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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
林義正
Yih-Jing Lin
論列子之「虛」
On Concept of "Shue" (Emptiness) in Lieh-Tzu
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This paper divided into four parts: (i) preface; (ii) the conception of "shue" in Lieh-Tzu; (iii) The conception in Toaistic school in the Pre-Chin; (iv) conclusion. The author deals with this concept based upon the recent studies - the book of Lieh-Tzu is not an apocrypha. Lieh-Tzu conceived that the saint is the highest stage of human life. The issue is how do one achieve it. His answer is “shue." It has two denotations --“kung-fu" (drill) and the mental stage. “Shue" is not only in the realm of language and conceptual, but also in that of practice. The method of practice is by intellectual reflection and meditation from the concentration of consciousness to that of spirit. Finally, it can unify his spirit with nothing. Nothing is “ tao" from the Taoistic point of view. Lieh: Tzu followed the method of the ancient Taoism in practice. But author contends that the method is derived from Lao-Tzu's “shue" of imitating “heaven" which is different from Kuan-Yin-Tzu's interpretation of it, that is, “chin" (stillness) of imitating “earth." From historical viewpoint, Lieh-Tzu dealed with the notion of “shue" in order to provide an answer to the meaninglessness of life of the people and disturbance of the society in the warring states period. The author believes that it is the right prescription for it.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
關永中
Carlo KWAN (KWAN Wing Chung)
上與造物者遊與莊子對談神秘主義
A Dialogue with Chuang-Tzu On Mysticism
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Chuang-Tzu never deliberately emphasizes that he is a mystic. Yet , his writings are filled with mystical flavor. This motivates us to ask: Can the doctrine he puts forward be regarded as a type of Mysticism? Here , the meaning of the idea of “Yau/ Ecstatic Flowing" (遊) is investigated with the result of affirming his mystical tendency. Whereas , the notion of the “Creator " (造 物者) is also studied , and we draw the conclusion that Chuang-Tzu's mysticism is theistic in orientation , even though he also incorporates in his system the monistic and naturalistic elements which make his writings all the more spectacular.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
陳鼓應
Guu-Ying Chen
〈管子〉四篇的心學和氣論
The Teaching on Hsin and Discussion on Ch'i in the Four Chapters of the “kuan-tzu "
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While Lao-tzu in his discussion on tao gave evidence of unpreeedented originality, he did not make any contribution to the study of hsin. After the middle of the Warring States period, Chi-hsia Huang Lao daoism greatly promoted teachings and discussions on hsin and ch'i' thereby enriching ancient China's 'teachings of the inner sage'. Chi-hsia Huang Lao made the metaphysical tao concrete in the form of ching-ch'i, put it in relation to the human hsin and expressed the view that tao (ch'i) resides in the hsin('the lodging of ching-she'). This article expounds on the teachings of hsin-hsing, hsin-ch'i and hsin-hsing and furthermore explains the teaching of ching-ch'i and the method of concentrating ch'i.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
王曉波
Hsiao-Po Wang
論「歸本於黃老」韓非子論「道」
On 'Basing on Huang-Lao' Han Fei Tzu's Comments on 'Tao'
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The Historian Szu-ma Chien's comn1ents on Han Fei Zi:‘Emphasizing Xin Min Fa Shu, and basing his views on Huang-Lao.' Since Huang disappeared, and contents of two chapters of Han Fei Tzu, Interρretation of Lao and Analogy of Lao, were not quite the same of Lao Tzu, besides, a lot of his views of Xin Min Fa Shu were different from Lao Tzu, hence a lot of scholars suspected these comments on Tao and Te in Han Fei Tzu were actually the works of Taoists of Warring Era or West Han Dynasty. After Lao Tzu, according to my arguments, Taoists putted forward Zhuang Tzu and ‘Huang-Lao' (The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emρeror), both inherited and expanded the thoughts of Lao Tzu. Han Fei's thoughts inherited and expanded ‘Huang - Lao'. Interρretation of Lao and Analogy of Lao were inheritance and expansion of the thoughts of Lao Tzu too. His views of Xin Min Fa Shu may differ from thoughts of Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu, but were not far from thoughts of The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emperor of ‘Huang-Lao '. Therefore, Han Fei's arguments on Tao were in fact 'basing on Huang-Lao'. Scholars doubts arose from the disappearance of The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emρeror, and fromtheir misunderstanding of 'Huang-Lao'.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
