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101. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Paul S. Ropp The Real Costs of War
102. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
James P. Sterba Reply to Richard Wemer
103. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Predrag Cicovacki Nonviolence in Theory and Practice - Tribute to Robert Holmes
104. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Robert L. Holmes Toward a Nonviolent American Revolution
105. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Predrag Cicovacki Introductory Remarks
106. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Robert W. Brimlow Beat Me Daddy, 12 to the Bar: The Blues, Peace and Cats in a Trance
107. The Acorn: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Barry L. Gan Reply to Brimlow
108. The Acorn: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
b. l. g. To the Reader
109. The Acorn: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Andrew Fiala Pacifism and the Trolley Problem
110. The Acorn: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Jacob N. Bauer Gandhian Nonviolence and the Problem of Preferable Violence
111. The Acorn: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Richard McCutcheon Gandhi Confronts Imperial Violence: How Amritsar Changed His Political and Spiritual Life (Part I)
112. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal Affirming a Vital Connection: Nonviolence and the Disavowal of Death as a Harm
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Having freedom from the fear of death is a quality needed not just by peace activists; however, it is in particular need of affirmation by those espousing a philosophy of nonviolence. A rich philosophical literature explores the supposed harmfulness of death, but the topic is scarcely discussed by peace theorists. This paper shows the significance of the topic for highlighting the attractiveness of nonviolent philosophy given certain non-religious understandings of death that are well suited for advancing nonviolence. Classic Stoic and Epicurean disavowals of the harmfulness of death are presented, criticisms of the Epicurean position are outlined, and the example of Mahatma Gandhi is provided as an ally to Epicureans in response to the criticisms discussed. The second part of the paper more concretely illuminates the implications that a Gandhian rejection of the harmfulness of death has for living nonviolently in everyday life.
113. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Anthony Sean Neal, Dwayne A. Tunstall, Felipe Hinojosa (R)evolutions of Consciousness in Thurman and Newton: Anthony Neal, Author of Common Ground, Meets Critics Dwayne A. Tunstall and Felipe Hinojosa
114. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
John Nolt Anger, Despondence, and Nonviolence: Reflections on the D.C. Climate March
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Reflections on anger, despondence, and nonviolence are prompted by student responses to the 2016 election, especially given the likely implications for climate change policy. The author reflects on the value of nonviolence, environmental activism, and participation in a national climate march.
115. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Sanjay Lal The Relevance of Northern Ireland: Review of Andrew Fitz-Gibbon, Talking to Terrorists, Nonviolence, and Counter-Terrorism
116. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Court D. Lewis Cosmopolitan vs. Westphalian “Borders”: Review of Eddy M. Souffrant, ed. A Future without Borders? Theories and Practices of Cosmopolitan Peacebuilding
117. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Rick Werner Burdens of Warism: Review of Robert L. Holmes, Pacifism
118. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Bat-Ami Bar On A Realist Approach to Immigration: Review of David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst
119. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Greg Moses Editor's Introduction
120. The Acorn: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Corey L. Barnes Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles
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Cosmopolitanism seems to appeal to liberal neutrality because both are committed to core values such as reciprocity, autonomy, respect for the individual, personal accountability, and inclusivity. Further, cosmopolitanism is legitimate for many only insofar as it endorses value-pluralism in open societies, which is a staple of liberal neutrality. And yet, one might think that there is a moral obligation to create a cosmopolitan community. One can think of this as moral (normative) cosmopolitanism. To the end of creating a cosmopolitan community, certain values ought to be fostered in laws and public policies, and certain attitudes ought to be cultivated. This leads to a potential impasse, namely if cosmopolitanism is committed to neutrality then it cannot promote its normativity, and if it is not committed to neutrality then it cannot promote value-pluralism. I propose a solution to this potential impasse by examining several of the democratic and cosmopolitan commitments of Alain Locke. What I take from Locke is his grounding of both pluralism and moral cosmopolitanism in democratic, time-honored principles that exist in all acts of free association, namely: liberty, equality, and fraternity. These values, of necessity, pervade all political conceptions of good lives because all political conceptions require what acts of free association allow, namely community with others. To this end, I provide an argument for how someone can consistently be committed to both moral cosmopolitanism and liberal neutrality.