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101. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Negative Entities
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It is argued that efforts by Plato, Bradley, Cook Wilson, Bergson, Russell, Prabhakara, etc. to reduce negation to affirmation or negative predicates to positive predicates fail: the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of negative entities deserves serious consideration. Important evidence for negative entities comes from perception such as that there is no book on the table: this testifies to the existence of absence of the book (the negatum or what is negated) on the table (the locus of negation) as an indispensable negative entity. Such perception is not set aside by compelling counterevidence, is reliable and justifies admitting negative entities on grounds of simplicity. A negative entity presupposes awareness of the negatum and differs as the negata differ but may be the same in different loci, e.g. the same absence of the book may be on the table and the floor. Negative entities are of four kinds: prior absence (absence of a thing before origin), posterior absence (absence of a thing after cessation), absolute absence (of something in something such as absence of color in air that is forever) and difference of one thing from another thing.
102. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Svabhavahetu in Dharmakirti's Logic
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The concept of svabhavahetu is a major contribution of Dharmakirti to Buddhist logic. In such a case the invariable relation of pervasion between the probans and the probandum is based on identity or non-difference. This implies, according to our interpretation, that some general statements are true by virtue of meaning but are not devoid of content. This disagrees with the view of many recent philosophers who hold that statements true by virtue of meaning are devoid of content. We explain that svabhava general statements are true by virtue of meaning in the sense that the grounds for calling something by the name of the probandum are the same as some or all of those for calling something by the name of the probans. We explain how such general statements differ from general statements based on causation as also the threefold classification of svabhava general statements.
103. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Universals
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In the Nyaya-Vaisesika view universals are eternal and objectively real often perceptible common characters that are independent of the particulars and inseparably inherent in the latter in the sense that the latter as long as they exist remain related to the universal. Such common characters should not be confused with Platonic Ideas that are perfect exemplars graspable only by reason. It is argued that without objective common characters it is hard to account for the distinction between natural classes such as man, horse, etc. that are independent of human convention and conventional classes such as lawyers, cooks, etc. Universals are also needed to provide objective basis for causal connections whereby only things of a certain kind produce other things of a specific kind. There are universals for generic terms such as man or horse, for qualities such as color or smell, for relations such as spatial proximity, for motion such as contraction, etc. But no universal is admissible if any restrictive condition such as not leading to a vici11ous infinite regress is violated.
104. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Response to Roy W. Perrett's Review of Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyaya Dualist Tradition
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In the Nyaya view a causal condition is a non-superfluous invariable antecedent of the effect. Does this mean that causality for the Nyaya is a necessary connection as some scholars suggest? No. Invariable antecedence means that a causal condition is not the negatum of any absolute absence in the locus of the effect immediately before the latter’s origin (a causal condition is not absent where the effect arises immediately before origin). Non-superfluity means fulfilling requirements of economy three main kinds of which are economy in constitution (non-inclusion of anything redundant), economy in relation (something related directly is preferable to something related indirectly) and economy in cognitive order (being knowable in fewer steps). None of the above jointly or severally involve necessity.
105. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Some Comparisons between Frege's Logic and Navya-Nyaya Logic
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This paper has three parts. The first part explains the similarities and differences between Frege’s distinction between sense and reference needed for the possibility of true and informative identity statements and the distinction between the reference and the limitor or specifier of reference of a linguistic expression in Navya Nyaya. The second part compares Frege’s definition of number to the Navya Nyaya definition of number. The third part shows how restrictive conditions for universals in Navya Nyaya anticipates some developments in modern set theory. Thus, the condition that two universals having neither more nor less members are the same is analogous to the thesis of extensionality. Again, the condition that no universal is admissible if there is a vicious infinite regress that rules out universal-ness as a universal would also rule out the so-called Russell set of all sets which are not members of themselves.
106. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Universal Premise in Early Nyāya
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Indian logic is mainly devoted to the study of nyaya the logical structure of which is analogous to that of a categorical syllogism. In a nyaya it is inferred that since the probans (similar to the middle term) is pervaded by or never exists without the probandum (similar to the major term) and since the probans belongs to the inferential subject (similar to the minor term), the probandum belongs to the inferential subject. Many modern scholars hold that in early Indian logic a nyaya was an analogical argument from particular to particular. We disagree. Early Nyaya works say explicitly that what deviates is a pseudo-probans; this implies that a probans is non-deviant or pervaded by the probandum and thus that a universal premise stating the pervasion of the probans by the probandum is needed. Such a universal premise is also found in articulated arguments. Further, a counterargument based on mere analogy to a nyaya based on a universal connection is viewed as a pseudo-refutation.
107. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Toward Dualism: The Nyaya-Vaisesika Way
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This paper deals with psycho-physical dualism as developed by Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. It is argued that internal states like pleasure, desire, etc. that are directly observable only by one’s own self and not by others and thus are private are not bodily states that are directly observable by one’s own self and others and thus are public. Common experiences such as I am happy, I want this, etc. testify, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, that desire, etc. belong to the self. The self is not only non-physical but also a permanent substance contrary to the Buddhist-Humean view that there are only fleeting internal states and no abiding self. Desire, etc. presuppose that the person who experienced something in the past remembers it now and desires it so that the agent of previous experience and later remembrance is the same continuant person.
108. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabati The BHAGAVADGITA and Ethical Pluralism
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In an episode in the Bhagavadgita Arjuna refuses to fight that would involve killing his teachers, elders, relatives and friends. Krishna argues that he should fight because it is the special duty of a soldier to fight in a just war, one should do one’s duty regardless of the consequences, one should act for the common good, one should build an unwavering character taking victory and defeat, pleasure and pain, friend and foe in the same way, etc. Some of these reasons may be taken to promote deontology, others utilitarianism, yet others virtue ethics that are often viewed contemporarily as incompatible ethical theories. We argue that these three theories are not necessarily incompatible and may be linked to three sides of human nature: deontology to cognitivity, utilitarianism to dynamism and virtue ethics to affectivity. We also argue that Krishna may be taken to promote ethical pluralism just as he may be taken to promote religious pluralism by recommending the path of knowledge, the path of action and the path of devotion from an inclusive perspective.
109. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Hindu Ethics in a Comparative Perspective
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Some key ideas in Hindu ethics are: 1. One should do one’s duty regardless of consequences. 2. One should follow the path of the sage king Janaka who acted ceaselessly, selflessly and wisely for the welfare of the subjects. 3. One should act for the common good. 4. All that one does, eats, sacrifices, donates or purifies one should offer to God. One should build the character to look at a confidant, a friend, an enemy, an indifferent person, an impartial person, a harmful person, a benefactor, an honest person and an evil person in the same way. One should build the character to see everyone in oneself and oneself in everyone. One should build the character to take victory and defeat, pleasure and pain and praise and insult in the same way. It is argued in the paper that these ideas may provide the foundations of a comprehensive and cohesive ethical theory that may offer solutions to some of the serious problems in the classical ethical theories of Aristotle, Kant and Mill.
110. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Eternal Word
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Grammarian philosophers in India hold that although there is much in language that is conventional and at the surface level languages are different, there is a deep structure that is common to the languages, independent of human convention and eternal. It is argued that if there is objective knowledge that is universal and necessary, it must be independent of human authorship that can only provide subjective and fallible opinion; similarly, language as the vehicle of universal and necessary knowledge must also be independent of human agency and eternal. Further, meanings cannot be identified with forms (for then even a wooden horse could be a horse) or individuals (for then there would be an infinity of meanings) and can only be universals that are changeless and eternal without which, again, universal and necessary knowledge is impossible. It is also argued that both language and consciousness are unnegatable and all pervasive, are ultimately non-different and constitute the essence of the self that too is unnegatable, all pervasive and eternal.
111. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Aristotle's View of Definition
112. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Nyaya View of Definition
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A Nyaya definition the major purpose of which is efficient use of words and avoiding ambiguities and errors, is the statement of a unique feature that belongs to each definiendum and nothing else so that there is none of the three faults of overcoverage, undercoverage and failure to belong to any definiendum. There should be no circularity that is of three kinds, self-dependence (where the definiendum appears in the definiens); mutual dependence (where the definiendum and the definiens are used in the definition of each other) and defining in a circle. A definition should also be economical: there are mainly three kinds of economy; economy in constitution (that avoids including anything superfluous or unnecessary to distinguish the definiendum from everything else), economy in relation (the directly related is preferable to the indirectly related) and economy in cognition (something cognitively prior is preferable to something posterior). While more than one definition is possible that need not state the essence, the test of economy is in place to avoid redundancy and provide criteria of preference among defining features that are unique and non-circular.
113. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Stoic View of Definition
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In the Stoic view a definition is a representation of a peculiar characteristic that is neither too wide nor too narrow and has necessary or reciprocal force and is a statement of analysis matchingly expressed. That is, a peculiar characteristic is convertible and coextensive with the definiendum. Many scholars hold that for the Stoics a defining characteristic is not only a feature that is co-extensive with the definiendum but is also essential. We do not find any conclusive evidence for this claim. The Stoics nowhere say that a defining feature is not only peculiar but also essential. They also sometimes offer more than one definition of a thing and this goes against the Aristotelian position that since a thing has single essence, there can only be one definition in the ideal sense. Further, the Platonic/Aristotelian tradition views a definition as being mainly concerned with relations between universals. But for the Stoics universals are mental constructs, individuals alone are real, and definitions are ultimately about individuals.
114. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Epicurean Attack on Definition
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The Epicureans were committed to the priority of sensation and opposed the Platonic/Aristotelian view that definitions that display essences graspable only by reason should play a central role. To the Epicureans the so-called search for essences amounted to turning away from actual observation of things and indulging in speculation based on assumptions: instead one must conduct an inquiry about nature as the phenomena dictate. Epicurus held that the first or basic concepts of an inquiry need not be demonstrated for that would open an infinite regress and might have held that the first concepts need not be defined for the definiens should be prior to the definiendum but nothing is prior to the basic concepts. Further, while explaining or defining each term is impossible (and perhaps involves infinite regress), explaining some is pointless. However, Epicureans were not opposed to providing descriptions so that there could be clear notions of words used, an investigation could proceed methodically, and all participants could agree on the subject matter.
115. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Annotated Translation of Udayana's AATMATATTVAVIVEKA
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The Buddhist offers an inference from the Nyaya standpoint to prove that universals are not positive entities but are differences from others: Cow-ness is difference from non-cows because it has both positive and negative features. Whatever has both positive and negative features is nothing but difference from others. Thus, not being measurable has the positive feature of being related to time and the negative feature of not being prior absence and is nothing but difference from being measurable. Cow-ness too has the positive feature (in the Nyaya view) of being, say, eternal and the negative feature, say, of not being horse-ness. So, cow-ness is nothing but difference from non-cows and so on, mutatis mutandis, for other universals. Udayana objects that this inference is unsound from the Buddhist standpoint: Self-differentiating unique particulars that alone are real for the Buddhists are not measurable; but these are not taken to be mere difference from others that is a non-entity for these are taken to be real.
116. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Definition and Induction: A Historical and Comparative Study: Abbreviations and Introduction
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Although ancient Greek and Indian philosophers held remarkably similar philosophical positions, the possibility of these two traditions having developed independently cannot be discounted. However, in the fifth century BCE substantial parts of Greece and India were under the Persian rule and belonged to the same political entity. It is very likely that Greeks and Indians sat together in the Persian court where translation services were provided to mitigate the language barrier. In the fourth century BCE there were Greek kingdoms for more than a century in and around northwest frontiers of India paving the way for substantial political and commercial contact. Greeks like Megasthenes, Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Porphyry, etc. testify that eminent Greek thinkers like Democritus, Pyrrho, etc. visited India and/or that Plato, Plotinus, etc. knew about or admired Indian wisdom. Some of this evidence is relatively late but cannot be dismissed in the absence of specific rebuttal; thus, Indo-Greek scholarly exchange is likely.
117. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 22
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Introduction
118. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
Stfianeshwar Timalsina Bhartṛhari and the Daoists on Paradoxical Statements
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Rather than considering paradox in a literal sense to be unresolvable, both Bhartṛhari and the Daoists develop a distinctive hermeneutics to decipher them, always exploring an overarching meaning where the fundamental differences are contained within. The conversation on paradox escapes the boundary of paradox then, as it relates to interpreting negation, and above all, the philosophy of semantics. Being and non-being, one and many, or something being both true and false at the same time are examples found from their texts. Just as the static and dynamic domains of the Dao remain a key to address paradox in Chinese literature, the stratification of speech, wherein deeper layers of speech are capable of resolving the apparent tension found at the surface level, seems central to Bhartṛhari’s approach.
119. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
James Ryan The Brahmasūtra and the Commentaries of Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara
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This article examines the basic content of the Brahmasutra and compares and contrasts the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on it. Firstly the issue of possible errors or interpolations in the BSis addressed. Then the full contents of the BS is surveyed briefly but with important detail. Finally, the important disagreements between the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on the BSare discussed. This includes discussion of selected sutras in question.
120. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
Dylan Shaul Duty Without/Beyond Duty: Meta-Ethics with Derrida, Paul, and Mahāyāna Buddhism