From A Theory of Justice to The Law of Peoples Rawls’s liberalism develops from individualism to a kind of communitarianism. This apparently makes him blind to conflicts between the individual and the collective, and the resulting position contributes to change his perspective on just war. From a duty to prevent war by civil disobedience he develops a duty to initiate war because of human right violations, and this must be criticized.

Assuming that Aristotelian ethical thought is specifically related to the problem of stability and permanency of Polis, this paper researches the relationship between the human soul and the ethical-political order. Ethical life is described as an on-going process whereby we learn how to think and desire, due to the experience of each particular situation. Ethics shows the human life as a progressive assimilation of ethical-political order in which one becomes the man one is. But, on the other hand, it also shows that any order owes itself to the character of men who take part in it. Interiorising of customs – the purpose of ethical process of personal constitution – forms the man (character is built from the communitarian experience). The virtuous man’s soul is the strongest guarantee againstruination that always threatens Polis. The affirmation of a good life as a happy life in virtue – as the permanent and stable activity according to virtue – assures political order’s stability and the permanence of the Polis. This leads to a reflection about how much Politics owes Ethics: the possibility of the most esteemed idea in Aristotelian political discourse (the permanence of Polis) depends on the ethical process of human soul’s construction. The soul belongs to the order just as the order belongs to the soul. Seen as a virtue, Justice is a certain configuration of the soul (of desiring, thinking and even of feeling) of a man. The abandonment of that incarnate old conception of Justice is strictly related to the contemporary crisis of Law, whose weaknesses in legitimacy and efficacy are evident.

The Rule of law often is considered to be a criterion for legal positivistic thinking. According to this maxim: can the Chinese Legalistic thinking of Shang Yang and Han Fei be considered as a sort of Legal Positivism? There are many positions shared by both, like the idea of a positive law or the binding character of the law despite of person and sympathies or even the concept of the law as a system. There is, however a important difference between them: legal positivism can be best described as “rule of the law” whereas Legalism best fits the idea of “rule by the law”, since there were no secondary rules stating how the legislator had to make the law. On the other hand, the strongest approach to draw a parallel between both is the commonly shared concept of realism of the law as social construction.

His philosophical thinking was influenced by his legal knowledge, but when reading carefully his articles and papers we can notice a detachment from the philosophical premises in the development of the concepts of law. Like Del Vecchio, Djuvara makes no difference between law and philosophy and therefore the legal philosophy looks like a completion of law, these two concepts being comprehended only by a general, epistemological and philosophical approach; the issues related to the philosophy of law are not only isolated from the big philosophical issues but there are closely related to them so that the philosophy of lawintegrates completely in the general philosophy.

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the world taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context.

This paper aims to rethink the reason why nineteenth century common lawyers required a promise to be ‘accepted’. James Gordley expresses his opinion on this matter that they did it just in order to answer the annoying question of why and when a promise was binding. He might be right if he were dealing with the nineteenth century civil lawyers. But he cannot explain why common law of contract still employs the doctrine of consideration and refuses to replace the concept of promise with the notion of offer, despite the doctrine of offer and acceptance. This paper reminds readers that the word promise is rather moral than legal. Thenineteenth century common lawyers wanted not to lose the moral force of this word, so they could not exchange a promise for an offer. What they actually did is not to require a promise to be ‘accepted’ but to require ‘a promise’ to be accepted.

In 'Yeogi (禮記)', the Chinese scriptures of Confucianism, they recoded the solar calendar of modern viewpoints. According to the ancient document, the 24 solar terms was one of seasonal divisions in a year. The regularly change of the four seasons play an important part in the national economic project. For a national economy depended on agriculture in East Asia of ancient times, the administration to pay no regard to the change of the season was directly connected to the fall of the nation. And then the legislator must enact laws to reflect the change of the season. According to the 'Wolryeong (月令)' in 'Yeogi (禮記)', there is recoded national regulations to suit with the each twelve momth. The first month of spring is the prime of the year (February). The month shows sign of new livingthings. The ruler take order to protect the first breath of spring and ought to put a ban on the military training and labor mobilization. The reasons are to safeguard the new life and not to interrupt the preparation for farming. Confucian attach value to the nature within a human’s way of life. Therefore the norm of human do correlate closely with the principle of nature. The rule of Wuju (宇宙) was not a simple concept of the natural phenomenon and Cheon (天) was not the Almighty for himself. Cheon was just the existence of virtue and moral influence in the confidence of man. And Ji (地) was the Mother of all things. In this space man had to manage the world in sympathy with the process of cheonJi (天地); Cheonsi (天時), JIri (地利), Inhwa (人和).

