Dieser Artikel skizziert die Bedeutung der Fragestellung in der Erkenntnis, wie sie sich in den Anfänger der griechischen Philosophie darstellt: bei den drei Milesiern (Thales, Anaximander und Anaximenes), in den sokratischen und platonischen Dialogen sowie bei Aristoteles. Die griechische Philosophie war von Anfang an mit der Fragestellung an sich verbunden. Die erste philosophische Frage war die Frage nach dem άρχή. Sie diente der Entmythologisierung und hatte Erkenntnischarakter. Die Bedeutung der Frage nach dem άρχή wurde unterschieden je nach Bedeutung des Terminus άρχή. Jedoch unabhängig von diesen Unterschieden zielte die Frage auf die Klärung der ganzen Wirklichkeit ab, und diese Klärung mußte außerhalb der Fakten, dem Verstande nach, gesucht werden. Während wir es bei den Milesiern mit dem “Faktum“ der Fragestellung zu tun haben, wurde die Frage bei Sokrates und später bei Plato deutlich in die Methode, zur Fragestellung zu gelangen, eingebaut. Die Dialektik, jenes “Spiel“ von Frage und Antwort, war bei Sokrates und später bei Plato eine Konfrontation zwischen der einen und der anderen Seele und diente zunächst der gemeinsamen Wahrheitsfindung, der das Verhalten folgt. Im Bereich der Elenktik spielte die Frage eine therapeutische, dagegen im Bereich der Maieutik eine stimulierende Rolle. Die sokratische Dialektik betraf nicht die materielle Wirklichkeit, sondern des menschliche Vorstellungsvermögen von der Wirklichkeit und führte zu neuem Wissen, das rein intellektuell war. Gemäß der Lehre Platos war die Frage ein Mittel, um zu dem vorzudringen, was intelligibel ist, d.h. zur Idee. Erkenntnis wurde zur Erinnerung, zur Anamnese, und der Impuls für die Erinnerung an die Idee war unter anderem die Frage. Den Beginn der Theorie der Frage finden wir schon in den Logikschriften des Aristoteles. Er tat dies im Kontext des Syllogismus und der Theorie der Lehre. Die Frage betrachtete er als Baumaterial für jegliche Diskussion. Er unterschied vier Arten von Fragen, je nachdem, wonach wir fragen, sowie vier Arten von Fragen, je nachdem, welches Wissen wir erreichen, das sich auf das Wissen von ὄτι und διότι zurückführen läßt. Voraussetzung für jede dieser Fragestellungen ist das fehlende Wissen. Aristoteles bringt in das Phänomen der Bedeutung von Fragen im Erkenntnisablauf einige neue Elemente ein: er zeigt die logische Ordnung der Fragestellung auf; das Stellen von Fragen siedelt er im Bereich praktischer Fähigkeiten an, die der Wissensaneignung dienen, und er weist darauf hin, daß von der Art der Fragestellung der inhaltliche Gehalt der Antwort sowie die Art des erlangten Wissens abhängen.

The article is a discussion of the following issues: (a) moral significance of the so-called everyday life; (b) individuality of each man resulting from God’s creative act; (c) uniqueness of man’s fate due to God’s permanent presence in every moment of his existence; (d) man’s dignity, whose source is the fact that man is ontologically derived from God.

Emergentism is (a) an ontological doctrine about how the phenomena of this world are organized into autonomous emergent levels and (b) a metascientific thesis about the nature of relationship between basic physics and special sciences (such as biology, psychology and sociology). Claims involving emergent properties (laws and regularities) are now rife in discussions of non-linear dynamics, connectionist modelling, chaos theory, complexity studies and ontology of mind. According to R. Spencer-Smith there are three major concepts of emergence, which might be termed: (a) epistemic emergence, (b) interactional emergence, and (c) radical emergence. The author of the paper distinguishes and discusses two kinds of radical emergence − autocreational and actualizational emergence. The second notion leads directly to a form of dual-aspect theory in ontology of mind. In this case the notion of a causally closed (purely) physical world makes no sense because even micro-events have proto-mental properties. A metaphysical theory of this sort provides a conceptually coherent middle road between Cartesian dualism and materialist monism.

Wilfrid Sellars very often expounds his philosophical views in an historical context. In his paper „Being and Being Known” Sellars gives a succinct account of his epistemology while at the same time discussing the Thomistic conception of sensory and intellectual knowledge. His aim in that paper is to provide a plausible interpretation of the doctrine that both the senses and the intellect are informed by the nature of external objects, and thus our cognitive acts are isomorphic with their objects. Sellars claims that there are two dimensions to that isomorphism, and that those separate dimensions are conflated by the Thomists, as well as by other philosophers. That is to say, there is isomorphism in the real or the natural order, and there is isomorphism in the intentional or the logical order. Sellars insists that in sensory cognition isomorphism holds merely in the real order. By contrast, intellectual knowledge is based upon the isomorphism of the intentional order. However, that isomorphism obtains in virtue of specific relations holding in the real order. Thus those two orders are intimately connected. Unfortunately, Sellars does not fully elaborate the nature of the connections between those two orders. I argue that in light of his commitment to ontological naturalism, Sellars should claim that ultimately there is only one isomorphism, namely the isomorphism in the real order. I suggest that his insistence that there are no genuine semantical relations holding between the elements of the intentional and the real supports such an interpretation.

