This paper divided into four parts: (i) preface; (ii) the conception of "shue" in Lieh-Tzu; (iii) The conception in Toaistic school in the Pre-Chin; (iv) conclusion. The author deals with this concept based upon the recent studies - the book of Lieh-Tzu is not an apocrypha. Lieh-Tzu conceived that the saint is the highest stage of human life. The issue is how do one achieve it. His answer is “shue." It has two denotations --“kung-fu" (drill) and the mental stage. “Shue" is not only in the realm of language and conceptual, but also in that of practice. The method of practice is by intellectual reflection and meditation from the concentration of consciousness to that of spirit. Finally, it can unify his spirit with nothing. Nothing is “ tao" from the Taoistic point of view. Lieh: Tzu followed the method of the ancient Taoism in practice. But author contends that the method is derived from Lao-Tzu's “shue" of imitating “heaven" which is different from Kuan-Yin-Tzu's interpretation of it, that is, “chin" (stillness) of imitating “earth." From historical viewpoint, Lieh-Tzu dealed with the notion of “shue" in order to provide an answer to the meaninglessness of life of the people and disturbance of the society in the warring states period. The author believes that it is the right prescription for it.

Chuang-Tzu never deliberately emphasizes that he is a mystic. Yet , his writings are filled with mystical flavor. This motivates us to ask: Can the doctrine he puts forward be regarded as a type of Mysticism? Here , the meaning of the idea of “Yau/ Ecstatic Flowing" (遊) is investigated with the result of affirming his mystical tendency. Whereas , the notion of the “Creator " (造 物者) is also studied , and we draw the conclusion that Chuang-Tzu's mysticism is theistic in orientation , even though he also incorporates in his system the monistic and naturalistic elements which make his writings all the more spectacular.

While Lao-tzu in his discussion on tao gave evidence of unpreeedented originality, he did not make any contribution to the study of hsin. After the middle of the Warring States period, Chi-hsia Huang Lao daoism greatly promoted teachings and discussions on hsin and ch'i' thereby enriching ancient China's 'teachings of the inner sage'. Chi-hsia Huang Lao made the metaphysical tao concrete in the form of ching-ch'i, put it in relation to the human hsin and expressed the view that tao (ch'i) resides in the hsin('the lodging of ching-she'). This article expounds on the teachings of hsin-hsing, hsin-ch'i and hsin-hsing and furthermore explains the teaching of ching-ch'i and the method of concentrating ch'i.

The Historian Szu-ma Chien's comn1ents on Han Fei Zi:‘Emphasizing Xin Min Fa Shu, and basing his views on Huang-Lao.' Since Huang disappeared, and contents of two chapters of Han Fei Tzu, Interρretation of Lao and Analogy of Lao, were not quite the same of Lao Tzu, besides, a lot of his views of Xin Min Fa Shu were different from Lao Tzu, hence a lot of scholars suspected these comments on Tao and Te in Han Fei Tzu were actually the works of Taoists of Warring Era or West Han Dynasty. After Lao Tzu, according to my arguments, Taoists putted forward Zhuang Tzu and ‘Huang-Lao' (The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emρeror), both inherited and expanded the thoughts of Lao Tzu. Han Fei's thoughts inherited and expanded ‘Huang - Lao'. Interρretation of Lao and Analogy of Lao were inheritance and expansion of the thoughts of Lao Tzu too. His views of Xin Min Fa Shu may differ from thoughts of Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu, but were not far from thoughts of The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emperor of ‘Huang-Lao '. Therefore, Han Fei's arguments on Tao were in fact 'basing on Huang-Lao'. Scholars doubts arose from the disappearance of The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emρeror, and fromtheir misunderstanding of 'Huang-Lao'.

Use quotations from Chuang-Tsu, this article argues that: (1) Chuang-Tsu considered “chi" the basic component of all tagible existences, an element that does not in itself consist of any driving force. The driving force behind the formation/ extinction of tangible existence is “tien" (or the creator). (2) Since “chi" is everlasting, there exists no absolute nihility in the universe. The formation of tangible existences is therefore not a process from “nothingness" to “existence". (3) We have no means to comprehendthe reason and purpose of existence. Consequently, we can not, and should not, define or criticize the meaning or value of any existence. Further, the existence of human beings, like all other tangible existences, is by no means significant. (4) Since there is no significance in human existence and it is not possible to create any meaning through the process of existence, the only purpose of life is not to impair the current existence. (5) However, as individual life, unlike “chi", is not eternal, death is inevitable.Chuang-Tsu hence attempted to ease the anxiety of nihilism through asserting that “chi" transforms among different existences. It is nevertheless doubtful that such reasoning can effectively unravel human anxiety over death.

