When William May first wrote Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life, his position was that to perform a craniotomy on a child to save the mother’s life constitutes a direct abortion and is not justifiable. In later editions, May rejected his earlier position in favor of one he originally argued against, most notably by Germain Grisez. The author maintains that the argu­ments surrounding craniotomies on the unborn are still of major relevance today, because they relate directly to certain controversial techniques used to manage ectopic pregnancies. He also argues that May’s original conclusion ought to be upheld, and that May’s later conclusion places too much weight on the interior intention of the actor and not enough on the act itself.

This article offers a detailed response to a recent article in this Journal (Winter 2014) by Charles Robertson titled “A Thomistic Analysis of Embryo Adoption.” A careful review of important terminology that is used in both Donum vitae and Dignitas personae was undertaken, and a summary is included to help define frequently misleading and even mistaken concepts and terms that can often lead to erroneous conclusions. This article focuses on Donum vitae I.3 and n. 2275 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which provide strong magiste­rial support for the liceity of embryo transfer and, ultimately, for the morality of embryo adoption as the only moral solution for “orphaned” embryos. The conclusion offers a faithful interpretation and resolution of the difficult passages in Donum vitae I.5 and Dignitas personae n. 19 regarding the magisterial liceity of both embryo transfer and embryo adoption.

Antifertility vaccination is a proposed method of contraception that induces infertility through an immunological response to specific reproductive targets. The following essay analyzes several peer-reviewed articles to identify these potential targets and then determines the bioethical implications of vac­cine use through the lens of Thomistic personalism. Vaccines that intentionally utilize a contraceptive action violate the principles of totality, integrity, and inseparability; while vaccines that intentionally utilize a contragestive action additionally violate the principles of inviolability of human life and non-maleficence. An exception may exist in cases where application is directed at the treatment of specific pathologies. These cases may be tolerated using the principle of double effect when certain conditions are met. Furthermore, the safeguarding of informed consent may prove problematic if contraception is integrated with established vaccine programs.

In his encyclical on the environment, Laudato si’, Pope Francis proposes that the natural moral law can be reimagined as an ecological moral law that challenges us to evaluate the morality of our actions not only within our personal and nonpersonal relationships in society but also within the greater reality that is creation. In this essay, the author offers several reflections on the ramifications of this innovative proposal on a contemporary Catholic bioethics that seeks to be faithful to the classical moral tradition.

This article explores ten models for thinking critically about tech­nology’s place in our lives, which have been proposed in some form by vari­ous modern philosophers and theologians, including Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI. The author first provides a definition of technology and then analyzes the models. He concludes with a consideration of what he calls a moral “partnering” of man with technology and some thoughts on the role that technology plays in the mission of the Church and in her efforts to evangelize.

Pope Francis’s encyclical on ecology addresses the deep and abiding problems of atomism, exploitation, and prodigality that distort the God–human-nature relationship. The invitation to think and act in more integrated and integrating ways—already put forward in Evangelii gaudium—thwarts our becoming “nomads without roots” and binds ostensibly disparate voices in a solidarity that is truly global in its reach. The resolve for such a change in worldview and agency is reminiscent of Van Rensselaer Potter’s original conceptualization of bioethics as a field of study and application that would bridge the disciplines.

Cryopreservation and vitrification are techniques employed in fertility clinics to preserve embryos not used in in vitro fertilization cycles. These frozen embryos carry the dignity of persons, and it has been suggested that they could be unfrozen and adopted. Experts have offered divergent opinions on the legitimacy of this practice. This essay reviews the debate and offers a phenomenological description of embryo adoption considered in itself, as well as reflections on current circumstances which the author proposes make embryo adoption not only imprudent but illicit.

The difference between partially and completely eliminating an individual’s state of consciousness through the use of pharmacological agents seems particularly significant in the final phases of dying. Remediating pain and suffering by means of palliative sedation and the complete shutting down of consciousness raises ethical and spiritual concerns about categorically precluding participation in one’s own death. Given that, at the end of life, suffering almost invariably imposes itself on us in some form, we are challenged to reflect on how our dying process should appropriately incorporate and take cognizance of that suffering, even as we acknowledge the value and importance of palliative steps to remediate the suffering.

Zika virus infection in a pregnant woman may cause severe brain malformations (microcephaly) and other birth defects in her child, and women living in or traveling to areas where it is endemic are urged to postpone pregnancy. Do the dangers posed by microcephaly justify the use of contraceptives under the principle of double effect? The author discusses ambiguities in Humanae vitae n. 14 and the claim that the use of contraceptives was approved by Pope Paul VI for nuns at risk of rape, and uses the principle of double effect to show that the answer to this question is no: the use of the anovulant pill by married couples for the purpose of preventing conception of a microcephalic child cannot be licit.

This article morally assesses alkaline hydrolysis as a means of final bodily disposition. Arguing from the Catholic social and theological principles of human dignity, the doctrine of bodily resurrection, subsidiarity, and the common good, the author shows that, while alkaline hydrolysis has some advantages over burial and cremation (incineration), Catholic conferences should be encouraged to resist its legalization, provided they focus renewed energy on teaching the faithful about the significance of Christ’s victory, by the Resurrection, over the corruption of bodily death.

Opponents of conscience protections for Catholic Health Care institutions claim that, since institutions are not autonomous individuals, they are not subjects of conscience. Therefore, since institutional conscience does not exist, it does not deserve protection. In this article, the author demonstrates not only that institutional conscience exists but that it is an activity that pervades all human institutions. He provides a metaphysical sketch that illustrates how institutions are organic outgrowths of human social nature which mitigate the natural limitations of human individuals. Consequently, the activity of conscience is inherently a component of the life of human institutions.

The widespread availability of effective vaccines against life-threatening infections has been one of the greatest public health achievements. Unfounded but widely circulated safety concerns about some vaccines and ethical concerns about the derivation of others have caused a decline in the number of immunized individuals in the United States. Exploring distinctions between formal and material cooperation in evil provides reassurance that, in the absence of alternatives, Catholics may, in good conscience, receive vaccines originally derived from fetal tissue obtained from abortions. Examining Catholic teaching on the individual’s responsibility to the common good shows that, in the absence of medical contraindications, each person has a duty to receive currently recommended vaccinations.

This article examines capitalist, socialist, and solidarist wage theories to determine which theory is best suited to our health care system. It argues for solidarist wage theory, which is based on Catholic social teaching, relying on the notion that wages are inexorably entwined with providing for oneself and one’s family as a consequence of the Fall. It then discusses several unique features of health care wages that threaten the sustainability of the system, and explores how application of the solidarist model can address these problems.

The experiences of clinicians who care for the sick and dying after withdrawal of treatment are rarely documented. This may be because these narratives, which offer insight into the intentionality and character of the clinician, do not lend themselves to clinical reports. The experience of palliative care touches clinicians in different ways and often confronts them with complex ethical dilemmas about care and treatment. This article explores the character of the clinician in relation to the telos of medicine and the experience of accompanying the dying after withdrawal of treatment.

In each US state that has legalized physician-assisted suicide, the law stipulates that it may be pursued only by terminally ill patients with a prognosis of six months or less to live. It appears that this requirement makes euthanasia laws more palatable for the general public. However, this restriction is not justified by the reasoning commonly used to support assisted suicide. The desire to alleviate suffering and uphold personal autonomy should require that assisted suicide be allowed for individuals who do not have a six-month prognosis. The author concludes that a moral contradiction arises for individuals who support limited assisted suicide but oppose unrestricted suicide because acceptance of the former logically leads to acceptance of the latter.