Consequences of world-scale anti-terrorism campaign (which included pre-emptive and coercive regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq) equaled to or even exceeded consequences of the terrorist challenge itself, and must be analyzed as dialectically interfaced dual factor influencing international politics and law. This dual factor changes basic rules of international relations through wider employment of the principle of pre-emption (retaliation against perceived intentions, rather than against actions), and further blurring of national sovereignty resulting from more coercive interference of the international community into domestic affairs of certain states and societies. Counter-terrorism is philosophically interpreted internationally as reestablishment and strengthening of the monopoly of a state onto use of force, while terrorism is accused for illegal use of force “for private political purposes”. Counter-terrorist practices return previously missing severe coercive sanctions in the international law, and are implemented on behalf of the international community. The problem is to assure both legality and legitimacy of applied measures, especially in situation when major world powers’ interests are split in elaboration of the UN SC decisions authorizing the internationalinterference into sovereign affairs of states. In fact, the very field of counter-terrorism becomes a field for projection and juxtaposing pragmatic interests of world powers. Classical contradiction between international law based on values and principles and pragmatic politics based on interests re-emerges in the area of terrorist challenges/antiterrorist responses. Counter-terrorist practices require as much legal regulation as do terrorist challenges themselves.

Given certain well-known empirical facts–including the Bush II administration’s motivations and its actions initiating the war – the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (and its continuing war of occupation) is not just (i.e., is not morally justified), on any standard interpretation of Just War Theory criteria for jus ad bellum. Since there was no imminent threat of attack by Iraq against the U.S., the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a Preventative or Merely Precautionary War (which is notrecognized by either Just War Theory or international law as a legitimate basis for initiating a war) rather than a Preemptive War (which may sometimes be justified, if there is a real threat of imminent attack) or a Reactive War (responding to an unjustified attack from an aggressor, which is always justified). Moreover, the neo-conservative program for perpetual U.S. world domination by the weakening of other nations and the invasions of weaker nations for purposes of U.S. economic and geopolitical advantage (behind the facade of “spreading democracy and freedom”) is not morally justified. However, the moral status of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is much less clear. Many argue that is was morally justified according to both Just War Theory and international law, given certain well-established empirical facts; particularly, al-Qaeda’s involvement with the events of 9-11 and the Taliban government’s protection of al-Qaeda and its terrorist infrastructure within Afghanistan. On this analysis, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was justified as both a Reactive War (responding to an unjustified attack against primarily civilian targets) and a Preemptive War (to try to make sure that al-Qaeda did not have the opportunity to use its infrastructure in Afghanistan to arrange other attacks on civilian targets in the U.S. or other nations). But the cogency of this analysis depends on whether there were any realistic alternatives fordisrupting al-Qaeda and bringing its leaders to justice; and some argue that such alternatives did exist. Moreover, even if U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan was morally justified it is arguable that the amount and type of force used – e.g. intensive, wide-spread bombing campaigns that killed many civilians – were not justified.

The objective of this research is to examine the legal interpretation that is applied to the Venezuelan law. To this effect, this work departs from Article 4º of the Venezuelan Civil Code (VCC) that establishes the methods and principles for interpreting Venezuelan law. Similarly, it presents research and explains whatlegal interpretation means and what is interpreted in legal matters.

This article insists on the relationship between law and morality from the internal point of view. H.L.A. Hart makes distinction between internal and external viewpoints. In the framework of Hart’s approach, it is difficult to imagine the internal point of view as a moral point of view. In fact, the internal point of view illuminates the normative character of rules; it shows that the members of the group accept the rules as standards of behavior for the group as a whole. To explain the internal point of view which includes also moral view, we should leave Hart’s definition. But we may use his definition as accepting and using a rule. For this, we should question the meaning of accepting a rule and using a rule.

In this paper I will argue that normativity in its pure form is a matter of gap. I will elucidate this idea in three aspects. First, I will suggest that the ‘ought’ is the unique creation of human language to deal with the contingencies and the complexity of the world. And the particular merit of the nature of ‘ought’ or the normativity is not what it positively can offer or do, but what it negatively leaves rooms for, because the ‘ought’ opens up some space for reason or action. Second, every normative system must transform the real human being into its own normative construction of person. I call it the subjugation process. Third, the normativity can show its force more deeply through the escape, resistance and refusal, in another word, through struggle for recognition of the agents. This aspect has certain connection with the critical theory.

In the philosophy of mathematics, as in its a meta-domain, we find that the words as: consequentialism, implicativity, operationalism, creativism, fertility, … grasp at most of mathematical essence and that the questions of truthfulness, of common sense, or of possible models for (otherwise abstract) mathematical creations,i.e. of ontological status of mathematical entities etc. - of second order. Truthfulness of (necessary) succession of consequences from causes in the science of nature is violated yet with Hume, so that some traditional footings of logico-mathematical conclusions should equally be falled under suspicion in the last century. We have in mind, say, strict-material implication which led the emergence of relevance logics, or the law of excluded middle that denied intuitionists i.e. paraconsistent logical systems where the contradiction is allowed, as well as the quantum logic which doesn't know, say, the definition of implication etc. Kant's beliefs miscarried hereafter that number (arithmetic) and form (geometry) would bring a (finite) truth on space and time, when they revealed relative and curvated, just as it is contradictory essentially understanding of basic phenomena in the nature: of light as an unity of wave – particle, or that both "exist" and "don't exist" numbers as powers of sets between 0א and c (the independence of continuum hypothesis) etc. Mathematical truths are ''truths of possible worlds'', in which we have only to believe that they will meet once recognizable models in reality. At last, we argue in favour of thesis that a possible representing "in relief" of mathematical entities and relations in the "noetic matter" (Aristotle) would be of a striking heuristic character for this science.

