101.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Shari Collins,
Eric Comerford
Anonymous Sperm Donation:
A Case for Genetic Heritage and Wariness for Contractual Parenthood
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Anonymous sperm donation offspring often yearn for information about their biological fathers, and as they come of age that yearning increases in intensity. We first explore will and interest theory regarding this desire to know one’s heritage and argue that both theories lead to a right of the offspring to know. We then turn to the donor contract, look at the inconsistencies between donor ability to eschew parental responsibility compared to other biological fathers, and argue that there should be a procedure similar to adoption procedures, whereby sperm donors take seriously the legal severing of their parental rights and responsibilities. We conclude that the offspring have a right to their genetic heritage and call for caring reproductive technological practices that ensure children of donors this right.
|
|
|
102.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Conway Waddington
Reconciling Just War Theory and Water-Related Conflict
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
This paper suggests that certain characteristics of resourcerelated conflict reveal areas of contemporary Just War Theory that are insufficiently rigorous or robust in their current form. Water security in particular, reveals ambiguity in the Just War framework’s treatment of the jus ad bellum criteria of ‘just cause,’ which in turn challenges the credibility of the entire system. The insufficiency that is exposed has consequences for the effectiveness and cogency of the bodies of international law and global community, which are fundamentally based, and function according to, this predominantly Western moral framework. Key problem areas relating to flexible notions of ‘aggression,’ coincide with a persistent dilemma of simultaneously advocating responsibility to a global community while maintaining sovereign rights and security. Focusing on the ‘just cause’ criteria, justification for acts of war over certain resources is evaluated. Worryingly, the same powerful strategic reasons that might motivate a state to engage in what would otherwise be labelled a ‘realist’ war over certain resources, appear to gain moral merit through interpretation of the jus ad bellum in the specific case of water security, while argument against military action appears increasingly absolutist and impractical. The aim here then is to show the vulnerability of a dangerous prescriptive void in the Just War framework itself. Central to this is the question of the moral weight and significance, if any, of vital resources, as defined by strategic and humanitarian necessity.
|
|
|
103.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Minako Ichikawa Smart,
Shunzo Majima
The Moral Grounds for Reparation for Collateral Damage in Expeditionary Interventions:
Beyond the Just War Tradition
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Despite a significant effort to reduce civilian casualties, a large number of civilians have been killed and injured by the military forces of the Western powers undertaking military operations in remote regions. However, there is no requirement in the just war tradition (JWT) and international humanitarian law (IHL) to provide reparation for the victims of unintended and proportional attacks. This article seeks to establish moral grounds for responsibility to provide reparation for “collateral damage” by focusing on the distinct characteristics of expeditionary intervention and supplementing JWT with the frameworks of corrective justice and restorative justice. We propose that the elective, non-reciprocal, and asymmetrical natures of expeditionary interventions give rise to a special obligation to provide reparation for the civilian harms permitted by the JWT, on the basis of the fair distribution of risks and the need to restore damaged relationships.
|
|
|
104.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Evan Feinauer,
Nir Eisikovits
Noncombatant Immunity in Asymmetrical Warfare
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The principle of noncombatant immunity (NCI) lies at the heart of jus in bello or the moral rules governing the conduct of war. This paper takes up the status of NCI in asymmetrical wars (AW). The argument proceeds in six parts. In the first we present a skeptical or realist position about the feasibility of NCI in AW. Part two surveys the development of the idea of NCI. Part three provides an account of the logic and dynamics of AW. Part four lays out a set of objections to the realist position. Part five imagines a realist rejoinder. In the final part we examine the moral and political implications of assuming that the realists are right about NCI in AW. We argue that even if they are, this does not imply the realist conclusion that “anything goes” in AW. In fact, we suggest that difficulties upholding NCI in AW may give rise to a special argument for conscientious objection.