The article attempts at giving an adequate characteristics of Albert Einstein as a philosopher. Firstly, it presents a philosophical biography of the founder of the relativity theory. In order to fulfil this aim, first it was shown how, what manner and why Einstein became also a philosopher. Secondly, a reconstruction of Einstein’s views was undertaken to show his attitude to philosophy as a special kind of the human knowledge as well as to characterize it at the metalanguage level. Finally, the main topics of his philosophy are in short presented.

I suggest to distinguish the following three types of metaphysics:(1) the metaphysics of undifferentiated being (Parmenides, B. Russell, W. V. O. Quine, M. A. Kra˛piec, M. Przełęcki): to be (in the existential use) and to exist mean the same, all objects are/exist in the only one way (i.e. all objects are real), there are no nonexistent objects:(2) the metaphysics of differentiated being (Plato?, Ch. Wolff, A. Meinong, K. Twardowski, J. J. Jadacki): the meaning of to exist is the one of many meanings of to be, all objects are but not all objects exist, there are nonexistent objects;(3) the metaphysics of ways of existence (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas?, R. Ingarden, A. B. Stępień): to be (in the existential use) and to exist mean the same, there are some different ways of being/existence (i.e. some objects are real, other objects are ideal or intentional, etc.), there are no nonexistent objects – if something does not exist in some way, it does not exist at all.I consider in details the above-mentioned metaphysics. One can give some objections to each of them but there are some possibilities of their defence. How to choose one of given metaphysics? It seems that the choice of metaphysics is the choice of some uses of the words to be-to exist and its ontological commitments. I prefer the metaphysics of ways of existence because its universe is not too poor or too rich. This metaphysics is „the golden mean” between the metaphysics of undifferentiated being and the metaphysics of differentiated being.

The article is concerned with A. B. Stępień’s philosophical and metaphilosophical views. The author of the article analyses the main oppositions appearing − in his opinion − in Stępień’s views. They are: the opposition between metaphilosophical pluralism and metaphilosophical monism, between transcendental idealism and realism, between ontology and metaphysics, between existential pluralism and existential monism, between Platonism and nominalism, between intuition and construction and between essentialist and semiotic approach.

Three phenomena strike one when he investigates the history of the issue of God in the 20th century thought: (1) existence of philosophies and ideologies denying God, i.e. various forms of atheism covering an earlier unparalleled range; (2) appearance of philosophies in which the issue of God is not their inner problem (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger); (3) striving after replacing philosophy of God (metaphysical approach) with philosophy of religion, and especially with phenomenology of religion.The article contains a presentation of the issue of God in the main philosophical trends of the 20th century. Philosophy of God in its metaphysical dimension is still continued in classical philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy of religion, whose main author is M. Scheler, originates in phenomenology. The broadly understood phenomenological trend brought new approaches in which not so much the problem of God’s existence and his nature, as the relation between God and man was considered. The approaches are: philosophy of dialogue (M. Buber, G. Marcel), philosophy of encounter (E. Lévinas, F. Rosenzweig), philosophy of gift (J. L. Marion). Also existentialism with its three standpoints is presented in the article: (1) natural (M. Heidegger), (2) negative (J. P. Sartre, A. Camus, M. Merleau-Ponty) and (3) positive (S. Kierkegaard, G. Marcel, K. Jaspers).In the article also the problem of relations between science and the issue of God is considered, pointing to various solutions (P. Teilhard de Chardin, H. L. Bergson; philosophy of process − A. N. Whitehead, Ch. Hartshorne). A special place is taken by a discussion of the issue of God in philosophy of process.

