〈管子〉四篇的哲學理論主要在於繼承老子的道論再加以獨 特的發展，表現出老學齊學化的特色。本文首先析論〈管子〉四篇在道論方面祖述老學的成份，其 次就道之特性暨「虛」與「無為」等觀念申論其對老學的發展: 〈管子〉四篇不但將老子原本作為空間義之「虛」提昇到宇宙論 的範疇，以「虛」來表達作為萬物之始的「道J '另方面也將老 子有關心境修養之「虛J轉化為認識論的概念，使「虛」的意義 延伸至知識論主客關係的層面，強調主體的認識應著重保持空明 靈覺的性能。以〈管子〉四篇為代表的稜下道家， -方面就道與主體之關 係進行申論，透過精氣說，將道其象化並落實於人身，乃提出 「道不遠人」、「道者充形」等說法，進而發展出「以心受道」 的觀點，如此使得「道」與人的聯繫'得以其體落實於「心」。 另方面則援禮法以入道，將道落實於政治社會之運作，提出 「道生法」之命題;認為禮、法出於道，並將形而上之道與形而 下之禮法貫通為一整體，如此使得稜下道家在有關道的具體施用 方面，重視「應時而變J '兼顧「情」與「理」的平衡。再者是將「因J字發展成為獨立的哲學概念，不僅提出「舍 己而以物為法」與「因其能者言其所用」這兩個界說，更在「道 貴因」的命題下表現出「因時應物」的原則，又將「因」的概念 與「刑名」相結合，發展成「因之術J '在此同時也提出「靜因 之道」這一認識論上的重要命題，對於苟子「虛壹而靜」的主張 有直接的影響。

本論文共分六節，一、前言，二、易道思想的含義，三、〈列子﹒天瑞〉與〈易緯﹒乾鑿度〉的關係，四、〈天瑞〉的易 道思想，五、〈天瑞〉易道思想的特色，六、結論。本文乃續〈論列子之「虛˩ )之作，在前言裡已表明列子非偽書，基本上 認為〈列子〉乃出自先秦，至少〈天瑞〉便是如此，所以只要善 加揀擇，還是可以作為研究列子易道思想的依據。根據本文的研 究，以為易道思想本不限於〈周易〉才有， {列子﹒天瑞〉也 有，而且亦有它的特色。同時在論述〈天瑞〉篇時，也一並討論 它與〈易緯﹒乾鑿度〉的關係。本文舉出新證與解說，認為〈列 子﹒天瑞〉篇並不是抄〈易緯﹒乾鑿度> '反而是〈乾擊度〉的 作者抄〈天瑞〉以廣〈易〉說，同時提出新見，以為〈列子〉的 〈天瑞〉是〈天端〉的誤寫。針對易道思想，作者分析〈易 傳〉、〈老子〉與〈列子〉的主張，發現其中的論點有同有異， 今且置〈易傳〉在宋儒有不同的解說不論，如果把〈易傳〉當作 是歸屬先秦儒家借益明理之作，其主陰陽合德，剛柔並濟，但側 重生生、健動、積習，此與〈老子〉不言益、卦、交，但假象言理之作不同，彼實有取於〈易〉損、復之義，強調歸根、復命、 致虛守靜。作者可以肯定地說， <列子﹒天瑞〉的易道思想顯然 是睡〈老子〉之後，而又企圖超越〈老子〉。

我們可從三個角度去窺視邵雍易學的知識論:A. 認知的三層面: r 觀之以目、以心、以理」B. 被知的視域: r 理、性、命」C.「 窮理、盡性、至命」的知識論五重面向一一思辯、逆覺、存在、冥契、德踐上述的角度，都在〈皇極經世〉、〈觀物篇〉之六十二中有 所提示，並從中凸顯人在認知時所憑藉的「認知結構」 '即「經 驗」、「理解」、「判斷」、「抉擇」。關鍵詞:觀物Contemplation of Beings以目With the Eye以J 心With Heart以理With Reωon窮理Exhaustive Investigation of the Principle盡性Fulfillment ofNature至命Reaching One's Destiny知識論Epistemology形上學Metaphysics德踐Moral Practice

史萊瑪赫、海德格的〈存有與時間〉和高達美都曾討論詮釋 學循環的概念。雖然海德格認為他的詮釋學循環是瞭解( Verstehen, understanding) 本身的結構， 但本文要指出， 它依然擁有 史萊瑪赫詮釋學循環的性格一一一個方法論的概念。這是說，兩 者都是用以證實一個結論。另一方面，高達美雖號稱其詮釋學循 環來自海德格哲學，不過，本文卻要指出高達美的詮釋學循環, 已完全擺脫方法論的意涵，因為它不是用以證實一個結論，而是 讓真理得以出現。

批判思考( critical thinking ) 在教育中扮演了相當重要的角 色。但是批判思考與教育之間的關係到底是什麼，不同的教育哲 學家有不同的看法。John E. McPeck '認為批判的思考是教育的 必要條件，教育邏輯地蘊涵( logically entails ) 了批判的思考; 而 Harvey Siegel '主張批判的思考不但與教育的內容、方法有著密 切的關聯，而且更重要的是，批判的思考是教育的目的 ( ideal ) ，但二者之間的關係不是邏輯涵蘊的。本篇論文就是要 對這兩個相競爭的理論做一探討，企圖找出批判思考與教育之間一個較合理的關連。在討論這個問題之前，我們先來看看什麼是批判的思考，然 後再來探討它與教育之間的關係。所以，在第二節中，介紹 McPeck 對批判思考的看法， 以及他如何論證批判思考與教育之 間的關係是邏輯關係。在第三節中，介紹 Siegel 的批判思考的概 念是什麼;以及他如何證成批判思考是教育的目的。在第四節 中，試圖去(1) 論證: McPeck 的證明批判思考是教育的必要條件 的論證中，由於前提裡所包含的「知識」概念有歧義，因此不能 保證他的結論; (2) 論證Seigel 證成批判思考是教育目的的四個理 由，同樣可以用來證成「關心是教育的目的」的理由，可見這四 個理由是不充足的; (3) 雖然批判思考與教育之間的關係不是邏輯 涵蘊的關係'而用相同的理由也可以證成關心是教育的目的，但 上面的論證也沒有否認批判思考是教育的目的，更何況，我們發 現即使我們以「關心」做為教育的目的時，我們仍會需要使用批 判的思考，來衡量、判斷我們應以何種合適的方式來關心他人。 所以我們還是認為，批判思考與教育仍有密切的關係'批判思考 是教育眾多目的之一，而不是教育的唯一目的;但或許是教育目 的中最重要的一個。