|
|
|
105.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Susan T. Gardner
Love Them or Leave Them? Respect Requires Neither
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The notion of “respect for persons” is a one often closely tied to the religious edict that “we ought to love one another.” It thus appears to give rise to a command that we are obliged to nurture some kind of positive regard toward others.Taking on a slightly different hue, Kant’s notion of “respect for persons” requires that we recognize universalizing agents as autonomous, and, hence, even if fanatical (Hare), we have no grounds to condemn.In this paper, both of these views will be challenged. It will be argued that we do not owe persons respect in the sense of positive regard, nor are we ethically required to give wide birth to “rational” choices. It will be argued, rather, that, although we do owe “respect to persons,” we owe respect in the sense of being prepared to hold persons “communicativelyaccountable”— of being prepared to engage in hard-nosed intersubjective communicative-interaction (Habermas) about the sort of values/ideals that ought to guide all reasonable people. Since such interaction necessitates the interchange of both positive AND negative judgements, it follows that “respect for persons” requires neither that we love them, nor that we leave them alone, but rather that we engage.
|
|
|
106.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
About the Contributors
|
|
|
107.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Jesper Ryberg
Punishment, Pharmacological Treatment, and Early Release
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Recent studies have shown that pharmacological treatment may have an impact on aggressive and impulsive behavior. Assuming that these results are correct, would it be morally acceptable to instigate violent criminals to accept pharmacological rehabilitation by offering this treatment in return for early release from prison? This paper examines three different reasons for being skeptical with regard to this sort of practice. The first reason concerns the acceptability of the treatment itself. The second reason concerns the ethical legitimacy of making offers under coercive conditions. The third relates to the acceptability of the fact that those criminals who accepted the treatment would be exempted from the punishment they rightly deserved. It is argued that none of these reasons succeeds in rejecting this sort of offer.
|
|
|
108.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Elliot D. Cohen
Is Perfectionism a Mental Disorder?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
This paper brings to bear empirical evidence from a sample of undergraduate students to show that perfectionism can be a fundamental cognition behind the essential symptoms of some anxiety and mood disorders, notably Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Major Depression; and it suggests that this popular “philosophy of life” may helpfully be used in diagnosing these disorders.
|
|
|
109.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Michael Davis
Rewarding Whistleblowers:
A Conceptual Problem?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Since 2010, Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act has required the Securities and Exchange Commission to give a significant financial reward to any whistleblower who voluntarily discloses original information concerning fraud or other unlawful activity. How, if at all, might such “incentives” change our understanding of whistleblowing? My answer is that, while incentives should not change the definition of whistleblowing, it should change our understanding of the justification of whistleblowing. We need to distinguish the public justification of whistleblowing, its public defense, from its personal justification, the defense the whistleblower should be able to present to conscience. Motive is relevant only to the personal justification—but, since motive is relevant to that, statutes should be written so as not to interfere with personal justification, for example, by offering incentives when compensation would do. Though the paper’s focus is Section 922, its argument and conclusions are quite general.
|
|
|
110.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
26 >
Issue: 2
Fernando Suárez Müller
Eurocentrism, Human Rights, and Humanism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The universal validity of human rights is endangered by the charge that these rights are ‘Eurocentric’ and this means that human rights could be considered to be a product of illegitimate power relations developed by European cultures. I differentiate several levels of this charge and show that, logically, there is a genetic fallacy at its heart so the concept of human rights cannot be invalidated by it. Historically, human rights are indeed the result of the development of Western humanist thought but we should differentiate the genesis of an idea from its validity. I outline how this development took place, how the argument of Eurocentrism developed, and why this argument can only function when the idea of human rights is taken for granted.Although the argument of Eurocentrism cannot be used to dismantle the idea of the universality of human rights, it still has an important function in a self-critical theory of universal human rights. It can be used as a hermeneutic tool that reflects on the formulation of these rights without endangering the universal claim of the idea itself. The quasi-transcendental legitimation of the idea of human rights developed by the Frankfurt philosopher and Habermas pupil Rainer Forst can be seen as a strategy of validation of the universality of human rights that is able to integrate arguments centred around Eurocentrism in a pluralistic hermeneutics of human rights. Forst’s theory can be read as a response to Amartya Sen’s criticism of transcendentalism as it is developed in his philosophy of justice.