何保中
Pau-Chung Ho
死亡問題在莊子思想中的意義與地位
The Essence and Significance of the “Death" Issue in the Thinking of Chuang-Tsu
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Use quotations from Chuang-Tsu, this article argues that: (1) Chuang-Tsu considered “chi" the basic component of all tagible existences, an element that does not in itself consist of any driving force. The driving force behind the formation/ extinction of tangible existence is “tien" (or the creator). (2) Since “chi" is everlasting, there exists no absolute nihility in the universe. The formation of tangible existences is therefore not a process from “nothingness" to “existence". (3) We have no means to comprehendthe reason and purpose of existence. Consequently, we can not, and should not, define or criticize the meaning or value of any existence. Further, the existence of human beings, like all other tangible existences, is by no means significant. (4) Since there is no significance in human existence and it is not possible to create any meaning through the process of existence, the only purpose of life is not to impair the current existence. (5) However, as individual life, unlike “chi", is not eternal, death is inevitable.Chuang-Tsu hence attempted to ease the anxiety of nihilism through asserting that “chi" transforms among different existences. It is nevertheless doubtful that such reasoning can effectively unravel human anxiety over death.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
孫效智
Johannes Sun Hsiao-Chih
神律倫理與自律倫理
Theonomous Ethics and Autonomous Ethics
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Theonomous ethics, an important theory of religious ethics, has invited numerous attacks from modern religious critics. The paper begins with a scrutiny of the main ideas of theonomous ethics and of the five opposing.The second part of the paper deals with the main arguments of these religious critics. First of all, the problems of theodicy will be addressed from three aspects, namely, the general moral intuition, the basic position of teleological ethics, and the basic principIes of theories of definition and reference. The discussion is meant to illustrate that whereas the theory of theonomous ethics needs to be revised, the arguments given by the religious critics are not impeccable either. Some flaws in their arguments are listedand discussed in the paper.The following part is devoted to the assessment of the position of theonomous ethics in the traditions of Judaism, Islamism and Christianity. It is discovered that theonomous ethics not only does not belong to the main stream of the three religions, but also is criticized by dominating theologies. We can infer that taking theonomous ethics as the target of their attacking fires, the religious critics actually commit the mistake of “strawman argumentation." Basically the ethics of the three religions are rationalistic rather than theonomous in nature.The concluding part of the paper analyzes the autonomous characteristics of religious ethics with the focus on biblical ethics. The significance of the Ten Commandments, for example, can be fully understood in terms of rationality. As a conclusion the paper points out that autonomous rationality is the last criterion for biblical ethics.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1999 >
Issue: 22
嚴靈宰
Ling-Feng Van
黃老道術源流
The Origin and Development of Huang-Lao Dao-Shu
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This paper discusses the central ideas of Huang-lao thought and inquires into its origin and development. At the time "Lietzu, false accusations and its main ideas" was being reprinted, the author rearrenged several important materials, resulting in this article. According to the Shi-chi, pre-Ch' in Huang-ti and Lao-tzu were not named together, the term 'taoism', originating in the early years of the Han dynasty, referred exclusively to Lao-tzu's ch'ing-ching wu-wei and combined the essentials of the yin-yangschool , confucianism, mohists, school of names and legalists. Afterwards, Liu Hsiang wrote that the Lei-tzu had its origins in Huang-ti and Lao-tzu; the work was subsequently also classified as ‘taoism.' The ancient saying that Huang-lao was based on the teachings of Huang-ti and Lao-tzu first appears in the Lie-tzu, which mentions the now lost Book of Huang-ti. The ancient saying that it was written by Huang-ti is clearly a hypothesis, but fragments are quoted in the Lie-tzu and Chuang-tzu and the figuresand historical facts mentioned can make up for what is left out in history.Huang-lao thought is extremely rich and deals with cosmology, the way of heaven, the way of man, psychology, nurture of life etc. The documents excavated in 1973 are extremely helpful in the author's understanding of Huang-lao dao-shu, provide new evidence for its relation with hsing-ming, but also leave open many questions.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