In this article the problem of justification of mathematical axioms (in the context of traditional standpoints in the philosophy of mathematics) is discussed. Stress is laid on themethodological analysis, which concerns the notion of “justification” itself. Concrete choices, known from mathematical practice are not discussed here.In the process of formulating an axiomatic theory, the problem of the choice of the appropriate axiom system and of the justification of this choice emerges. In particular, thefollowing problems are connected with it:(1) The problem of the relation between the concept of “justification” and “truth” of mathematical sentences (when the classical definition of truth is assumed).(2) The problem which criteria of justification can be considered appropriate, and whether the problem of justification is well-posed.(3) The problem, whether these criteria can be applied only to axioms, in the process of constructing an axiomatic theory, or also to independent sentences (after their metamathematical status has been settled. In that case, extending a theory T by an independent sentence φ or ¬φ cannot be justified by a formal proof.)(4) The problem, whether the choice of a particular justificatory procedure is motivated philosophically; in particular, whether the problem of justification is considered well-posed.These questions are analysed in the context of classical philosophical standpoints in the philosophy of mathematics, such as: (1) strict formalism; (2) Hilbert’s formalism; (3)mathematical instrumentalism; (4) intuitionism; (5) Quine’s realism; (6) Gödel’s realism. The standpoint of the “working mathematician” is also discussed.

In debate with scepticism three general strategies may be differentiated: (1) pointing to self-refutation of scepticism; (2) looking for certainty; and (3) modification of the concept of knowledge. The latter strategy has at least three versions: (a) knowledge does not require certainty, (b) knowledge is not broadened by way of deduction, and (c) knowledge does not require the knowledge of knowledge. The first strategy refutes global scepticism, but does not give an example of knowledge and is not efficient in the case of scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist. Also the second strategy is only able to refute the typical thesis of global scepticism (knowledge does not exist). Scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist is more efficiently refuted in the third strategy. However, separation of knowledge and certainty is only avoiding the problem of scepticism. It is also doubtful if the principle of broadening knowledge by way of deduction may be refuted. Negation of the principle of transparency of knowledge is the most convincing one. After it is refuted, knowledge is possible in the situation when we do not know if we know and we cannot exclude sceptical hypotheses.

The author discusses the question of reduction of consciousness. At the beginning she declares her externalistic and realistic position. Her externalism is seen through the nature of human action which demands both, intentionality and consciousness. But her argumentation against reduction of consciousness is made from an internalistic (not externalistic) point of view, and is supported by some results given by certain cognitive neuroscientists, like Susan Greenfield, for instance. In line with those neuroscientists she argues that consciousness (consisted in conscious states) is characterized by such features (like: spatial multiplicity, modality, single temporality) which in spite of their neuronal realizability, are not reducible. Another specific feature of consciousness (especially emphasized in philosophy by Kant and Husserl) is its ability to synthesize. In her consideration, the question of synthesis (contrary to Stanisław Judycki who used it in his argument against naturalistic conceptions of the mind) remains open.To conclude, she defends a many-dimensional strategy of research and thinks that despite the continuity between the account of the mind and the natural world, there is a place for nonnaturalized epistemology in which our rich mental life can be also viewed in certain autonomy.

The article contains a discussion of the relations between physical necessity, the idea of law in natural sciences, and the possibility of proving a teleological structure of the universe. Against the tradition reaching back to D. Hume, the author defends the view that the essence of physical laws cannot be reduced only to the level of observable regularities. The existence of regularities in nature assumes existence of latent relations of necessity that form the order of nature. The interpretation of the laws of nature that stresses necessity makes it possible to pass over to the teleological way of looking at the way that the universe functions.

L’article n’est qu’un bref aperçu des problèmes que pose aux catholiques le développement de la science moderne.L’activité scientifique n’est qu’une extension et une amplification des procédés du bon sens ordinaire. Celui-ci exige que chaque fois qu’il s’agit de la recherche de la vérité, on fait recours aux faits, et que les schèmes théoriques soient non-contradictoires et vérifiables. Toute science, ainsi que toute description qui prétend être vraie, doit être conforme à ces exigences.La description des vérités religieuses doit être, elle aussi, non-contradictoire. L’absolu est inconcevable et inaccessible pour l’homme. Tout-de-même, des schèmes analogiques non- contradictoires peuvent être formés, permettant l’élaboration d’une théorie métaphysique de l’absolu, aussi exacte qu’une théorie mathématique.Mais, pour donner une preuve scientifique adéquate, qu’une telle théorie est vraiment conforme à la réalité, il faut avoir recours aux faits perceptibles. Cependant, le surnaturel est en dehors de toute expérience sensible. Il ne pourrait être fait accessible que par l’intermédiaire d’un appareillage surnaturel, accommodant les faits surnaturels à la perception humaine.Ainsi, pour qu’une doctrine religieuse puisse être conforme aux exigences d’une critique scientifique elle doit être élaborée en une théorie métephysique non-contradictoire et elle doit faire appel à un tel appareillage surnaturel. L’Église catholique se donne pour un tel appareillage surnaturel. Aucune autre religion ne fait appel à un tel appareillage surnaturel. Donc, sauf l’Église catholique, aucune religion ne peut résister à la rigueur d’une critique scientifique.L’article ne prétend pas prouver la vérité de la foi catholique; mais il indique—comment pourrait être démontrée l’insuffisance scientifique de toute autre religion que la religion catholique.