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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
29 >
Issue: 3
Jeffrey Flynn
Habermas on Human Rights:
Law, Morality, and Intercultural Dialogue
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Social Theory and Practice:
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Issue: 3
Keith Burgess-Jackson
Deontological Egoism
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Social Theory and Practice:
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29 >
Issue: 3
Richard L. Lippke
Diminished Opportunities, Diminished Capacities:
Social Deprivation and Punishment
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
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Issue: 4
Eugene Rice
Solving Human Rights Conflicts by Dissolving Them:
The Failure of the Dissolution Strategy
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
29 >
Issue: 4
George Schedler
Should the Federal Government Pay Reparations for Slavery?
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6.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
29 >
Issue: 4
Andrew Alexandra
Political Pacifism
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
29 >
Issue: 4
Kevin E. Dodson
Kant’s Socialism:
A Philosophical Reconstruction
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8.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
29 >
Issue: 4
Martin van Hees, Paul Anand
New Choices:
Genomics, Freedom, and Morality
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9.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
29 >
Issue: 4
D. W. Haslett
Murder and the Exception for Fair Competition
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10.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
3 >
Issue: 1
Norman Bowie
Some Comments on Rawls’ Theory of Justice
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11.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
3 >
Issue: 1
John Schaar
Reflections on Rawls’ Theory of Justice
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12.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
3 >
Issue: 1
Charles Frankel
Justice, Utilitarianism, and Rights
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13.
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Social Theory and Practice:
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3 >
Issue: 1
Gerald Tattershall
A Rawls Bibliography
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14.
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Social Theory and Practice:
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3 >
Issue: 1
James Sterba
Justice as Desert
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
3 >
Issue: 1
Andrew Levine
Rawls’ Kantianism
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16.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
3 >
Issue: 1
David Gauthier
Justice and Natural Endowment:
Toward a Critique of Rawls’ Ideological Framework
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17.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
41 >
Issue: 4
Robert Sugden
Looking for a Psychology for the Inner Rational Agent
abstract |
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rights & permissions
Research in psychology and behavioral economics shows that individuals’ choices often depend on “irrelevant” contextual factors. This presents problems for normative economics, which has traditionally used preference-satisfaction as its criterion. A common response is to claim that individuals have context-independent latent preferences which are “distorted” by psychological factors, and that latent preferences should be respected. This response implicitly uses a model of human action in which each human being has an “inner rational agent.” I argue that this model is psychologically ungrounded. Although references to latent preferences appear in psychologically based explanations of context-dependent choice, latent preferences serve no explanatory purpose.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
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Issue: 4
Sven Ove Hansson
Mill’s Circle(s) of Liberty
abstract |
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rights & permissions
J.S. Mill’s advocacy of liberty was based only in part on his harm principle. He also endorsed two other principles that considerably extend the scope of liberty: first, a principle of individual liberty that is based on the value of positive freedom and of developing individuality, and second, a principle of free trade or economic freedom that is based on the value of economic efficiency. An analysis is offered of how these three principles are combined in Mill’s account of liberty and how they connect with his antipaternalism. It is proposed that his appeal in On Liberty to positive freedom and the development of individuality provides a uniting principle that makes his view on liberty cohere with his utilitarianism.
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19.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
41 >
Issue: 4
Kalle Grill, Danny Scoccia
Introduction
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20.
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Social Theory and Practice:
Volume >
42 >
Issue: 1
Fabian Wendt
Political Authority and the Minimal State
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Robert Nozick and Eric Mack have tried to show that a minimal state could be just. A minimal state, they claim, could help to protect people’s moral rights without violating moral rights itself. In this article, I will discuss two challenges for defenders of a minimal state. The first challenge is to show that the just minimal state does not violate moral rights when taxing people and when maintaining a monopoly on the use of force. I argue that this challenge can be met. The second challenge is to show that the just minimal state has political authority, including, most importantly, the moral power to impose duties on citizens. I argue that both Nozick and Mack lack the resources to meet that challenge, and that political authority cannot be deflated. This is an important problem, because a lack of political authority also undermines a state’s justness.
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