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101. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Fernando Rey Puente Simone Weil, Platon et le Bien
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The aim of this article is to provide an overview about Simone Weil’s interpretation of the Good in Plato. The article has two parts. In the first one, we focus on her exegesis of the ancient Greek civilization and of the Pythagorean tradition. We also signalize that her interpretation cannot be confused with the one done in Neoplatonism. After that, we investigate her interpretation of Plato’s philosophy with special emphasis on two dialogues : Republic and Timaeus. In the second part we research two main concepts of Simone Weil’s philosophy, i.e., the notions of value and of lecture and finalize our text with the question of how we should situate her appropriation of the Platonic tradition.
102. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Michel Narcy L’idée du bien chez trois platoniciens modernes: Alain, Pétrement, Weil
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This paper consists in three case studies of modern French philosophers who drew their inspiration from Plato : Emile Chartier (1868‑1951), known under his nom de plume Alain, famous as a teacher in the twenties of the last century, and two of his pupils, Simone Petrement (1907‑1992) and Simone Weil (1909‑1943). Great admirer of Plato, Alain taught the survival of his main thoughts through all the philosophical tradition and their agreement with the rationalistic mood of 19th‑20th century philosophy. This implied that these thoughts were stripped of the allegorical or mythological way in which Plato often expresses them. In particular, Plato’s allegory of the cave, one of his core images, turned out in Alain’s interpretation to be a metaphoric description of the difficult ascent of the mind up to scientific or at least rational knowledge. Consequently in this interpretation it was no longer question of any transcendency of the idea of the Good.Petrement and Weil remained faithful to their teacher and therefore to Platonic inspiration. Nevertheless, both of them, although in different ways, have reacted against this exhaustion of transcendence and come into conflict with modern interpretation of Plato. Petrement, even before specialising in the history of Gnosticism, worked out a dualistic system in which truth is absolutely transcendent because, as universal, it is unattainable for any particular mind inasmuch it is a subject’s mind. Truth, therefore, is unattainable throughout this life. On Weil’s part, the interest in Plato took place after a period of left wing militancy, following her discovery of Christianity and some personal experiences of mysticism. Platonism was for her a means of combining her new faith with a properly philosophical, i.e. rationalistic, way of thinking. Of course in this view transcendency was crucial to the idea of Good as much as to that of God. Whether this transcendency is more a matter of faith than of reason is at least uncertain.
103. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Marilena Vlad Denys l’Aréopagite et le principe donateur de bien
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In this article I discuss the perspective of Dionysius the Areopagite regarding the problem of the absolute Good. I begin with a short outline of the main Neoplatonic ideas concerning the identity between the One and the Good. I then try to show how, in Dionysius’ thinking, the role of the Good changes. The Good appears as the source of all procession and it aquires more and more names, as the procession advances. However, I also try to show the reverting manner in which these names (goodness, light, beauty and love) act.
104. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Francisco J. Gonzalez The Aristotelian Reception of the Idea of the Good According to Heidegger and Gadamer
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Pendant l’ete de 1928 Heidegger a offert un seminaire sur le troisieme livre de la Physique d’Aristote et donc sur l’explication aristotelicienne de la nature du mouvement (kinesis). La derniere seance de ce cours, qui eut lieu le 25 juillet, est d’une grande importance parce que c’est a cette occasion que Heidegger va au livre neuf de la Metaphysique pour essayer de comprendre la notion ontologique qui est a la base de l’interpretation aristotelicienne du mouvement : l’energeia. Mais dans les protocoles de ce seminaire qui se trouvent parmi les papiers de Heidegger et qui ont ete publies recemment dans le volume 83 de la Gesamtausgabe, la seance du 25 juillet se trouve absente. Ce fait a conduit l’editeur a conclure que le seminaire avait pris fin le 23 juillet, sans s’apercevoir donc que la conclusion du seminaire manquait. Il existe heureusement une transcription preservee parmi les papiers de l’etudiante de Heidegger, Helene Weiss, et accessible aujourd’hui dans les archives de l’universite de Stanford. Cette transcription montre que la derniere session eut bien lieu le 25 juillet et nous offre la lecture heideggerienne de Metaphysique IX qui ne se trouve pas dans la version de la Gesamtausgabe. C’est dans le contexte de cette lecture que Heidegger fait la declaration etonnante qui nous concerne ici : ≪Dans la derniere instance, la Metaphysique Θ revient a Platon ; la priorite de l’energeia est fondamentalement la meme chose (im Grunde dasselbe) que l’epekeina des Idees. (Donc, pour cette raison aussi la these de Jaeger d’une evolution chez Aristote est fausse, parce que la Metaphysique Θ appartient a la periode tardive dans laquelle Aristote aurait [selon cette these] surmonte le platonisme.)≫La première tâche que je me propose ici sera d’expliquer cette déclaration qui suggère une relation tres etroite, ou meme une identite, entre la notion aristotelicienne de l’energeia comme ayant une priorite vis‑a‑vis de la dunamis et la notion platonicienne de l’Idee du Bien comme etant epekeina de l’ousia. Pour cette explication je ferai appel non seulement au contexte du seminaire de 1928, mais aussi aux textes plus tardifs comme les Beitrage et les cours sur Nietzsche dans lesquels Heidegger semble presupposer et développer sa déclaration de 1928. Ma seconde tâche sera de comparer cette thèse heideggerienne a la tentative de Gadamer de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre les ontologies de Platon et d’Aristote en faisant appel a l’idee du bien chez les deux. Cette tentative se trouve dans le texte Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles. La comparaison que j’entreprends ici va montrer certaines affinites entre les interpretations de l’Idee du Bien chez Heidegger et Gadamer, mais aussi de profondes differences qui vont determiner leurs differents projets philosophiques.
105. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Franco Trabattoni Heidegger e l’idea platonica del bene: storia di una amicizia fallita
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Dans un travail anterieur j’ai essaye de montrer que Heidegger a finalement refuse de faire place, dans sa philosophie, a la notion platonicienne d’idee, bien qu’elle semblait, selon un certain point de vue, etre une figure capable de representer l’ouverture originelle de l’être qui était au coeur des recherches de Heidegger dans les annees qui entourent Etre et Temps. La raison de cela, a mon avis, est que l’approche aristotelicienne de la philosophie de Platon par Heidegger explicitement adoptee conduisait au bout du compte a interpreter l’idee de Platon comme une substance (et donc comme une figure de l’etant et non pas de l’etre). Mais qu’en est‑il de l’idee du bien, qui pour sa determination teleologique et pour sa collocation au‑dela de l’ousia d’un cote semblait repondre aux besoins propres a la pensee heideggerienne, et d’un autre cote etait plus refractaire a la substantialisation aristotelicienne (la Verdinglichung de P. Natorp) ? La these que je soutiens est que Heidegger, tout en ayant cultive pour longtemps le projet d’utiliser l’idee du bien comme un precedent important de son ontologie, a finalement decide que ce projet n’etait pas possible, parce que la connotation ethique de cette idee (qui non seulement ne l’interessait pas, mais qu’il detestait ouvertement) etait largement dominante sur l’aspect ontologique.
106. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Sylvain Roux Quel nom pour le Principe ? Un problème chez Plotin et Proclus
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The question to know which name to attribute to the First principle is a difficult question in the Neoplatonic tradition. Indeed, as this one is situated beyond being, no term can apply to him and thus it is only in a negative way that it can be described. But the problem also settles about another aspect because, as first term, it performs a causal function. Thus it is advisable to know if certain terms turn out more appropriate than others to indicate this function. By what name to indicate the First one as being a principle ? We would like to show that this question is approached and answered differently throughout the Neoplatonic tradition. If Plotinus admits the existence of different names, he does not really consider that they indicate different causal functions. For Proclus, in particular in the Platonic Theology, different names refer to different manners in which the principle manifests.
107. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Silvia Fazzo Le manuscrit Laurentianus 87.12 comme le témoin le plus ancien du Commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise à la Métaphysique d’Aristote
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Prolegomena pour une nouvelle modalite critique d’edition et de reference concernant le temoignage d’Alexandre sur le texte de la Metaphysique d’Aristote. Methode et cas d’etude : ‘Alexandre’ et le ‘telephone sans fil’ des apparats critiques in Metaphysique 1072b2‑3. Quel ‘Commentaire’ d’Alexandre ? Un texte a re‑etablir. Les editions du commentaire d’Alexandre au XIXe siecle (1836, 1847, 1891) : le role du manuscrit Monacensis gr. 81, a. 1550 env. (sigle M). L’edition Hayduck 1888 du commentaire d’Asclepius comme etude de cas parallele et comme source supplementaire. Le commentaire d’Alexandre selon la recensio laurentiana (AlL). L’independance des deux recensiones comme dilemme. La tradition indirecte de la tradition indirecte de la Metaphysique : le commentaire d’Asclepius. L’analyse des parties communes entre Asclepius et la recensio laurentiana sur Δ29 : un cas particulier. Les arguments de Hayduck 1891 pour l’athetese du texte du Laurentianus. L’argument de Hayduck 1891 sur la recensio laurentiana in Arist. 985a18‑20 et ses developpements recents : la suppression des mots d’Aristote concernant la fonction du νοῦς chez Anaxagore. La nouvelle athetese de la recensio laurentiana : arguments pro et contra. Discussions de nos jours sur l’edition d’Alexandre : l’hypothese du Paris. 1878 comme branche β. Tradition d’exegese, souci de legitimation, perte d’information, normalisation du langage. L’hypertexte possible et autres perspectives.