陳鼓應
Guu-Ying Chen
〈管子〉四篇的道論
The Theory of Dao in the Four Chapters of the Guanzi
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〈管子〉四篇的哲學理論主要在於繼承老子的道論再加以獨 特的發展,表現出老學齊學化的特色。本文首先析論〈管子〉四篇在道論方面祖述老學的成份,其 次就道之特性暨「虛」與「無為」等觀念申論其對老學的發展: 〈管子〉四篇不但將老子原本作為空間義之「虛」提昇到宇宙論 的範疇,以「虛」來表達作為萬物之始的「道J '另方面也將老 子有關心境修養之「虛J轉化為認識論的概念,使「虛」的意義 延伸至知識論主客關係的層面,強調主體的認識應著重保持空明 靈覺的性能。以〈管子〉四篇為代表的稜下道家, -方面就道與主體之關 係進行申論,透過精氣說,將道其象化並落實於人身,乃提出 「道不遠人」、「道者充形」等說法,進而發展出「以心受道」 的觀點,如此使得「道」與人的聯繫'得以其體落實於「心」。 另方面則援禮法以入道,將道落實於政治社會之運作,提出 「道生法」之命題;認為禮、法出於道,並將形而上之道與形而 下之禮法貫通為一整體,如此使得稜下道家在有關道的具體施用 方面,重視「應時而變J '兼顧「情」與「理」的平衡。再者是將「因J字發展成為獨立的哲學概念,不僅提出「舍 己而以物為法」與「因其能者言其所用」這兩個界說,更在「道 貴因」的命題下表現出「因時應物」的原則,又將「因」的概念 與「刑名」相結合,發展成「因之術J '在此同時也提出「靜因 之道」這一認識論上的重要命題,對於苟子「虛壹而靜」的主張 有直接的影響。
The four chapters of the Guanzi embody the adaptation and further development of Laozi's theory of the dao by the Daoists in Qi. The paper first shows, where Guanzi builds on the theory of dao in the Laozi. Then the further development of this theory through the notions of “non action" and “emptiness" is analysed. The notion of emptiness is incorporated into the cosmological framework in such a way as to describe the origin of all things. In an epistemological context the “emptiness." describes a certain state in which the subject should be.The Jixia Daoists as presented in the four chapters of the Guanzi on one hand concretise the dao with the help of the notion jingqi. On the other hand they implement the dao in the social realm by the means ofthe rites (Ii) and the law (fa). Thus by the combination of the metaphysical dao with the empirical dao the Jixia Daoists are puttingthe dao into practice. Furthermore the concept of following (yin) is a major focal point in the four chapters of the Guanzi. Not only should one “Give up oneself and follow the things", but under the premise that “the dao values following" the principle of“following the times and reacting to the things" is put forward. In an epistemological context the concept of “following" as exemplified in “the dao of following quietly" also plays an important role. Xunzi later on is to adopt this concept into his thinking.
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9.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
林義正
Yih-Jing Lin
論〈列子 • 天瑞〉的易道思想
Discussing the yidao( 易道) thinking in the tianrui( 天瑞) chapter of the Liezi
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本論文共分六節,一、前言,二、易道思想的含義,三、〈列子﹒天瑞〉與〈易緯﹒乾鑿度〉的關係,四、〈天瑞〉的易 道思想,五、〈天瑞〉易道思想的特色,六、結論。本文乃續〈論列子之「虛˩ )之作,在前言裡已表明列子非偽書,基本上 認為〈列子〉乃出自先秦,至少〈天瑞〉便是如此,所以只要善 加揀擇,還是可以作為研究列子易道思想的依據。根據本文的研 究,以為易道思想本不限於〈周易〉才有, {列子﹒天瑞〉也 有,而且亦有它的特色。同時在論述〈天瑞〉篇時,也一並討論 它與〈易緯﹒乾鑿度〉的關係。本文舉出新證與解說,認為〈列 子﹒天瑞〉篇並不是抄〈易緯﹒乾鑿度> '反而是〈乾擊度〉的 作者抄〈天瑞〉以廣〈易〉說,同時提出新見,以為〈列子〉的 〈天瑞〉是〈天端〉的誤寫。針對易道思想,作者分析〈易 傳〉、〈老子〉與〈列子〉的主張,發現其中的論點有同有異, 今且置〈易傳〉在宋儒有不同的解說不論,如果把〈易傳〉當作 是歸屬先秦儒家借益明理之作,其主陰陽合德,剛柔並濟,但側 重生生、健動、積習,此與〈老子〉不言益、卦、交,但假象言理之作不同,彼實有取於〈易〉損、復之義,強調歸根、復命、 致虛守靜。作者可以肯定地說, <列子﹒天瑞〉的易道思想顯然 是睡〈老子〉之後,而又企圖超越〈老子〉。
The paper is divided into six sections. 1. Introduction, 2. The contents of the yidao thinking, 3. The relationship between the tianrui chapter and qianwei-chenzaodu, 4. The thinking ofthe tianrui chapter, 5. The distinctiveness of the yidao thinking in the tianrui chapter, 6. Conclusion.This paper builds on the essay “Emptiness in the Liezi" by the same author.There the author already argued that Liezi was written in Pre-Qin times. Thus we can use the tianrui chapter to discuss the thinking of Liezi. In this paper it is argued that then yidao thinking does not only exist in the Zhouyi, but also in the tianrui chapter ofthe Liezi.As far as the relationship between the tianrui chapter and the qianwei-chenzaodu is concerned, the paper advances new arguments that support the view that the qianwei-chenzaodu copied from the tianrui, not the other way around. At the same time it argues that tianrui should be read as tianduan.When tracing the yidao thinking through the Yizhuan, the Laozi and the Liezi the author finds differences and similarities. In the Yizhuan Confucianists use the hexagrams ofthe Yijing to express the notion ofthe mutuality of yin/yang and gang/rou. Although the Laozi does not refer to the hexagrams, the notions of “returning to the roots" and “being empty and quiet", as expressed in the sun and the fu hexagram in the Yij ing, are being adopted by the Laozi. Liezi builds on these notions in the Laozi and further develops them.