Theonomous ethics, an important theory of religious ethics, has invited numerous attacks from modern religious critics. The paper begins with a scrutiny of the main ideas of theonomous ethics and of the five opposing.The second part of the paper deals with the main arguments of these religious critics. First of all, the problems of theodicy will be addressed from three aspects, namely, the general moral intuition, the basic position of teleological ethics, and the basic principIes of theories of definition and reference. The discussion is meant to illustrate that whereas the theory of theonomous ethics needs to be revised, the arguments given by the religious critics are not impeccable either. Some flaws in their arguments are listedand discussed in the paper.The following part is devoted to the assessment of the position of theonomous ethics in the traditions of Judaism, Islamism and Christianity. It is discovered that theonomous ethics not only does not belong to the main stream of the three religions, but also is criticized by dominating theologies. We can infer that taking theonomous ethics as the target of their attacking fires, the religious critics actually commit the mistake of “strawman argumentation." Basically the ethics of the three religions are rationalistic rather than theonomous in nature.The concluding part of the paper analyzes the autonomous characteristics of religious ethics with the focus on biblical ethics. The significance of the Ten Commandments, for example, can be fully understood in terms of rationality. As a conclusion the paper points out that autonomous rationality is the last criterion for biblical ethics.

This paper discusses the central ideas of Huang-lao thought and inquires into its origin and development. At the time "Lietzu, false accusations and its main ideas" was being reprinted, the author rearrenged several important materials, resulting in this article. According to the Shi-chi, pre-Ch' in Huang-ti and Lao-tzu were not named together, the term 'taoism', originating in the early years of the Han dynasty, referred exclusively to Lao-tzu's ch'ing-ching wu-wei and combined the essentials of the yin-yangschool , confucianism, mohists, school of names and legalists. Afterwards, Liu Hsiang wrote that the Lei-tzu had its origins in Huang-ti and Lao-tzu; the work was subsequently also classified as ‘taoism.' The ancient saying that Huang-lao was based on the teachings of Huang-ti and Lao-tzu first appears in the Lie-tzu, which mentions the now lost Book of Huang-ti. The ancient saying that it was written by Huang-ti is clearly a hypothesis, but fragments are quoted in the Lie-tzu and Chuang-tzu and the figuresand historical facts mentioned can make up for what is left out in history.Huang-lao thought is extremely rich and deals with cosmology, the way of heaven, the way of man, psychology, nurture of life etc. The documents excavated in 1973 are extremely helpful in the author's understanding of Huang-lao dao-shu, provide new evidence for its relation with hsing-ming, but also leave open many questions.

The four chapters of the Guanzi embody the adaptation and further development of Laozi's theory of the dao by the Daoists in Qi. The paper first shows, where Guanzi builds on the theory of dao in the Laozi. Then the further development of this theory through the notions of “non action" and “emptiness" is analysed. The notion of emptiness is incorporated into the cosmological framework in such a way as to describe the origin of all things. In an epistemological context the “emptiness." describes a certain state in which the subject should be.The Jixia Daoists as presented in the four chapters of the Guanzi on one hand concretise the dao with the help of the notion jingqi. On the other hand they implement the dao in the social realm by the means ofthe rites (Ii) and the law (fa). Thus by the combination of the metaphysical dao with the empirical dao the Jixia Daoists are puttingthe dao into practice. Furthermore the concept of following (yin) is a major focal point in the four chapters of the Guanzi. Not only should one “Give up oneself and follow the things", but under the premise that “the dao values following" the principle of“following the times and reacting to the things" is put forward. In an epistemological context the concept of “following" as exemplified in “the dao of following quietly" also plays an important role. Xunzi later on is to adopt this concept into his thinking.

The paper is divided into six sections. 1. Introduction, 2. The contents of the yidao thinking, 3. The relationship between the tianrui chapter and qianwei-chenzaodu, 4. The thinking ofthe tianrui chapter, 5. The distinctiveness of the yidao thinking in the tianrui chapter， 6. Conclusion.This paper builds on the essay “Emptiness in the Liezi" by the same author.There the author already argued that Liezi was written in Pre-Qin times. Thus we can use the tianrui chapter to discuss the thinking of Liezi. In this paper it is argued that then yidao thinking does not only exist in the Zhouyi, but also in the tianrui chapter ofthe Liezi.As far as the relationship between the tianrui chapter and the qianwei-chenzaodu is concerned, the paper advances new arguments that support the view that the qianwei-chenzaodu copied from the tianrui, not the other way around. At the same time it argues that tianrui should be read as tianduan.When tracing the yidao thinking through the Yizhuan, the Laozi and the Liezi the author finds differences and similarities. In the Yizhuan Confucianists use the hexagrams ofthe Yijing to express the notion ofthe mutuality of yin/yang and gang/rou. Although the Laozi does not refer to the hexagrams, the notions of “returning to the roots" and “being empty and quiet", as expressed in the sun and the fu hexagram in the Yij ing, are being adopted by the Laozi. Liezi builds on these notions in the Laozi and further develops them.

