William James's essay, "The Will to Believe," is interpreted as a philosophical argument for two conclusions: (l) Some over-beliefs—i.e., beliefs going beyond the available evidence—are rationally justified under certain conditions; and (2) "The Religious Hypothesis" is justified for some people under these conditions. Section I defends viewing James as presenting arguments, Sections II-III try to formulate the dual conclusions more precisely, and Section IT defends this reading against alternative interpretations. Section 7, the heart of the paper, elaborates five logically distinct arguments (or approaches) implicit in "The Will to Believe" with regard to non-evidential justification. Section VI examines "The Religious Hypothesis," and Section VII concludes by noting that while James's particular arguments are largely unsuccessful nevertheless the project of finding non- evidential or "practical" rational warrants for religious over-beliefs seems promising. Two appendices supplement the body of the text. The first considers some formal aspects of the so-called "ethics of belief" in order to clarify James's desired conclusions) in "The Will to Believe," and the second shows that and how James's own "technical distinctions" are both obscure and largely irrelevant to his central task.

This article seeks to make a contribution toward the eventual construction of an adequate formulation of rule-utilitarianism by explaining same of the difficulties the notion of supererogation poses for such an enterprise, and by describing a rule-utilitarian theory of supererogation which would resolve those difficulties. The first difficulty that the notion of supererogation raises for rule-utilitarianism is that beliefs concerning acts "beyond the call of duty" are not an insignificant part of many persons' considered moral opinions and any theory, rule-utilitarian or not, which does not provide a place for them will be found lacking on that account. Secondly, I shall argue that without an adequate theory of supererogation it is extremely unlikely that the rule-utilitarian will succeed in arriving at a moral code which will maximize utility. Thirdly, without an adequate theory of supererogation, rule-utilitarian accounts of basic moral concepts such as "right", "obligatory", and "wrong" will be unsatisfactory, even frcm a utilitarian point of view. I begin in section I by considering how best to define 'supererogation." I propose a reforming definition at the end of that section. In section II I claim that rule-utilitarians must recognize a distinction between two types of rules if they hope to avoid the difficulties mentioned above. In section III I attempt to explain and to resolve the difficulties supererogation poses for rule-utilitarianism.

The aim of this bibliography is to present a comprehensive list on the concept of promises. Its main focus is the ethical discussions of promises. It includes also some of the essential legal reference works and literature on promises and contracts, the linguistic materials on speech-acts and performatives (for example, the so-called performative analysis of John Ross) that have a bearing on the concept of promises, and some of the philosophical literature on the related topics of social contract, consent, and obligation. Readers are invited to submit to the author any omissions.

This essay examines Kant's relationship to the Stoics with respect to the affective dimension of the moral life. Besides offering a general description and comparison of the two philosophies in this particular regard, it utilizes numerous specific Kantian references to and parallels with Stoicism to argue that his own position was, throughout its development, shaped by a growing contact with and appreciation of the Stoic view. The paper proceeds from some negative remarks of Kant about suppressing or even eliminating the emotions and inclinations found mainly in the Grundlegung and the second Critique, and then goes on to show how Kant was able to draw upon a number of Stoic distinctions and concepts, such as that between the affects and the passions, in order to mitigate these negative and exclusivistic attitudes and to reincorporate the affective components of the personality into his conception of a fully human moral life. Moreover, because of the numerous subtopics explored in making the main case for the Kant-Stoa link, the essay also accomplishes its subsidiary purpose of showing the importance of the sometimes overlooked emotional factor or dimension of Kant's ethics as such.

This paper examines problems and inconsistencies in the Plotinian conception of evil. A review of all the pertinent passages in the Enneads concludes that evil is non-existent in the metaphysical realm and that the absolute evil of the moral realm is subservient to a universal order and functions to produce a harmony in accord with the intellectual realm (Nous) of which it is but an image. [Most of the difficulties are seen as eliminated by adopting an interpretive view of evil as the result of the soul’s misdirected orientation toward its own completeness in matter.]

While in the research area known,as ’philosophy of science' there is a growing interest in separate disciplines of the empirical sciences, applied sciences and even technologies, one can find hardly any reference to the discipline of chemistry other than some preliminary discussions of chemical concepts or studies concerning the rational reconstruction of the history of chemistry. No analyses, which might be called 'philosophy of chemistry’ can be found to date. It is hoped that this review paper on what has been published on the philosophy of chemistry will show that chemistry is a philosophically rich field. After an introduction, in section 2, a more detailed classification is given of the various areas from which a (marginal) interest in the philosophy of chemistry has emerged.In section 3 there is a review of the opinions on the subject matter of chemistry, be it straightforward definition or indications of the relation to other natural sciences, in particular physics. In section 4 publications on the philosophy of chemistry are reviewed which fit the conventional format of the philosophy of science (discussing laws, theories,explanations , models). In section 5 some of the literature on the concept of chemical species is reviewed. In section 6 and 7 a review of the literature on the concepts of chemical structure and chemical reactions is presented.

