En las teorías científicas se postulan entidades teóricas que de alguna manera se relacionan con lo observable. Sin embargo con el avance científico y tecnológico, los científicos a menudo sostienen poder observar, co ayuda de algún artefacto, las entidades que tiempo atrás habían sido postuladas por la teoría. Esta transición de algunas entidades del reino de lo teórico al de lo observable con carga teórica presenta características interesantes para un análisis sobre la articulación de las teorías. En este trabajo se presenta una descripción de tal transición en la que se pone en evidencia que además de la aceptación de la teoría involucrada en garantizar el funcionamiento y construcción del artefacto, la carga teórica asociada a la observación con instrumentos, también se debe aceptar un postulado de reducción que establece una relación entre entidades pertenecientes a distintas teorías. También se sugiere una dificultad intuitiva en sostener una postura antirealista de entidades teóricas frente a la posibilidad de que tales entidades puedan revelarse como ‘visibles’ con la ayuda de algún desarrollo tecnológico aceptado por la comunidad científica.

Michael Dummett has argued that antirealism requires a rejection of bivalence. However, his version of antirealism is not the only available one. In fact, it is arguable that his antirealism is not sufficiently antirealist and falls short of his intentions. On the basis of a study of the Indian Buddhist philosopher, Nāgārjuna, I think that a more complete and coherent kind of antirealism is possible, one that respects the phenomena of conventional ontology and retains the principles of classical logic, but reinterprets both in a radical way.

De Parménide, distinguant ontologiquement le chemin de la vérití de celui de la fausseté, à Descartes, garantissant l'infaillibilité de la raison par la méthode, en passant par Spinoza, insistant sur l'infaillibilité de l'esprit qui se porte sur l'idée vraie ou adéquate, la tradition épistémique a toujours marginalisé l'erreur, qu'elle situait alors aux antipodes de la vérité. Or, la tradition doxologique ou conjecturale dont relève l'eépistémologie historique en particulier va la réévaluer, dans le sillage de Kant, critique du paternalisme despotique, mais dont l'atavisme dogmatique affecte encore son projet critique, qui croit que son compterendu des conditions de possibilité de la science ne saurait être crédible s'il n'en constate pas, en même temps, la "clôture" ou l'achèvement. On verra ainsi opérer le gester réévaluatif, dès son inscription inaugurale kantienne, à l'intérior d'une anthropologie négative, qui fait néanmoins de l'erreur le pédagogue d'une humanité incapable d'effectuer toujours des essais parfaits our réussis, mais sachant au moins apprendre de ses erreurs. L'erreur devient alors la clé de toute forme d'ouverture.

Imre Lakatos' "methodology of scientific research programs" and Alasdair MacIntyre's "tradition-constituted enquiry" are two sustained attempts to overcome the assumptions of logical empiricism, while saving the appearance that theory-change is rational. The key difference between them is their antithetical stand on the issue of incommensurability between large-scale theories. This divergence generates other areas of disagreement; the most important are the relevance of the historical record and the presence of decision criteria that are common to rival programs. I show that Lakatos' rejection of the incommensurability thesis and dismissal of actual history are motivated by the belief that neither are compatible with the rationality of theory-change. If MacIntyre can deny the necessity of dispensing with the historical record, and show that incommensurability and the consequent absence of shared decision criteria are compatible with rationality in theory-change, then Lakatos' argument will lose its force, and MacIntyre will better honor the intention to take seriously the historicality of science. I argue that MacIntyre can dissolve tensions between incommensurability and rationality in theory-change if he is able, first, to distinguish a sense of the incommensurability thesis that preserves genuine rivalry between theories, and second, to show that the possibility of rationality in theory-change depends not on the presence of common decision criteria, but on the fact that traditions can fail by their own standards. After reconstructing and examining the argument, I conclude that the notion of a tradition's "internal failure" is coherent, but that it leaves crucial questions about the epistemology and ontology of traditions that must be answered if MacIntyre's proposal is to constitute a genuine improvement on Lakatos.

