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101. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Peter Byrne God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman
102. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 2
Stephan Torre De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being
103. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Jerome Gellman Beyond Belief: On the Uses of Creedal Confession
104. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Michael Scott How to Defend Religious Realism
105. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Jason A. Mahn Felix Fallibilitas: The Benefit of Sin’s Possibility in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety
106. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
David Bradshaw The Divine Glory and the Divine Energies
107. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
C. Stephen Evans Can God Be Hidden and Evident at the Same Time? Some Kierkegaardian Reflections
108. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Michael J. Murray Natural Providence: Reply to Dembski
109. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 4
Michael Bergmann, J. A. Cover Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom
110. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 4
Eric Funkhouser On Privileging God's Moral Goodness
111. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 4
Thomas D. Senor Goodness Needs No Privilege: A Reply to Funkhouser
112. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 4
Brian Leftow Divine Simplicity
113. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 4
Alan R. Rhoda, Gregory A. Boyd, Thomas G. Belt Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future
114. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 4
Bruce Langtry God and Infinite Hierarchies of Creatable Worlds
115. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Dale Tuggy Three Roads to Open Theism
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Open theists agree that God lacks what is normally called “comprehensive” foreknowledge, but why believe this? Open theists answer in three ways, which I call the narrow road, the wide road, and the shortcut to open theism. Here I argue that (1) the narrow road faces a difficulty concerning the doctrine of divine omniscience which doesn’t arise for the wide road, (2) the wide road is well-motivated and appealing, given certain philosophical commitments, (3) the shortcut is too simple to work, and (4) William Lane Craig’s objections to the wide road fail. I conclude with some observations about the state of the dispute between open theists and their critics.
116. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Thomas D. Senor THE COMPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE INCARNATION
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In a pair of recent articles, Brian Leftow and Eleonore Stump offer independent, although similar, accounts of the metaphysics of the Incarnation. Both believe that their Aquinas-inspired theories can offer solutions to the kind of Leibniz’s Law problems that can seem to threaten the logical possibility of this traditional Christian doctrine. In this paper, I’ll have a look at their compositional account of the nature of God incarnate. In the end, I believe their position can be seen to have unacceptable philosophical and theological implications, and that is it inadequate to solve the Leibniz’s law problems that motivate it in the first place.
117. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Andrew Graham, Stephen Maitzen CORNEA AND CLOSURE
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Could our observations of apparently pointless evil ever justify the conclusion that God does not exist? Not according to Stephen Wykstra, who several years ago announced the “Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access,” or “CORNEA,” a principle that has sustained critiques of atheistic arguments from evil ever since. Despite numerous criticisms aimed at CORNEA in recent years, the principle continues to be invoked and defended. We raise a new objection: CORNEA is false because it entails intolerable violations of closure.
118. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Katherin A. Rogers ANSELMIAN ETERNALISM: THE PRESENCE OF A TIMELESS GOD
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Anselm holds that God is timeless, time is tenseless, and humans have libertarian freedom. This combination of commitments is largely undefended incontemporary philosophy of religion. Here I explain Anselmian eternalism with its entailment of tenseless time, offer reasons for accepting it, and defend it against criticisms from William Hasker and other Open Theists. I argue that the tenseless view is coherent, that God’s eternal omniscience is consistent with libertarian freedom, that being eternal greatly enhances divine sovereignty, and that the Anselmian view supports the contention that the Bible is relevant today far better than does Open Theism.
119. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Stephen J. Wykstra Cornea, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement
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Graham and Maitzen think my CORNEA principle is in trouble because it entails “intolerable violations of closure under known entailment.” I argue that the trouble arises from current befuddlement about closure itself, and that a distinction drawn by Rudolph Carnap, suitably extended, shows how closure, when properly understood, works in tandem with CORNEA. CORNEA does not obey Closure because it shouldn’t: it applies to “dynamic” epistemic operators, whereas closure principles hold only for “static” ones. What the authors see as an intolerable vice of CORNEA is actually a virtue, helping us see what closure principles should—and shouldn’t—themselves be about.
120. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Elliot Sober INTELLIGENT DESIGN THEORY AND THE SUPERNATURAL—THE ‘GOD OR EXTRA-TERRESTRIALS’ REPLY
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When proponents of Intelligent Design (ID) theory deny that their theory is religious, the minimalistic theory they have in mind (the mini-ID theory) is the claim that the irreducibly complex adaptations found in nature were made by one or more intelligent designers. The denial that this theory is religious rests on the fact that it does not specify the identity of the designer—a supernatural God or a team of extra-terrestrials could have done the work. The present paper attempts to show that this reply underestimates the commitments of the mini-ID Theory. The mini-ID theory, when supplemented with four independently plausible further assumptions, entails the existence of a supernatural intelligent designer. It is further argued that scientific theories, such as the Darwinian theory of evolution, are neutral on the question of whether supernatural designers exist.