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10.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
關永中
Wing-Chung Kwan
邵雍易學的知識論向度 一一〈皇極經世〉﹒〈觀物篇〉之六十二所給予的提示
The Epistemological Perspective of Shao Jung's Reflection on I-Ching
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我們可從三個角度去窺視邵雍易學的知識論:A. 認知的三層面: r 觀之以目、以心、以理」B. 被知的視域: r 理、性、命」C.「 窮理、盡性、至命」的知識論五重面向一一思辯、逆覺、存在、冥契、德踐上述的角度,都在〈皇極經世〉、〈觀物篇〉之六十二中有 所提示,並從中凸顯人在認知時所憑藉的「認知結構」 '即「經 驗」、「理解」、「判斷」、「抉擇」。關鍵詞:觀物Contemplation of Beings以目With the Eye以J 心With Heart以理With Reωon窮理Exhaustive Investigation of the Principle盡性Fulfillment ofNature至命Reaching One's Destiny知識論Epistemology形上學Metaphysics德踐Moral Practice
The contents ofthis essay include: (A) Three Levels ofKnowing: by the Eye, by the Heart, and by Reason; (B)The Horizons Known : Heavenly Principle, Cosmic Nature, Human Destiny; (C) From “the Cosmic exhaustive investigation ofthe principle", to “the total fulfillment ofthe Cosmic Nature", to “the reaching of one's destiny". These were all embedded within Shao lung's Huang-chi ching-shih (The Grandest Ultimate Way of Ordering the World), Chapter 62, which further suggests that “experience", “understanding",“judgement", and “decision" constitute the main items of human cognitional structure.
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11.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
陳榮華
Wing-Wah Chan
詮釋學循環:史萊瑪赫、海ZU各和高達美
On the Hermeneutic Circle of Schleiermacher, Heidegger and Gadamer
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史萊瑪赫、海德格的〈存有與時間〉和高達美都曾討論詮釋 學循環的概念。雖然海德格認為他的詮釋學循環是瞭解( Verstehen, understanding) 本身的結構, 但本文要指出, 它依然擁有 史萊瑪赫詮釋學循環的性格一一一個方法論的概念。這是說,兩 者都是用以證實一個結論。另一方面,高達美雖號稱其詮釋學循 環來自海德格哲學,不過,本文卻要指出高達美的詮釋學循環, 已完全擺脫方法論的意涵,因為它不是用以證實一個結論,而是 讓真理得以出現。
The concept of hermeneutic circle appears in the works of Schleierrmacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. In this essay I argue that although Heidegger, in Being and Time, thinks that his concept ofhermeneutic circle belongs to the structure of understanding, it still possesses a characteristic of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic circle, namely, bothof them are methodological concepts. However, although Gadamer claims that his concept of hermeneutic circle is developed out of Heidegger's philosophy, I show that it is no longer a methodological concept, but is the happening of truth.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
黃懿梅
Yih-Mei Huang
批判思考與教育的關係 -- 論McPeck 與Siegel 的相關理論
Critical Thinking and Education
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批判思考( critical thinking ) 在教育中扮演了相當重要的角 色。但是批判思考與教育之間的關係到底是什麼,不同的教育哲 學家有不同的看法。John E. McPeck '認為批判的思考是教育的 必要條件,教育邏輯地蘊涵( logically entails ) 了批判的思考; 而 Harvey Siegel '主張批判的思考不但與教育的內容、方法有著密 切的關聯,而且更重要的是,批判的思考是教育的目的 ( ideal ) ,但二者之間的關係不是邏輯涵蘊的。本篇論文就是要 對這兩個相競爭的理論做一探討,企圖找出批判思考與教育之間一個較合理的關連。在討論這個問題之前,我們先來看看什麼是批判的思考,然 後再來探討它與教育之間的關係。所以,在第二節中,介紹 McPeck 對批判思考的看法, 以及他如何論證批判思考與教育之 間的關係是邏輯關係。在第三節中,介紹 Siegel 的批判思考的概 念是什麼;以及他如何證成批判思考是教育的目的。在第四節 中,試圖去(1) 論證: McPeck 的證明批判思考是教育的必要條件 的論證中,由於前提裡所包含的「知識」概念有歧義,因此不能 保證他的結論; (2) 論證Seigel 證成批判思考是教育目的的四個理 由,同樣可以用來證成「關心是教育的目的」的理由,可見這四 個理由是不充足的; (3) 雖然批判思考與教育之間的關係不是邏輯 涵蘊的關係'而用相同的理由也可以證成關心是教育的目的,但 上面的論證也沒有否認批判思考是教育的目的,更何況,我們發 現即使我們以「關心」做為教育的目的時,我們仍會需要使用批 判的思考,來衡量、判斷我們應以何種合適的方式來關心他人。 所以我們還是認為,批判思考與教育仍有密切的關係'批判思考 是教育眾多目的之一,而不是教育的唯一目的;但或許是教育目 的中最重要的一個。
In this paper we discuss the relation between critical thinking and education. J. McPeck thought that critical thinking is the necessary condition for education. Education logically entails critical thinking. But H. Siegel believes that critical thinking is the ideal of education. (1) We argue that because the concept of 'knowledge', which is in the firstpremise of McPeck's argument, is ambiguous, so the truth of conlusion that education logically entails critical thinking cannot be warranted. (2) Then we argue that the four reasons which Siegel used to justify the proposition that critical thinking is the ideal of education could also be used to justify the proposition which states “care is theideal of education." (3) But we did not deny that critical thinking as the ideal of education, and even when we believe that care is the ideal of education, we still need critical thinking to measure what is the appropriate manner to care someone. Therefore, critical thinking still is one of the ideals of education, and might be the most important ideal of education.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 23