Habida cuenta de los intensos debates de los años '60 y '70, al interior de la tradición anglosajona en filosofía de la ciencia, y que minaron los postulados más básicos de la Concepción Heredada, apareció la necesidad de explicar el desarrollo de la ciencia en la historia, es decir el despliegue mismo de la racionalidad científica. Las epistemologías evolucionistas constituyen uno de esos intentos, aunque de su analogía con la teoría de la evolución biológica surge como problema el desajuste de explicar una empresa teleológica (la de la ciencia) mediante un modelo no teleológico (el de la evolución de las especies). En este trabajo se realiza un polemica imaginaria entre un epistemólogo evolucionista (Popper) y otro que no lo es (Kuhn) respecto de la cuestión del progreso de la ciencia: el primero, comprometido ontológicamente con un punto de vista evolucionista, mientras que el segundo realiza sólo una analogía.

This lecture will deal with the heuristic power of the deductive method and its contributions to the scientific task of finding new knowledge. I will argue for a new reading of the term 'deductive method.' It will be presented as an architectural scheme for the reconstruction of the processes of gaining reliable scientific knowledge. This scheme combines the activities of doing science ('context of discovery') with the activities of presenting scientific results ('context of justification'). It combines the heuristic and the deductive side of science. The heuristic side is represented, e.g., by the creative methods to find the 'best' hypotheses (abduction), to design experimental systems for empirical research in order to formulate general laws (induction), or to create axiomatic systems. The other side consists of the production of deductive knowledge. This combination leads to a clear hierarchy: the heuristic side provides the basic presuppositions from which the deductive side takes off. The former is used to make deductions possible. The deductive method can be presented as an analysis-synthesis scheme as it can be found, e.g., in the tradition of Kant, Jakob Friedrich Fries, and Leonard Nelson. Nelson's critical philosophy can be seen as a key for understanding the philosophy behind David Hilbert's early axiomatic method. This axiomatic method is usually restricted to a non-philosophical approach to pure mathematics ('formalism'). But Hilbert was not an exclusive formalist; he proposed a mathesis universalis in the Cartesian-Leibnizian sense according to which mathematics is the syntactical tool for a general philosophy of science, applicable to all scientific disciplines. In this function, mathematics takes its problems from the sciences. Hilbert did not deny that mathematics should play a role in explaining the world. The analysis-synthesis scheme helps to provide a consistent interpretation of these two sides of Hilbert's attitude towards his working field.

If the 17th century could be considered the century of the reformation of science, the present century is one of counterreformation in every sense of the word. The ideology of this century can be seen in the titanic efforts to complete the development of science which foundation was laid in the 17th and 18th centuries, in the outright failures, and in attempts at reconstructing the foundation (e.g., Hilbert's formalization program, Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Charlier's theory of a hierarchic universe, Fridman's evolutionary cosmology, Newton's mechanics, relativistic and/or quantum mechanics in physics, the logical turn of the Vienna circle and epistemological anarchism in methodology). Our task is to reveal the essence of the turning points in 20th century science and to determine at least the general outlines, if not the cause, of the new type of rationality that is replacing the old one. I will focus on the history of cosmology, or rather on its three paradigms that have succeeded each other in this century: Newtonian, Fridmanian and the inflationary paradigms. By outlining the problem, I will pose a possible solution from clarifying changes in the value orientations, ideals and norms of scientific research to their possible generalization.

Many post World War II thinkers have been perplexed by the problem of how or even whether people from different cultures can understand each other. The problem arose when we started to think of culture as formative of language and thought. The common assumptions of most theorists of language are that language is fundamental to thinking and culture; and language, thought, culture or humanity is a natural product of biological evolution. Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi-seen as diametrically opposed-both independently criticize these assumptions and provide alternative theories of humanity (i.e. culture, thinking, and language) whereby cross-cultural understanding is a real problem that can be broached through engaging in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. So, though language and culture creates hurdles for achieving cross-cultural understanding, the pursuit of science transcends the limitations of culture.

De acuerdo al título la presentaciòn se refiere a un analísis del origen de las funciones consideradas como propiedades insertas en la realidad. Para ello me dedico al estudio de ciertas propiedades biológicas que considera se encuentran en los organismos vivos desde el principio, esta es la razón que incido en la visión molecular de la biología por considerarla como las mas apta para estudiar esta problemática. Cuando abordamos los procesos de regulación y expresión de la información genética, vemos que se tenía la convicción de que las variantes encontradas eran indicadores de distintas estrategias que obedecían a un único patrón establecido en los orígenes mismos de la vida. Dicho patrón, involucra la presencia de ciertas estructuras con ciertas propiedades que, a escala molecular, permiten el despliegue de la evolución biológica. Aunque no es mi intención discutir aquí los detalles de la problemática que surge del análisis de las cuestiones teóricas en biología evolutiva, si me interesa dejar claro que los temas que trato tienen, necesariamente, que ponerse en relación con esta área teórica; en particular, con el problema de las unidades de selección y el problema de los criterios de normalidad y adaptación, entre otros. En esta breve presentación me dedico al análisis de los supuestos teóricos que subyacen al problema de la génesis de la expresión genética. Espero mostrar que dicho análisis sugiere una vía para el desarrollo de una teoría de las funciones consideradas como propiedades reales de ciertas cosas del mundo. Vinculado a lo anterior, el objetivo principal de esta presentación es brindar al menos tres argumentos que sustenten la afirmación de considerar a las funciones como un tipo especial de propiedades que se encuentran en ciertos sistemas fisico-químicos. Dichas propiedades, que resultan ser emergentes con respecto a las estructuras moleculares subyacentes, nos permiten hablar de una visión holista compatible con la versión estructural del realismo.

Die Zeiten, in denen Kausalität das Charakteristikum von Wissenschaftlichkeit war, scheinen sich ihrem Ende zu nähern. Seit dem Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts ist eine seit langem schwelende Krise des herkömmlichen Kausalitätsverständnisses in den Naturwissenschafteen unübersehbar zum Ausdruck gekommen. Dessen ungeachtet halten jedoch viele Wissenschaftstheoretiker an Kausalitätsvorstellungen als vermeintlich unverzichtbarem Analyseinstrument fest. In Kritik dieser Tendenz zur Verkennung eines grundlegenden Bedeutungsverlustes wird der historische Verdrängungsprozess von Kausalitätsvorstellungen unter den Stichworten der Entfinalisierung und Entsubstantialisierung nachgezeichnet. Aus der Perspektive geschichtlicher Rekonstruktion handelt es sich bei den gegenwärtigen Vorstellungen um den letzten Rest einer unvergleichlich reichhaltigeren ursprünglichen kausalen Begrifflichkeit. Am Beispiel der heute wohl weitverbreitetsten, auf C. G. Hempel zurückgehenden Vorstellung werden die wichtigsten Merkmale der kausalen Relation diskutiert. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass für das naturwissenschaftliche Kausalitätsverständnis, soweit es sich auf einen Begriff bringen lässt, in der Tat ein reduzierter Sinngehalt der Kategorie der Verursachung in kausalen Erklärungen, eine begrenzte Anwendbarkeit sowie ein reduzierter Geltunganspruch typisch sind. Die Grenzen naturwisseschaftlicher Kausalitätsvorstellungen betreffen deren strenge begriffliche Fassung, nicht jedoch ihre Brauchbarkeit als heuristische Forschungsmaxime in Situationen, in denen unerwartete Phänomene auftreten oder Phänomene ausbleiben, mit denen man zuvor fest gerechnet hat. Für diese Situationen ist die Überlegung, was der Fall gewesen wäre, wenn eine Ursache nicht eingetreten wäre, in besonderer Weise bezeichnend. Welche Relevanz dieser Kausalitätsvorstellung qukünftig zukommen wird, hängt wesentlich vom Charakter der weiteren Wissenschaftsentwicklung ab.

