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1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
M. J. Loux Nutné a možné (dokončení): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (2) Vyjádření k Maternově poznámce: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Jan Palkoska „Corpus non est Substantia, sed modus tantum Entis“ leibniz o fenomenalitě látkového světa: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis onpinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times.
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Marvan Putnamovy realismy a pojmová relativita: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada Abstraktívne poznanie podl'a Jána Dunsa Scota základné prístupy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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According to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology.
6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Josef Smolka Caramuelův List Markovi Marci Ještě Jednou: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Reálné Potence: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Kamila Pacovská Kritika metaetiky v díle P. Footové a dalších „deskriptivistů“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article aims to present one of the most decisive criticisms of metaethics which resulted in the restoration of substantive ethics in Great Britain in the late fifties. Philippa Foot attacks the basic metaethical presupposition that evaluative meaning is logically independent of descriptive meaning. She concentrates on the semantics of the word “good”. The second, most extensive part of my article summarizes her argumentation for the thesis that evaluative meaning of the latter word can imply some description of the object evaluated. This result can be linked with the rejection of formalistic methods in ethics.
9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Univerzální preskriptivismus R. M. Hara: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article is a critical systematic presentation of R. M. Hare's ethical concepts and doctrine as outlined in his books The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). The theory merits attention for many reasons, yet it appears to suffer from some weaknesses; the chief among them being the lack of explanation for the source of binding force of moral principles.
10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Lukáš Novák Orcid-ID Můžeme mluvit o tom, co není?: Aktualismus a possibilismus v analytické filosofii a ve scholastice
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The aim of the article is twofold: (i) to document how what the author labels the “Principle of Reference” – viz. the claim that that which is not cannot be referred to – inspires both actualist and possibilist philosophical conceptions in the analytic tradition as well as in scholasticism, and (ii) to show how Duns Scotus’s rejection of the Principle allows us to see that there are two distinct and logically independent meanings of the actualism–possibilism distinction: viz. metaphysical actualism/…possibilism, and semantic actualism/possibilism. By way of an appendix, the author off ers some critical remarks on recent Czecho-Slovak debates about the ontological status of non-existents.
11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Dan Török Spor o svobodnou vůli mezi Erasmem Rotterdamským a Martinem Lutherem
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In my paper I try to reconstruct the core of Martin Luther’s and Erasmus of Rotterdam’s view on the question of free will on the basis of my analysis of Erasmus’ treatise De libero arbitrio diatribé sive collatio (1524) and Luther’s answer De servo arbitrio (1525). I also examine the compatibility of their views, or rather the main reasons for their incompatibility. I analyse the problematic and adversarial moments of both of the great thinkers views, which I fi nd in the case of Martin Luther for example in the idea of all-doing God and in the view on the creation of the fi rst human, Adam; and in the case of Erasmus of Rotterdam for example in the question of merits and in the assertion that a spreading of the truth might be scandalous. Before presenting my conclusions I also deal with the diff erences in applied terminology and methodology of these two reform thinkers, which leads me to the question of the criterion of the truth. On the basis of these observationsI search for the key reasons for the disagreement between the two protagonists of this dispute and I evaluate the whole debate.
12. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Miroslav Hanke Paradox lháře ve světle scholastických klasifikací
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The systematic focus of twentieth century logic and analytic philosophy on semantic paradoxes prompted the rediscovery of the nearly six hundred years of scholastic research devoted to paradoxes. The present paper focuses on the following three branches of scholastic logic: 1. definitions of semantic paradox; 2. basic strategies of solving paradoxes; 3. scholastic classifications of solutions to paradoxes. Scholastic logicians analysed paradoxes from threebasic points of view: the point of view of paradox-generating inferences, the point of view of paradoxical sentence, and the point of view of the theoretical context of paradoxes. These partial analyses can be synthesised into a coherent approach, allowing for analysing different aspects of semantic paradox.
13. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta O logice ontologického důkazu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm’s use of the definite description “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence “there is an x such that…” does not imply “x exists”. Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God’s existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x does not exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes’ ontological argument can be derived from it.
14. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Suárezova nauka o receptivních potencích a její ohlas u R. Arriagy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse).
15. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Anselmův ontologický důkaz očima teorie abstraktních objektů: Úvodní poznámka
16. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD K Novákově odpovědi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
17. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Problém abstraktních pojmů: Odpověď Davidu Peroutkovi
18. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Peter Hoenen SJ Descartův Mechanicismus: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
19. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík, Karel Šprunk G. Frege: Dialog s Pünjerem Český překlad s kritickým výkladem
20. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Gottlob Frege Funkcia a pojem: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism