Virtue epistemology focuses on traits of persons or their faculties or psychological processes in the analysis of basic epistemic concepts such as justification or knowledge. Virtue epistemology is a reaction to a style of epistemology that makes individual beliefs and evidential relations between beliefs the elements of analysis. Following the Aristotelian distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, virtue epistemologists, from E. Sosa and A. Goldman to A. Plantinga, emphasize the epistemic value of intellectual virtues without taking seriously, if not ignoring completely, the epistemic value of moral virtues. Linda Zagzebski was one of the first virtue epistemologists to speak of the importance of moral virtues for virtue epistemology, supporting a unified account of moral and intellectual virtues and arguing that moral virtues have the potentiality to have cognitive contact with reality. Yet, despite her effort to establish moral virtues as epistemically valuable, all she achieved was to define the cognitive value of moral virtues as the person’s ethical responsibility to develop and exercise the intellectual virtues in order to promote the advancement of knowledge. ― In this paper an attempt is made to reconsider the epistemic value of moral virtues and their importance for virtue epistemology. By employing Gregory of Nyssa’s understanding of the cognitive value of love, we argue that moral virtues, understood as manifestations of love, not only have epistemic value but can also be so reliable that they may convert a true belief into knowledge.

The first part of the text is a reading of the Biblical narrative of creation. It deals with the God’s speech “in the beginning” requiring a unique narrative position, a mystical communion with God, from which the narrative as testimony ensues. In the narrative, a thing comes into being from nothing through the God’s word of creation; only when it is called upon, in its own name, it is suddenly in being and time. But this is not the case with man who, on the other hand, aquires an ability of naming. So, man’s naming is a translation from God’s names, a translation of the language of things, its voicing in the language of man. The second part of the text discusses the implications of this particular narrative in the European intelectual tradition. It starts with the traditional conjecture that created things have in essence a structure of logos, i.e. their own language, and it attempts to show that this conjecture was given a new twist with the emergence of modern science, which fought to obtain the right to read the language of the book of the world, namely the language of things, without the authority of the Book of Revelation. But it was the same narrative, which also gave rise to an analogy between the Maker and the poet as a “second Maker”. The poet’s battle with God for the precedence of creation, however, sharpened in different modernist counter-poetics and, apart from man, also included the world and language.

The aims of this paper are to qualify theologically Paul Fiddes’ claim that creative writing can be understood as a response to divine revelation and to construct a preliminary sketch of a theological framework in order to appreciate textuality and move from reading literary texts in the light of theology to considering them as theology, that is, as sacraments of communion with God. What follows is, thus, an inquiry into some of the theological presuppositions and criteria, which would enable a reader with a Christian perspective to consider any literary text theologically and read it as a kind of doxology.

This paper examines the challenge that philosophers influenced by positivism posed to religion during the twentieth century, and considers how philosophers more sympathetic to theism responded to this challenge. By focusing upon the trajectory of the philosophical challenge to theismin the twentieth century, this paper seeks to highlight the various ways that the relationship between theistic faith and reason was conceived by those debating the credibility of religious belief. The paper concludes that although the conception of reason’s relationship to faith dominant at the end of the twentieth century was more conducive to creative religious thought than was that prevalent at the beginning of the century, it nevertheless generates significant unresolved problems.

The Minos is a much neglected dialogue. The scholarly attention that has been given to it is unimaginative and general. Our discussion of the Minos remedies these scholarly deficits.We have read the dialogue closely and have concluded, on a textual basis, that Socrates intends an empirical investigation of νόμος insofar as νόμος is the product of tradition and the behavior it prescribes. Our investigation also has been especially sensitive to the dialogue’s etymological sophistication. Besides Plato’s Cratylus, no other dialogue comes close to mirroring the argument explored with its etymological foundations. This observation justifies the seriousness with which we have treated Socrates’ discussion of King Minos. In fact, it is Socrates’ discussion of King Minos that unifies the dialogue as a whole. Our hope is that the treatment contained in these pages of the Minos contributes to a scholarly reevaluation of this profound and complex dialogue.