The contents ofthis essay include: (A) Three Levels ofKnowing: by the Eye, by the Heart, and by Reason; (B)The Horizons Known : Heavenly Principle, Cosmic Nature, Human Destiny; (C) From “the Cosmic exhaustive investigation ofthe principle", to “the total fulfillment ofthe Cosmic Nature", to “the reaching of one's destiny". These were all embedded within Shao lung's Huang-chi ching-shih (The Grandest Ultimate Way of Ordering the World), Chapter 62, which further suggests that “experience", “understanding",“judgement", and “decision" constitute the main items of human cognitional structure.

The concept of hermeneutic circle appears in the works of Schleierrmacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. In this essay I argue that although Heidegger, in Being and Time, thinks that his concept ofhermeneutic circle belongs to the structure of understanding, it still possesses a characteristic of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic circle, namely, bothof them are methodological concepts. However, although Gadamer claims that his concept of hermeneutic circle is developed out of Heidegger's philosophy, I show that it is no longer a methodological concept, but is the happening of truth.

In this paper we discuss the relation between critical thinking and education. J. McPeck thought that critical thinking is the necessary condition for education. Education logically entails critical thinking. But H. Siegel believes that critical thinking is the ideal of education. (1) We argue that because the concept of 'knowledge', which is in the firstpremise of McPeck's argument, is ambiguous, so the truth of conlusion that education logically entails critical thinking cannot be warranted. (2) Then we argue that the four reasons which Siegel used to justify the proposition that critical thinking is the ideal of education could also be used to justify the proposition which states “care is theideal of education." (3) But we did not deny that critical thinking as the ideal of education, and even when we believe that care is the ideal of education, we still need critical thinking to measure what is the appropriate manner to care someone. Therefore, critical thinking still is one of the ideals of education, and might be the most important ideal of education.

This is one of the essays on the reflection on logic. The author points out some well-known concepts and principles, with their limitation in application, of the classicallogic are almost neglected by most users, in particular, in the areas of information processing and engineering, philosophical and linguistic analysis , and even in (college levelof) mathematical education in the present Taiwan.In retrospect to Quine's critique (during 1943-1970), which is still influential in Taiwan, ofthe propositional and the quantified modal logic, the author first, reflects on and then reformulates some conceptually foundational thought (central claims) in modallogic, and furthermore, propose some philosophico-technical problems in the boderlinedarea of (philosophical) logic, philosophy, philosophy of language, third, the author presents a bird-eye view on the source of the main concepts concerning inquiry in philosophical logic, the conceptions in and approaches to mathematical / formallogic and philosophical logic. Finally, his own perspectives on philosophical logic and its application.

Aristotle’s De anima is the first book which deals with all sorts of organism: the living facts of all the plants, animals and human beings, and their proper activities or functions respectively. Soul is defined as the vital principle which enables the natural bodies from having life in potency to be a living body in act.The problem regarding the immortality of the soul is altogether unclear in Aristotle’s writings. However, what is definite is that the concept of immortality of the soul is one of the central ideas in his early lost writings. At his early age, Aristotle was influenced by Plato and accepted the idea of the immortality of the soul. In his mature writings, Aristotle develops his own philosophy. When he speaks about psychology, he speaks in terms of the hylomorphism in the Physics. According to which, all the material substances are composed of form and matter, so is a man composed of soul and body. For Aristotle, as a man is a whole man, the soul cannot subsist separately in itself. In such a case, the possibility of the survival of the soul, after the death of body, becomes the repeated question on which philosophers have been trying to investigate.Aristotle never makes any demonstration of the immortality of the soul, as Plato does before him. Nevertheless, he affirms that the intellect is the very soul of human beings, being metaphysically simple and immaterial, and its activity is immaterial in nature. Intellect is not the form of body; it is a separable substance in its own right. In fact, hylomorphism cannot be referred to the relationship between intellect and body. Intellect is different from the vegetative and animal souls which are bound to be united with bodily organs, whereas intellect can be a separable substance in its own right. It is a different genos of soul. Since intellect is immaterial, its activities are independent from body. It is therefore eternal and immortal. The Aristotelian idea of the intellect is platonic in essence. Aristotle has never given up his early idea of the immortality of the soul throughout his whole life.