108. Chôra: Volume > 17
Olivier Renaut Le plaisir dans la cite platonicienne
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This article aims at showing that the definition of pleasure in Plato’s dialogues cannot be separated from a political educational program and an anthropology that consider pleasure as the main vehicle towards virtue. The political use of pleasure is as important as its definition, insofar as its manifestation and content are the prerogatives of the legislator. All pleasures are politically meaningful in the Republic and in the Laws, and among them especially the triad hunger, thirst and sex ; in making pleasures a “public” issue, as pleasures are object of surveillance and political control, Plato gives several means in order to shape the way pleasures are felt in the city, and in order to make the community of pleasure and pain a fundamental role in unifying the city under the reason’s commands.
109. Chôra: Volume > 17
Annick Jaulin, Michel Crubellier Présentation
110. Chôra: Volume > 17
Charlotte Murgier Platon et les plaisirs de la vertu
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How does Plato conceive the pleasures attendant on the virtuous life? Does he provide a specific account of them ? By reading through key passages from Laws book 5, Republic book 9 and the Philebus, I try to assess the way Plato endeavours to demonstrate that the virtuous life is also happy and thereby pleasant. I investigate to what extent these texts put forward any specificity of the pleasures of being virtuous, and how far the account they provide harmonizes with Plato’s general views about pleasure.
111. Chôra: Volume > 17
Karine Tordo·Rombaut Protagoras 351b3‑358d4 : le plaisir et rien d’autre
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In Protagoras 351b3‑358d4, Socrates apparently admits the use of pleasure and pain as criteria for distinguishing between good and bad. Focusing on this passage, my paper outlines three problems, raising from : (1) the contradiction between Socrates’ objection to pleasure in other platonic dialogues and his assent here to a hypothesis which identifies good with pleasure ; (2) the petitio principii apparently involved in Socrates’ argument to support the thought that knowledge is more powerful than emotions ; (3) the compatibility of his “ hedonist ” hypothesis with his “intellectualist” thought. My paper undertakes to reconstruct Socrates’ argument, in order to answer problem (2). I contend that this argument makes the humans admit they are deprived of the knowledge both of good and evil and of pleasant and painful, a point sufficient to silence them when they speak of “knowledge being defeated by pleasure”. This contention helps answering problem (1), through a distinction between so‑called pleasures (to which Socrates objects) and real ones (which he might accept). My conclusion answers problem (3), by showing that, held together, both the “hedonist” hypothesis and the “intellectualist” thought lead to not take pleasure for granted, as required to secure a philosophical approach.
112. Chôra: Volume > 17
Michel Crubellier Aristote : poursuivre et fuir
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ARISTOTLE ON PURSUIT AND AVOIDANCE. Pleasure and pain play an essential role in Aristotle’s conception of the goal‑directed activities of animals and human beings, since they trigger the reactions of pursuit or avoidance, and hence the entire behavior. The present paper inquires into Aristotle’s analysis of this phenomenon on the basis of De Anima III , chapter 7 and De Motu Animalium, chapters 6‑7‑8. The crucial move in this analysis is the definition of pleasure and pain given in both treatises : “To feel pleasure or pain is to actualize through the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad, as such”. The paper examines the meaning of this definition and shows how it connects and agrees with the explanation of the principles of the physical motions of animals in the De Motu Animalium.
