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101. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Daniel Engster The Place of Parenting within a Liberal Theory of Justice: The Private Parenting Model, Parental Licenses, or Public Parenting Support?
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Parenting has an ambiguous place within the liberal tradition. On the one hand, liberal theorists have traditionally portrayed it as a private activity. On the other hand, they have also acknowledged the need for some public regulation of parenting in order to protect children’s interests. Some theorists have suggested that this ambiguity within liberalism can be best resolved by implementing parental licensing plans that would limit childrearing opportunities strictly to individuals who could prove their psychological, moral, and financial competency to raise children well. In this article, I critique parental licensing schemes from a liberal perspective and argue that public parenting support, including paid parenting leaves, public childcare subsidies, and the like, is more consistent with liberal values and, in fact, a necessary component of any coherent liberal theory of justice.
102. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Mira Bachvarova Ownership, Authority, and Self-Determination
103. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Nahshon Perez Why Tolerating Illiberal Groups is Often Incoherent: On Internal Minorities, Liberty, “Shared Understandings,” and Skepticism
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This article suggests that in cases in which illiberal groups face internal disagreement, plausible liberal arguments for toleration of such groups are hard to find. Since internal disagreement is widespread, this article proposes that arguments that attempt to justify toleration vis-à-vis illiberal groups are mostly incoherent views. I differentiate this argument from a different issue, namely, whether there is a justification for an external liberal agent to actively intervene in cases in which there exists a justification for lack of toleration.
104. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Quong Justice Beyond Equality
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This essay reviews G.A. Cohen’s final major work, Rescuing Justice and Equality. In the book, Cohen challenges the Rawlsian account of the content and the concept of justice. This essay offers a summary of Cohen’s main arguments, and develops objections to several of those arguments, particularly Cohen’s claim that his proposed egalitarian ethos is not vulnerable to a well-known trilemma (liberty, equality, efficiency) that might be pressed against it. The essay’s final section offers critical reflections on the important differences between Cohen’s and Rawls’s views about the nature of justice, and suggests that Cohen’s view may not be helpful if we believe justice is a complex value that includes considerations other than distributive equality.
105. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Glen Pettigrove I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies
106. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Brian McElwee The Appeal of Self-Ownership
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In this paper, I argue that the appeal of a principle of self-ownership is grounded in the specially intimate relationship that each of us has with our body. I argue that once we appreciate the source of the appeal of a claim of self-ownership, we can see how a differently shaped set of strong rights over our body can do justice to the considerations that ground this appeal, without committing us to the most controversial implications of a claim of self-ownership.
107. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Michael Bacon Breaking Up is Hard to Do: John Gray’s Complicated Relationship with the Liberal Project
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This paper examines the issue that has taken center stage in the writings of John Gray, the bankruptcy of the Enlightenment project and its implications for liberal political theory. The paper outlines Gray’s critique, showing that elements of his argument against what he calls “the liberal project” apply equally to his own value-pluralist position. It suggests that Gray equivocates between rejecting the Enlightenment liberal project and offering a value-pluralist version of that project because of a fear of moral relativism, a fear that, it is argued, is misplaced.
108. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Stefan Rummens The Semantic Potential of Religious Arguments: A Deliberative Model of the Postsecular Public Sphere
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This paper introduces a distinction between three different kinds of religious arguments. On the basis of a deliberative model of democracy, it is argued that autonomy and identity arguments should be acceptable in public debate, whereas authority arguments should be rejected. This deliberative approach is clarified by comparing it with the exclusionist position of John Rawls on the one hand and the inclusionist position of Nicholas Wolterstorff on the other. The paper concludes with some general remarks about the relation between reason and religion that explain the sense in which a postsecular public sphere also remains a secular one.
109. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Danny Scoccia Physician-Assisted Suicide, Disability, and Paternalism
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Some disability rights (DR) advocates oppose physician-assisted suicide (PAS) laws like Oregon’s on the grounds that they reflect ableist prejudice: how else can their limit on PAS eligibility to the terminally ill be explained? The paper answers this DR objection. It concedes that the limit in question cannot be defended on soft paternalist grounds, and offers a hard paternalist defense of it. The DR objection makes two mistakes: it overlooks the possibility of a hard paternalist defense of the limit, and it confuses terminal illness, which is at best one type of disability, with disability itself.
110. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Angela M. Smith Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness
111. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Kristján Kristjánsson Desert and Virtue: A Theory of Intrinsic Value
112. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Sonya Charles How Should Feminist Autonomy Theorists Respond to the Problem of Internalized Oppression?
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In “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” Natalie Stoljar asks whether a procedural or a substantive approach to autonomy is best for addressing feminist concerns. In this paper, I build on Stoljar’s argument that feminists should adopt a strong substantive approach to autonomy. After briefly reviewing the problems with a purely procedural approach, I begin to articulate my own strong substantive theory by focusing specifically on the problem of internalized oppression. In the final section, I briefly address some of the concerns raised by procedural theorists who are leery of a substantive approach.
113. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Michael Huemer Is There a Right to Immigrate?
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Immigration restrictions violate the prima facie right of potential immigrants not to be subject to harmful coercion. This prima facie right is not neutralized or outweighed by the economic, fiscal, or cultural effects of immigration, nor by the state’s special duties to its own citizens, or to its poorest citizens. Nor does the state have a right to control citizenship conditions in the same way that private clubs may control their membership conditions.
114. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Norvin Richards Lives No One Should Have To Live
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Prospective parents centainly ought to avoid creating a child whose life would be so terrible that no one should have to live it. However, those who sought to avoid it would risk making a serious moral error, if their reasoning did follow a certain pattern.The error would be failure to respect autonomy, which includes a claim to judge for oneself whether one's life is worth living. I explain how this applies to a decision about whether someone is to exist at all, and what difference it would make if prospective parents paid autonomy the respect it merits.
115. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Amy R. Baehr Toward a Humanist Justice: The Political Philosophy of Susan Moller Okin
116. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 36 > Issue: 3
Kok-Chor Tan Global Justice and Global Relations
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In Globalizing Justice, Richard Miller offers a novel understanding of the grounds and scope of the demands of global justice. Miller argues that our duties to the global poor should be conceived relationally, that is, as deriving from the very complex and substantial relationships that we, members of rich countries, have with members of poor countries. In this review essay, I ask whether a relational approach to justice is necessary for the kinds of global duties Miller wishes to advance (that fall short of an egalitarian distributive duty). Indeed, so I argue, the global relations Miller describes go beyond grounding a duty to assist the needy, but are sufficient to generate more substantial global egalitarian obligations.
117. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Books Received
118. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
William Nelson Equal Opportunity
119. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Kelly A. Oliver Woman as Truth in Nietzsche’s Writing
120. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
James L. Hudson The Ethics of Immigration Restriction