My focus in this paper is on how the basic Bayesian model can be amended to reflect the role of idealizations and approximations in the confirmation or disconfirmation of any hypothesis. I suggest the following as a plausible way of incorporating idealizations and approximations into the Bayesian condition for incremental confirmation: Theory T is confirmed by observation P relative to background knowledge B iff Pr(PΔ│T&(T&I ├ PT)&B) > Pr(PΔ│~T&(T&I├PT)andB), where I is the conjunction of idealizations and approximations used in deriving the prediction PT from T, P􀀧 expresses the discrepancy between the prediction PT and the actual observation P, and ├ stands for logical entailment. This formulation has the virtue of explicitly taking into account the essential use made of idealizations and approximations as well as the fact that theoretically based predictions that utilize such assumptions will not, in general, exactly fit the data. A non-probabilistic analogue of the confirmation condition above that I offer avoids the 'old evidence problem,' which has been a headache for classical Bayesianism.

La incidencia de la educación humanista, en su vertiente filosófica, sobre algunos de los físicos que formaron parte de la creción de la teoría de los quanta-reconocida unánimemente como la más fértil de la historia de la física-es un dato innegable. En este trabajo no pretendemos argumentar a favor o en contra de las dos posturas en pugna, que se observan desde los inicios de esta teoría, sino denunciar algunos de los malentendidos que prácticamente han sepultado el pensamiento de uno de los integrantes más conspicuos de la denominada 'Escuela de Copenhague' y que es Werner Heisenberg. La razón para semejante trvestismo conceptual, bien pudo haberse debido según nuestro criterio, a que su perspectiva filosófica no se habría prestado a ser aprehendida por los Denksysteme que subyacen a las corrientes epistemológicas tradicionales. Esta es la razón por la cual nos ceñiremos estrictamente a sus escritos, subrayando sus reflexiones sobre el pragmatismo y el positivismo y que, paradójicamente, han servido para tildarlo de tal. Sin intención de hacer gala de un inocuo ejercicio de erudición solamente pretendemos mostrar la convicción más profunda de nuestro autor, a saber, que la ciencia nace en diálogo, en la frontera con la filosofía, sin la cual la primera no sería posible.

In this paper I conduct a philosophical-physical analysis leading to the development of a philosophically justified form of Coulomb's law on the basis of contents-form philosophy.. From this it follows that dimensionality of "electric charge" at the subatomic level of matter is g/s, i.e., the charge in fact represents the mass speed of exchange at the field level. Thus, the philosophiclogical solution to Coulomb's law on the basis of contents-form philosophy radically changes our conventional concepts about the microworld, the consequences of which will be considered in greater detail.

For two centuries Kant's first Critique has nourished various turns against transcendent metaphysics and realism. Kant was scandalized by reason's impotence in confronting infinity (or finitude) as seen in the divisibility of particles and in spatial extension and time. Therefore, he had to regard the latter as subjective and reality as imponderable. In what follows, I review various efforts to rationalize Kant's antinomies-efforts that could only flounder before the rise of Einstein's general relativity and Hawking's blackhole cosmology. Both have undercut the entire Kantian tradition by spawning highly probable theories for suppressing infinities and actually resolving these perplexities on a purely physical basis by positing curvatures of space and even of time that make them reëntrant to themselves. Heavily documented from primary sources in physics, this paper displays time’s curvature as its slowing down near very massive bodies and even freezing in a black hole from which it can reëmerge on the far side, where a new universe can open up. I argue that space curves into a double Möbius strip until it loses one dimension in exchange for another in the twin universe. It shows how 10-dimensional GUTs and the triple Universe, time/charge/parity conservation, and strange and bottom particle families and antiparticle universes, all fit together.

Continuous controversies about how Aristotle's teleological biology relates to modern biological science address some widely debated questions in contemporary philosophy of science. Three main groups of objections made by contemporary science against Aristotle's biology can be identified: 1) Aristotle's biological teleology is too anthropomorphic; 2) the idea is tied too substance based; 3) Aristotle's final ends contradict the mechanistic spirit of modern science, which is looking for physical causes. There are two ways of dealing with these objections. The first consists in showing misinterpretations of Aristotle's thought that underlie these arguments. A second line of defense explores the idea that teleological concepts are not only incorporated and widely used in contemporary science, but that in fact biology does not have to renounce teleology in order to reconcile with the modern scientific mind. I suggests that a complete understanding of complex biological phenomena can only be achieved by combining different approaches to this issue.