113. Chôra: Volume > 17
Marguerite Deslauriers Le plaisir et le temps dans le livre X de l’Éthique a Nicomaque
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Aristotle begins the discussion of pleasure in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics with the claim that pleasure “is thought to be most properly connected with our kind,” (EN X 1, 1172a19‑23). In his positive account of pleasure in X 4, he suggests that we can somehow experience pleasure otherwise than “in time” (1174b2‑10). The aim of this article is to show how the claim that pleasure does not occur ‘in time’ might illuminate the claim that pleasure is most properly connected to our kind. The point, I will argue, is not only that pleasure is complete at every moment – that will be true of many activities – but also that pleasure has the same structure as the best activity available to us, and a structure different from the best activity available to other kinds. Several passages indicate that Aristotle believes that all living things act for the sake of immortality, understood as divine and eternal life, and connect the pursuit of eternal life with the activities that are natural to a species. These offer us a way to understand why the pleasure of contemplation is the best pleasure, and why pleasure is most intimately connected with our kind. I begin in section (ii) with an exploration of the pleasures proper to different activities which are in turn proper to different kinds. In subsequent sections (iii) I take a closer look at contemplation, particularly insofar as it is an activity that does not take place ‘in time’ but rather ‘in a moment’, and consider Aristotle’s reasons for describing such activities as wholes, or indivisible, or without parts ; and (iv) I turn to the relation between the activities and pleasures proper to different kinds and the possibilities available to those different kinds for approximating divine life. In the final section (v) I return to question of pleasure and its intimate connection with our kind.
114. Chôra: Volume > 17
Annick Jaulin Aristote : le plaisir des differences
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Given the necessary connection between pleasure and energeia, the value of an aristotelian pleasure depends on the value of its correlative activity. Since the absolute pleasures the philokalos takes in his virtuous activities might go hand in hand with pains, the definition of absolute pleasure cannot rely on the distinction between mixed pleasure (pleasure with pain) versus pure pleasure (pleasure without pain). So, how can we characterize the pleasures of the temperate man (sophron) ? My thesis is that the right way to define the pleasures of the temperate man is to describe them as pleasures derived from differences. A pleasure derived from differences is involved in the pleasure human beings get from the formal use of their senses. It then belongs to the kind of pleasure they take in knowing. This formal use of the senses helps understanding how the pleasures of the temperate man can be separated from the pleasures enjoyed by children and animals.
115. Chôra: Volume > 17
Pierre Pellegrin Le plaisir animal selon Aristote
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In an evolutionist theory like that of Darwin, animal pleasure has a properly vital function in directing animals toward pleasant behaviors which also happen to be advantageous. The best example of this is probably sexual pleasure which contributes to the survival of species. Aristotelian fixism does not need such an analysis since Nature has provided living beings with an innate tendency to reproduce and pleasure cannot have an adaptative function, because adaptation is given to animals once and for all and cannot improve. The idea that pleasure induces an animal to adopt some useful behavior by trials and errors is unacceptable to Aristotle. Animals, on the other hand, being deprived of the perception of the good and the beautiful because they do not partake in reason, do not get pleasure from things in the world but in a coincidental way : the odor of the hare is pleasant to the dog because it is associated, in the dog’s perception, to the fact that dogs do eat hares. Far from being pleasant by itself, the odor of the hare is not attractive at all for a fed up dog. It remains for pleasure to be the sign of the good functioning of the organism, that is an hymn to the perfection of Nature.
116. Chôra: Volume > 17
William Marx Catharsis et plaisir tragique selon Aristote
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Catharsis and tragic pleasure according to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, tragedies induce three different kinds of pleasures. First, there is the cognitive pleasure of imitation, since it is pleasurable to recognize in the imitation an object one already knows. Second, there is the aesthetic pleasure linked to the material parameters of the tragedy, that is the language, the show, and the performance (verses, singing, acting). Third, there is the “specific” pleasure of tragedy. This specific pleasure is linked to the affects of pity and fear through the process of catharsis. Although pity and fear are two opposite affects depending on the position of the subject relatively to an event, the spectator of the tragedy is bound to experience both of them simultaneously because of the ethical similarity the playwright must keep between him and the tragic hero. But pity and fear are also two opposite affects on the physiological level : pity is a warm affect, fear a cold one. Catharsis is then a physiological balancing of pity by fear, of warmth by cold, and reciprocally, and this continuous suppression of excesses of temperature through the tragic imitation, while bringing a feeling of relief and pleasure, rids the spectator of all excessive affects. Catharsis provides a healthy and hygienic pleasure, and so can Aristotle effectively reply to Plato’s criticism of tragedy.