我們指出古典邏輯最易被忽視的一些概念和原理，針對 Quine 在 1943 - 1970 年代對模態的命題邏輯，述詞邏輯之批評、挑擊， 反思模態邏輯之一些基礎思想。為清楚交代，我們提出形式的表 示法，提出一些問題，供邏輯-哲學一語言哲學之研究者參考。 其次，對數理邏輯/形式邏輯之概念、方法作一鳥轍，提示這些 邏輯與哲理邏輯在研究題材、方向、切入法上之差異，最後表述 作者對哲理邏輯的遠景。

Heidegger said in 1928: “die Frage nach dem Sein [ist] keine beliebige und [wird] nicht von aussen dem Menschen zugetragen, sondern in ihm mehr oder minder wach ist, sofern er ueberhaupt als Mensch existiert…” The author is very critical of this assertion. If it is really the case, are the people who speak non Indo-European language still human beings or not? Is it possible the non-Indo-European language speaking people could have latent understanding of the meaning of being without the word being at all in their language? If the second one were a reality, could the assertion of Heidegger be correct that Sprache is “das von Sein ereignete aus ihm durchgefuegte Haus des Seins”?

View History as the Existing Situation from the Being of Thing. The question of “What is a thing?” is closely related to that of Being. Heidegger had dealt with the research of thing repeatedly since 1919. The following article will show that, regardless of his inspiring thinking about “ready-to-hand” of thing in Being and Time, his research was more extensively developed in his later years at the end of 1940s. By exploring the possibilities of viewing a thing, Heidegger continuously attempted to reveal the serious limitation of Platonic tradition in the western philosophy. This article will analyze in detail the crucial role of History of Being in Heidegger’s understanding of thing through an example of jug. Heidegger in his piece not only suggests a change of attitude to view a thing, but also “viewing a thing” as not simply a passive activity. It is rather a kind of “step backward” of thinking, which means how to let the representative, analytical and interpretative art of thinking return to its pre-reflective, pre-conceptual and intuitive state of existence.

Temporality, death and history: a reflection after Heidegger. This paper aims to evaluate how Heidegger deals with the problem of time in Being and Time. The fundamental issue in that magnum opus is to explain the question of the meaning of Being under the horizon of time. But what kind of philosophical resource could make Heidegger be capable to resolve the problem in the most effective way? The phenomenological interpretation of time takes the first priority in consideration. Although in Being and Time Heidegger has literally made a very little reference to Husserl, the influence of Husserl is too obvious to be denied. Heidegger, however, finds Husserl’s elucidation of time has ever dissolved the dimension of time into the immanence sphere of subjectivity. By making the position of the subject in an all too mighty status, the phenomenon of time has not been rendered faithfully in a phenomenological sense, the motto “zu die Sache selbst”. And, Heidegger would regard Husserl’s working on time has not fully observed this highest norm. Bearing the problem in mind when starting to compose Being and Time, Heidegger has to find a new way to avoid the same “mistake” as his master, and the overall contribution of his great work could in turn be assessed under the same evaluative principle. Has Heidegger successfully saved up “time” from the over dominance of the subject? Has he re-disclosed time as objectively as time itself (die Sache selbst)? This paper focus especially on how Heidegger’s thinking of the past and the future moments in Being and Time. Then, we can see that, when comparing with two other phenomenologists’ treatments on the same issue, Gadamer and Levinas, Heidegger resolutions on “past” and “future’ obviously show their weakness. And, the promise of removing the dominance of the subject is doomed to failure. Moreover, the underlining structure of organizing Being and Time has not fully escaped the way of metaphysical thinking. In his later period, which is so called the “turning”, Heidegger attempts to break down the metaphysical thinking about “foundationalism”, behind this thinking is the presupposition of dichotomy between founding and founded. Judging from this perspective, Being and Time has found no way out of the labyrinth.

The active subject in the historical situation: An interobservation between the philosophy of Marx and phenomenology. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Phenomenology and Marxism have been two major paradigms in human science based on their contribution to ontology about human being instead of methodology. The phenomenological analysis of the ability of sense-giving of human-being made man as a being-active in the world, while the historical materialism of Marx defined man as a passive-being within the particular historical situation. However, these two discourses may easily open to misconception. Phenomenology was once seen as under the banner of solipsism and the philosophy of Marx as an economical or material determinism. In fact, in Husserl’s Ideas II, Husserl had noticed the role and the function of the body in constitutive act and then the human being had been thought as a passive-being, a corporeal-being-in-the-world, in phenomenology. On the other hand, for Marx, his historical materialism had never negated man as a being-active in the historical process. But both of these two philosophical systems cannot successfully describe human being as being-active meanwhile as being-passive. Therefore, I suggest that it is propitious moment to clarify the unclear dimensions of these two philosophical discourses through the dialogue between them. In addition, I will attempt to propose some new statements on the relationship between the body, will and history.