The aim of this paper is to show how the concept of “possible world”, that Husserl inherits from his study of logics, is capital for the understanding of his phenomenology. This concept is a fine tool that provides him a possibility to articulate the question of the physical and the cultural dimensions of some objects. A cultural object as a book or a painting has in fact two dimensions: a “material” one and a “spiritual” one. The author examines which are the relationships between those two dimensions. This question leads him to an interrogation on the genesis of the ideality of the cultural world. Is there not a contradiction between the ideality of the meaning and his historical genesis? In order to provide an answer to this question, the author suggests that one may use the notion of a “linked ideality”, i.e. ideal but linked up to the earth.

According to Brentano, logic, ethics and aesthetics are practical normative sciences, and they correspond to the three classes of psychic phenomena. But if a judgment or a love may be correct or incorrect, it seems more difficult to speak of a correct representation as this class of phenomena ignores a polarity such as right / wrong or good / bad. Brentano speaks nevertheless from the aesthetical “value” of representations. Aesthetics could in this way be considered as part of a general theory of value; but compared to ethics the specificity of this science tends to vanish. Another way to consider the question is to remember that the distinction among the three classes of psychic phenomena is only formal. It means that one has to question more precisely the very nature of representation and especially its relation to feeling.

The three books recently published by C. Romano reconsider the phenomenological senses of world and time starting from the event as original phenomena. This review-article explores the new method that he propose, called “evenimential hermeneutics”, as applied to the relation to ourselves, to the world and to the general sense of being. These analyses lean upon an original way of thinking time, as born in each “sudden” moment. The paper also draws comparisons with Heidegger, Husserl and Lévinas, while proposing a critical point of view on Romano’s thesis, concerning the relationship between the novelty of the event and the past, and its relation with desire and otherness.

Bringing back reflection to the mobility of the existence, a systematic re-appropriation of the Aristotelian concept of movement underlines the Heideggerian re-foundation of philosophy. Hence deconstructed and elaborated through “mobility”, the notion of movement constitutes the foundation stone that allows to play Aristotle against Aristotle and to contribute, via his hermeneutical reinvestment, to the “destruction” of the substantialist tradition.

In this article, the author recalls the circumstances when he first met Alexandru Dragomir, together with André Scrima and Mihai Şora, with the occasion of a conference on the phenomenology of time at the New Europe College in Bucharest. Then, the author talks about his philosophical relationship with Alexandru Dragomir during the following years, insisting upon the phenomenological debates they had and upon the specific manner of Dragomir’s thinking.