Despite some surface similarities, Charles Peirce’s philosophy of mathematics, pragmaticism, is incompatible with both mathematical structuralism and fictionalism. Pragmaticism has to do with experimentation and observation concerning the forms of relations in diagrammatic and iconic representations ofmathematical entities. It does not presuppose mathematical foundations although it has these representations as its objects of study. But these objects do have a reality which structuralism and fictionalism deny.

Both the defenders and the challengers of the indispensability argument seem to ignore the obvious fact that it is meant to be an analogical inference. In this note, I shall draw attention to this fact so as to avoid unnecessary confusions in any future discussion of the indispensability argument. For this purpose, I shall criticize Maddy’s version of the indispensability argument. After having noted that Quinean holism does not have to be one of the necessary premises, I shall suggest alternative formulations of the indispensability argument as an analogical inference. Also, some further reflections on how to evaluate Maddy’s objections to the indispensability argument will be in due order.

Category theory doesn't support Mathematical Structuralism but suggests a new philosophical view on mathematics, which differs both from Structuralism and from traditional Substantialism about mathematical objects. While Structuralism implies thinking of mathematical objects up to isomorphism the new categorical view implies thinking up to general morphism.

This paper argues against neo-Fregeans that Frege was right to conclude that we cannot obtain the concept of number from Hume's Principle. Neo-Fregeans have claimed that Hume's Principle is analytic since it can be viewed as an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number. But it will be shown that if taken as an implicit definition, Hume's Principle is satisfied not just by the concept of number but also by the concept of discrete quantity, and hence it cannot be viewed as an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number as distinct from the concept of discrete quantity.

David Hilbert’s distinction between mathematics and metamathematics assumes mathematics is not metamathematics, cardinality of mathematics is less than cardinality of metamathematics, and metamathematics contains mathematics. Only by abandoning the last renders these characteristics consistent. Every set identifiable only in a metaset, following Kurt Gödel, the metaset is convertible into the set by translation of its constituents into constituents of the set, rendering the set indistinguishable from the metaset. Reversing Kurt Gödel, the set is convertible into the metaset by translation of its constituents into constituents of themetaset, rendering the set indistinguishable from the metaset. Set being indistinguishable from metaset, the set of mathematics is unidentifiable as constituent of the set of metamathematics. Only inductively by exclusive resolution of all constituents of the set of all disjunctives of the sets of mathematics and metamathematics is the set of mathematics identifiable. Generated is endless arbitrary qualification of mathematical identity exhibited in continual proofsof its axioms. Understood as clarification, when everything is unique, no concealed contradiction is contained. Constituted is the endless non-repeating digit to the left of the decimal of an algebraic unknown number. Manifest is casuistry, now neither objective nor specious identity, but instead necessary subjective identity distinguishing sets.

The bases of tenets of the World came from the East; Pythagoras learnt all there up the 26 years. At a home, the east ideas where took in no; then he bound the mathematics with the elements of matter. This was the best way to a blood feud of the all Humanity. The 17th age gave the bases of mathematics and the Greek atomism; this had led to the paranoia in all sciences. The LCE was brought in 19th age with bases no; really it was the box of Pandora in the form of wrong sciences of the Nature. The wise revenge of Pythagoras was in the form of riddle for the best thinkers in the World in all times; us solved one in the 50th years. A base of the World is of the material space (MS) with praatoms (PAs) Ao; they are of the affinity to matter. A density of the MS is of ~ 5.10‐6 kg/m3 close to the Ears. PA Ao is of quant of matter and antimatter; they are of rotate in the different sides. All matter takes up Ao and to grow. In the giant stars to go the bursts giving Ao, or caloric. The matter of being in the World on base of the key law of conservation of heat (caloric) and matter by loss of energy; it is main. Leibniz offered to the conservation of mv2 in the World. But Newton knew that any move is damped, and it need in filled up. This the author proved by tests over the 300 years just. D.Bernoulli given to the model of gas. I. Kant proved that mv2 is the quantity of heat by stop of the body; it is no the energy! A key leitmotiv of thought is blocked the grasp of facts if ones not leaded to an accepted concept. P. Mayer had the blunder in base of the LCE; a work of gas expansion in Torricelli tube is equal nil strong! This is the gross blunder of a sick paranoiac! The 21 age gave up a new philosophy and a way to endless engine. The super skills from ideal quartz with moving jaws to respond to the all new philosophy and sciences.

No question has demanded so much attention from the philosopher of mind as has this one: What is consciousness? One promising answer begins by noting that consciousness is, itself, a conjugate of more basic stuff. For the ethicist, there is a question that seems at least formally related to the question of consciousness: What is conscience? Could it be that a similar approach carries similar promise? The following short paper first examines consciousness as a conjugate, and then pursues the implications of this analysis for a novel understanding of conscience as the grounds for a science of ethics.