121.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Robert C. Pinto
Argument Schemes and the Evaluation of Presumptive Reasoning:
some Reflections on Blair’s Account
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122.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Ralph H. Johnson
Reasoning, Argumentation and The Network Problem
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123.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Leo Groarke
The Fox and the Hedgehog:
On Logic, Argument, and Argumentation Theory
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124.
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ProtoSociology:
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13
J. Anthony Blair
Presumptive Reasoning/Argument:
An Overlooked Class
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125.
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ProtoSociology:
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13
Douglas Walton
The New Dialectic:
A Method of Evaluating an Argument Used for Some Purpose in a Given Case
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126.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Manfred Kienpointner
Comments on Douglas Walton’s Paper: The New Dialectic: A Method of Evaluating an Argument Used for Some Purpose in a Given Case
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127.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Christopher W. Tindale
The Authority of Testimony
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128.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Hans Lenk
Interdisziplinarität und Interpretation
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129.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
John Woods
Peirce’s Abductive Enthusiasms
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130.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Imprint
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131.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
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Authors
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132.
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ProtoSociology:
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Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.
“‘Any,’ ‘Every,’ and the Philosophical Argumentum ad Hominem”
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133.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Ellery Eells
Causal Decision Theory
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134.
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ProtoSociology:
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13
On ProtoSociology
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135.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
13
Volumes
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136.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
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Bookpublications
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137.
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ProtoSociology:
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Digital Publications – Special Offer
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138.
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ProtoSociology:
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Subscription
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139.
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ProtoSociology:
Volume >
14
Alvin I. Goldman
Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts
abstract |
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rights & permissions
There are several different questions associated with the study of folk psychology: (1) what is the nature of our commonsense concepts of mental states?, (2) how do we attribute mental states, to ourselves and to other people?, and (3) how do we acquire our concepts and skills at mental-state attribution?Three general approaches to these questions are examined and assessed: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. A preliminary problem is to define each of these approaches. Alternative definitions are explored, centering on which questions each approach tries to answer and how it answers them. For example, simulation theorists substantially agree on the answer to question (2) but not on the answer to question (1). The paper then turns to some serious problems facing both rationality theory and theory theory.Rationality theory is faulted for its inadequate treatment of question (1) and for its implausible answers to question (2). Theory theory is faulted for the problems it encounters in explaining first-person attribution, and for its treatment of attributed reasoning about change (the “frame problem”). Turning to simulation theory, the paper argues against Gordon’s “ascent routine” account of first-person attribution and in favor of an inner detection account. Finally, the paper addresses the question of the contents of our mental-state concepts. How do these concepts incorporate both behavioral features and inner features? A dual-representation hypothesis is advanced, and linked speculatively to mirror neurons.
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140.
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14
Philip Pettit
How the Folk Understand Folk Psychology
abstract |
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rights & permissions
Let folk psychology consist in the network of concepts, and associated beliefs, in terms of which we make sense of minded performance.This paper addresses the question of how we, the folk, come to understand those concepts: this, as distinct from the separate question as to how we come to apply them in the interpretation of particular minds, our own and those of others.The argument is that even though the network of concepts is akin to a set of theoretical, interdefined terms, still it is possible to explain how we, the folk, understand them without suggesting that we are proto-scientists. The understanding required can be based on a sort of know-how: that is, a practical, untheoretical, form of knowledge.
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