|
|
|
111.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
James McBain
Reproductive Reasons and Procreative Duty
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Debates on procreative liberty usually surround the issue of whether it is permissible to not bring a child into existence. However, some argue that, under certain conditions, there is an obligation to bring a child (or even as many children as possible) into existence. This position, I will call the procreative duty stance, is argued for in two general ways—obligations arising from the extinction of the human species and obligations arising from personal reasons which override the reluctance of a potential parent. It is argued that no version of either of these arguments works to establish a duty to procreate. So, the procreative duty stance is mistaken.
|
|
|
112.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
V. P. J. Arponen
The Human Collective Causing of Environmental Problems and Theory of Collective Action:
A Critique of Cognitivism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
A range of multidisciplinarily arguments and observations can and have been employed to challenge the view that the human relationship to nature is fundamentally a cognitive matter of collectively held cultural ideas and values about nature. At the same time, the very similar cognitivist idea of collective sharing of conceptual schemes, normative orientations, and the like as the engine of collective action remains the chief analytic tool offered by many influential philosophical and sociological theories of collective action and human sociality generally. Critically discussing in empirical as well as theoretical contexts the prospects of cognitivism to account for the human collective causing of environmental problems, the paper illustrates the deficiencies of cognitivism about collective action and discusses the challenges facing a different way forward.
|
|
|
113.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Jane Duran
NGOs and Growth:
A New Approach to Feminist Epistemology
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Feminist standpoint theory, as a tool for examining women’s lives in less developed nations, is scrutinized from the vantage of NGO-driven work and its changes in women’s routines. Work from Bangladesh and Mexico is cited, and commentary from workers in UN agencies and other non-governmental organizations is used.
|
|
|
114.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Deni Elliott,
Pamela S. Hogle
Access Rights and Access Wrongs:
Ethical Issues and Ethical Solutions for Service Dog Use
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Individuals with a variety of disabilities benefit greatly from the ADA provision of easy public access with their service dogs. However, the growing problem of non-disabled individuals passing off their pets as service dogs both threatens public safety and can result in denial of access for legitimate service dog teams. We argue that requiring certification of service dog teams and furnishing qualified teams with state-issued ID tags, following a process similar to that for obtaining accessible-parking placards, is the least intrusive way to protect access for legitimate teams and protect public safety. While some consider a certification requirement for service dog teams to be burdensome, balanced against the harms posed by easy public access for untrained or inappropriate dogs, the mild burden is justified.
|
|
|
115.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Julie Kirsch
Is Abortion a Question of Personal Morality?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Is abortion a question of personal morality? Liberals and feminists often embrace this idea, but so also do those who are personally opposed to abortion. Someone may claim to believe personally that abortion is wrong without holding the corresponding public belief. I am interested in what exactly one means when one says that abortion is a question of personal morality. In Sec. II, I consider three influential interpretations of the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality. After showing that each of these interpretations is inadequate, I develop a fourth that avoids some of the problems with the first three (in Sec. III). But even on this interpretation, the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality is difficult to defend. This is because we cannot show that abortion is a question of personal morality without first knowing something about the moral status of the fetus. I conclude the paper with some pessimistic remarks concerning our ability to arrive at a compromise position on abortion.