洪成完
Cheng-Uan Hung
思想追蹤: 由初階邏輯至哲理邏輯,一些層面的探討
Tracing back philosophical conceptions of logic from the first-order logic to the philosophical logic
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我們指出古典邏輯最易被忽視的一些概念和原理,針對 Quine 在 1943 - 1970 年代對模態的命題邏輯,述詞邏輯之批評、挑擊, 反思模態邏輯之一些基礎思想。為清楚交代,我們提出形式的表 示法,提出一些問題,供邏輯-哲學一語言哲學之研究者參考。 其次,對數理邏輯/形式邏輯之概念、方法作一鳥轍,提示這些 邏輯與哲理邏輯在研究題材、方向、切入法上之差異,最後表述 作者對哲理邏輯的遠景。
This is one of the essays on the reflection on logic. The author points out some well-known concepts and principles, with their limitation in application, of the classicallogic are almost neglected by most users, in particular, in the areas of information processing and engineering, philosophical and linguistic analysis , and even in (college levelof) mathematical education in the present Taiwan.In retrospect to Quine's critique (during 1943-1970), which is still influential in Taiwan, ofthe propositional and the quantified modal logic, the author first, reflects on and then reformulates some conceptually foundational thought (central claims) in modallogic, and furthermore, propose some philosophico-technical problems in the boderlinedarea of (philosophical) logic, philosophy, philosophy of language, third, the author presents a bird-eye view on the source of the main concepts concerning inquiry in philosophical logic, the conceptions in and approaches to mathematical / formallogic and philosophical logic. Finally, his own perspectives on philosophical logic and its application.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 42
丁 福寧
Ting, Paschal Fu-Ning
亞理斯多德的靈魂不朽概念
Aristotle on the Immortality of the Soul
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亞理斯多德的《論靈魂》一書探討所有有機體;植物、動物和人之所以 有生命的事實,以及它們分別可以有的活動。他將靈魂定義為生命的原理,靈魂是潛能中可以有生命的自然身體之所以活著的現實原理。有關靈魂不朽的問題是亞理斯多德思想中最不清楚的問題。唯可以明確 的即靈魂不朽的概念是他早期已遺失的著作中的核心問題。在早期著作中,他基本上受柏拉圖的影響,肯定靈魂不朽。在他的成熟期著作中,亞理斯多 德以物理學中的形質論,類比的用到靈魂與身體之間的是形式與質料之間關 係。人是一完整的人,靈魂不能分開、自立地存在,靈魂當與身體組合成一 完整的人。在形質論的框架下如何解釋在身體死亡後,靈魂仍有繼續存在的 可能,就成為哲學家不斷地探討的問題。在本文的探討中,我們指出亞理斯多德雖從沒有一系列有關靈魂不朽的 論證,但從他肯定理性才是人的靈魂,它是形上的簡單,是非物質的,它的 固有活動是非物質的活動,他肯定靈魂的本性是不朽的。理性非身體的形 式,它是在自身分開的實體,形質論不能用到理性與身體的關係。不同於植 物和動物的靈魂當與身體組合在一起,理性是不同類的靈魂。從理性是分開 的實體,它的活動與身體無關,它是非物質的,它因而是永恆和不朽的。亞 理斯多德的這種有關理性的靈魂的獨特本性和活動的特性有著濃厚的柏拉 圖色彩。本文旨在論證靈魂不朽的概念是亞理斯多德早期思想中的主要概 念,也是他一生所未曾放棄的。
Aristotle’s De anima is the first book which deals with all sorts of organism: the living facts of all the plants, animals and human beings, and their proper activities or functions respectively. Soul is defined as the vital principle which enables the natural bodies from having life in potency to be a living body in act.The problem regarding the immortality of the soul is altogether unclear in Aristotle’s writings. However, what is definite is that the concept of immortality of the soul is one of the central ideas in his early lost writings. At his early age, Aristotle was influenced by Plato and accepted the idea of the immortality of the soul. In his mature writings, Aristotle develops his own philosophy. When he speaks about psychology, he speaks in terms of the hylomorphism in the Physics. According to which, all the material substances are composed of form and matter, so is a man composed of soul and body. For Aristotle, as a man is a whole man, the soul cannot subsist separately in itself. In such a case, the possibility of the survival of the soul, after the death of body, becomes the repeated question on which philosophers have been trying to investigate.Aristotle never makes any demonstration of the immortality of the soul, as Plato does before him. Nevertheless, he affirms that the intellect is the very soul of human beings, being metaphysically simple and immaterial, and its activity