In "Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories" (Ethics, 90:191-202, January 1980) David Levy argues against a number of theories of perversion by means of the method of counter-example. This is inappropriate since many familiar accounts are not attempts to provide a "one-over-many" formula for a core of clear cases. Rather, like Levy himself, many understand perversions as "unnatural" or "non-human" actions, i.e. as distortions of human nature. Here there is agreement on the intension of the term. Differences in the extension arise in virtue of the relational character of the meaning. For what counts as a distortion of human nature depends on the paradigm of human nature one endorses. In these cases the appropriate way to decide between competing lists of perversions is to evaluate the competing paradigms of human nature on which they rest. Typically these paradigms embody important value assumptions.

I try to show that there is much sap (synthetic a priori) knowledge although one may not find many, or even any, sap true statements in most natural languages. Reasons are given for the difficulty of expressing sap truths in natural languages, but it is argued that these are not necessary features of language as such. There are, then, sap true statements in some possible languages.Admission of the sap gives one a way of distinguishing logical from metaphysical possiblity. Something is metaphysically impossible just in case it is a sap truth that it is impossible. I argue that the realm of logically possible entities is vastly larger than the realm of metaphysically possible entities.My .defence of the sap begins with a partial defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In particular, I attack the intentionality circle argument,Quine's indeterminacy thesis and some applications of the Kripke/Putnam theory of meaning for natural kind terms. Without being a conclusive defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction, this section makes the defence of the sap more secure. Arguments are then mounted in direct defence of the sap by showing that the purported reduction of sap truths to analytic truths is mistaken. Examples are adduced to show that, even where expressions of natural language fail, one can stipulate usage in ways that allow expression of sap truths. I then consider and reply to various objections, giving an example of the sort of meaning theory which illegitimately legislates the analyticity of any purported sap true statement.

This is a list of journal articles and chapters of hooks on locke's philosophy, published in the last fifty years or so. The subjects covered are those treated by locke in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, i.e. metaphysics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and ethics. The bibliography was produced with the help of a computer, using the INFOL-2 program and RNF text processor. There are 202 distinct items. These are first listed chronologically, then alphabetically; then eight lists of items on special topics, selected from the master list, are given. The special topics are Innate Ideas, Primary and Secondary Qualities, Substance, Personal Identity, language, Essence, Knowledge, and locke and Leibniz.

Sorely needed by scholars of nineteenth-century philosophy is a researdh bibliography on Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924). The existent bibliographic tools presently available on Bradley are very incomplete, inaccurate, and outdated, making them valueless for serious philosophical research on this very important contemporary philosopher. Every major book, review, doctoral dissertation, article, and note is cited exactly and completely. Approximately a thousand different citations are given indicating the tremendous influence Bradley's thought had on subsequent thinkers and movements. It is no minor thinker who could influence deeply a Russell, James, or Whitehead. Like Plotinus before'him, Bradley's place in philosophy has not been fully appreciated because of the artificial divisions of philosophy proposed by its historians. In any event, this bibliography is offered to scholars whose interests are English Idealism in general and Bradley's philosophic contributions in particular.

Over the past several years John Hick has developed a view of theistic faith which is philosophically sophisticated and religiously sensitive. In this paper I first attempt to develop an overall interpretation of Hick's position and offer several piecemeal criticisms of it. I then offer "diagnosis" of why Hick cannot, in his own terms, develop a coherent defense of theism and suggest a basic strategy for avoiding the problems he encounters. This strategy results in a defense of theistic faith that is philosophically coherent, but its result is to lay bare the genuine difficulty with being a theist in the late twentieth century.

St. Thomas is usually thought to have rejected abortion and euthanasia as murder (viz, the statement of The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "On Procured Abortion"). By going back to Aquinas' own words I show that this is mistaken: that he explicitly states abortion prior to a certain point of fetal development to be non-murderous and that his position, when consistently developed, allows for euthanasia under analogous circumstances. These claims are argued by presenting an analytical expose of Aquinas’ metaphysics of man and of human ontogenesis. The implications of this for current bioethical concerns are sketched briefly.

It is commonly believed that prostitution—i.e., the practice of indiscriminately selling sex—is morally wrong. In this paper it is argued that it is at least not obvious that prostitution is morally wrong, and that several arguments which seem to underlie the view that it is are unsound. The following claims are examined: (1) Prostitution is morally wrong because it is degrading. Several interpretations of this claim are considered, and each is criticized. (2) Prostitution is morally wrong because it promotes socially harmful consequences. The following purported social harms are discussed: the destruction of the institution of marriage, the spread of venereal disease, and an increase in crime. Special attention is given to the assertion that prostitution contributes to the destruction of the institution of marriage. This claim is challenged on a number of scores. More generally, it is argued that consequentialist claims which cite the foregoing social harms do not provide a firm basis for the belief that prostitution is morally wrong. (3) Prostitution is morally wrong because of what it is: the indiscriminate sale of sex. A number of attempts to justify this claim are discussed, and it is argued that none succeeds in establishing that prostitution is morally wrong.