|
|
|
116.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Michael Davis
A Present Like Ours:
A Refutation of Marquis’s Argument against Abortion and a Sketch of a General Theory of Personhood
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
This paper seeks to refute Don Marquis’s well-known “future like ours” argument against abortion (1989) by offering an alternative explanation for why killing people is prima facie morally wrong, one which overall is at least as good as Marquis’s. That alternative is in part that what makes killing “us” wrong is not primarily that it denies us a future (as Marquis would have it) but that it ends our present. Of course, Marquis has dismissed other present-state explanations for what may seem good reasons. To avoid a similar dismissal, I fit my explanation into a larger theory, one I believe plausibly explains the moral status of a wide range of beings, both human and non-human, better than Marquis’s. Ironically, that larger theory recognizes Marquis’s “future like ours” as a relevant consideration for protecting the (normal) fetus against killing but not as the decisive consideration that Marquis claims it to be. Marquis’s ultimate mistake is treating a relevant consideration as the sole consideration.
|
|
|
117.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Shlomit C. Schuster
A Philosophical Analysis and Critique of Dr. Irvin Yalom’s Writings Concerning Philosophical Counseling
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In this analysis of Yalom’s account of philosophical counseling I show that his perception of it is largely informed by his own ideas about existential psychotherapy and group therapy. Additionally I find that When Nietzsche Wept, and The Schopenhauer Cure comply with Yalom’s personal development and struggles in psychotherapy with philosophy, religion, and boundary violations. Conflicting ideas and attitudes concerning the formerly mentioned are traced also in other works by Yalom.
|
|
|
118.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Andrew Oberg
The Occupied Toolbox:
Revisiting the Question of Violence as an Instrument of Protest
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In the present paper the issue of using violence in protests to garner political gain is considered against the background of the Occupy movement and the varied responses to it. Although some may now feel, and certainly many did while the movement was at its peak, that the Occupy protestors should alter their tactics and embrace violence as an efficacious means to sought ends, it is argued here that such a move would be counterproductive and delegitimizing. Moral and psychological impacts on the non-demonstrating public that protestors’ tactics can have are weighed against traditional arguments in favor of using violence. Sources of political legitimacy are also examined, and it is put forward that changes achieved by nonviolence are more likely to be accepted by society at large. Finally, contemporary thinkers and scholars of the left are encouraged to fill the roles open to them that have emerged with Occupy and related movements.
|
|
|
119.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Allison B. Wolf
Metaphysical Violence and Medicalized Childbirth
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Feminists have highlighted various ways in which medicalized childbirth is connected to violence. For example, the literature is replete with examples of court-ordered Cesarean sections, intimidation in the delivery room, women diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of their childbirth experiences. The most common approach to the accusations about the connections between medicalized childbirth and violence has been to investigate the degree to which the evidence bears out their accuracy. In this essay, the author takes a different course; instead of trying to confirm or refute reports of violence in childbirth, she posits that understanding the ways in which violence is connected to medicalized childbirth requires us to note the existence of another form of violence that has not been recognized or discussed up to this point – metaphysical violence. The primary focus of this essay is to define that other form of violence as well as to suggest places where the routine practices of medicalized childbirth perpetuate it and possible ways to resist it.
|
|
|
120.
|
International Journal of Applied Philosophy:
Volume >
27 >
Issue: 1
Alberto Giubilini
Euthanasia:
What Is the Genuine Problem?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
The current impasse in the old debate about the morality of euthanasia is mainly due to the fact that the actual source of conflict has not been properly identified—or so I shall argue. I will first analyse the two different issues involved in the debate, which are sometimes confusingly mixed up, namely: (a) what is euthanasia?, and (b) why is euthanasia morally problematic? Considering documents by physicians, philosophers and the Roman Catholic Church, I will show that (a) ‘euthanasia’ is defined by the intention to bring about a patient’s death, and (b) the distinction between what is intentional and what is not does not represent the morally problematic reason against euthanasia. Therefore, although the debate on euthanasia so far has mainly focussed on the distinctions ‘active /passive’ and ‘intentional /unintentional,’ I argue that neither constitutes the genuine source of the controversies. I will clarify what the source of controversies is, and outline the minimal requirement for an argument against euthanasia.
|
|
|