is immaterial in nature. Intellect is not the form of body; it is a separable substance in its own right. In fact, hylomorphism cannot be referred to the relationship between intellect and body. Intellect is different from the vegetative and animal souls which are bound to be united with bodily organs, whereas intellect can be a separable substance in its own right. It is a different genos of soul. Since intellect is immaterial, its activities are independent from body. It is therefore eternal and immortal. The Aristotelian idea of the intellect is platonic in essence. Aristotle has never given up his early idea of the immortality of the soul throughout his whole life.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 42
孫效 智
Johannes Hsiao-chih Sun
論儒家現實擁有判準理論 與等差之愛原則的人類胚胎觀點
Confucian Accounts of Personhood and the Moral Status of Human Embryos
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本文旨在探討當代儒家在位格理論上所提出的「儒家現實擁有判準」 理論及「等差之愛」原則,以及它們對於人類胚胎的觀點。「儒家現實擁有 判準」(Confucian actual-possession criteria)是區別位格(person)與非位格 (non-person)的一種理論,該理論及由之衍伸出來的「儒家位格漸進論」 (Confucian gradualism)、「儒家社會性位格論」(Confucian social personhood) 是本文首先要加以探討的幾個儒家位格理論,這些理論對於人該如何看待人 類胚胎乃至如何看待人提出了非常具爭議性而值得探討的看法。其次,本文 進一步要探討訴諸儒家「等差之愛」原則以證立「為了醫學進步及人類福祉 的理由而許可傷害人類胚胎」的主張。本文主張,無論「儒家現實擁有判準」、「儒家位格漸進論」或「儒家 社會性位格論」等概念,都無法從儒家思想中推導出來,而且也與儒家思 想互不相容。至於以儒家「等差之愛」原則來證立犧牲胚胎的作法,不僅 證據薄弱,從「不傷害」(first, do no harm)原則的角度來看,更是站不住 腳的。
The aim of this article is to critically explore both the theories of “Confucian actual-possession criteria” and “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” and their views on the moral status of human embryos. “Confucian actual-possession criteria”, as accounts proposed for distinguishing person from non-person, and related ideas of Confucian gradualism and Confucian social personhood are discussed first. Their views on the moral status of human embryos are significant, though controversial, and therefore worthy of in-depth analysis. The article discusses then the claim appealing to “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” to justify the destructive use of human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind.I argue in this paper that none of the aforementioned Confucian theories of personhood is derivable from nor compatible with Confucianism. Moreover, the justification of sacrificing embryos based on “the Confucian principle of love of gradation” is not only ungrounded but also untenable from the viewpoint of the basic principle of non-maleficence.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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徐 學庸
Hsu, Hsei-Yung
四個角色的理論 ─西塞羅《論義務》I, 105-125
The Theory of Four Personae -Cicero’s De Officiis I, 105-125
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根據羅馬哲學家西塞羅《論義務》(De Officiis)的記載,西元前二世紀 的斯多葛學派的哲學家帕奈提烏斯(Panaetius),在論述合宜行為時提出四 個角色(personae)的理論(I, 105-125)。合宜行為的判定,根據帕奈提烏 斯的思想,必須依據一個人是否將其具有的四個角色扮演好,即理性,個人 特質,環境與運氣及選擇。這篇文章的論述主要有兩個目的:首先試探究帕 奈提烏斯的四個角色理論的內涵;其次是藉此理論的討論為當代一空洞的口 號「做自己」,提供一可能的內容充實。本文主要由三部分組成:第一部分 針對四個角色分別進行討論,並論及帕奈提烏斯的思想是受哪些哲學家或學 派的影響;第二部分主要處理的問題是:這四個角色如何能和諧運作?最後,能使四個角色和諧運作者會有什麼樣的生活,會是第三部分關注的焦點。
According to Cicero’s De Officiis, the Stoic philosopher Panaetius discusses the notion of proper conduct in terms of the theory of four personae, i.e. rationality,personal characteristics, circumstance and chance, and choice. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, the content and connotation of the theory will beexplored; secondly, by virtue of the discussion of the theory, the contemporary content-free slogan ‘Be Yourself’ could hopefully be provided with substance.This paper therefore consists mainly of three parts: The first part of this paper explores the four personae respectively, and discusses the problem: WhetherPanaetius’s theory is his own creation or influenced by some other philosophers? The second part deals with the issue: How can the four personae harmoniouslywork together? The third part focuses on the problem: What kind of life will one have, when he can make his four personae harmoniously work together?