In 'Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory' Michael Levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine Saul Kripke's Cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. In this paper it is argued that Levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which Kripke has provided a plausible alternative, viz., the causal theory of reference. Thus, using the private language argument in the way Levin suggests begs the question against the Cartesian line of argument.

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the (ordinary-language) distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states, as when people say "Admittedly I did (saw, desired, believed, etc.) X, but I wasn't conscious of it." It is argued that "unconscious" varieties of mental states, processes, or events---even perception---can be analyzed entirely in terms of the possession, exercise, acquiring, or loss, of dispositions, whereas conscious mental states involve the same dispositional items, temporally conjoined with at least one of a variety of appropriate experiences. The "temporal conjunction" relationship between behavior and "appropriate" experiences turns out to be much looser than recent causal or functional theories of mental concepts have allowed; the views of e.g., David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett are critically discussed.

In a recent discussion, Susan Anderson argues that Alvin Plantinga’s version of the Free Will Defense has not shown that the existence of God is neither precluded nor rendered improbable by the existence of evil. She grants Plantinga that God cannot control free actions and that only free actions have moral worth but denies that this entails that God cannot insure a world containing only moral good. God could do so, she argues, simply by taking away the freedom of persons when he foresees they would sin if allowed to act freely. Anderson also believes that Plantinga must assume that God is a benevolent being who attempts to bring about the greatest net good if he is to justify the evil we experience, both she argues that such an assumption is dubious. I argue that both of these arguments contain fundamental misinterpretations of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and, accordingly, that neither presents a serious objection to it.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the concept of model as it is applied in the physical sciences, and to show that this analysis is fruitful insofar as it can be used as an acceptable account of the role of models in physical explanation.A realist interpretation of theories is adopted as a point of departure. A distinction between theories and models is drawn on the basis of this interpretation. The relation between model and prototype is expressed in terms of the concepts of access and accessibility, and four conditions are proposed as an analysis of the concept of model. It is concluded that models are introduced when approximate methods are used.

Since the early seventies, when English translations of Jürgen Habermas’ principal works became available to English-speaking scholars, there has been a virtual “Habermas explosion” of research papers, dissertations and books. Informative and penetrating discussions already exist discussing Habermas’ encounter with positivism and his relationship to the “Frankfurt school.” There are however few detailed discussions of the theoretical relationships between Habermas’ project of a critical theory of society and Hegel’s system. We attempt to correct this previous omission in the following paper.The central thesis of Jürgen Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is that theoretical discourse is fundamentally tied to human experience. Habermas wishes to show that all theoretical statements about the world have their genesis in the experience of everyday life and practices. His particular understanding of this approach to the question of the possibility of knowledge has its origins in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology defines the development of knowledge in terms of a science of experience and must therefore constitute the main text in locating the philosophical parameters of Habermas’ thought. Our paper is an exercise in hermeneutics addressed to this task.In rejecting both Hegel’s philosophy of identity and Marx’s ontology of nature, Habermas has forced himself into a position where he must elaborate exactly how knowledge is possible at all. That is, the question which he confronts concerns the underlying basis of human experience. Hegel and Marx in Habermas’ opinion, were both unsuccessful in developing an adequate account of human life precisely because they tended to give an absolute basis to the the structure of the world. Knowledge itself, was considered as knowledge of something which existed beyond the scope of human control. Habermas attempts to overcome these difficulties by developing an explicitly ontological account of man through his theory of cognitive interests. Thus the process of reflection is ‘guided’ by certain cognitive interests. These interests perform the same function in Habermas’ system as does the notion of Geist in Hegel’s or Nature in Marx’s. They determine the conditions by which ‘knowledge’ can be generated and thus constitute the grounds upon which our world-view is constituted.

In his book, Reason and Morality, Gewirth has defended the principle of generic consistency as logically and materially necessary: “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.” This paper argues that Gewirth can make a good response to the evaluation of Adams that Gewirth gives “no conceptual analysis of ‘X is a necessary good’ and ‘X is a right’ that reveals . . . an entailment.” The paper also argues that Gewirth has not shown that one who would claim superior rights because of superior intelligence necessarily involves himself in a logical self-contradiction. Finally, the paper considers how the positions of Gewirth and Adams could be used to provide an existentialist, assertoric foundation of morality and suggests how Gewirth would evaluate such a foundation.