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101. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Walter J. Schultz Orcid-ID Genuine Logical Consequence
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Our pretheoretic sense of the relation of logical consequence arises from our experience of deductive inference. By ignoring the priority of inference and failing to provide an account of the ontological grounds of the conceptual experience and of the modal and truth elements in the statement of our pretheoretical sense, informal and technical accounts are at best partial. This paper proposes an ontological analysis of both elements which accounts for our conceptual experience and differentiates genuine from ersatz logical consequence.
102. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
C. A. McIntosh, Tyler Dalton McNabb Orcid-ID Houston, Do We Have a Problem?: Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life and Christian Belief
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Would the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent life (ETI) conflict in any way with Christian belief? We identify six areas of potential conflict. If there be no conflict in any of these areas—and we argue ultimately there is not—we are confident in declaring that there is no conflict, period. This conclusion underwrites the integrity of theological explorations into the existence of ETI, which has become a topic of increasing interest among theologians in recent years.
103. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Travis Dumsday Orcid-ID Platonism about Abstracta: Supporting Theism or Naturalism or Neither?
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I present a new argument to the effect that platonism about abstract entities (at least when combined with a specific understanding of the abstract / concrete distinction) undermines metaphysical naturalism and provides some support to theism. I further suggest that there are ways of extending this line of reasoning to point toward one or another more specific varieties of Christian theism.
104. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Leo K. C. Cheung Orcid-ID On William Rowe’s Evidential Arguments from Evil
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William Rowe has put forward four popular evidential arguments from evil. I argue that there was already a prominent distinction between logical and evidential arguments from evil—the IN-IM-distinction, and that its adoption leads to two important results. First, all three non-Bayesian evidential arguments are actually not evidential but logical, while the Bayesian evidential argument genuinely evidential. Second, and most importantly, Rowe’s Bayesian evidential argument is redundant, in the sense that it has the same difficulties his three non-Bayesian arguments have. His move from the three earlier non-Bayesian arguments to the Bayesian argument is futile.
105. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
William Hasker Orcid-ID The Need for Thisnesses: Swinburne on Souls
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Richard Swinburne is an emergent dualist. One feature of his view is the need for a “thisness” or haecceity that makes each soul the soul that it is, distinct from other souls that may be indistinguishable from it in all qualitative respects. I argue that there is no need for thisnesses.
106. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Steven B. Cowan Orcid-ID Or Abstractum: Idealism and Abstract Objects
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George Berkeley is famous for the metaphysical principle esse is percipi or percipere (“to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver”). Many Berkeleyan idealists take this principle to be incompatible with Platonic realism about abstract objects, and thus opt either for nominalism or divine conceptualism on which they are construed as divine ideas. In this paper, I argue that Berkeleyan idealism is consistent with a Platonic realism in which abstracta exist outside the divine mind. This allows the Berkeleyan to expand Berkeley’s principle to read: esse is percipi or percipere or abstractum.
107. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
J. P. Moreland The Epistemic Advantage of Lost Autographic Tokens of the Bible
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I address an epistemic and related ontological dificulty with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. The ontological problem: If biblical inerrancy applies to the original autographs, why would God allow these to disappear from the scene? The epistemological problem: Given that the original autographs are gone, we lack a way to know exactly what the original writings were. The first problem is solved by distinguishing text types and tokens, and claiming that semantic meaning and inerrancy are underivative features types. The second is resolved by claiming that in the actual world, we are epistemically better off with the original tokens gone.
108. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
Keith Hess Physicalism and the Incarnation: A Reply to Mullins
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Trenton Merricks holds to a physicalist view of the Incarnation according to which the Son transformed into a physical object (the body of Jesus) at the Incarnation. R. T. Mullins, in “Physicalist Christology and the Two Sons Worry,” claims that Merricks’s account is Nestorian since it entails that it is metaphysically possible for the human nature of Christ to be a person independently of the Son’s incarnation. While I am not a physicalist, in this essay I defend Merricks’s view against Mullins’s claim. I argue that if the Son is numerically identical to the body of Jesus, then it is not possible for the body of Jesus to exist independently of the Son’s incarnation.
109. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1
R. T. Mullins Physicalism and the Incarnation Once More: A Response to Keith Hess
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In a previous publication, I offered a novel argument against physicalist approaches to the Incarnation called “the Two Sons Worry.” In brief, I argued that a physicalist who is committed to the ecumenical teachings about the Incarnation cannot easily escape the worry that there are two persons in Jesus Christ. Keith Hess has recently pointed out a flaw in the argument that I present. In this paper, I offer a reply that fixes the argument, thus leaving the problem for the physicalist intact.
110. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
111. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Richard L. Purtill, Norman L. Geisler, Francis J. Beckwith, Winfried Corduan, Ronald H. Nash Replies to Evan Fales: from the Contributors to In Defense of Miracles
112. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Paul K. Moser Divine Hiding
113. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Garrett DeWeese Toward a Robust Natural Theology: A Reply to Paul K. Moser’s “Divine Hiding”
114. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Stephen T. Davis A Reply to Paul K. Moser’s “Divine Hiding”
115. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Ronald Scott Smith Conceptual Problems for Stanley Hauerwas’s Virtue Ethics
116. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Graham Oppy Orcid-ID Time, Successive Addition, and Kalam Cosmological Arguments
117. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Wes Morriston Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?
118. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Michael J. Behe The Modern Intelligent Design Hypothesis: Breaking Rules
119. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Paul K. Moser A God Who Hides and Seeks: A Response to Davis and DeWeese
120. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Gregg Ten Elshof The Problem of Moral Luck and the Parable of the Land Owner