117. Chôra: Volume > 17
Louise Rodrigue L’ideal ethique selon d’Aristote, ou la ≪belle vie≫
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This study aims at providing a global explanation of the good life or happiness according to Aristotle. By applying the method used in ethics by Aristotle, the specific content of happiness is determined, of which meditation is the essence, together with the practice of moral virtues. The article rests on a relatively new perspective, neither ‘exclusive’ nor ‘inclusive’, considering the results of each type of traditional interpretation, and shedding light upon the richness of all happiness’ dimensions.
118. Chôra: Volume > 17
Iacopo Costa Le statut ontologique du plaisir: exegese aristotelicienne et querelles theologiques (1250·1320 env.)
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The aim of this paper is to study some aspects of the Medieval Latin reception of Aristotle’s theory of pleasure (Eth. Nic. X). First, I introduce Aristotle’s position, with special attention to the problem of the ontological status of pleasure and the relationship between pleasure and the different genera of causes (viz. formal and final causality), as well as the somehow ambiguous exegesis of Michael of Ephesus. Second, I take into account the interpretation given by Albert the Great in his first commentary on the Ethics. Finally, I present some theological issues raised by Albert’s interpretation, in the discussions about beatific vision. The authors taken in account are James of Viterbo, Radulphus Brito, Peter Auriol and William of Ockham.
119. Chôra: Volume > 17
Gweltaz Guyomarc’h Plaisir et acte selon Alexandre d’Aphrodise
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According to some testimonies, the Aristotelian ethics have been torn between a hedonist reading, as much as an anti‑hedonist one, throughout Antiquity. From Critolaos to Verginius Rufus and Sosicrates, pleasure is considered both as “an evil [that] gives birth to many other evils” and as the first appropriate thing and the supreme good. This noteworthy disagreement stems from a famous difficulty within the Aristotelian corpus, raised by Aspasius, i.e. the alleged coexistence of two ‘definitions’ of pleasure in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VII and X. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Alexander’s treatment of this difficulty, based on some passages from Alexander’s Ethical Problems and the Mantissa. I try to show that Alexander does not dismiss the so‑called “definition A” of pleasure (the unimpeded activity of one’s natural state) as being spurious, although he obviously values more the definition B (according to which pleasure perfects the activity as a kind of supervenient end). Even if he never openly brands the definition A as “dialectic” (like Aspasius), Alexander takes it as a reputable endoxon, which however needs to be emended in that it blurs the distinction between pleasure and activity. Pleasure only supervenes on the activity to which it is appropriate, and this supervenience is precisely what accounts for the inaccuracy of the definition A. As much as the child conflates the apparent good and the good, so the hedonist takes pleasure to be identical with the activity and the telos of human life. On the contrary, for Alexander, pleasure is actually only a sign of happiness and the shadow of the activity.
120. Chôra: Volume > 17
Xavier Gheerbrant Interpreter l’Elegie parenetique archaique: A propos de l’ouvrage de Magali Annee sur Tyrtee et Kallinos
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The book by Magali Année, Tyrtee et Kallinos (Paris, 2017), claims to establish new and ambitious grounds on which to found an interpretation of Tyrtaeus’ and Kallinos’ works. By analysing the underlining networks of phonic‑syllabic repetitions in the available fragments, she studies how those two poets have elaborated a paroenetic‑incantatory diction to make the audience accept the content of the exhortation as an already‑lived experience. For instance, she argues that any item in the phonic sequence ‑μεν/μην/μον/μν‑, even as a palindrome, refers to the action denoted by the verb μένειν, “to resist”. Année elaborates the conditions for the plausibility of her original interpretation through a re‑evaluation of the frameworks through which archaic poems are usually interpreted, and she proposes a new edition of the testimonies and fragments on the ground of radical textual conservatism. After summarising the author’s arguments in detail, I conclude that, in spite of their merits, they fail to meet the author’s objectives completely. I discuss in turn : how the author arranges the new edition of the testimonies and fragments ; how she argues for her central view about phonic‑syllabic repetitions and the elaboration of the secondary layer of meaning ; and how she analyses meter, which she presents as one of the bases for phonic‑pragmatic constructs ; and how she conceives of her hermeneutical approach. On this last point, I specifically address the author’s view on the relationship between testimonies and fragments, the type of meaning she focuses on, the deconstruction of pre‑interpretations, and textual conservatism. I argue that the Année’s proposed underlying network of meaning comes at the expense of “meaning” in the more usual sense ; we could however have expected her to elaborate on how her proposed layer of meaning enriches or enhances our understanding of the more usual layer. Tyrtee et Kallinos therefore represents an alternative to traditional interpretative approaches, with limits of its own, rather than a re‑founding.