view of other intellectuals. If we take his agapē into account, it is easy to see that while there is some irony in the Euthydemus, none of it is Socratic.

The paper deals with the theory of universals of Sebastian Izquierdo (1601–1681), a Spanish Jesuit author working in Rome, as he formulated and defended it in Disputation 17 of his major philosophical work The Lighthouse of Sciences (Pharus scientiarum), published in Lyon in 1659. Izquierdo’s discussion centers around three questions: What is universality? Is there some intellect-independent universality? What is the nature of the intellect-dependent universality? Izquierdo’s approach may be seen as a search for the third way between the (moderate) realism of the Thomists and the Scotists and the (conceptualist) nominalism of some Jesuits such as Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641).

While examining how Aquinas defends his account of the human soul in Article 2 of On Spiritual Creatures, I will point out the difficulties that arise in determining the nature of the human soul when the very starting question is formulated in the manner of Article 2’s question: “Can a spiritual substance be united to a body?” This way of examining the human soul—beginning by considering pure spiritual substantiality and then considering whether it is possible that spiritual substance can relate to a body—reveals an intractable tension which Aquinas would have a difficult time resolving. However, this tension is avoided when the method for discussing the nature of the soul is a bottom-up analysis of the human composite and its operations, which is precisely how Aquinas argues in his Answer. The dialectic between these two different sorts of questioning in Article 2 represents the key opposition between Aquinas’s arguments regarding the soul and those of Averroes and Avicenna.

I argue that Thomas Aquinas’s Identity Formula—the statement that the “intellect in act is the intelligible in act”—does not, as is usually supposed, express his position on how the intellect accesses extramental realities (responding to the so-called “mind-world gap”). Instead, it should be understood as a claim about the metaphysics of intellection, according to which the perfection requisite for performing the act of understanding is what could be called “intellectual-intelligible being.” In reinterpreting Aquinas’s Identity Formula, I explore the notion of being “in act” as an intellect or intelligible (intelligibile actu, intellectus actu), his curious comments about an “order” or “genus” of intelligibles, and the relationship of understanding and being-understood.

In Thomistic metaphysics, the domain of ens rationis pertains to a hazy region of “non-real” being, laying outside of the proper scientific subject of metaphysics. In addition to negations and privations, a very important domain of entia rationis pertains to that of relationes rationis, especially such relationes as play a role in human reasoning. Logic, studying these “non-real” relations, thus focuses on a unique, if hazy, realm of “non-being.” While this particular type of ens rationis receives the lion’s share of attention among Thomists, there is evidence that similar reflection should be given to two additional domains of experience, namely that of “moral being” and “artificial being” (i.e., the being of artifacts). This paper lays out the general metaphysical concerns pertaining to each of these domains, providing an outline of topics pertinent to a Thomistic discussion of the intentional existence involved in logic, moral realities, and artifacts.