In this paper I deal with the status of science in Heidegger's thought. Particularly, I pose to Heidegger the question whether science can constitute a problem for philosophy, once one has cast doubt on philosophy's rank as first science whose prerogative is to establish the truth-criteria of the particular sciences. To express it with the convenience cliches always afford, this is the question of knowledge in the postmodern epoch. The paper traces the transition from the early "fundamental ontology" to the late notion of a thinking that is to come at the end of philosophy. It will include some reflections on the role of an education for science at the end of modernity. The texts analyzed include Being and Time, "What calls for thinking," and "The end of philosophy and the task of thinking."

In modern physics the common relational approach should be extended to the concepts of element and set. The relationalization of the concepts of element and set means that in the final analysis the World exists as an indivisible whole, not as a set (of one or another kind of elements). Therefore, we have to describe quantum systems in terms of potentialities and probabilities: since quantum systems cannot be analyzed completely into sets of elements, we can speak only of the potentialities of isolating elements and sets within their structure. On the other hand this quantum property of the world as an indivisible whole accounts for the astonishing logical properties of the structure of the potentialities of quantum systems which it brings forth. This has been confirmed by quantum-correlation experiments (A.Aspect and oth.). These effects have a relational nature, not a physical-causal or material one, and they are brought forth by the changes (resulting from measurement or physical interaction) in the structure of the relations of the mutually complementary sides of reality. One of these sides expresses an actually existing structure of the system as a real (and physically verifiable) but only relatively separable set, and the other expresses the sets of potentialities in it which arise from the astonishing property of finite non-analyzability of the system into elements and sets (i.e. by the quantum property of the world as an indivisible unit).

In this paper we suggest that the contemporary global intellectual crisis of our (Western) civilization consists in the fundamental transformation of the classical (both Ancient and Modern) types of rationality towards the nonclassical one. We give a brief account of those classical types of rationality and focus on the more detailed description of the contemporary process of the formation of the new HTR which we label as nonclassical. We consider it to be one of the historical possibilities that might radically transform the fundamentals of our human world; in fact, this process has already begun. The paper mentions some of the main features of this process, such as formation of a new type of scientific object; new conceptual schemes; new logical and methodological equipment of scientific research; and new understanding of human nature, human mind, human action, and social order.

Can there be scientific theories in psychology, medicine or psychiatry? I approach this question through an in-depth analysis of a typical experiment for clinical depression involving the monoamine hypothesis, drug action, and placebos. I begin my discussion with a reconstruction of Adolph Grünbaum's conceptual analysis of 'placebo,' and then use his notion of "intentional placebo" to discuss a typical experiment using the monoamine hypothesis, two drugs and a placebo. I focus on the theoretical aspects of the experiment, especially on the notion of causal explanation. I then raise five conceptual and methodological problems for theory construction. These problems focus on questions of the causal efficacy of placebos and drugs; ad hoc versus ceteris paribus explanations in biomedicine and psychology; and the falsifiability of the monoamine hypothesis. I conclude by pointing out the need for further, rigorous philosophical analysis concerning the possibility of theory construction in psychology, medicine, or psychiatry.

Traditional convictions regarding science (such as universalism, necessity and eternal validity) are currently in doubt. Relativism seems to destroy scientific claims to rationality. This paper shows a way to keep the traditional convictions of scientific knowledge while acknowledging relativism. With reference to the practicing scientist, we replace descriptivism with constructivism; we modify relative validity with the claim to understanding; and, we offer methodological strategies for acquiring understanding. These strategies we call strangification, which means taking a scientific proposition system out of its context and putting it in another context. We can thus see the implicit presuppositions of the given proposition system by means of the problems arising out of the application of this procedure. Such a change in the understanding of science holds important consequences.