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 42
陳瑞 麟
Ruey-Lin Chen
牟宗三「科學開出論」的形上學困難 ─以儒家思想為本的中國文化 可以開出現代科學嗎?
Metaphysical Predicaments in Mao Zhongsan’s “Science Kei-Chu-Lun”: Could Modern Science Be Developed Out of Chinese Culture Based on Confucianism?
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「以儒家思想為本的中國文化可以接受西方現代科學嗎?」是二十世紀 新儒家企圖解決的一個核心問題。他們的解決方案是牟宗三著名的「科學開 出論」,亦即主張科學必須從中國文化內部、即儒家思想本身發展出來(開 出)。這套科學開出論預設了一個道德形上學的學說,包含一個「先驗道德 界」與「經驗現象界」的二分架構。本文爭論這套形上學不相容於現代科學 發展的形上學條件,因此無法支持科學開出論,進而我們可由此申論儒學與 中國傳統文化無能力發展出現代科學,雖然它已經產生中國傳統科學。最後 本文想指出,當代台灣哲學家要面對的問題不再是「中國文化與科學的關 係」,而是「在現代科技的衝擊下,什麼是中國文化」的新問題。
The key question which new Confucians in the twentieth century attempted to solve is “Can Confucianism-based Chinese culture adopt Western modernscience?” Their program is Mou Zhongsan’s distinguished “Kei-Chu-Lun,” which claims that modern science must be dialectically developed out of, but not be transplanted to, Confucianism-based Chinese culture. The theory presupposes a doctrine of moral metaphysics, which implies a dichotomy between “the kingdom of a priori morality” and “the kingdom of a posteriori phenomena”. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical doctrine is incompatible to ontologicalconditions by which modern science could be produced. Therefore, it fails in supporting “Kei-Chu-Lun.” I also argue that Confucianism-based Chinese culturehas no capability to develop Western modern science, although it has produced Chinese traditional science. Finally, I want to point out that the key problemwith which contemporary philosophers in Taiwan should deal is rather “what is Chinese culture when it has been transformed by modern science and technology” than “what is the relationship between modern science and Chinese culture.”
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 43
黃文 宏
Wen-Hong Huang
論早期西田哲學中「自覺」的基本構造 ─以〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉 為線索
On The Basic Structure of Self-awareness in Early Nishida -In View of His Discussion of "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding"
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「自覺」是西田對「純粹經驗」的發展的一個邏輯性說明。本論文的 目的在依據西田〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉(1912)來思考西田早期的 「自覺」構造。在這裏有著西田對齊格瓦特與李克特的邏輯思想以及對羅 伊斯與戴德金的無限觀念的改造,我們將重點置於李克特的部分,看看西 田如何從自身的立場轉化了李克特對邏輯與數理的想法,將「邏輯」與「數 理」視為連續性的關係,乃至有所謂「由邏輯往數理」的說法,這形成了 後來西田《自覺中的直觀與反省》中自覺的第一個階段。筆者的論點在於,自覺的體系除了無限自我表象的系統之外,還必須包含著一個對「有+非 有」的全體的直覺,這個全體的直覺或體驗才是自覺體系的中心。在行文 上,我們先沿著〈邏輯的理解與數理的理解〉的思路,重構西田對「邏輯 的理解」(第二節)與「數理的理解」(第三節)的思考,在最後一節(第 四節),筆者試著透過《自覺中的直觀與反省》西田對「絕對自由意志」 的討論來補充之。在這裏,筆者將西田這種「全體的直覺」連結到海德格 對康德的「先驗想像力」的闡釋,西田與海德格都將重點置於經驗中的「無 而生有」的領域。西田所謂的「理解之前的理解」或「純粹經驗」指的就 是這種全體直覺。筆者個人的觀點也表達在這裏。
In this article, I attempt to throw some light on the basic structure of self-awareness (jikaku), which is one of the central concepts in the philosophy of Nishida, according to his early essay "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding" published in 1912. Nishida puts forward a theory of logical development of experience which can be considered as the prototype of self-awareness. Here we can see Nishida's incorporation of ideas drawn from Rickert's and Sigwart’s logical thinking, Royce's self-representative system and Dedekind's definition of infinity into his own system of self-awareness. We focus on Nishida’s Rickert-interpretation. It is my view that only an infinite self-representative or a self-mirroring system cannot explain all of the aspects of Nishida's self-awareness for missing the intuition into the whole that inherent in this system. This ultimate whole which absolute free will intuits is the totality of being (on) and non-being (me on). I try to clarify its meaning according to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant’s productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft). The article is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction of the theme and method of the article (section one), I try to reconstruct Nishida's argumentations in logical understanding (section two) and mathematical understanding (section three). Finally in the last section (section four), I discuss some insights of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant's productive imagination, and attempt to expound possible horizons opened by Nishida in his discussion of the "Absolute Free Will".
