One objection against the kalam is that while the standard arguments for its causal premise (everything that begins to exist has a cause) apply to things in the universe, they do not apply to the universe itself. Thus, universes could come into existence uncaused from nothing. This objection, however, creates a situation where an absurd universe is as likely to come into existence uncaused as a normal universe is. This then generates serious skepticism about the reliability of our cognitive faculties, the truth of our sensory inputs, and our past knowledge, thus creating a reductio ad absurdum against the objection.

This article contends that considerations of continued human existence beyond this earthly life are advantageous both for defending against a key challenge to the existence of a good God (the evidential problem of evil) and for making a positive moral case for theism. On the defensive side, I address the charge that the amount and alleged gratuitousness of evil render God’s existence unlikely. On the offensive side, I leverage postmortem considerations to bolster a positive case for a good God by offering new arguments that God and an afterlife are key to making sense of moral rationality and morality’s overridingness.

The traditional Molinist scheme implies that God is one center of consciousness, knowledge, and will. The person-will paradigm, however, claims there are three centers of consciousness, knowledge, and will in the Godhead. I argue that the Molinist ought to reject the person-will paradigm, and thus reject both monothelitism and social trinitarianism. I begin by presenting standard accounts of Molinism, monothelitism, and social trinitarianism. Then I consider three approaches to reconciling Molinism and the person-will paradigm. I show that each approach is fraught with difficulties.

This article argues that within the framework of historic Chalcedonian Christology, Jesus should be recognized not only as a fully divine Person, as the incarnation of the Logos, but also as a fully human person, and that this recognition of the full human personhood of Jesus does not constitute a new form of Nestorianism. It is further argued that the concept of the human hypostasis of Jesus nested within the divine hypostasis of the Logos provides a plausible explanation of how Jesus’s human lack of knowledge of the time of the second coming can be consistent with the omniscience of the divine Logos.

Many philosophers have thought that aggregates of small, broadly dispersed evils don’t pose the same sort of challenge to theism that horrendous evils like the Nazi Holocaust do. But there are interesting arguments that purport to show that large enough aggregates of small evils are morally and axiologically equivalent to horrendous evils. Herein lies an intriguing and overlooked strategy for defending theism. In short: small evils, or aggregates of such evils, don’t provide decisive evidence against theism; there’s no relevant difference between horrendous evils and aggregates of small evils; hence horrendous evils must not provide decisive evidence against theism, either.

In this essay, I argue that developments in Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism—specifically, Thomas Crisp’s argument against a naturalistic metaphysics—have likely undermined the project of science for naturalists who are scientific realists. Scientific theorizing requires the use of abductive reasoning. A central component of abductive reasoning is the use of one’s imagination. However, Crisp’s argument provides us reason to doubt the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties as it relates to the imaginative abilities necessary for complex abductive reasoning.

Dan Baras has recently argued for the claim that Theistic Mathematical Platonism (TMP) fares no better than Mathematical Platonism (MP) with respect to explaining why our mathematical beliefs are correlated with mind-independent mathematical truths. In this paper I argue that, insofar as TMP provides a proximate or local explanation for this truth-tracking correlation whereas MP fails to offer any corresponding explanation, Baras’s claim that TMP fares no better than MP with respect to explaining this correlation is false.

In this précis I introduce the topic of the symposium, namely, Oliver D. Crisp’s book, Analyzing Doctrine: Toward a Systematic Theology. I discuss the impetus behind the symposium, provide a précis of Analyzing Doctrine, and preview the various responses to the book given by his interlocutors. I conclude by highlighting some possible new directions for analytic theology.

The disciplines of systematic theology, dogmatic theology, fundamental theology, philosophical theology, and philosophy of religion are characterized and their relations to one another are discussed.

Oliver Crisp proposes “chastened theism” as a theologically realist alternative to classical theism and theistic personalism. I critique his chastened theism and propose the alternative of Christian Pure Act theism, a “chastened” version of theological nonrealism.

In Analyzing Doctrine: Toward a Systematic Theology, Oliver Crisp infers from a general principle concerning God’s providential care for the church that it is implausible that God would allow substantial error on the central theological promulgations of an ecumenical council. is conclusion is then used specifically against contemporary neo-monothelites, who consciously contravene the dyothelite teachings of the third Council of Constantinople. In this paper, I raise several doubts about the inference utilized by Crisp against these neo-monothelites, and I seek to point to a more promising manner of upholding the deliverances of the ecumenical councils.

This essay engages with Oliver D. Crisp’s parsimonious model of divine simplicity while offering a defense of a maximal account of simplicity. Specifically, I clarify (1) the way in with Reformed orthodox theologians, like Gisbertus Voetius, anticipate something like Crisp’s model, (2) that pure actuality is an explication, rather than an entailment, of the doctrine of simplicity, and (3) that the doctrine of simplicity remains consistent with epistemic modesty in relation to theological matters.

As Oliver D. Crisp’s Analyzing Doctrine sets out the major moves of a future analytic systematic theology, this response worries about the lack of close attention to work of the Holy Spirit. It is argued that this generates an unhelpful (and unintended) tendency for key theological concepts to collapse into one another. First, the concepts of theosis, participation, union, conformity, and sanctification appear indistinguishable. Second, Crisp portrays monofocal attention to the union of incarnation, without equal concern for that additional complementary way that humanity is united to God, namely, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.