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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洪巳 軒
Szu-Hsuan Hung
論《管子》政治權威之形式與基礎 ─以〈權修〉為核心之探討
On The Forms and Bases of Political Authority in Guanzi ─A Research on “Quanxiu”
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本文將政治權威視為一種「命令─服從」的權力關係,並以呈現此種 關係之不同的性質為其「形式」,又以支撐起各種形式之原因為其「基礎」, 進而以此種角度探究《管子•權修》對於政治權威相關主張。結果本文發現, 〈權修〉篇中已然將道德與法律視為政治權威的形式,而且在法律形式中又 可以進一步區分出合法性、引誘性以及強制性等三種權威形式。再者,道德 形式的政治權威其基礎則是心理的,法律形式的政治權威則是以經濟與武力 為其基礎。
The present study treats political authority as a “command-obedience” relationship. This relationship appears in different “forms,” and each respective form is underpinned by a certain “base.” The author targets the forms and bases of political authority exposed in the chapter “Quanxiu” of Guanzi and finds that morality and law are typical forms of authority. From a more detailed analysis, the legal form is presented in the three distinctive dimensions: legitimate authority, induced authority, and coercive authority. The author further argues that the moral form has a mental base, whereas legal form is based on economy and force.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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陳 平坤
Chen Ping-Kun
幻有假名觀下的「物不遷」論辯
Dialectic of “Things Do Not Shift” under the View of “Naming of Illusory Existence”
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本文旨在論究僧肇依據幻有假名的佛教觀點,如何洞徹一切諸法的存 在底蘊,去開顯其中稱得上是究竟真實的內涵,以簡別於非真實的存在體 和認識構作物,從而為世人打通一條得以趣入「諸法實相」或「物性」的 思維道路。本文論述的主要典據是〈物不遷論〉和《注維摩詰經》的僧肇注解;而 所採取的進路,則為重視反省思維和闡釋義理的哲學研究進路。本文研究成果的主要重點如下:(1)涉及「物性」課題的「物不遷」論點只是一種假名言說。(2)「不遷」假說建立在取相分別之認知活動架構上。(3)「物不遷」雖不意謂就是諸法實相,但可當作趣入實相的一道 法門。(4)有關「物不遷」論據的探討,必須清楚辨明認識論問題思維脈絡 中的「[事]物」與存有論問題思維脈絡中的「[事]物」二者間的不同意 義分界,如此才能不管反對僧肇、還是贊同僧肇,在論據上都有比較圓滿的 說服力。
This paper aims to discuss how Sengzhao, basing on the Buddhist view of “naming of illusory existence”, acquires the insight into the existence of all dharmas and reveals the connotation of ultimate reality. Through this insight, he distinguishes true existence from insubstantial and epistemological existence and opens a thinking path to the “ultimate truth” or “nature of things”. The discussion is based mainly on Sengzhao's works: Treatise of Things Do Not Shift and Commentary to the Vimalakirti Nirdesa-Sutra. The approach focuses on self-reflection and the interpretation of his philosophy. The main conclusions drawn from this research include:(1) The viewpoint taken in Treatise of Things Do Not Shift involving “the nature of things” is a theory which establishes the concept of naming for the insubstantial existence.(2) The theory of “Not Shift” is established on the cognitive framework through which things are distinguished from the phenomena.(3) Although the concept, “Things Do Not Shift” does not imply that it is the ultimate truth, it can be seen as a path of exploring truth.(4) Regardless pro or con towards the views of Sengzhao, one must clearly distinguish the differences between the epistemological and ontological definitions of “Things” in order to discuss the divergent views of “Things Do Not Shift” and to be more convincing.
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